ANIMADVERSIONS

Written by the Right Reverend Father in God

IOHN,

Lord Bishop of SARISBVRY,

upon a Treatise intitled

Gods love to Mankind.

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I Have perused these Animadversions upon a Treatise intitled *Gods love to Mankind*, and now acknowledge them thus corrected for mine own.

JO. SARUM.

Addenda & Emendanda.

~~*Page* 13. *lin.* 6. *adde*, It is truly said by Abulensis. 107. 21. *after* Being *adde*, As for death, it is a privation of bodily life and bodily pain, but it is no absolute privation of the being either of body or soul. 129. *title*, *reade*, mere sinner. 149. 20. they would never. 169. 3. 2129. 185. 15. three Indignities. 202. 9. *put in* (H.) 218. 4. *adde*, We in this place think it rather respecteth all mankind, unto whom God offereth life upon the condition of believing. 224. *title*, The Subapsarian doctrine. 246. 30. *adde*, Pelagian, truly excepted. 255. 28. *for* eligendos *reade* fideles. 263. 28. *put in* must. 303. 16. was therein.~~

In the margin.

~~*Pag.* 86. *for* Commun. *reade*, Sent. super. 97. *for* Aetern. *reade* occulta. 157. 8. *put* O. 161. [illegible] P. 240. 3. A. 305. 16. M. 355. 28. Vide Calvin. in Hoseam, [illegible] v. 1. *pag.* 340. *lin.* 1. K. 379. *for* Doct. *reade*, Deel. 480. 43. C. 433. 30. L. 462. 5. C.~~

ANIMADVERSIONS
pon a Treatise lately publish-ed and intitled,

Gods love to Mankind,

Manifested by disproving his Absolute decree for their Damnation.

Hos. 13. 9.

O Israel, thou hast destroyed thy self: but in me is thy help.

Wisd. 1. 12, 13.

Seek not death in the errour of your life; and pull not upon your selves destruction with the works of your hands.

For God made not death: neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living.

Concerning the Title of this book.

THe generall love of God towards mankind is so clearly testified in holy Scripture, and so demonstrated by the manifold effects of Gods goodnesse and mercy extended to every particular man in this world, that to doubt thereof were infidelity, and to denie it, plain blasphemie: yet for all this, if any shall go about to magnifie the common love of God extended promiscuously to

Contrari tect. Ma 55.

all men, that thereby he obſcureth the ſpeciall love and mercy of God prepared from all eternitie and beſtowed in due time upon elect men, this may lead the ignorant and unlearned into a dangerous errour: And therefore obliquely to oppoſe the eternall, free and abſolute decree of Predeſtination or Election under colour of diſapproving an abſolute decree for any mans Damnation, befitteth not any Divine who acknowledgeth the truth of that doctrine which the Scriptures have delivered, St Auguſtine cleared, and the Church of England eſtabliſhed in the xvii^th Article. But if the Authour of this treatiſe had no other aim, then the overthrowing of ſuch an eternall decree of Predeſtination and Preterition as is fondly ſuppoſed will ſave men whether they repent or not repent, believe or not believe, perſevere or not perſevere; and ſuch an abſolute decree of Reprobation as will damne men though they ſhould repent and believe, or will hinder any man from repenting and believing, or will cauſe and work any mans impenitency or infidelity; we both wiſh, and ſhall endeavour together with him to root ſuch erroneous fanſies out of all Chriſtian minds.

The place cited out of Hoſea, with many others which might be alledged, will eaſily prove that Man is the authour of his

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own ſinne and the procurer of his own damnation, and God onely the Judge and puniſher: But withall they prove as clearly that Man is not the procurer of his own Predeſtination, nor the deſerver of his own Salvation by his foreſeen faith and perſeverance: but God is he who according to his abſolute and infallible purpoſe giveth in time that grace unto his elect which before all time he decreed ſhould be an effectuall means to bring them unto glory.

To the Reader.

THe Authour of this Treatiſe was perſwaded to penne the reaſons of his opinion againſt abſolute Reprobation, that he might ſatisfie a worthie friend of his, who required it. what ſatisfaction that learned gentleman, his friend, hath received by theſe reaſons, I know not: but ſure I am, they have given good content to ſome others, who have read them, and do ſtill deſire a copie of them for their further uſe. To eaſe whoſe pains in tranſcribing this treatiſe, it doth now appear in this form. If any of contrary opinion ſhall undertake to anſwer or refute it, I wiſh he would ſet down his opinion and reaſons with that perſpicuitie and modeſtie that our Authour hath ſet down his. Such a courſe of diſputing will gain more credit to himſelf and his cauſe, then voluminous vagaries about impertinent things. If any ſhall uſe railing ſpeeches, or unneceſſary diverſions from the cauſe, I ſhall ever interpret that to be a ſtrong ſigne of a weak cauſe; or at leaſt I ſhall think it to be an argument of an obſtinate mind, who neither knoweth how to yeeld to the truth nor to defend his errour. I hope the Reader who loveth his own ſalvation will be a more indifferent judge in a queſtion which concerneth him ſo nearly. And ſo I leave him to Gods bleſſing.

An answer to the Preface, with some propositions concerning the true nature of Predestination or Election.

THe Title of the Book justly rejecteth an absolute Decree for the damnation of any particular person: for such a decree was never enacted in Gods eternall counsel, nor ever published in his revealed word. But for absolute Reprobation, if by this word be understood onely that Preterition, Non-election, or negative decree of Predestination, which is contradictorily opposed to the decree of Election, the one is as absolute as the other, and neither dependeth upon the foreseen difference of mens actions, but upon the absolute will of God. For if God from eternitie absolutely elected some unto the infallible atteinment of Grace and Glory, we cannot but grant that those who are not comprised within this absolute decree are as absolutely passed by as the other are chosen. The decree of Damnation therefore must not be confounded with the decree of negative Predestination, which (according to the phrase of the School rather then of the Scripture) is usually termed Reprobation. By which term of Reprobation some understand onely the deniall of Election or Predestination. And because the negation is to be measured by the affirmation, unlesse

unleſſe we be agreed what is meant when we ſay, *Peter was predeſtinated before the foundations of the world were layd*, we can never rightly judge what is meant when on the contrary we avouch, *Judas was reprobated before the foundations of the world were layd.* Some others under the name of Reprobation involve not onely the negative decree of preparing ſuch effectuall grace as would bring men moſt certainly unto glory, but an affirmative decree alſo for the punſhing of men eternally in hell-fire.

So farre forth as this Authour ſeemeth to oppoſe the abſolute decree of Predeſtination, and the abſolute decree of negative Reprobation or Non-election, reducing them to the contrary foreſeen conditions of good or bad acts in men, he croſſeth the received Doctrine of the Church of England. But if he intend onely to prove, that the adjudication of men unto eternall life or eternall death, and the temporall introduction of men into the kingdome of heaven, or caſting of men into the torments of hell, are always accompanied with the Divine preſcience or intuition of contrary acts or qualities in thoſe which are to be ſaved or condemned; we hold it and acknowledge it a moſt certain truth. Yet we muſt here adde, that Predeſtination and Preterition are eternall acts immanent in God the Creatour, where-

as Salvation and Damnation are temporall effects terminated unto the creature: and therefore the latter may be ſuſpended upon many conditions, though the former be in God never ſo abſolute.

The Treatiſe inſuing would have had much more perſpicuitie, if the Authour had briefly and plainly ſet down what he underſtandeth by this word *Predeſtination* or *Election*, and whether he conceive it to be an abſolute or a conditionall Decree. If conditionall; he ſhould have ſhewed us with whom God conditioned, upon what terms, and where the conditions ſtand upon record. If he grant abſolute Predeſtination, his plea for conditionate Preterition will be to little purpoſe with thoſe who underſtand that the abſolute Election of ſuch a certain number doth *in eodem ſigno rationis* as abſolutely imply a certain number of men not elected.

The wiſdome of our Church of England in the xvii^th^ Article layeth down the doctrine of Predeſtination, and doth not ſo much as in one word meddle with the point of Reprobation; leaving men to conceive that the one is the bare negation or deniall of that ſpeciall favour and benefit which is freely intended and mercifully beſtowed in the other. Would to God the children of this Church had imitated the wiſdome of their

their Mother, and had not taken a quite contrary courſe, balking the doctrine of Predeſtination, and breaking-in abruptly upon the doctrine of Reprobation.

I know not whether I ſhould think him more defective, who in diſputing about Reprobation runneth out into impertinent vagaries, or him that undertaketh the handling of this queſtion without premiſing and opening the true nature of Predeſtination.

And no man need fear but (with all that are judicious, religious, and loving their own ſalvation) that manner of handling this controverſie will be beſt accepted, which ſo reduceth mans Sinne and Damnation to himſelf, as withall it forgetteth not to reduce his Juſtification, Sanctification, Glorification not to any foreſeen goodneſſe ſpringing out of mans free-will, but to the free mercy of God, according to his eternall purpoſe effectually working in men thoſe gifts and acts of grace which are the means to bring them unto glorie.

Having thus briefly ſpoken of the Title and Preface, I will lay down ſuch fundamentall doctrines concerning Predeſtination or Election as I conceive are grounded upon the xvii^th Article, and have alwayes been taken for the common received do-

ctrine of our Church; the contradictory by our Universities and reverend Bishops (when they were broched) having been alwayes held and censured for erroneous. This done, I will go along with the Treatise it self, not intending to defend the particular opinions of any forrein or home-bred Divines, exorbitant from the doctrine of our own Church, but onely to defend our well-settled doctrine against all opposers of what names or sects soever.

Propositions concerning the nature of Predestination, and wherein it properly consisteth, with certain Corollaries apperteining thereunto.

Propos. 1 PRedestination is an eternall decree or purpose of God, in time causing effectuall grace in all those whom he hath chosen, and by this effectuall grace bringing them infallibly unto glory.

For proof of this proposition these places of Scripture might serve; Rom. 8. 29, 30. Ephes. 1. 4, 5, &c. Luke 12. 32. Matth. 24. 24.

The definitions of Predestination prove the same. As that of St Augustine, *De Bono Perseverantiæ*, c. 14. of the Schoolmen; *Præparatio gratiæ in præsenti & gloriæ in futuro.* Amongst the rest, of Aquinas; [a] *Prædestinatio est ratio ordinis aliquorum in salutem æternam*

[a] p. 1. q. 23. art. 2.

nam in mente Divina exsistens. of the Jesuite Vasquez; *Prædestinatio est propositum æternum Dei quo gratiam alicui præparat in vitam æternam.* And lastly Arminius himself giveth us this description; [b] *Prædestinatio est decretum beneplaciti Dei in Christo, quo apud se ab æterno statuit, fideles quos fide donare decrevit vitâ æternâ donare.* In all these descriptions, Predestination conteineth an eternall, absolute, infallible decree, as well for the giving of grace effectuall unto certain persons here, as the bringing of the same persons unto glory hereafter. Arminius perceiving this, in his private disputations [c] wipeth out those words, *quos fide donare decrevit,* which he had used in his publick.

[b] *Disp. publ. Thes.* 15.

[c] *Thes.* 40.

Predestination being an immanent and eternall act of the Divine understanding and will, cannot be conceived as dependent upon any foreseen temporall acts of Mans free-will. *Coroll.* 1

A prime and eternall cause cannot depend upon the self-same temporall effects which are thereby caused. If therefore Predestination be the prime and eternall cause from whence Peters faith, repentance and perseverance were derived, his foreseen faith, repentance and perseverance cannot in any good sense be imagined antecedent causes, merits, conditions or motives unto the Divine Predestination.

The

[d] *In 1. disp. 89.* The Jesuite Vasquez, [d] though he found Predestination unto glory upon foreseen merits, yet in this he is sounder then the Arminians, in that he maketh the differencing of the Predestinate from the Reprobated to beginne before all absolute prevision of their free-will consenting the one way or the other. And our learned Bishop of Norwich Dr Overall explaining the xviith Article hath these words, *Nostra Ecclesia conjungit particulare decretum absolutum, non ex præscientia humanæ fidei aut voluntatis dependens, sed ex proposito Divinæ voluntatis & gratiæ de his quos Deus elegit in Christo liberandis, cum generali & conditionata voluntate, seu generali promissione*, &c. Where he evidently acknowledgeth an eternall, secret, absolute Decree, predestinating particular persons unto eternall life without all dependency upon their foreseen faith or perseverance; though therewithall he conjoyn an open, revealed and Evangelicall Decree of bringing men into the possession of eternall life by the way and upon the condition of their faith, repentance and perseverance.

Prop. 2. Election or Predestination findeth or considereth all mere men in one and the selfsame condition: and it is the grace prepared for them in Predestination which maketh the predestinate become holy & happy men.

If Predestination be conceived as antecedent

cedent to the fall, then it taketh all men *in ſtatu innocentiæ*, and ſo alike. If it be conſidered *in ſtatu lapſo*, then it alſo findeth all the ſonnes of Adam alike miſerable and damnable.

They who will have God in his Divine Predeſtination to behold all men, and elect thoſe men conſequently whom he conſidereth as believing and perſevering in faith and holineſſe unto the laſt gaſp, are in an errour. For 1. this is to elect or predeſtinate men not conſidered *in ſtatu integro*, nor *in ſtatu lapſo*, but *in ſtatu reparato, & tantùm non glorificato*. 2. Again, this is not to bring Faith, Holineſſe, Perſeverance, out of the gracious benefit of Election, but to bring Election out of the foreſeen acts of Believing, Obeying, Perſevering, quite contrary to the doctrine of our Church and of the truth. 3. Laſt of all, if we admit this opinion of conditionate Predeſtination, following upon the eternall foreſight of mens finall obedience and perſeverance, we muſt of neceſſity grant that the grace or benefit of Predeſtination affordeth no man any help at all in the way unto eternall ſalvation or glorification: which no Chriſtian eare can patiently heare. For how can that be the cauſe leading infallibly in the way unto eternall life, which cometh not ſo much as into conſideration untill a man have runne *Coroll.* 2

out

out his race in faith and godlineſſe, and be arrived at heaven-gates? Such a falſely-named Predeſtination might more truly and properly have been called a Poſtdeſtination. But call it how they pleaſe, it enacteth onely *per modum legis*, That men thus living and dying ſhall be received into the kingdome of heaven: but it doth not *per modum decreti operantis* infallibly work thoſe graces and gracious actions whereby men are brought unto heaven.

Prop. 3. The grace prepared for the Elect in Gods eternall Predeſtination, and beſtowed upon them in the temporall diſpenſation, ſo cauſeth their belief, repentance, perſeverance, as that it impoſeth no neceſſity or violent coaction upon the wills of men, but cauſeth their free and voluntary endeavours.

That the grace prepared in Predeſtination is an infallible cauſe producing faith and perſeverance in all the elect, appeareth from the nature and eſſence of Predeſtination: which being a ſpeciall part of the Divine providence, is diſtinguiſhed from that more generall providence, by appointing and applying ſuch means as never fail to produce the end whereunto they are fitted.

So that St Auguſtine feareth not to inferre, That if the grace prepared for the elect in their Predeſtination ſhould not work the intended end, which is their glorifica-

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tion; *aut vinceretur aut falleretur Deus*, God himself must either be overcome or deceived. Yet he withall defendeth, That this effectuall grace hath no violent coactive operation upon the will, but causeth it to work by its own freedome. [e] *Stat libertas arbitrii cum Divina motione voluntatem nostram ad id quod vult applicante.* And St Augustine to the same purpose, *Deus omnipotentissimâ facilitate convertit, ac volentes ex nolentibus facit.* In which few words he conjoyneth the invincible operation of the grace of God with the free operation of mans will. Nay the grace flowing from the decree of Predestination is so farre from putting a necessitation upon the will, as that it is the very cause which freeth the will from the slavery of sinne, and maketh it freely to move and work in all good acts. It *giveth the will and the deed*; and therefore it implyeth a contradiction to say, it maketh a man do any good by way of necessitation. [f] *Ubi consensus, ibi voluntas; ubi voluntas, ibi libertas.* Whenas therefore God had eternally predestinated Peter to believe in Christ, to repent, to persevere, he did by speciall grace move him and work him to the most free and willing performance of all these things; according to that of S[t] Augustine, *Cùm Deus vult fieri quod non nisi volentibus hominibus oportet*

[e] *Abul. in 3. Reg. cap. 12.*

[f] *Bern. De lib. arbitr.*

tet fieri, *inclinat eorum corda ut hoc velint.* They who refuse to acknowledge this power of Gods will over mans will, do not perceive how they stumble at the first article of the Apostles creed.

Coroll. 3 Those horrible consequents which the ancient Semi-Pelagians would have forced upon Augustines opinion of absolute Predestination, are of no force: As for example; [g] If the Divine Predestination be absolute, *nemo vigilet, nemo jejunet, nemo libidini contradicat*, &c. And again; If Predestination be absolute, *ad vitam rectam non suo ductu, sed violento tantùm Dei imperio homines pertrahuntur.* In a word; If absolute Predestination unto grace and glory be granted, *intra gratiæ vocabulum absconditur fatale venenum.* These with many other inferences of the same stamp Faustus & others of the Semipelagian sect would needs thrust upon the doctrine of Predestination: and as for themselves, they boldly maintained these propositions, as it were in defiance of Gods absolute and free Election;

[g] *Faust. Rheg.*

[h] *Hoc propositum vocationis Dei, quo eligendorum & rejiciendorum dicitur facta discretio secundùm quod placuit Creatori, lapsis curam resurgendi admit, sanctis occasionem affert*, &c. *Prior est hominis obedientia quàm Dei gratia. Initium salutis ex eo est qui salvatur, non ex Deo qui salvat.* And Faustus

[h] *Prosp. Epist. ad Aug.*

Rhegiensis

Rhegienſis hath the like or worſe: *Salus hominis non in prædeſtinatione Factoris, ſed in operatione famulantis collocata eſt. Non eſt ſpecialis circa credentes Dei munificentia. Prædeſtinatio ad juſtitiam pertinet. Niſi præſcientia exploraverit, prædeſtinatio nihil decernit. Juſtitia periclitabitur ſi ſine merito indignus eligitur.*

Unto all theſe and the like inferences and opinions we briefly anſwer three things. Firſt, That Predeſtination is abſolute, not becauſe it intendeth the bringing of any man unto eternall life without performing the conditions which God requireth in the Goſpel, as Repenting, Believing, Perſevering, and the like; but becauſe God in his moſt gracious decree of Election doth as abſolutely and certainly ordain men unto ſaving grace as unto everlaſting glory. Secondly, That in the Divine Predeſtination there is alwayes included a preſcience of the faith and perſeverance of all ſuch as are elected: yet ſo, that this preſcience is not the antecedent motive unto their Election; but this foreſeen faith and perſeverance is a conſequent fruit or effect of the Divine Election. Laſtly, That there is a decree conditionall eſtabliſhed by God concerning mans ſalvation, namely, That if any man repent, believe and perſevere, he ſhall moſt certainly be ſaved. But we ſay it is

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an abuſe of the Word, to call this the d
cree of Gods Election or Predeſtinatio
For the truth of this decree may ſtand goo
and firm though no man living ſhould b
lieve or attein unto eternall life. But th
Divine Predeſtination or Election is ſuch
decree as infallibly in ſome men produce
faith, and bringeth unto eternall life a ce
tain number of perſons known onely unt
God himſelf.

To ſhut up this Corollary; We do no
onely avouch the doctrine of S. Auguſtin
concerning abſolute Predeſtination to b
true, allowed by our Church, and eaſil
cleared from all thoſe abſurd conſequence
which the Adverſaries would fain faſte
upon it; but we further avouch, That th
new-deviſed plat-form of Predeſtinatio
grounded by Arminius upon foreſeen faith
and perſeverance, is falſe, vain, and diſagree
ing from the notion of Predeſtination root
ed in the hearts of all catholick and ortho
dox Chriſtians. For his Predeſtination i
ſettled upon theſe foure pillars.

1. The firſt is, an abſolute decree of giving
Chriſt for a Mediatour and Redeeme
unto mankind conſidered as fallen, in the
ſtate of ſinne.
2. Another abſolute decree, To receive in
to favour all ſuch as ſhall repent and be
lieve, and to ſave them perſevering unto
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the end; as also, To leave the impenitent and unfaithfull under Gods wrath, and to condemn them as men out of Christ.

A third decree, Effectually to afford and administer unto all men sufficient and necessary means of breeding faith and repentance.

The fourth and last, a decree, To save or condemne certain singular persons, grounded upon the Divine foresight who will repent, believe and persevere, and who will not.

To this plat-form in generall we say, That the marshalling of the eternall immanent acts of the Divine understanding or will into First, Second, Third, Fourth, is weak imagination of mans brain, and so uncertain that amongst twenty who give us such delineations of Gods eternall decrees, you shall not find two who agree between themselves in numbring them and ordering them; but where one maketh foure, another maketh five, six, or seven, &c. and that which one man setteth in the first place, another setteth in the last: and in brief, every man ordereth them *secundùm suum modum imaginandi*. To build therefore any doctrines of faith upon the Prioritie or Posterioritie of such decrees, is to build castles in the aire. For as Hilarius speaketh,

i De Trin. lib. 12. i *Omnia penès Deum æquabili æternitatis infinitate consistunt.*

Now to come more particularly to Arminius his decrees. Whereas the true decree of Election or Predestination is an Operative Practicall decree, preparing from all eternitie and in time certainly causing grace and glorie in singular persons elected; Arminius hath given us Enunciative Doctrinall decrees concerning the generall causes and means of salvation, apperteining promiscuously unto all men, whether elected or not elected, conjoyned with an act of Divine prescience, which causeth not Peters Faith, Repentance, Perseverance, Salvation, but rather Peters Faith, Repentance and Perseverance cause or draw after them his Predestination. So that in the whole series of Arminius his Predestination there is not one decree to be found which causeth infallibly in any singular man Justification, Sanctification or Glorification.

1. His first decree is very defective, because it giveth us a predestinated Mediatour and Redeemer *in separato signo rationis* from the persons predestinated infallibly to participate the benefit of this Mediatour and Redeemer, which is reconciliation and effectuall grace in this world, and eternall glory hereafter. For as it were an absurd imagination to conceive that God first decreed

creed to make Adams head, and then by another decree to make him members subordinate to his head; so is it, to frame a particular decree for the Predestination of Christ, and then to devise another for the Predestination of his subordinate members.

2. His second decree is a decree revealed about the manner how many in time must be brought unto heaven, and not the secret decree wherein God from all eternity predestinated those whom he pleased unto the infallible obteining of the kingdome of heaven: so that this eternall decree, *Quicunque crediderit & perseveraverit salvus erit*, might stand true though no man in the world should either believe or be saved. But the decree of Election or Predestination doth imply, *per modum causæ infallibiliter operantis*, the faith, perseverance and salvation of a number of singular persons known unto God, and cannot be verified otherwise.

3. His third decree hath the same fault: For God may (in his sense) sufficiently and effectually administer the means of grace and salvation unto millions of men who notwithstanding will never attein salvation. But that administration of grace which floweth from the decree of Predestination never failed to bring those particular persons unto whom it is mercifully vouch-

safed, unto the state of glorification. These decrees hitherto concern Cain as well as Abel, and Judas as well as Peter; and therefore as yet we see in them no decree of Election.

4. His last decree is it wherein onely the Divine Predestination is formally and essentially placed by Arminius: and yet this hath as little in it of reall Predestination or Election as the former. For, First it is a decree for the temporall and actuall introduction of certain singular persons into the kingdome of glory; whereas Predestination is a decree fore-appointing and preparing that effectuall grace whereby those persons were infallibly brought unto glorie. Secondly, this decree is founded upon the prescience of mans right use of Gods grace: But the decree of Predestination causeth the right use of grace. [k] *Hoc ipsum velle accipere gratiam est ex praedestinatione Divina.*

[k] *Aquin. Qu. De Praedestin.*

This discourse concerning Predestination is necessary for the true understanding of Reprobation: And it is probable that those who erre in the one are not free from errour in the other.

Gods

Gods Love to Mankind.

SIR,

I Have sent you here the reasons which have moved me (A) to change my opinion in some controversies of late debated between the Remonstrants and their Opposites.

I do the rather (B) present them unto you,

1. That I may shew the due respect which I bear your Worship with my forwardnesse to answer your desires, as I can with regard to conscience.

2. That you may see that I dissent not without cause, but have reason on my side.

3. That if I can be convinced that my grounds are weak and insufficient, I may think better of the opinion which I have forsaken then I can for the present.

In the delivery of my motives I will proceed in this order: 1. I will state the opinion which I dislike. 2. I will lay down my reasons against it.

Touching the first your Worship knoweth these two things very well:

1. That (C) the main ζητούμενον and question in these controversies, and that on which the rest do hang, is, What the decrees of God are touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered.

2. That the men who have disputed these things, may be reduced to two sorts and sides.

The first side (D) affirmeth, That there is an Absolute and Peremptorie decree proceeding from the alone pleasure of God, without any consideration of mens finall impenitency and unbelief: by which God casteth men off from grace and glory, and shutteth up the farre greater part (even of those that are called by the preaching of the Gospel to repentance and salvation) under invincible and unavoydable sinne and damnation.

The other side disavowing any such decree, say, That *Gods decree* of casting men off for ever, is grounded upon *the foresight of their continuance in sinne and unbelief*, both avoydable by grace, and consequently inferring no mans damnation necessarily.

The first side is divided: For

1. Some (E) of them present man to God in the decree

of *Reprobation*, lookt on *out of* or *above the Fall*; and say, That God of his mere pleasure antecedent to all sinne in the creature, originall or actuall, did decree to glorifie his Soveraignty and Justice in the eternall rejection and damnation of the greatest part of mankind, as the end; and in their unavoydable sinne and impenitency, as the means. And this way go Calvine, Beza, Zanchius, Piscator, Gomarus, and some of our own countreymen.

2. The rest (F) of that side thinking to avoyd the great inconveniences to which that Supralapsarian way lyeth open, fall down a little lower, and present man to God in his decree of Reprobation, *lying in the Fall* and under the guilt of originall sinne, saying, That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in Adams sinne, did decree the greatest number of men (even those whom he calleth to repentance and salvation by the preaching of the Gospel) to hell-torments for ever and without all remedy, for the declaration of his severe Justice. This way went the Synod.

The difference (G) between them is not much, and even in their own account too small a discord to cause a breach. Notwithstanding this petty difference therefore, they agree well enough together, as we may see in the Hague-Conference and Synod.

In the Conference at Hague the Contra-remonstrants have these words; (a) *As touching the diversitie of opinions in this argument*, viz. *That God looked at man in this decree, not yet created, or created and fallen; because this belongeth not to the foundation of this doctrine, we do in Christian equity bear with one another.*

(a) Col. Hag. Brand. pag. 37. Quoad sententiarum diversitatem in hoc argumento, quod Deus respexit hominem in hoc decreto nondum creatum, vel creatum & lapsum; quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrinæ non pertinet, libenter alii alios æquitate Christianâ toleramus.

After this in the Synod at Dort they permitted Gomarus to set down his judgement in the upper way. And the Delegates of South-Holland were very indifferent which way they took: For these are their words, (b) *whether God in choosing considered men as fallen, or else as not fallen, they* (the Delegates of South-Holland) *think it is not necessary to be determined, so it be held, that God in choosing considered men in alike estate.* (c) Maccovius (H) also Professour of Divinity at Franeker, a violent and stiff mainteiner of the most unsavoury speeches which have been uttered in this Contro-

(b) Act. Syn. part. 3. pag. 48. An Deus in eligendo consideraverit homines ut lapsos, an etiam ut nondum lapsos, existimant non esse necessarium ut definiatur, modò statuatur Deum in eligendo considerasse homines in pari statu. (c) Antisoc. Remonstr. pag. 32.

verſie,

verſie, and one that undertook in the very Synod to make good againſt Lubbert his fellow-Profeſſour, That God did (d) *will ſinne, ordain men to ſinne, and would not at all that all men be ſaved*; and beſides this, openly and peremptorily affirmed, That *except theſe things were held and mainteined by them*, they could not poſſibly keep their own ground, but *muſt come over to the Remonſtrants*: this man was not onely not cenſured, but publickly declared in the Synod to be *pure* and *orthodox*, and *diſmiſſed onely with this kind and friendly admonition, That he ſhould hereafter take heed of ſuch words as might give offenſe to tender ears, and could not well down with thoſe who are yet uncapable of ſuch myſteries.*

(d) Velle peccata, ordinare homines ad peccatum quâ peccatum, & neutiquam velle ut omnes homines ſalventur, &c.

By theſe inſtances it appeareth that they of the firſt ſide can eaſily bear one with another in this difference. And (to ſay the truth) there is no reaſon why they ſhould quarrel about circumſtances, ſeeing they agree in the ſubſtance. For they both (1) contend,

1. That the *moving-cauſe* of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the ſinne of man, originall or actuall.

2. That the finall impenitency and damnation of Reprobates are *neceſſary* and *unavoydable* by Gods abſolute decree.

Theſe two things are the *maxima gravamina*, principall grievances, that the other ſide ſtick at. So that theſe two paths meet at laſt in the ſame way.

Both theſe opinions of the firſt ſide I diſlike.

My reaſons why, are of two ſorts;

1. Such as firſt made me to queſtion their truth.
2. Such as convince me of their untruth.

Anſwer.

THe Remonſtrants in this controverſie concerning Election, Preterition, or negative Reprobation, have not onely the Contra-remonſtrants for their Oppoſites, but the Church of England alſo; which holdeth the middle way, as the learned Biſhop of Norwich hath plainly ſhewed: The change of your A

opinion, therefore is not to be blamed, unleſſe where from one extremity you have run into the other.

B A friend might have been ſatisfied in this kind by private conference, or writing, though his Majeſties Declaration had not been broken by printing and publiſhing ſuch controverſiall points.

C The *main* ζητήμενον is not, What are the Decrees of God onely concerning the finall conditions of men; but, What are the Decrees of God concerning the different preparation of grace, whereby ſome are guided infallibly unto ſalvation, others are permitted through their own corruption or voluntary tranſgreſſion to fall into damnation. As for the *ordering* of ſuch eternall Decrees by firſt, ſecond, third, fourth *inſtantia rationis* (as they term them) it is a School-deviſe unknown to the Ancients, and never attempted by any with good ſucceſſe.

D No ſide affirmeth an *abſolute decree* by force whereof Perſons not elected are *caſt off from grace*: for the non-elect Angels and many millions of men not predeſtinated have had a great meaſure of grace beſtowed upon them. Reprobation is not a deniall of ſufficient grace, but a deniall of ſuch ſpeciall grace as God knoweth would infallibly bring them to glory.

Neither

Neither doth the decree of Preterition *shut up* any man *under a necessitie of sinning and being damned*; but it permitteth men voluntarily and freely to run into damnable sinnes, and through their voluntary impenitency to incurre eternall damnation. [a] *Non cursus ruentium, nec malignitatem iniquorum, neque cupiditates peccantium praedestinatio Dei aut excitavit, aut suasit, aut impulit, &c.* [b] *Nemini Deus correctionis adimit viam, nec quenquam boni possibilitate despoliat.*

[a] *Prosp. ad Obj. Vinc. Resp.* 10.

[b] *Resp.* 15.

And last of all, absolute Predestination, and absolute Reprobation or Non-election, do not exclude or deny the eternall intuition of Faith and Perseverance in the Elect, nor the eternall consideration of Infidelitie and Impenitency in the Non-elect; but they deny such a consideration of good or bad acts foreseen in men as causeth or precedeth the different decrees of God in electing some men mercifully unto salvation, and leaving others through their own default to plunge themselves into eternall damnation.

If by *casting off men for ever* you mean the eternall exclusion of the damned from the blessed presence of God, and their eternall tormenting in hell, no side will deny but this is grounded upon the foresight of their finall continuance in sinne: yet so, that as the finall continuance of Peter in faith was not a cause, condition or motive fore-

seen

seen, and so determining the Divine will to elect him; but the Divine Election was the cause which afterwards produced in him that foreseen faith. So the foreseen finall continuance of Judas in sinne and infidelitie was not it which determined the Divine will to passe-by him in his decree of electing singular persons unto the infallible attainment of eternall life; but being thus passed-by, God foreseeth that through the voluntary obstinacy of his own will (not by any necessitating violence of Gods decree) he will live and die in sinne and impenitency, and for his voluntary sinne and impenitency deserve and undergo eternall torments.

E Those who in ordering the eternall Decrees, place Predestination and negative Reprobation before the consideration of the fall, are not few for number, nor men of any late sect. [c] Scotus with the whole army of Scotists, the greater number of late School-Divines, are of this opinion: And Suarez by name; whose words are these, [d] *Probabiliorem existimo communem sententiam Theologorum asserentium electionem hominum prædestinatorum antecessisse permissionem originalis peccati.*

[c] *Lib. 1. dist. 41. Lib. 3. dist. 19.*

[d] *In 3. disp. 5. p. 103.*

As for Calvine, he never troubled himself with these imaginary Priorities and Posteriorities in the eternall immanent operations of God: but all that he aimed at was to prove

prove; That the fall foreseen could not be cause or motive unto God of some mens Election and others Reprobation. As for the intuition or Divine consideration of all mankind *in statu lapso*, Calvine in plain terms avoucheth it; [e] *Postquam Paulus, Deum ex perdita massa eligere & reprobare quos illi visum est, docuit, quare & quomodo id fiat adeò non expedit, ut potiùs expavescens, &c.*

[e] *De aterna Dei Predest.*

And this Presupposition of sinne considered in persons, whether elected or not elected, whether to be saved or to be damned, is most convenient for helping our understanding in this deep mystery. But if any shall thereby conceive that the eternall Volitions or Intuitions of God have any reall posterioritie or prioritie in the Divine will and understanding, he deceiveth himself, and troubleth others with vain jangling. [f] *Utilitas distinguendi hac instantia rationis, non est, ut ille modus intelligendi retineatur, sed ut viam aperiat veritati, quæ aperta relinquatur.*

[f] *Ruiz. De volunt. p. 250.*

God did eternally decree to glorifie himself in the salvation of some and damnation of others; which the event doth plainly demonstrate: But for those in whose salvation he decreed to glorifie his Mercy, he worketh in them the means of their salvation, faith, repentance, perseverance in faith and godlinesse, by an influx of grace into their souls, by

by a powerfull yet not violent, by a moſt ſweet and yet moſt infallible guidance of their wills; in and over which God hath a more predominant power then themſelves. As for thoſe in whoſe damnation God glorifieth his Sovereigntie and Juſtice, he doth it not by an influx of malice into their ſouls, nor by unavoydable wreſting of their wills unto any particular ſinne; but leaveth all ſinfull defective actions to their own ſinfull defective wills, which wanting the ſpeciall grace and effectuall guidance proceeding from Divine Predeſtination, never fail to run themſelves willingly and wittingly upon their own damnation. The means whereby men are brought unto ſalvation, are reall effects of the Divine Election wrought by Gods Spirit; as the light and heat of the air is by the ſun: But the means whereby men are carried to their damnation, grow from themſelves; as coldneſſe and darkneſſe of the air is from it ſelf.

As for thoſe whom you term *Sublapſarians*, you ſhould have taken notice, that in this number you muſt put all who imbrace S. Auguſtines doctrine, and who have ſubſcribed to the XVII Article of our Church. Now theſe do as well oppoſe themſelves againſt the conditionate Election and Preterition, built upon the foreſight of mens good or bad acts, lately brought in by

by Arminius, as unto the extreme harsh opinions of Piscator, Gomarus, or whomsoever. So that by joyning your self with the Remonstrants, you have as clearly forsaken the doctrine of the Church of England, as of Beza, Zanchius, or Piscator.

The description of their opinion whom you term *Sublapsarians*, will not agree unto all who reject the conditionate Predestination and Reprobation of the Remonstrants. For many with S. Augustine & our Church, condemne this as erroneous who notwithstanding make no absolute decree adjudging men to hell-torments with an excluding of all preconsideration of sin: But they grant an absolute decree of not effectually freeing many men from their estate of Sinne, and an absolute decree of permitting many men to want the joyes of Heaven, and an absolute decree of punishing such mens foreseen sins voluntarily committed and voluntarily continued by eternall torments in Hell.

Those who are passed-by in the eternall decree of God are not by any force of the decree left without the benefit which the Scriptures promise upon condition of repentance, no more then those whom God hath eternally elected are by virtue of that decree freed from the punishment which supposing their impenitency must light upon them. Notwithstanding the absolute eternall

nall decrees of Election and Reprobation, the revealed Evangelicall decrees ſtand in their full force. If Cain repent and live well, he ſhall be pardoned and ſaved: If Peter repent not, and perſevere in his ſinne, he ſhall be damned. And yet farther (not to determine whether ſufficient grace be offered to every particular perſon in the world or no) we may reſolutely determine, that the diſtinct abſolute decree of Electing ſome infallibly unto perſeverance in grace and atteinment of glory, and of Paſſing-by and rejecting others, is no good argument to prove that therefore the non-elected are left without all remedy or ſufficient means of ſalvation. Adam was not predeſtinated to ſtand in the ſtate of his innocency, yet he was not thereby excluded or bereft of ſufficient means of ſtanding. From the decree of Preterition or Reprobation, it will follow-eth, Judas is reprobated; Therefore he will not uſe the remedies or means which God offereth for his ſalvation. But it is not good conſequence to ſay, Therefore God hath not given him ſufficient remedies or means to eſcape damnation, were not his own wicked will the onely hindrance.

The Synod of Dort injoyned men to ſet down their particular judgements concerning Predeſtination and Reprobation; and therefore they had no reaſon to forbid any man

man to set down plainly his own opinion. And since the Divine understanding doth not consider or behold this after that, but all together in one instant of eternitie, there is no cause why men should stiffly contend about these Priorities and Posteriorities, which are humane imaginations, or *intellectûs nostri fictiones*, as some truly term them.

Maccovius was upon a by-occasion brought before the Synod; and the businesse betwixt him & Lubbertus was committed to the examination of some few Delegates, according to whose report he was dismissed. H

Unto the objection of *ordaining men unto sin*, his answer was, That God did not ordain any man unto sin *efficiendo*, but *permittendo*.

For his denying of a *will* in God *for the saving of all men*, he understood it of the absolute effectuall operative will, not of the conditionall and approbative will of God.

They both confesse, that the Divine understanding could not but eternally foresee the originall and actuall sinne which should finally cleave unto every particular man who should afterwards be born into this world: but they for all this deny, that the *moving causes* whereupon God distinguished men into Elect and Non-elect, was the foreseen faith of some, and the foreseen infidelitie and impenitency of others. The state of men under sinne was common to all: the mercy of God in effectually freeing from sinne was due to none. I

My

MY reasons of the first sort do indifferently respect and make against both, and I will set them down against both together. My second sort of reasons I will divide, delivering some of them against the upper and more rigid way, others against the lower and more moderate way.

I begin with those reasons which first moved me to question the truth of absolute Reprobation, as it is taught both wayes. They are these foure which follow.

1. *Reason* NOVELTY

1 The Novelty (*A*) of this opinion. Absolute and inevitable Reprobation hath little or no footing in Antiquitie. The upper way was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers (even the stoutest defenders of Grace against the Pelagians) for the space of six hundred (I may say eight hundred) years after Christ: nor the lower way till the time of S. Augustine, which was about foure hundred years after Christ. They did generally agree upon the contrary conclusion, and taught men in their times, That it was *possible* (*B*) for them to be saved which in the event were not saved, and to have repented, which repented not; and, That there was no decree of God which did lay a *necessity* of perishing upon any sonne of Adam. This that I say Mr Calvine himself doth freely acknowledge, speaking of Election and Reprobation according (*C*) to Gods foreknowledge; [e] *This commonly received opinion*, saith he, (of a conditionall respective decree) *is not the opinion onely of the common people but hath had great authours in all ages*. Reverend Beza likewise speaking of the same opinion, hath these words to the same purpose; [f] *Into which surely most foul errour Origen hath driven many of the Ancients both Greek and Latine*. To the same effect also Prosper, S. Augustines follower, hath a remarkable speech: [g] *Almost all the Ancients*, saith he, *did grant with one consent, that God decreed mens ends according to his foresight of their actions*, and not otherwise. To these speeches let me adde that of Remigius Archbishop of Lyons, who to Rabanus Archbishop of Mentz, objecting that S Augustine wrote a book called *Hypognosticon* against Pelagius and Cælestius, wherein he denied that Reprobates were properly [h] *prædestinati ad interitum*, predestinate to destruction, answereth, That S. *Augustine said not so; but some other man (as*

e *Calv. Inst. lib. 3. c. 22. Sect. 1.* Neque hæc vulgò recepta opinio solius vulgi est: habuit enim seculis omnibus magnos autores.

f *Beza, in cap. 11. ad Rom. v. 35.* In quem errorem sanè turpissimum Origenes veteres plerosque tum Græcos tum Latinos adegit.

g *Prosper, in Epist. ad Aug. prope finem.* Penè omnium parem inveniri & unam sententiam, quâ propositum & prædestinationem Dei secundùm præscientiam receperunt: ut ob hoc Deus alios vasa contumeliæ, alios honoris vasa fecerit, quia finem uniuscujusq; præviderit, & sub ipso gratiæ adjutorio in quo futurus esset voluntate & actione præscierit.

h *Rish. hist. Gott. pag. 107*

it is supposed) *to purge the Church of that calumny which some ill-affected ones did cast upon it, namely, That it taught that God by his Predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing, did withdraw the word* PREDESTINATION *from the point of Reprobates, and gave it onely to the Elect; and so gave great occasion of further errour and mistake.* In this speech of his is clearly implied, that it was (D) the constant doctrine of the Church then, that Reprobates lie under no necessitating decree of perdition.

The truth of this charge may further appear by a few particular instances. Minutius Felix bringeth in the Pagans objecting to the Christians, That they held the events of all things to be inevitable, and did feigne and frame to themselves an unjust God, who did punish in men their unavoidable destinies, not their ill choises. This is the objection; [i] *Whatsoever we do, as others to Fate, so ye ascribe to God: ye make therefore to your selves an unjust God, who punisheth in men their lot, not their will.* To this he answereth, [k] Christians hold no other *Fates* then *Gods decrees; [l] who foreknowing all men and their actions, did accordingly determine their retributions.*

S. Hierome an eager opposer of the Pelagians, in many places of his writings saith the same thing; [m] *From the foreknowledge of God it cometh to passe, that who he knoweth will be righteous, him he loveth before he cometh out of the wombe; and who he knoweth will be a sinner, him he hateth before he sinneth.* In another place he speaketh to the same purpose, [n] *The love and hatred of God ariseth either from the foresight of future things, or from the works; otherwise we know that God loveth all things, nor doth he hate any thing that he hath made.* And in his book against Pelagius he saith, [o] Eligit Deus quem bonum cernit, *God chooseth whom he seeth to be good.*

The summe of all which speeches is but this, That (E) there is no decree of damning or saving men, but what is built upon Gods Foreknowledge of the evil and good actions of men. Fulgentius is plain for that too: [p] *Those whom God foresaw would die in sinne, he decreed should live in endlesse punishment.* I may take in S. Augustine and Prosper also, who are judged to be the Patrones of the Absolute decree, as it is

i *Min. Felix, pag.* 23. Quicquid agimus, ut alii fato, ita vos Deo addicti: iniquum igitur Deum fingitis, qui forte in hominibus puniat, non voluntatem.

k *Idem, pag.* 216. Illud fatum est, quod de unoquoque Deus fatus est.

l *Ibid.* Qui cum universam præscit materiam, pro meritis & qualitatibus singulorum etiam fata determinat, & ità in nobis non genitura plectitur, sed ingenii natura punitur.

m *Hieron. ad Galat. c.* 1. *v.* 15. Ex præscientia Dei evenit, ut quem justum futurum scit, prius diligat quàm oriatur ex utero; & quem peccatorem, oderit antequam peccet. *Ad c.* 1. *Malac.* Dilectio & odium Dei vel ex præscientia nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus; alioquin novimus quod omnia Deus diligat, nec quicquam eorum oderit quæ creavit. o *Lib.* 3. *contra Pelag.* p *Fulgent. lib.* 1. *ad Monimum;* Quos præscivit Deus hanc vitam in peccato terminaturos, prædestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos

set down the Sublapsarian way: Even they do many times let fall such speeches as cannot fairly be reconciled with absolute Reprobation. I will onely cite Prosper: (for S. Augustine speaketh in him.) He discoursing of some that fall away à *sanctitate ad immunditiem*, from holinesse to uncleanesse, saith, q *They that fall away from holinesse to uncleannesse, lie not under a necessity of perishing because they were not predestinate; but therefore they were not predestinate, because they were foreknown to be such by voluntary prevarication.* Not long after speaking of the same men he saith, r *Because God foresaw they would perish by their own free-will, therefore he did not by any predestination sever them from the children of perdition.* And again in his answer to the xiith Objection he hath these words, s *God hath not withdrawn from any man ability to yield obedience because he hath not predestinated him; but because he foresaw he would fall from obedience, therefore he hath not predestinated him.*

I will shut up the instances of that age with the judgement of the Councel at Arles against the Pelagians in the yeare CDXC, or thereabout. This Councel subscribed to the letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Predestinarian, and made the *Anathemaes* (F) and curses which therein he denounceth against him and such like, to be their own: Some of which were these; t *Cursed be the man that shall say that the man that perisheth might not have been saved.* and again, u *Cursed be the man that shall say that a vessel of dishonour may not rise to be a vessel of honour.*

A testimony or two I will borrow likewise from some persons of note, and those S. Augustines followers too, who lived about foure hundred yeares after S. Augustines time. Remigius the great patrone of Gottschalk the zealous preacher and publisher of Absolute reprobation in those times, in his answer to that epistle which we suppose to be the Epistle of Rabanus, to Rabanus saying That God did vv *make the nations of the world healthfull*, and that he doth *velle omnes homines salvos fieri*, will that all men be saved; he giveth such an answer as cannot stand with Absolute reprobation: x *This*, saith he, *is very true, because God layeth on no man a necessity of perishing,*

q *Prosp. ad Object.* 3. *Gall.* Non ex eo necessitatem pereundi habuerunt quia prædestinati non sunt; sed ideo prædestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntaria prævaricatione præsciti sunt.

r *Prosp. Resp. ad Object.* 7. Quia illos ruituros propriâ voluntate præscivit, ob hoc à filiis perditionis nullâ prædestinatione discrevit.

s *Ibid. Resp. ad Object.* 12. Vitæ obedientiæ non ideo cuiquam subtraxit quia eum nô prædestinavit; sed quia recessurum ab ipsâ obedientia esse prævidit, ideo eum non prædestinavit.

t Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui perit non accepisse ut salvus esse possit.

u Anathema illi qui dixerit quòd vas contumeliæ non possit assurgere ut sit vas in honorem.

vv *Bishop Ussher, hist. Gottsc. p.* 53, & 54. Sanabiles facere nationes orbis terrarum.

x Ex hoc omnino verum est, quia nemini Deus imponit necessitatem pereundi, sicut nemini imponit necessitatem malè agendi.

as he hath laid on none a necessitie of sinning. And a little after he is plainer: [y] *Those whom God did foreknow would live and die in their wickednesse, for reasons most just be decreed should perish: as himself saith, Him which sinneth against me, even him will I blot out of my book.*

In the Valentine Synod assembled in favour of Gottschalk we may find these words, [z] *Therefore do the wicked perish, not because they could not, but because they would not be good, and by their own fault originall or actuall also, remained in the masse of perdition.* And in the end of their third Canon they denounce *Anathema* to those that hold that men are so predestinated unto evil as that they cannot be otherwise: [a] *That any should be* (saith the Councel) *predestinated to evil by the power of God, so as he cannot be otherwise, we do not onely not believe, but also if there be any that will believe so great an evil, with all detestation we denounce them accursed, as the Arausicane Councel also did.* By these testimonies (which are but a few of many) it appeareth that absolute and inevitable Reprobation found but cold entertainment from Antiquity.

Which considering, I began to call it into question. For albeit I make not the decisions and determinations of the Fathers or Councels the rules of my faith, because they are but men, and therefore subject to errour; yet I honour their gray hairs, and their grave assemblies, and do vehemently mistrust those doctrines which they never taught or approved, but misliked and condemned.

y Quos verissimè præscivit impios & iniquos futuros, & in sua impietate & iniquitate permansuros, justis & rectissimis de causis decrevit, statuit & prædestinavit perituros: sicut ipse ait, *Qui peccaverit mihi, ipsum delebo de libro meo.*

z *Can.* 2. Nec ipsos malos ideo perire, quia boni esse non potuerunt, sed quia boni esse noluerunt, suóque vitio in massa damnationis vel merito originali vel etiam actuali permanserunt.

a *Can.* 3. Verùm aliquos ad malum prædestinatos esse Divinâ potestate, ut aliud esse non possint, non solùm non credimus, sed etiam si sint qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione, sicut Arausicana Synodus, illis Anathema dicimus.

Answer.

ABsolute negative Reprobation is no *novell* opinion: But on the contrary, That Gods immanent and eternall acts of Predestination and Reprobation can be *in potestate prædestinatorum & reprobatorum*, is novell and false. A

The Ancients before S. Augustine granted a Prescience in God of all the future

good and bad acts of men: but their good acts they derived from Predestination, their bad, from their own Free-will, and not from the Reprobation. And as for the sentence of Damnation, it layeth hold upon them, *non quâ non-electi, sed quâ impii.* In all this Augustine differeth not from those Fathers that went before him.

B The terms of *Possible* and *Impossible* being taken in divers senses afford the Remonstrants many advantages amongst the ignorant, in their disputes against absolute Election and Reprobation. It is therefore to be observed, that in Scriptures, Fathers, School-men, and all manner of Authours, and in the common use of all languages, many acts or events wherein no necessitie or inforcement is laid upon mens wills, are notwithstanding said impossible to be otherwise then they are. But for the eternall Divine decrees of Predestination and Reprobation, to say that they are or ever were *in potestate prædestinatorum aut reprobatorum*, is contrary to the very essence & formalitie of Decrees. Those things wherein men may *agere* or *non agere*, are said *to be in their own power*: But Predestination and Reprobation are immanent acts of the Divine will and understanding, and therefore it is impossible that they should be either way *in potestate voluntatis humanæ.* [a] *Hoc quisque in suâ potestate*

[a] *August. De Spir. & lit. c. 31.*

state habere dicitur, quod si vult facit, si non vult non facit.

Now for the acts of believing, repenting, and atteining unto salvation, we say not that these are simply impossible, or that the decree of God leaveth a necessitie of perishing upon the non-elect. *Perditio tua ex te*, is as true in their Doctrine which maintein Absolute and oppose Conditionall Predestination and Reprobation, as in the Decree of the Remonstrants.

The Remonstrants grant an eternall Prescience of many mens infidelitie and impenitencie, and thereupon an eternall immutable decree of their damnation: and yet they hold (and that truly) that thereby no necessitie of infidelitie or impenitencie, no impossibilitie of believing or repenting is laid upon men. They must give us leave to say the same of Predestination, untill they can demonstrate how this doth more infringe the libertie of mans will then the other. If we respect that necessitie which is called *Necessitas Infallibilitatis*, Anselmus maketh it alike in both: [b] *Necesse est fieri quæ præsciuntur & quæ prædestinantur.* If we call that an impossible act or event which cannot stand *in sensu composito* when the contrary is presupposed, the Divine prescience maketh believing, repenting and being saved as impossible unto Cain, Judas, or any person re-

[b] De Concord. c. 2.

probated upon prescience, as when they are reprobated upon Gods mere will. But the truth is, neither the one nor the other can stand *cum eventu contrario*; and yet both the one and the other do stand *cum possibilitate ad eventum contrarium.*

Nota

Conditionall decrees of Salvation and Damnation have been published in the Gospel, and are acknowledged by all Divines: but conditionall Decrees of eternall Predestination and Preterition are not found in Scripture, nor allowed of by the Church of England. Every man knoweth where to find these conditionall decrees, *If any man believe and repent, he shall be saved; If any man continue in infidelitie and impenitencie, he shall be damned*: But it will be hard for any Remonstrant to shew these other, *If any man believe, he shall be predestinated; If he believe not, he shall not be predestinated.* Faith is a temporall effect produced in those which were elected from eternitie, not a foreseen condition drawing after it Gods eternall Election. And infidelitie and finall impenitencie are faults voluntarily proceeding out of the wicked hearts of men eternally reprobated, not preceding the eternall act of Reprobation but the temporall act of their judiciall Condemnation. As for the Fathers which grounded Predestination upon Prescience, they understood [s] a practicall

[s] *Vide Aug. De bono persever. c. 18.*

ticall Divine prescience, not a bare speculative.

No Divine that acknowledgeth the Omniscience of God and his eternall Prescience of all future actions and events, will denie, that God in the same eternitie wherein he elected some and passed-by others, foresaw both what the one and what the other would do, and what contrary ends they would come unto. But the question is not, Whether God from all eternitie had such a foresight, but, Whether the different actions of men foreseen caused the different decrees of their Election and Preterition. As for their different ends, namely, that the one atteineth salvation after this life, and the other undergo eternall damnation, this we confesse to follow upon their contrary actions of Believing, Repenting, and Not-believing, Not-repenting. Neither were they otherwise by any eternall decree appointed unto damnation, then with respect unto the just desert of their sinne. It is truly said by Calvine, [d] *Reprobi suo delicto morti devoti sunt; non pereunt nisi qui digni sunt.* & Zanchius, [e] *Peccatum non est causa rejectionis, sed est causa damnationis.*

[d] *In 2. ad Thess. cap. 2.*

[e] *De Natura Dei, l. 5. p. 712.*

For the phrase, *Prædestinati ad interitum*; it is manifest that Augustine and his followers applied it unto all such as were not *prædestinati ad gloriam*; though the word *Electi*

was never used by them in that sense.[f]

That which Augustine *denied* was a Predestination of reprobates unto sinne: But as for their Predestination unto the just punishment of their sinnes, namely death and destruction, Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius[h] were never afraid to acknowledge it.

As for Hincmarus his fansie, that the book called *Hypognosticon* or *Hypomnesticon*, was written by S. Augustine himself, and that in the sixth book thereof he retracted what before he delivered concerning *praedestinati ad interitum*, is false and frivolous, and sufficiently confuted by Remigius. Yet we willingly grant, that in the most strict and proper sense the word *Predestination* doth onely respect the good supernaturall qualities and acts which God worketh in men elected, and the supernaturall blessed end whereunto he bringeth them by the foresaid means. And the reason hereof is, because[i] *Destination* is the direction of a thing unto such a scope as by its own strength and nature it could never move unto. Thus the arrow is destinated unto the mark, whereunto of it self it could never move. Now men are too ready to move in the way of wickednesse, and to carrie themselves unto destruction: and therefore as God cannot predestinate men unto sinne, so he doth not properly predestinate them unto

[f] *Vide Aug. tract. 48. in Joan. & De Civit. l. 15. c. 1. & Enchir. c. 100. & in Psal. 13.*

[h] *Vide Prosp. ad Cap. Gall. resp. 19. & ad Object. Vincent. resp. 10, 11.*

[h] *Vide Fulgent. ad Mon. l. 1. c. 7. 14 & 18.*

[i] *Aquin. 1. q. 23. art. 1.*

to their damnation (for then he should be a working cause thereof) but he preordaineth their just damnation as a recompense of their sinne and rebellion [k]. So that if by Predestinating *ad interitum* we understand the causing and effectuall working of any mans destruction, God cannot be said *prædestinare ad interitum*: But if we onely understand the preordaining of those to damnation whom God foresaw deserving and working the same, we neither think nor speak otherwise then the orthodox Fathers did.

[k] *Vide Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1. c. 17. Bed. l. 1. qu. art. 13.*

It is still the constant Doctrine of those that teach absolute Predestination and Reprobation, That neither persons elected lie under a *necessitating decree* of doing well and being saved, nor persons not-elected under a *necessitating decree* of doing ill and being damned. The eternall decrees of Gods will take not away the libertie of mans will; and therefore the Pagan objections were Paganish.

The eternall decree of saving or damning men is conjoyned with an eternall foresight of the obedience of men saved, and disobedience of men to be damned; but with this difference: The foreseen good actions of the elect were neither antecedent conditions moving God to elect them, nor meritorious causes of their salvation: but the foreseen

seen finall estate of the wicked in their sins, was the intuition of a most just and meritorious cause of their damnation. As for Election and Preterition, all men being represented unto God electing as in the common masse of sin and miserie, there can be found no opposite qualities or actions in men whereupon to ground the opposite decrees of Gods eternall Election and Reprobation. And therefore we think that saying of Calvine warrantable, [1] *Deus in negotio prædestinationis non egreditur extra seipsum.* To which we adde another of the same Authour; [m] *Si judicio mortis obnoxii sunt omnes naturali conditione quos Dominus ad mortem prædestinat, si ex corrupta massa desumti sunt omnes, non mirum si damnationi subjaceant.*

[1] *Instit. l. 3. c. 22.*

[m] *Ibid. c. 23. §. 3.*

There needed no such pains in heaping up Fathers for proof of this conclusion, That there is no decree of damning men otherwise then upon the guilt, and for the misdeserts of their sinnes. Not onely Fulgentius, Augustine, Prosper, but Calvine, Beza, and others whom you make Supralapsarians, have constantly defended this true doctrine. Calvine; [n] *Quisque sibi propriâ incredulitate est damnationis autor.* Beza; [o] *Inepte faciunt, qui Reprobationis decretum cum Damnatione confundunt: cùm hujus causa manifesta sit, nempe peccatum; illius verò, sola Dei voluntas.* Zanchius; [p] *Certum est, Deum, sic-*

[n] *De æter. Præd. p. 709.*

[o] *Annot. in 9. ad Rom. ver. 15.*

[p] *Lib. 5. De attrib. qu. 3. pag. 506.*

ut propter peccata impios punit, sic etiam decreviſſe illos propter hæc peccata punire.

This Authour is doubly miſtaken: First, E
in that he conceiveth a conditionate Predeſtination or Election grounded upon Preſcience of mens good actions; whereas no ſuch good actions can be foreſeen in men conſidered *in ſtatu maſſæ corruptæ*, but as they are cauſed by that grace which was eternally prepared for them in their Predeſtination, and actually beſtowed upon them in their effectuall Vocation, Juſtification, Sanctification. This conditionall Predeſtination upon foreſight of mens goodneſſe or holineſſe, was the errour which Auguſtine aſcribeth to the Pelagians: [q] *Præſciebat ergò, ait Pelagianus, qui futuri eſſent ſancti per liberæ voluntatis arbitrium, & ideo eos ante mundi conſtitutionem in ipſa ſua præſcientia, quâ tales futuros eſſe præſcivit, elegit.* But what ſaith S. Auguſtine to this point? [r] *Non quia futuri eramus ſancti, ſed ut eſſemus, nos elegit. Ideo quippe tales eramus futuri, quia elegit ipſe prædeſtinans ut tales per gratiam eſſemus.*

[q] *Aug. De Prædeſt. Sanct. l. 1. c. 18.*

[r] *Ibid.*

Secondly, he is miſtaken, in thinking thoſe ſpeeches of the Fathers cannot fairly ſtand with abſolute Non-election, Preterition or negative Reprobation, which import a decree of poſitive or punitive Reprobation, that is, of damnation, no otherwiſe grounded

grounded then upon preconſideration of ſinne. For though God out of the corrupted maſſe of mankind electeth ſome men unto the means and end of ſalvation, merely of his own gracious good pleaſure in Chriſt, yet he enacteth no decree of damning men for his pleaſure, but for their own ſinne and miſdeſerts. And as for *negatio prædeſtinationis*; it is not a working cauſe of any mans ſinne or damnation, though it contein a decree of not working their deliverie, of not working their effectuall ſalvation. But farre be it from God that it ſhould import a decree neceſſitating their perdition and eternall deſtruction. As men not compriſed within the decree of Predeſtination commit ſinne willingly and greedily, ſo they run on to their own deſtruction voluntarily, and not carried by any neceſſitating force flowing out of the decree of Reprobation.

Note

Whereas Auguſtine or Proſper[f] ſeem to fetch the cauſe *negatæ prædeſtinationis* or *negativæ reprobationis* (as ſome call it) from the foreſeen diſobedience of men, their purpoſe is to ſhew, That the finall continuance of any man in the ſtate of ſinne, and his finall falling into the ſtate of damnation is not cauſed by the negative act of Predeſtination: and further, That where men are foreſeen of God as ending their lives in ſinne, there is a ſufficient

[f] *Ad Cap. Gall. reſp. 3.*

sufficient reason to inferre, *Ideo non fuerunt ex praedestinatis*, or, *Ideo Deus eos non praedestinavit*. But that this foresight of their personall sinnes was the cause of the Divine decree of their Non-election whereby they stand distinguished from the elect, was no part of the Fathers meaning. So that the eternall prevision of some mens perseverance in faith and godlinesse, and of other mens perseverance in infidelity and ungodlinesse, was not the ground, cause or reason of the opposite decrees of Election and Preterition; but a proof that there are such distinct or different decrees concerning men.

Last of all, this foresight of God concerning men left to the deficiency of their own wicked wills, and through infidelity and impiety procuring their own destruction, is not alledged as a cause why this man rather then another was not predestinated, but as a certain note and an infallible consequent of men not predestinated; *causa probationis, non rei ipsius*.

Those curses may be most just, granting that positive Reprobation, which is *peremtorium decretum puniendi*, never proceedeth *ex solo Dei beneplacito*: though we hold therewithall, that negative Reprobation, which is *absolutum decretum non praedestinandi*, dependeth onely upon Gods free pleasure. For it is no errour to say, that non-election or negative F

gative

gative Reprobation may ſtand together with a poſſibilitie of avoiding ſinne and damnation. The non-elect angels had this poſſibility; all mankind generally in Adam had this poſſibility: and yet every ſingular perſon was not predeſtinated. And if God were ſo pleaſed to give as ſufficient grace to every particular man in the world as he gave to Adam in his creation, yet the oppoſite decrees of Election and Preterition or negative Reprobation may ſtand firm and good. The reaſon is evident: Becauſe Predeſtination is not a bare ordination of men unto eternall life by ſufficient means, which make the event onely poſſible; but a mercifull providence in ordering ſuch means for the elect as make the event infallible and infruſtrable. On the other ſide, Preterition or negative Reprobation is not a decree neceſſarily excluding perſons not-elect from all poſſible means of ſalvation; but a decree permitting ſuch out of the freedome of their own wills to neglect and abuſe ſuch means of their ſalvation: which abuſe foreſeen of God, is unto him a juſt cauſe of their damnation.

As for *veſſels of Honour* and *Diſhonour*, we grant, that not onely men may but do continually from veſſels of Diſhonour riſe to be veſſels of Honour. For when any man whatſoever, who hath lived in infidelity & uncleanneſſe of life, believeth, repenteth,

and

and leadeth a holy life, then a vessel of Dishonour becometh a vessel of Honour. But if by *vessels of Honour* you understand the Elect, and by *vessels of Dishonour* the Non-elect; and conceive such a change, that men not-elected may by acts of their own make themselves elected; this is a fansie contrary to truth, and rejected of all orthodox and judicious Divines; who consent, *Nec prædestinationem esse in potestate prædestinati sed prædestinantis, nec reprobationem in potestate reprobati sed reprobantis.* For we understand the Divine Reprobation, where there is not a Predestination unto effectuall and infallible means of eternall life. Now who can say, that it is in the power of mans will either to procure or hinder such a decree?

All the testimonies of the ancient Fathers here cited, do not prove the eternall decrees of Election and Non-election to be conditionall, or to depend upon the contrary foreseen actions of mens will; But they prove two other things, which we willingly grant: 1. That these decrees necessitate no mans will unto good actions, much lesse unto wicked. 2. That wicked men are not therefore damned because they were not predestinated, but because they lived and died obstinate in sinne.

As for the possibility which men non-elected have, either to believe or to eschew this

this or that sinne, and so to escape condemnation. The Fathers, when they consider that the wills of men not-elected do commit all their evil acts freely, usually say, that they had a power to have done the contrary: But when they consider the infallible certainty of their impietie and infidelity, then many times they pronounce it a thing impossible that they should unfeignedly repent, perseverantly believe, and finally attein salvation: Of which manner of phrase of speech we have frequent examples in Scripture, Fathers, Schoolmen, and all kind of Authours.

He that embraceth the opinion of the orthodox Fathers, cannot hold Predestination to be grounded upon the prevision of perseverant faith, since they confesse Perseverance to be an effect of Election; nor the decree of negative Reprobation to be grounded upon foresight of infidelitie, since Infidelity is a consequent thereof.

2. *Reason* UNWILLINGNESSE to be tried.

II. Its Unwillingnesse to abide the triall. I find that the authours and abettours of it have been very backward to bring it to the standart; not onely when they have been called upon by their adversaries to have it weighed, but also when they have been intreated thereto by their chief Magistrates, who might have compelled them: A shrewd argument (me thinks) that it is too light.

In the disputation at Mompelgart, *Anno* 1586. held between B. Iaa and Jacobus Andreæ, with some seconds on both sides,

sides, Beza and his company having disputed with the Lutheranes about the Person of Christ and the Lords Supper, when they came to this point, did decline the sifting of it, and gave this reason among others, That it could not then be publickly disputed of [b] *without the great scandal and hurt of the ignorant, and unacquainted with these high mysteries.* [c] The Contra-remonstrants also in their Conference with the opposite parties at the Hague, in the yeare 1611, could not be drawn to dispute with them about this point, but delivered a petition to the States of Holland and West-Friezland that they might not be urged to it, resolving rather to break off the conference then to meddle with it. In the Synod likewise at Dort, in the yeares 1618 and 1619, the Remonstrants were warned by the President of the Synod [d] *That they should rather dispute of the point of Election then the odious point of Reprobation.*

b *Beza in Coll. Mompelg. p. 373. Sine gravi eorum offendiculo qui tanti mysterii capaces non sunt.*

c *Brand. Coll. Hag. pag. 57.*

d *Acta Synod. part. 1. pag. 133. Ut de Electione potius quàm de odiosa Reprobationis materia agerent.*

Can this Doctrine be a truth, and yet blush at the light, which maketh all things manifest? especially considering these things: 1. That Reprobation is a principall head of Divinity, by the well or ill stating and ordering of which the glory of God and the good of Religion is much promoted or hindered. 2. That there is such a necessary connexion between the points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of Predestination) that the one cannot well be handled without the other. 3. That the Doctrine of Reprobation was the chief cause of all the uprores in the Church at that time. 4. That it was accused with open mouth and challenged of falshood, and therefore bound in justice to purge it self of the crimination. 5. That the Remonstrants did not at that time desire that it should be talked of among the common people, who might have stumbled at it, but disputed of among the judicious and learned, who (as the threshing Oxen which were to beat the corn out of the husk) are to bolt out those truths which are couched and hidden in the letter of the Scriptures.

That the Doctrine which is loth to abide the triall even of learned men, carrieth with it a shrewd suspicion of falshood, the heathen Orator shall witnesse for me: who to Epicurus, saying that he would not publish his opinion to the simple people, who might happily take offense at it, answereth thus; [e] *Declare thine opinion in the place of judgement; or if thou*

e *Cicero, de fin. bon. & mal. l. 2. pag.*

115. Aut tu eadem ista dic in judicio; aut si coronam times, dic in senatu. Nunquam facies. Cur nisi quòd turpis est oratio?

art afraid of the assembly there, declare it in the Senate-house, among those grave and judicious persons. *Thou wilt never do it: and why, but because it is a foul and dishonest opinion?*

This striving to lie close is (peradventure) no infallible argument of a bad cause, yet it is a very probable one. For true religion (as Vives saith) is not a thing *guilded over, but gold it self: The more that is scraped and discovered, the brighter and goodlier it is*; and so is the truth. [f] *Disputations illustrate and set forth true opinions more then silence can. Let us not fear therefore* (saith he) *lest our Faith when it is laid open, appear filthy to the eyes of the beholders.* [g] *Let false and superficiall religions, in which there is no soundnesse, be afraid of this.* The Jew is loth to reason with the Christian touching his Law, and the Turk is forbidden to dispute of his Alcoran, because their Religions are brittle, like glasse broken with the least touch: But the Christian, [h] who *is confident of the goodnesse of his Faith, feareth no examination, but rather as much as may be, soliciteth and provoketh his adversary to the combat.* Truth, whether it be in men or doctrines, is best when it is uncovered: it coveteth no corners, though Errour do; but it is willing to abide the triall. [i] *Search me, O Lord, and know my heart; try me, and know my thoughts, and see if there be any way of wickednesse in me,* saith the Prophet David, knowing his heart to be without guile. And our Saviour telleth us, [k] *That every one that doeth evil, hateth the light, and cometh not to it, lest his deeds should be reproved: but he that doeth truth, cometh to the light, that his deeds might be made manifest that they are wrought in God.* As S[t] Paul saith of an heretick, * He is *αὐτοκατάκριτος, self condemned*; so we may say of heresie and untruth, It condemneth it self, and by nothing more then by refusing the touchstone. He is to be thought an empty scholar, who is loth to be apposed; and his gold to be light and counterfeit, who will not have it toucht and weighed; and those opinions to be but errours, which would so willingly walk in a mist and dwell in silence, when it concerneth the peace of the Church so much to have them examined.

f *Vives, De ver. fidei, l. 1. p. 16.* Puriorem ac nitidiorem illam reddit bellum, quàm pax adversùs gentes.

g Metuant hoc aliæ religiones falsæ & umbratiles

h *Vives, l. 4. pag. 429.* Qui veritate suâ fidit, nihil reformidat examen ingenii, imò advocat & quantum potest exacuit.

i *Psal. 139. 23, 24.*

k *John 3. 20, 21.*

* *Tit. 3. 11.*

Answer.

IF *Unwillingnesse to abide the tryall* be an argument of a bad cause, never men shewed themselves more unwilling to abide the tryall of their doctrine in this controversie of Predestination and Reprobation then the Remonstrants. At the Synod of Dort, it being ordered by all the power Civil and Ecclesiasticall which was in the Commonwealth or Church, that the Remonstrants cited should lay down their opinion concerning Predestination and Reprobation, together with their reasons, and so expect the answer of the Synod; they first, contrary to all reason and to the duty which they ought to their chief magistrates, would begin at the point of Reprobation, or do nothing at all. And as if this had not sufficiently expressed their perversenesse, they refused to set down their own tenents, and to confirm them; and would needs make themselves opponents, and put the Synod to answer such objections or cavills as for the most part were scraped together out of the writings of men either dead long since, or not there to answer for themselves: with whom the Synod had no reason then to meddle.

It was intended and yielded unto them, that the point of Reprobation should also

be treated upon in due place and time. That which was denied them, was their prepoſterous demand of ſetting Reprobation before Election; whereas Reprobation, being the negative act of Election, cannot be well ſtated, ordered or underſtood, if men will needs begin at the wrong end.

It is true that the doctrine of Reprobation was *the chief cauſe of uprores* on the Remonſtrant party: But the doctrine of Conditionall Predeſtination, whereby they endeavoured to ſet the rotten Dagon of mans Free-will before and above the Ark of Gods ſpeciall predeſtinating Grace, was it which chiefly offended both the orthodox miniſters & people in the Belgick Churches. And if any were ever bound in juſtice and duty to purge themſelves from crimination, it lay then upon the Remonſtrants, who were cited unto the Synod by publick Authoritie, ſo to do; and not upon the Synod, to ſubmit themſelves unto the wilfulneſſe of thoſe who appeared there as delinquents. If here in our Church of England the Nonconformitants ſummoned to lay down their own opinions concerning their Presbyteriall Parity together with their proofs and arguments, ſhould refuſe to do it, and ſtiffly ſtand upon it that they will firſt oppoſe the Epiſcopall authoritie, which hath given all the offenſe, and hear what the Biſhops

ſhops can ſay for themſelves, it would be deemed an inſolent part, and not ſo long tolerated as it was by the Synod of Dort. And yet this was juſt the caſe and behaviour of the Remonſtrants: which this Authour doth not onely endeavour to juſtifie, but to caſt an aſperſion upon the Synod for not obeying thoſe who in ſuch a caſe owed obedience unto them.

And yet that it may further appear how fearfull the Remonſtrants were of clearly and plainly opening their own tenents at that time; When by reaſon of their obſtinacy the Synod was reſolved to diſmiſſe them, and yet deſired withall to know their doctrine concerning the controverſed articles, it was asked of them ſeverally, whether they now acknowledged for their doctrine that which formerly they had ſet down *in Collatione Hagienſi*, and ſince publiſhed in print unto the world; not one of the fourteen could be drawn to ſay in plain and expreſſe terms, that he either held that doctrine for true, or that he held it not. If Unwillingneſſe therefore to come to open tryall be a ſigne of falſe doctrine, you had ſmall reaſon to become a Remonſtrant.

The queſtion was not, Whether the controverſie of Reprobation were to be treated upon or no, but, Whether the Remon-

strants were to prescribe the Synod their order and proceeding, or the Synod them, And then the Remonstrants devised another shift to put off the declaring and opening their own doctrine; and that was, That unlesse they might be promised beforehand a liberty [a] *eo modo causam suam propanendi, explicandi & defendendi, prout ipsi necessarium judicarent*, they refused any farther to proceed in laying down their opinions. If the Synod had been so foolish as to make the Remonstrants the moderatours, in all likelihood they had sat there till this day, perchance to their lives end, and yet never have brought one controversie to an end.

[a] *Act. Syn. Dordrecht. Sess. 42.*

If this Authour had been truly informed how the Remonstrants carried themselves in suppressing their own opinions, and onely aiming at the exagitating of other mens, he would have forborn his excursion into this common place. But it should seem he was more willing to believe what he desired should be true, then to enquire what indeed was true.

If *Striving to lie close* be *a probable argument of a bad cause*, those who are afraid to deal with the more lightsome part of this controversie, which concerneth Election and Predestination, and thrust themselves, without borrowing any light from this, into the other (which taken by it self is much

much more dark and obscure,) are the men who strive to wrap themselves and others in an obscure and dark cloud. Our Church of England was more willing and desirous to set down expressely the doctrine of absolute Predestination, I mean of Predestination causing faith and perseverance, then it was of absolute negative Reprobation, I mean of such Reprobation as implyeth in God a will of permitting some mens finall impietie and impenitencie, and of justly ordaining them unto punishment for the same: And yet the latter doth plainly follow upon the truth of the former. It was wisdome, & not *Jewish* or *Turkish* fear, which made our Church so clear in the Article for absolute Predestination, and yet so reserved in the other; easily perceiving that Predestination of some men cannot be affirmed, but Non-predestination or Preterition or negative Reprobation (call it as you please) of some others must needs therewith be understood.

Though *Truth* be *best uncovered*, yet all truths are not of the same nature, nor alike profitable to be debated upon: Yet for the truth of absolute Reprobation, so farre forth as it is connexed and conjoyned with absolute Predestination; when the main intent of the Remonstrants is by opposing of the former to overthrow the latter, it im-

porteth those who have subscribed to the xviiith Article not to suffer it to be obliquely undermined.

Treatise.

3. Reason Infamie.

III. The (A) Infamy of it. It is an opinion (especially as it is defended the upper way) odious to the Papists, opening their foul mouths against our Church and Religion; abhorred (maintained either way) by all the Lutherans, who for this very Tenet call us *damned Calvinists*, think us unworthy to be above ground, and in their writings protest that they will rather unite themselves to the Papists then to us: And it is also distastfull to all the Greek Churches, which are very many. Molin in his Anatomie, speaking of the Supralapsarian Doctrine, saith, [l] If it should be so that God hath reprobated men without the consideration of sinne, or hath ordained them to sinne, yet it is the part of a wise man to conceal these things, or not to know them, rather then to utter them; [m] *Because when they are taught and defended they fill mens heads with scruples, and give occasion to the adversaries of defaming the true religion.* The same may as truly be said of the Sublapsarian way: For (as I have said) they are in substance all one. And Sr Edwine Sandys is of the same mind too: For in his most excellent Book called *A Survey of the state of religion in the western parts of the world*, speaking of the deadly division between the Lutherans and Calvinists in Germany, he hath these words, That *though the Palsgrave and Landtgrave have with great judgement and wisdome, to asslake those flames, imposed silence in that part to the Ministers of their party, hoping the charitie and discretion of the other partie would have done the like; yet it fareth out otherwise: For both the Lutherane preachers rail as bitterly against them in their pulpits as ever, and their Princes and people have them in as great detestation, not forbearing to professe openly, that they will return to the Papacy rather then ever admit that Sacramentary and* (B) *Predestinary pestilence. For these two points are the ground of the quarrel, and the latter more scandalous at this day then the former.* And in the same book, pag. 194. and 198. speaking of men whom he commendeth for *singular learning*

and

l *Molin. Anat. Arm. c. 12. de Prædest.*

m Quia enunciata injiciunt scrupulos; & ansam præbent adversariis infamandi veram religionem.

Sir *Edwine Sandys*, pag. 172.

and pietie (whose judgement he so setteth down as that he declareth it to be his own) he saith, that they think *it were no blemish for the* (C) Reformed Doctours *to revise their doctrines, and to rebate the rigour of certain speculative opinions* (for so he is pleased to call them) *especially touching the eternall decrees of God: wherein some of their chief authours have run into such an extreme to all Romish doctrine, as to have exceedingly scandalized all other Churches withall, yea and many of their own to rest very ill satisfied.*

At the closing up of the Conference at Mompelgart, * when Frederick Earl of Wortenberg exhorted his Divines to acknowledge Beza and his company for brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hand, they utterly refused, saying they would pray to God to open their eyes, and would do them any office of humanitie and charitie, but they would not give them the right hand of brotherhood, because they were proved to be guiltie *errorum teterrimorum*, of most pestilent errours, among which this they reckoned for one. * *Coll. Momp. p. 566, 567. Osiand. Hist. Eccles. p. 1040. Cent. 16.*

Hemingius left his own side, and joyned with us in the point of the Sacrament: but he would come no nearer, maintaining alwayes a distance in this.

And as for the Grecians, we learn also by Sir Edwine Sandys his Relation, * that *they do mightily dissent from that doctrine touching the eternall counsels of God which Calvine* (as some conceive) *first* (D) *fully revealed or rather introduced into the Christian world, and since some of his friends and followers have seconded, as thinking it very injurious to the goodnesse of God, and directly and immediately opposite to his very nature. In regard of which one of their Bishops hath written a book against it, which hath been sent to Geneva, and there received.* * *Pag. 237.*

It is a morsell which the greatest part of Christian Churches cannot swallow: and therefore (I think) it should not very easily without suspicion down with us.

And to say one thing more; Besides this infamie of it among Christians, it is very probable, that among the too many scandals given to the Jews by Christians, among whom they dwell, this doctrine is not one of the least rubs in the way of their conversion. * *For they think it a* (E) *bad opinion* (saith the same judicious & learned Gentleman) *which some of great name have seemed to hold, That God in his everlasting and absolute pleasure should affect the extreme misery of any of his creatures for the shewing of his justice and severitie* * *Pag. 223, 224.*

severity in tormenting them, or that the calamity, casting away and damnation of some should absolutely and necessarily redound more to his glory then the felicity of them all; considering that his nature is mere goodnesse and happinesse, and hath no affinitie with rigour or misery. This is my third reason.

Answer.

A VVHereas this Authour goeth about to make men believe that there lieth a common *infamy* upon the opinion of the Supralapsarians; if that which he calleth the *Supralapsarians upper way* be onely that way which conceiveth the decrees of Predestination & Preterition in order of prioritie antecedent to the Permission of sinne, & therefore much more to the Prevision, it is so farre from being odious to the Romanists as that it is an opinion commonly received amongst them, as before hath been shewed. But if he bring this under the name of the *Supralapsarian Doctrine*, That any men are ordained unto damnation without all consideration of sinne, this is a calumnie of their Adversaries, not an *infamie* sticking to the opinion it self. And indeed it is impossible, that God, who by his infinite knowledge seeth not one thing after another as wee, but all things together by one infinite and eternall act, should predestinate or reprobate without prevision or consideration of sinne. That onely which is maintained by the judicious in the upper way, is this, That originall

originall sinne though eternally foreseen by God, yet neither was nor could be the cause why Peter was predestinated, and Judas not; seeing it was foreseen in both alike, and made them both *ex aque reprobabiles*: Which sheweth that it was Gods free pleasure to make a difference by Election and Not-election, where there was no foreseen difference in regard of originall corruption.

So likewise for actuall sinnes, as Infidelitie, Impenitencie, and the like, and for all good acts, as Repenting, Believing, Perseavering; no man can truly say, that God electeth some men and passeth-by others without the eternall cognition or consideration of these future actions. This were either to make God ignorant, or discursive, considering first one thing, then another, as we our selves do.

But the consideration of good or bad actions which is denied in the point of Election and Non-election, is such a consideration as procureth and draweth after it the distinct opposite decrees of Election or negative Reprobation.

As for the introduction of some men into the kingdome of heaven, and the abjection of others into the torments of hell; it is willingly granted, that the holy and good acts of the one are foreappointed and

and foreseen as the way and means where by God will bring them thither; and the voluntary wicked actions of the other, as the means whereby, and the misdeserts for which they are brought into hell, and there justly tormented.

As for the Lutheranes, that bring-in a conditionate Predestination; No man can look into Luthers works, but must needs see they have forsaken their own Master; and therefore they are lesse to be regarded when they rail upon the Calvinists.

For the Greek Churches; If they tread in the steps of the learned and ancient Greek Fathers, they may found Predestination upon Prescience, but not upon the Pelagian or Arminian Prescience, which they make *merely intuitive*, and caused by the object foreseen; but by a Prescience *practicall* or *factive* of that good which it foreseeth in the Elected, and *permissive* of those voluntary evil actions which are foreseen in the Non-elected; and also *preparative* of their just punishment.

The Sublapsarian way of considering this high mystery of Predestination and negative Reprobation, is the way which the Church of England taketh, as the more easy for our understanding. And it so walketh in this way, that it maketh Predestination an absolute decree of giving grace and

and glory unto the predeſtinate, and not a conditionate decree foreſeeing their gracious actions, and thereupon predeſtinating them: And by this it ſilently teacheth us what to think of negative Reprobation, which cannot be ſevered from Election.

If you embrace the late Lutheranes opinion, and bring within the compaſſe of the *Predeſtinary peſtilence* the doctrine of Predeſtination which they diſallow, you manifeſtly brand the Church of England with this note of infamy, and might as well charge us with the *Sacramentary peſtilence* for denying their feigned Conſubſtantiation and Orall manducation of the fleſh of Chriſt, as with the *Predeſtinary peſtilence* for denying their Conditionall Predeſtination upon foreſight of mens belief in Chriſt. The Lutheranes make Predeſtination or Election nothing elſe but a revealed decree of beſtowing eternall life upon thoſe which ſhall perſeverantly believe in Chriſt; and conſequently they make Reprobation nothing elſe but the revealed will of God to condemne all thoſe who ſhall continue in their infidelity and obſtinacy. Our Church acknowledgeth the truth of ſuch decrees; but it placeth not Election or Reprobation in ſuch generall conditionate decrees. The decree of Election or Predeſtination is by us conceived [a] an act of Gods abſolute

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[a] *Vide Pr. nott. pag.* 398.

absolute will by effectuall grace mercifully ordaining certain persons unto the infallible atteinment of glory. In this decree, Faith Perseverance, and all saving graces are not in order of nature the foreseen conditions but the afterseen effects of Predestination.

So likewise our Church conceiveth Reprobation to be [b] *negativus actus prædestinationis*, a free act of the Divine will denying the speciall benefit or favour of Predestination (which is the preparation of grace, infallibly bringing men unto glory) to some certain persons. As for positive Reprobation (which is eternall damnation) this our Church foundeth upon the guilt and demerit of mans sinne. We say therefore with a learned writer of the Romish Church (to whom you think this opinion to be so odious) [c] *Omnibus hominibus consideratis sub esse possibili prius ratione quàm prædestinarentur aut reprobarentur, nulla fuit ratio discriminis quæ potuerit Divinam voluntatem inclinare ut prædestinationem Judæ negaret potiùs quàm Paulo.* And again, [d] *Nulla scientia visionis ultimò formaliterq; constituit reprobationem, sed potiùs totam reprobationem supponit ex parte objecti.* So that all they, whether Lutheranes or Remonstrants, who make Predestination nothing but the will of God to save believers, and Reprobation or Preterition nothing else but

[b] *Vide Penott. pag. 393.*

[c] *Ruiz. De Prædest. & Repr. disp. 2. §. 2. pag. 19.*

[d] *Ibid. pag. 22.*

the

the will of God to damne unbelievers, retein for fashions sake the old words, but obtrude a new notion of those words upon the Christian Church.

In vain therefore it is to dispute with those about Election and Preterition who reject all the definitions or descriptions given by ancient Divines, and bring new ones of their own coyning.

If in explicating the decree of Predestination (which is a decree preparing speciall and effectuall grace for the predestinate) and handling the opposite decree of Preterition or negative Reprobation (which is a Decree, not of denying all grace, nor of causing any malice, but onely of denying speciall grace) some of the Reformed Doctours have run into any extremity, it becometh judicious Divines not to run into another extremitie, by founding Election and Preterition upon the foreseen acts of mans will, but to keep the middle way, and to remember the old saying, *Ità fugias ne præter cæsam.* C

That which exasperateth the Lutheranes against Calvines doctrine, was their own collection, That it made God the authour of sinne, and a damner of men to hell-torments onely for his mere pleasure, which opinions are justly to be detested: But Calvine both by his own writings, and by divers

vers learned writers [e] of our Church hath been sufficiently cleared from these false and malicious calumniations.

Jacobus Andreæ is no competent judge over Beza his antagonist: and if he were, yet we deny, that the rejecting of conditionate Predestination is to be reckoned amongst his errours.

They are grossely deceived who think Calvine was the first that defended Absolute Predestination and Reprobation, and who opposed Conditionate Predestination and Reprobation grounded upon the prescience of the good and bad acts of the Elect and Non-elect. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, all who opposed the Semipelagians, were of this mind: And amongst the Papists themselves [f] the fansie of conditionall Predestination and Reprobation is commonly rejected. Any man who understandeth that God out of his own free-will and speciall mercy hath elected some unto the infallible means and blessed end of eternall life, may as easily conceive that out of his own free-will he hath denyed the said speciall mercy unto some others, and so permitted them to fail in the atteinment of eternall life: For if that [g] be true (which all orthodox Divines are agreed upon) that both the materiall and formall number of men elected, or (as other term it) the *numerus numerans*

[e] *Vide Cranthorp. Defense Angl. c. 35. & Bishop of Ely his Defense of the orthodox faith, p. 228.*

[f] *Vide Carthusianum, in 1. Sent. disp. 41. p. 549. & Valentianum, tom. 1 disp. 1. qu. 23. De reprob. punct. 3. ubi agnoscit multos scholasticos idem sentire cum Calvino. Vide Suarez. Opusc. l. 2. pag. 174, &c. Ex nostris, Paul. Fer. Schol. orth. c. 28. & Fr. White, Defense of the Orthodox way, p. 231.*

[g] *Penott. p. 393.*

petrans and *numerus numeratus*, is eternally designed according to Gods own good pleasure, it must needs be acknowledged, that *in eodem signo rationis* there is a number also of men not elected, who are left out in this gracious designation. Suarez giveth a satisfactory reason why there can be no cruelty or injustice in this negative Reprobation, [h] *Quia hæc non-electio non est pœna, sed est solùm quædam negatio gratuiti beneficii quod Deus ut supremus Dominus negare potest.*

[h] *Opusc. l. 2. pag. 175.*

This may well be esteemed a *bad opinion*: But *non-prædestinatio*, *non-electio*, or *negativa reprobatio* importeth no such thing; as is evident *in angelis non-electis*. E

It is one thing *to affect the extreme misery of his Creature for the end of shewing his justice in tormenting it*; another, for God to [i] suffer some of his Creatures through their own default to fall into extreme misery, to resolve not to free them, and to decree their just punishment. And if any one will go about to bind God to prepare effectuall grace for all men we answer, It is lawfull for God to do as he listeth with his own. And it is usuall with God to dispence aswell supernaturall as naturall benefits according to his own absolute will and free pleasure. If God should necessitate any mans finall impenitency, that

[i] *Pen. pag. 398.*

so he might afterwards cast him into hell, this were to *affect his misery*: but the sinne and obstinacy in sinne of all the damned, was their own and voluntary, not of Gods causing, much lesse necessitating.

God is not to learn of us what maketh most for his own *glory*. He could have upheld the Angels which made a voluntary apostasie from him; he could have upheld our first Parents; he could by his speciall and effectuall grace have brought every particular man in the world unto salvation: and all this he could undoubtedly have done without prejudice to the Creatures free-will: But since we know and see he hath done otherwise, we must confesse that this order of Divine Providence, whereby he hath decreed to guide and bring some infallibly unto eternall happinesse, and whereby he hath decreed to permit some infallibly to fall into eternall misery, doth make most for his glory.

Treatise.

4. *Reason* AFFINITY to Fate

IV. The fourth, its *Affinitie* with the old exploded errours of the Stoicks and Manichees.

The opinion (*A*) of the Stoicks was, That all actions and events were unavoydable, determined either by the revolutions of the heavens, and the qualities of such starres as reigned at mens births, or by the concatenation of naturall things and the disposition of the first matter, all things being so put together from eternitie that one thing must needs follow another as it doth; and the *prima materia* being

being so disposed, that things cannot successively come to passe otherwise then they do, but must of necessitie be as they are, even *invito Deo*, though God would have some things to be otherwise then they are.

The Manichees held, That all mens actions, good or evil, were determined too; good actions by a good God, who was the authour of all good things that were created, and of all good actions that came to passe in the world; evil actions by an evil God, who was the *primum principium mali*, the prime authour of all evil things or actions that were extant in the world.

The mainteiners of the absolute decree do say one of these two things, either, That all actions, naturall and morall, good and evil, and all events likewise, are absolutely necessary; so the Supralapsarians: or, That all mens ends (at least) are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their wills; so the Sublapsarians: And this is upon the matter all one with the former. For first, (B) in vain is our freedome in the actions and means, if the end at which they drive be pitched and determined; sith all actions are for the ends sake, that it might be obteined by them, which without them could not. And secondly, the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the means that precede that end; as if a man be fore-determined to damnation, he must unavoydably sinne, else he could not be damned.

Now in these three opinions we may note two things.

1. The Substance and formalitie of them, which is an unavoidableneese of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be. In this all of them agree, all holding that in all things, at least in all mens ends, *undeclinable Fates* and insuperable Necessitie do domineere. And therefore (C) Melanchthon doth not stick sundry times in his Common places to call this Absolute decree *fatum Stoicum & tabulas Parcarum*, Stoicall fate and the Destinies tables. He also chargeth the Church of Geneva (the great Patrone of it) with a labour to bring-in the Stoicks errour, as we may see in a certain Epistle of Melanchthons to Peucer, where he hath these words; [n] *Lelius writeth unto me, that in Geneva there is such strife*

[n] *Melanch. in Epist. ad Peucer.* Scribit ad me Lælius, de Stoico fato usq; adeò litem Genevæ moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quòd à Zenone differret. O misera temporal Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur.

about the Stoicks Fate, that one was cast into prison because he dissented from Zeno. O miserable times! &c. And by the testimony of Beza too, who speaking of Melanchthon saith, o *Philip hath so written of these things, as if he meant to take the Geneva-Divines for bringers-in of Destiny.*

o Beza in vita Calvini; Philippus de his rebus ità scribere cœperat, ut Genevenses quasi Stoicum fatum invehentes notare quibusdam videatur.

2. We may note the Circumstance or the grounds of their opinions. The Stoicks (*D*) derive this necessitie from the starres or the first matter; the Manichees from two *principia, æterna & coæterna*, first prineiples of all things eternall and coeternall; these last, from the peremptory decree of almighty God. So that they differ in their grounds indeed: but in this difference the Stoicks and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive this necessitie of evil actions and unhappy events from an evil God or the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of their opinions is all one: the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to the errour.

Which being so, for this very reason alone may this doctrine of Absolute Reprobation be suspected: because those dreams of the Stoicks were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts; and this of the Manichees was generally cryed-down by the Fathers, not onely as foolish, but impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian heart or Christian Common-wealth, not so much for any thing circumstantiall in it, as for the substance of the errour, because it made all things and events to be necessary, and so plucked up the roots of virtue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments.

These are my reasons of the first sort.

Answer.

A YOu are mistaken in the *opinion of the Stoicks*. For though they held a necessary concatenation of causes over-ruling all externall events, yet they were of a near kin to the Pelagians, and thought mans will such an absolute Commandresse, that for his goodnesse, virtues and happinesse a man need be beholding onely to himself. *Vide Augus.*

August. de Civ. lib. 5. cap. 10. & Plat. 10. de Republ. pag. 617. & Senec. Epist. 31. 41. 93. The Remonstrants in a manner acknowledge this mistake, *Exam. Censura, pag. 79.* The *mainteiners of the Absolute decree* hold that nothing is acted in this world good or bad, without an eternall determination or decree of Gods will for the being of such a particular act: But they detest the Manichees; and make this difference betwixt good actions and bad, That good and holy actions have God not onely a determining cause for their event, but an effectuall working cause in their production; bad actions have God the determining cause of their event, but the permissive cause onely of their malice [a].

The *mainteiners of the Absolute decree*, whether *Supralapsarians* or *Sublapsarians*, hold no more necessitation to lie upon mens actions, ends, or upon any events depending upon mans free-will, then the mainteiners of the Conditionall decree of Election and negative Reprobation. Both hold the actions, events and ends of all things whether predestinated or foreseen to imply [b] *necessitatem infallibilitatis aut consequentis:* Neither hold that they imply *necessitatem coactionis aut consequentiæ.* For example; To reason thus, *God hath eternally foreseen Judas his impenitencie, and thereupon decreed him unto*

[a] *Vide Fr. White, Defense, p. 224. &c.*

[b] *Vide Aquin. contra Gent. 1. 67.*

eternall damnation; therefore Judas shall infallibly and unalterably continue impenitent, and at length be damned, is a true inference. But this, *God hath eternally foreseen Judas, &c. therefore Judas shall by coaction or compulsion of his will be made unalterably impenitent, and so be damned,* is a false conclusion. In like manner to reason thus, *God in his absolute decree of Reprobation or Non-election hath determined not to give Judas the speciall grace of repentance and perseverance, not to bestow upon him the benefit of eternall life; therefore Judas infallibly and unalterably will continue impenitent, obstinate, and will draw upon himself eternall death and damnation,* is a good inference: But this, *God in his absolute decree, &c. therefore Judas is compelled to be impenitent and obstinate and finally damned,* is not onely a weak and false but a wicked inference. For as the infallible prevision of God seeth from all eternity the actions of men and their ends, and yet this maketh not the *modus agendi* to be necessary or compulsory, but maketh the agent most free, as if he had never foreseen it: so the absolute decree of God to work repentance, faith and perseverance in Peter, and so to bring him infallibly to eternall life, maketh not the actions of believing, repenting, persevering necessary or compulsory, but maketh the agent most free in performing these actions; be-

because it giveth him that Spirit of which the Apostle saith, *Ubi Spiritus, ibi libertas.* And for the contrary absolute decree of Not-giving faith, finall perseverance and eternall life unto the Non-elect, it denieth them that grace which would effectually and infallibly make them produce good actions; but it depriveth them not of their own naturall freedome and liberty, neither doth it compell or constrain or necessitate them unto their bad actions. [c] *Divina voluntas non imponit necessitatem rebus volitis, quia ex voluntate ejus sequitur aliquid eo modo quo voluntas disponit, non eo modo quo voluntas habet esse.* And, [d] *Divina voluntas in contingentibus non tollit potentiam ad oppositum voluntatis, sed actum.* S. Augustine sheweth us the reason of this: [e] *Deus ità ordinat omnia, ut ipsa proprios motus exercere sinat.* From hence it appeareth how weak their judgement is who think Gods absolute decrees must needs absolutely destroy the freedome of mens wills; or, that where God is absolutely determined to permit any men to fail in the atteining of the blessed end of eternall life, there he must needs be the authour of the sinnes whereby they incurre eternall death.

[c] *Aquin. Quæst. de vol. Dei, art. 5.*

[d] *Ibid.*

[e] *De civit. 7. 30.*

In good actions the *freedome* of men elected is not *vain*, though *the end be determined*; because God hath together with the

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end determined that by their free actions they shall attein unto it. In bad and wicked actions of the reprobate their *freedome* of will is not *vain*; because thereby their consciences are convicted of their guiltinesse and misdeserts, and Gods justice is cleared in their damnation. Neither is there any *indeclinable* or *insuperable necessitie domineering* over free-will, more then in the opinion of the Remonstrants.

C *Melanchthon* took offense at the manner of delivering the doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation which some insisted upon, but for the substance of doctrine he acknowledgeth his agreement with Calvine. That men must come to knowledge of their Election from their faith and holy life, was Melanchthons opinion: but, That their foreseen faith and holinesse was the cause or condition or motive upon which God founded his decree of Election, was farre from his mind [f].

[f] *Vide Melanch. Enarr. in epist. ad Rom. p. 23, 24. & Calvin. Epist. p. 384.*

D For the *Stoicks*, it was before shewed that they were the Patrones of free-will, and of virtue and happinesse growing out of mans free-will, as it is to be seen in Tullie's Stoicall *Paradoxes*.

For the *Manichees*, who derived evil from an evil God; they were in a foul errour: But those who derive the evil actions of men from their own free-will as the proper

per efficient cause, & the existing or coming of such actions *in eventum à decreto Dei permittente & ordinante*, are in no errour at all. But if any shall go about to set mans will at libertie, & to tie up short the decreeing & determining will of God, as if this had not the determining stroke amongst all possible evil actions or events, which shall infallibly be, & which shall infallibly not be, he may avoid the suspicion of Stoicisme or Manicheisme, but he will hardly avoid the suspicion of Atheisme. For the greater number of mens actions being wicked and evil, if these come into act without Gods determinate counsel and decree, humane affairs are more overruled by mans will then by Gods.

g See Defence of the way, p. 228, 229.

The Stoicks mainteined free-will and free power in man to make himself virtuous and happie: From whence those Axiomes of theirs, h *Seipsâ contentam esse virtutem ad beatè vivendum*, Πάντες οἱ σοφοὶ ἐλεύθεροι, and the like: And that of Seneca, i *Beatæ vitæ causa & firmamentum est sibi fidere. Turpe est Deos fatigare: Quid votis opus est? fac te felicem.* k *Bonam mentem stultum est optare, cùm possis à te impetrare. Ratio recta & consummata felicitatem hominis implevit.* Whether the substance of these opinions belong to the Remonstrants or to their opposites, let any man judge.

h Cic. Parad. 2, & 5.

i Epist. 31. & 41.

k Epist. 77.

As for the Manichees, concerning *a good God* and *an evil God*, no man more cryed

el it down then S. Auguſtine, no man more ſtrongly confuted it; and yet the Remonſtrants cannot denie but he held abſolute Predeſtination and abſolute negative Reprobation, and alwayes oppoſed that Election and Non-election which the Semipelagians fetched from foreſeen merits and demerits, or (as the Remonſtrants change the words but not the ſubſtance of the opinion) from the foreſeen good and evil actions of men. As therefore we grant it a *fooliſh* and *impious* opinion, to father evil actions and unhappie events upon an evil God; ſo we avouch it a more *fooliſh* and *impious* opinion, to hold that abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation do either neceſſitate the wills of the elect unto their good actions, or the wills of the non-elect unto their wicked actions. Aquinas giveth this reaſon of both; [1] *Quia omnis effectus in neceſſitate & contingentia ſequitur cauſam proximam & non primam.*

[1] *In diſp. de Proph. art. 1.*

Treatiſe.

THe reaſons that have convinced me of the untruth of abſolute Reprobation now follow. And firſt of thoſe that fight againſt the upper way.

They are drawn *ab incommodo*, from the great evils and inconveniences which iſſue from it naturally: Which may be referred to two main heads: 1. The Diſhonour of God; 2. The Overthrow of religion and government.

1. *Inconvenience.* It diſhonoureth God: For it chargeth him deeply with two things no wayes agreeable to his nature: 1. Mens eternall Torments in hell; 2. Their Sinnes on earth.

I. FIRST,

1. First, it chargeth him with mens eternall Torments in hell, and maketh him (A) to be the Prime, Principall and Invincible cause of the damnation of millions of miserable souls: the Prime cause; because it reporteth him to have appointed them to destruction of his own voluntary disposition, antecedent to all deserts in them: and (B) the Principall and Invincible cause; because it maketh the damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoydable through Gods absolute and uncontrollable decree, and so necessary that they can no more escape it then poore Astyanax could avoid the breaking of his neck when the Grecians tumbled him down from the tower of Troy. Now this is a heavie charge, contrary to Scripture, Gods Nature, and sound Reason.

1. To Scripture: Which (C) maketh man the principall, nay the onely cause (in opposition to God) of his own ruine. *Thy destruction is of thy self, O Israel: but in me is thy help*, Hos. 13. 9 *As I live, saith the Lord, I will not the death of the wicked*, &c. *Turn ye, turn ye: why will ye die?* Ezek. 33. 11. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men*, Lam. 3. 33. To which speeches for likenesse sake I will joyn one of Prospers; p *Gods Predestination is to many the cause of standing, to none of falling.*

p *Resp. ad 12. Object. Vincent.* Praedestinatio Dei multis est causa standi, nemini est causa labendi.

2. It is (D) contrary to Gods nature: q Who setteth forth himself to be *a God mercifull, gracious, long-suffering, abundant in goodnesse*, &c. and he is acknowledged to be so by King David; r *Thou Lord art good and mercifull, and of great kindnesse to all them that call upon thee.* and by the Prophets Joel, Jonah, and Micah: * *He is gracious and mercifull, slow to anger, and of great kindnesse*, saith Joel. *I know*, saith * Jonah, *that thou art a gracious God and mercifull, slow to anger, and of great kindnesse.* and, * *Who*, saith Micah, *is a God like unto thee, that taketh away iniquity?* &c. *He reteineth not his wrath for ever, because mercy pleaseth him.*

q *Exod. 34. 6.*
r *Psal. 86. 5.*
* *Joel 2. 13.*
* *Jonah 4. 2.*
* *Micah 7. 18.*

3. It is contrary also to (E) sound Reason: Which cannot but argue such a decree of extreme cruelty, and consequently remove it from the Father of mercies. We cannot in reason think that any man in the world can so farre put off humanity and nature, as to resolve with himself to marry and beget children, that after they are born and had lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, tear their flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones with burning

burning pincers, or put them to any cruel tortures, that by thus torturing them he may shew what his authoritie and power is over them. Much lesse can we believe without great violence to reason, that the God of mercie can so farre forget himself, as out of his absolute pleasure to ordain such infinite multitudes of his children made after his own image to everlasting fire, and (F) create them one after another, that after the end of a short life here, he might torment them without end hereafter, to shew his power and sovereigntie over them. If to *destroy the righteous with the wicked* temporally, be such a piece of injustice, that Abraham removeth it from God with an ABSIT, *wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked? That be farre from thee, O Lord. Shall not the judge of all the world do right?* how deeply (may we think) would that good man have detested one single thought, that God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent souls eternally in hell-fire?

Gen. 18.25.

Object. But God (say some) is sovereigne Lord of all creatures and men: they are truly and properly his own: Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth, and do with his own what he will?

Answ. The question is not, what an Almighty Sovereigntie and power can do to poore vassals; but, what a power that is Just and Good may do. By the power of a Lord, his absolute and naked power, he can cast away the whole masse of mankind; for it is not repugnant to omnipotencie or sovereigntie: but by the power of a Judge, to wit, that actuall power of his which is alwayes clothed with goodnesse and justice, he cannot. For it is not compatible (G) with these properties in God, to appoint men to hell of his mere will and pleasure, no fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternall mind.

1. It is not compatible with Justice: Which is a constant will of rendring to every one his proper due, and that is vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. [f] *God is good* (saith S. Augustine) *and God is just: he may without any deserts free men from punishment, because he is good; but he cannot without evil deservings condemn any man, because he is just.* In another place also he saith, [t] *If God be believed to damne any man that by sinne deserveth it not, he is not believed to be free from injustice.*

2. Nor is it compatible with Goodnesse: Which is an in-

f *August. lib. 3. cont. Julian. c. 11. pag. 164.* Bonus est Deus, justus est Deus: potest aliquem sine bonis meritis liberare, quia bonus est; non potest quenquam sine malis meritis damnare, quia justus est.

t *Aug. epist. 106. ad Bonifac.* Quenquam verò immeritum & nulli obnoxiam peccato si Deus damnare creditur, alienus ab iniquitate non creditur.

clination

clination in God of communicating that good which is in himself to his creatures, as farre as he can without wronging his Justice: And therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) *good to all*, it cannot be that he should of himself without any motive in the reasonable creature provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it or bestowing any good at all upon it.

It is further objected, (*H*) That we do and may slaughter our beasts for our dayly use without any cruelty or injustice; and therefore God may as well, nay much more, appoint as many of us as he pleaseth to the torments of hell for his glory, and yet be just and good notwithstanding: for there is a greater disproportion between God and us then between us and beasts. *Object. 2. Park. De Prad. pag. 25.*

For answer to this we are first to premise thus much, namely, That our slaughtering of our beasts for our daily use, is by Gods ordinance and appointment: We had not this authority of our selves, but God of his bounty towards us gave it us, as we may see Gen. 9. 2, 3. where we may observe, First, that God delivereth up all creatures, beasts, birds, and fishes, into the hands of men; Secondly, that the end why he doth so, is, that they might be meat for men, and consequently that they might be slain. Which being so, our slaughtering of oxen, sheep and other creatures for our daily use, is to be accounted Gods doing rather then ours. And therefore the objection should have been made thus; God may without any breach of goodnesse or justice appoint brute creatures to be slain for mans use, therefore he may ordain men to be cast into hell-torments for ever for his own use, that is for the declaration of his sovereignty, &c. *Answ. 1.*

This being premised, I answer further, That this comparison holdeth not: For there is little proportion between the Objects compared, and lesse between the Acts.

1. There is but small proportion between the objects, Beasts and Men, creatures of a different nature and made for a different end. Beasts are void of reason and liberty in their actions, creatures whose beings vanish with their breath, made onely for the use and service of men upon earth: But Men are reasonable and understanding creatures, able through the Creatours bounty to discern between good and evil, and according to their first principles to choose the good and forsake the evil: they are the very image of Gods puritie and eternitie,

eternitie, and were made for the service of God alone upon earth, and his blessed and everlasting society in heaven. So that albeit there be a very great distance between God and Man, yet nothing so great as between God and Beasts. It followeth not therefore, that if God may appoint beasts to be killed of his own free pleasure for mans use, he may with like equitie and reason appoint men of his own will to destruction for his own use. We reade that God required of his people many thousand beasts for sacrifices, but not one man: the first-born of other creatures he challenged for burnt-offerings (except they were unclean beasts) but the first-born of men were to be redeemed: Which sheweth that he put a wide difference betwen the bloud of men and beasts. Besides, in the ninth of Genesis he giveth men power to kill and feed upon all living creatures, but he straitly forbiddeth them to shed mans bloud, and giveth this reason of the prohibition, *Man is the image of God.* So that we may well conclude that there is but small proportion between the objects compared, Men and Beasts, in respect of this act of killing or slaughtering.

2. There is farre lesse or rather no proportion at all between the acts compared, Killing and eternall Tormenting. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous injustice and cruelty torment his beast, and prolong the life of it that he may daily vex and torture it, to shew what power and soveraignty he hath over it: So I doubt not (though there be some that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely against God for affirming it) I doubt not (I say) but (1) God may kill a man of his own free pleasure, yea and resolve him into nothing, without any cruelty or injustice; because in so doing he doth but take away what he had given him: but he cannot without both these antecedently decree to keep him alive for ever in hell, that he may there torment him without end, to shew his soveraigntie. For this is to inflict an infinite evil upon a guiltlesse creature, to whom he had given but a finite good. And so is the comparison most unequall too in the acts compared; and therefore proveth just nothing.

Vid. Molinæi Enodat. quæst. gratiæ. p. 125.

But it is replyed by some (who will rather speak unreasonably & against common sense then lay down the conclusions which they have undertaken to maintein) That (K) it is *better* and more eligible *to be tortured in hell* then to want or lose a being: for he that wanteth a being, enjoyeth no goods;

D. Twisse his Vindic. grat. l. 2. part. 1. dig. 1. pag. 17. dist. 2.

good; but he that is tormented in hell, hath a being; and by consequence something that is good. If therefore God may take away a mans being that is innocent, and turn him into nothing for his pleasure, much more may he torment him in hell.

I. To the first part of this Reply, namely, That it is more desirable to be in hell then to be nothing, I oppose three things. *Answer I.*

First, the [L] speech of our Saviour concerning Judas; *wo be to that man by whom the Sonne of man is betrayed: it had been good for that man if he had never been born.* Two things especially are set forth in these words of our Saviour: 1. The miserie of Judas the betrayer of his Lord; *wo be to*, &c. 2. The greatnesse of his miserie, *It had been good*, &c. It [M] is as much as if our Lord had said, Judas the Traytour shall be damned: and therefore so wofull will his condition be, that it had been good and happy for him if he had never received a being: good in earnest, as Interpreters do generally expound it; not in the opinion and esteem of weak-minded and faint-hearted men onely, as some few understand it. For First, let it be granted that the Scripture speaketh of things sometimes according to mens opinions; yet without reason to fasten such an exposition upon any Scripture, is to do as Dunses do in the Schools, who being not able to answer a place in Aristotle wherewith they are charged, shift it off and say, *Loquitur ex aliorum sententia*, He speaketh according to the opinion of others. Secondly, This Scripture [N] cannot in reason be thus expounded, 1. Because it is an argument and ground by which Christ declareth the truth or greatnesse of the misery of Judas, *wo to the man*, &c. And why *wo*? Because *it had been good*, &c. But it were no argument to shew his wofull estate by, to say that it had been good for him that he had never been born in the opinion of men who mistake the case, but not in truth. 2. Because this exposition would teach and [O] encourage men to be Atheists and Epicures. In the second of *Wisdome* we reade, how voluptuous men do stirre up one another to *enjoy the good things that are present*, to *fill themselves with wine and oyntments*, to *leave some tokens of their jollitie in every place*, and to practice all manner of wickednesse: and what is their motive? A false perswasion that their souls should die with their bodies, and that they should have no being after death. If this conceit could flesh them thus in

Matth. 26. 24

their

their impious and voluptuous courses, how freely and eagerly (may we think) would they pursue their carnall and sinful delights, if they could be but once perswaded, that after all their pleasures they shall be in a better case then if they had no being?

Secondly, I oppose common consent. Where shall we pick out a man but will say (P) (if he speak from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thousand nothings then to be cast into hell? What is the reason why men are so afraid of hell when they are touched to the quick with the conscience of their ungodly lives and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with Job they curse their birth-day, and wish an hundred times over that they had never been, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into the place of torments; but because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse then no being any-where? And why are men who are sensible of hell-fire, so strongly curbed and held-in by the fear of feeling it, even from darling and beloved sinnes, but because they apprehend it to be the most terrible of all terribles? Fear of being annihilated can never do that which the fear of hell doth.

The third thing which I oppose is common sense: which judgeth (Q) pains when they are extreme to be worse then death. Hence it is that Job being tormented in his body by the devil, cursed his birth-day, magnified the condition of the dead, and wished himself in the grave, plainly preferring the losse of his being before that miserable being which he then had. And hence it is that men even of stoutest and hardest spirits (as we see by daily experience) would (if they might enjoy their opinion) choose rather to have no bodies at all, then bodies tormented with the stone, or gout, or any other sharp and sensible disease. It is a known saying grounded on this judgement of sense, *Præstat semel quàm semper mori*, Better it is to die once then to be alwayes dying. This the Tyrant Tiberius knew very well: and therefore he would not suffer those towards whom he purposed to exercise his cruelty to be put to a speedie death, but to lingring torments, as Suetonius reporteth of him in that chapter where he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruel practices. [u] *Those* (saith he) *who* through the extremitie of their torments *would have died, he used means to keep alive. Nam mortem adeò leve supplicium putabat*, For he accounted death so light a punishment, that when he heard that one Carnulius, a man appointed to torments,

u *Sueton. vit. Tib. cap.* 61. Mori volentibus vis adhibita vivendi.

ments, had prevented him, he cried out, *Carnulius me evasit*, Carnulius hath escaped my hands. To a prisoner intreating him to put him quickly to death, he gave this answer, *Nondum tecum redii in gratiam*, I am not yet friends with thee; accounting it great kindnesse to put him quickly to death whom he might have tortured. Many (*R*) that were called into question, did partly wound themselves in their own houses, *ad vexationem ignominiámque vitandam*, to prevent that pain and ignominy which they knew they should endure; and partly poysoned themselves in the midst of the court as they were going to their arraignment for the same cause. Seneca speaking of one Mecænas, who was so afraid of being dead that he said he would not refuse weakenesse, deformitie, *nec acutam crucem*, no nor the sharpest crucifying, (*w*) *so that he might live still in the midst of these extremities*, he calleth his desire *turpissimum votum*, a base and most ignoble and unnaturall wish, and censureth him for a most effeminate and contemptible man; (*x*) because in all his evils *he was afraid of that which was the end of all evils*, the privation of his being. And certainly we must needs conceive and censure them to be stocks and stones rather then flesh and bloud, who can so put off all feeling and sense, as to think a tormented being in hell to be a lighter and lesser evil then no being at all.

(*w*) *Seneca Epist. l. 17. Epist. 101. Dummodo inter hæc mala spiritus prorogetur.*

(*x*) *Quia dixit id quod est in malis optimum, supplicii finem.*

II. To the reason on which the Reply is grounded, which is, *Melius est esse quàm non esse*, It is better to be then to have no being, I answer that it is a sophisme or fallacy *à non distributo ad distributum*. *To be* in it self is better then *Not to be*: but it is not universally true in all particulars. Again, it is true in some cases, & *ex hypothesi*, *si cætera sint paria*, if there be any equality in the adjuncts. It is so farre from being simply true, that our Saviour limiteth it, and putteth a case wherein it is not true, but the contrary to it is true; and that is the case of *Judas*, of which we have said somewhat before: *It had been good*, &c. Which words S. Hierome expounding, saith, (*y*) *It is simply and plainly averred* by our Saviour *that it is better to have no being then an ill being*. This was the judgement too of Job, chap. 3. v. 11, 12, 13. *Why dyed I not*, saith he, *in the birth? why did the knees prevent me? and why did I suck the breasts? For now should I have lyen still and been quiet: I should have slept then and been at rest*. In which words he plainly implyeth, that he thought it farre better to have had no birth and being then

Answer 2.

(*y*) *Hieron. comment. in Matt c. 26. v. 24. Simpliciter dictum est, Melius est non subsistere quàm male subsistere.*

such a painfull and miserable being. This was also the opinion of Solomon, Eccles 4. 1, 2, 3. *So I returned*, saith he, *and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun, and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter*, &c. *wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead, more then the living which are yet alive: yea better is he then both they which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil work that is done under the sunne.* The words do clearly shew *(S)* that Solomon did think it better to be dead, and to be deprived of being, or to have alwayes wanted a being, then to be oppressed by the mighty, and to be without comforters; that is, then to have a miserable and a mournfull being.

Sr. Francis Bacons Colours of good and evil, the last Colour.

To this assenteth Sr Francis Bacon in his Colours of good and evil: Where against this *mathematicall position* (as he calleth it) That *there is no proportion between Something and Nothing*, and *that therefore the (T) degree of privation* seemeth greater then the *degree of diminution*; he excepteth, That it is false in sundry cases, and among the rest in this, namely, *when the degree of diminution is more sensitive then the degree of privation.* In this case a totall privation is much better then a diminution. Hence these usuall *forms* of speech, *Better (V) eye out then alwayes ake; Make or marre*, &c. Some evils and pains (perhaps) either for their lightnesse, because they may be well endured, or for their shortnesse, because they are quickly over, are lesse then resolution into nothing; and a man had better for a while endure them then lose his being to be rid of them, because his being may afford him presently or afterward such and so many desirable good things as will more then recompense his pains: But when his pains are so many and violent that they leave him no other good then a poore being, or so pinch him that he cannot enjoy or joy in the goods that remain, it were a thousand times better for him to have no being. And such are the pains of hell: which for their greatnesse are infinite, producing many miserable weepings and waylings and gnashings of teeth, all symptomes of intolerable griefs; and for their length, eternall: *The worm never dyeth, the fire is never quenched: but the breath of the Lord, as a river of brimstone, doth kindle it* for ever. And therefore it is incomparably better to cease to be, then to live in those torments, which cannot be equalled by any good which a being can make us capable of; much lesse by that

poore

pbore little entitative good, which is all the good the damned do enjoy in hell.

This (X) sophisticall evasion therefore and all others of the like sort notwithstanding, I doubt not but I may safely say, that the unavoidable damnation of so many millions cannot be absolutely and antecedently intended by God without the greatest injustice and crueltie, which may in no wise be imputed to God. [a] Plutarch speaking of the Pagans, who to pacifie the anger of their Gods did sacrifice to them men and women, saith, It had been much better with Diagoras and his fellows to denie the being of a God, then confessing a God to think he delighteth in the bloud of men. How much rather may we say, It were better to be an Atheist and denie God, then to believe or report him to be a (Y) devourer of the souls of men. The like argument is pressed by Eusebius against those cruel and mercilesse Gods of the Pagans; [b] *Doubtlesse*, saith he, *if there were any footstep or spark of goodnesse in them, for which they might deserve to be called good, they would be disposed to do good, and desirous to save all men, they would love justice, and take a care of men. And being such, how could they delight in their slaughter?* &c. Yea, he concludeth that they were [c] *Devils or evil spirits, and not Gods or good spirits; Because if they were good, they would do good; whereas those which are evil use to do hurt.* I will therefore shut up my first reason with the speech of Prosper; [d] *God is the Creatour indeed of all men, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be damned: The reason why we are created is one; and why we are damned, another.*

[a] *Plut. De superst. prope finem.*

[b] *Euseb. de præparat. lib. 4. cap. 16. pag. 161. Edit. Græcol.* Enimvero, si boni vestigium in iis ullum esset, quamobrem bonorum appellarionem jure sortirentur, eos utique cùm naturâ suâ benignos ac salutis omnium cupidos, tum verò amantes justitiæ, hominumque studiosos ac defensores esse oporteret, &c. [c] *ibid. c. 15. pag. 153.* Non bonos sed malos fuisse dæmones, vel hâc ipsâ ratione confici existimo: Quicquid bonum est, prodesse solet; nocere verò contrarium. [d] *Prosp. ad Object. Vincent. resp. 3.* Omnium quidem hominum Deus creator est: sed nemo ab eo ideo creatus est ut periret; quia alia est causa nascendi, alia pereundi.

An Answer to the first Inconvenience inferred upon the decree of absolute Predestination and Reprobation.

ABsolute Reprobation is (in the true sense of S. Augustine and his follow- A

ers) the eternall decree or act of Gods will Not to conferre upon some men his effectuall grace, Not to guide some men infallibly unto glory, but To permit them through their own voluntarie default to live in sinne, and To determine their eternall torments in regard of their sinnes. All this put together doth not make God the *Prime, Principall and Invincible cause*, nay, it doth not make him any cause at all, in working the damnation of any one soul, no not of the soul of Judas himself. Not the *Prime* cause: For by negative Reprobation no man is adjudged unto hell-torments, otherwise then for his own foregoing sinnes. As for the imaginary *antecedencie* of one act of the Divine volition or intuition unto another, because it is imaginarie, and no such reall priority or posterioritie of eternall acts to be found in God, there is no building of firm conclusions upon such a tottering foundation. And yet for further illustration of this point we adde, That as when a sovereigne King considering two of his subjects inwrapped in the guilt of rebellion, determineth in his mind that the one shall be freed the other hanged, it is not his determination, but the others rebellion, which is the prime and true cause of his hanging; though the Princes absolute will be the prime cause why he was not freed as-

well

well as the other: so God considering all mankind inwrapped in the guilt of Adams rebellion, absolutely determineth to free some both from their sinne and punishment, and as absolutely determineth not to free some others; and yet their own sinne and not Gods will was the prime cause of their being tormented, though Gods was the prime cause distinguishing and determining who should be delivered and who should be condemned.

Whereas it is further objected, That absolute Reprobation is a *principall* & *invincible* cause of many mens damnation, in that it *maketh it necessarie and unavoidable*; all this proceedeth from an erroneous and false imagination, That Gods absolute will of not producing such a good act or event is an invincible cause of producing the contrary evil act or event: Whereas this negative will of God is no cause at all of mans sinne or misery, but his own positive will is the cause both of his wickednesse and of his wretchednesse. He is the true and principall cause of any effect or event, who imployeth his faculties and indeavours to bring it into being; not he who onely resolveth not to hinder such evil effects, though he foresee they will come into being if he prevent them not. For first, this decree of negative Reprob- B

tion *tumbleth* no man down necessarily into the pit of destruction: [m] *Nam praedestinatus perit infidelitate voluntariâ non coactâ.* Secondly, though this decree contein a deniall of that grace which effectually freeth men from sinne and so consequently from destruction, yet it conteineth nothing which causeth effectually their impenitencie, their infidelitie and their destruction. [n] *Non est consequens, sicut putant qui talia objiciunt, ut Deus, quibus pœnitentiam non dederit, respiscentiam abstulerit; & quos non levaverit, alliserit; cùm aliud sit insontem in crimen egisse, quod alienum est à Deo; aliud, criminoso veniam non dedisse, quod de peccatoris est merito.* Lastly, he is said to be invincibly drawn into sinne and plunged into perdition, who fighteth against sinne with all his strength, and striveth to avoid damnation, and yet by the overmastering power of another is thrust into the one and hurled unto the other. The consciences of the most wicked men in the world can tell them, that there is no such forcing power in Non-election or Reprobation. The non-elect angels (which are now devils in hell) cannot upon their Non-election charge God, that either their transgression or damnation was invincibly forced upon them, they indeavouring to escape it.

m Prosp. ad Cap. Gall. 14. Init.

n Ad object. Vinc. resp. 15.

C The *Scriptures make* man *the onely cause* of

of his own ruine: But the Scriptures teach not, That God by his absolute will of preserving some from ruine, and permitting others to runne-on unto their own ruine, is the invincible cause of any mans ruine. God hath given some creatures sufficient means to preserve themselves from ruine, whom notwithstanding by the decree of Reprobation he permitteth to procure and work their own ruine.

It is *contrary to Gods nature* causelessely and cruelly to afflict or destroy his creature: But it is not contrary to Gods nature to decree out of the riches of his mercy to bestow grace and glory infallibly upon some, and to decree out of the libertie of his will to permit others through their own voluntary default, by abusing such means of grace as are afforded them, to fall into eternall miserie. And this is all which the decree of absolute Election and Non-election doth involve. Of the grace or benefit of Predestination S. Augustine saith as much; [o] *Hæc gratia prædestinatos & secundùm propositum vocatos ad glorificationem perducit.* And for the deniall of this speciall grace, which we term Negative Reprobation, Prosper confesseth, That it is not the foresight of any iniquitie in men which causeth this deniall: [p] *Nulla sunt tam detestanda facinora quæ possint gratiæ arcere donum.*

D

o De Gra. Christ. c. 13.

p De vocat. l. 1. c. 17.

q Ibid. c. 15. And yet more expresselv, q *Liberatur pars hominum, parte pereunte: Et si hoc voluntatum meritis voluerimus adscribere, ut malos neglexisse gratia, bonos elegisse videatur, resistet nobis,* r Ibid. &c. r *Latet discretionis istius ratio, sed non latet ipsa discretio. Non intelligimus judicantem, sed videmus operantem: Quid calumniamur justitiæ occultæ, qui gratias debemus misericordiæ manifestæ?* &c.

E It is not *sound* but blind reason, which forbiddeth God to elect and passe-by according to the good pleasure of his own will, and bindeth him to proceed according to his eternall foresight of the good or bad actions of mans will. As for those tragicall exaggerations of *Resolving to create that he might torment*, &c. they are all beside the purpose, and must not drive us to denie that Apostolicall decision, *Miseretur cujus vult; & quem vult indurat.* And when they can shew us that Faith, Perseverance, or any qualitie or act of saving grace, was foreseen in Peter and Paul, and thereupon their following Election grounded, we will grant that antecedent infidelitie in Cain and Judas was the cause of their negative Reprobation aswell as of their positive or punitive.

F As for the *creating* of any persons *to the end* or intent that *they might be eternally tormented*, we deny that the opposite decrees of absolute Election and Preterition, whether

ther considered in angels or men, imply any such thing. It is true, that the Elect are severally created to the end and intent that they may be glorified together with their Head Christ Jesus: But for the Non-elect, we cannot truly say that they are created to the end that they may be tormented with the devil and his angels. For we may then say, God maketh such a thing for such an end, when he giveth the thing a nature and qualities fitted to such an end. Now no man is created by God with a nature and qualities fitting him to damnation. Nay, take every man as he is created by God, and he is a capable and fitted subject for salvation: But, when he was at his best, so fitted, that he might runne himself into the pit of perdition. But neither in the state of his Innocency nor in the state of the fall and his corruption doth he receive any thing from God which is a proper & fit means to bring him to his damnation: And therefore damnation is not the *end* of any mans creation.

We say with Prosper, [r] *Universos homines non ignoramus à Deo sigillatim creari, & de hac universitate alios damnandos cum diabolo, alios regnaturos esse cum Christo. Quòd ergò etiam hi creantur qui aternæ vitæ participes non erunt, nulla est culpa Creatoris, qui naturæ autor est, non vitii quod natura contraxit.* And again, [t] *Omnium quidem hominum Deus*

[r] *Resp. ad Cap. Gall. resp. 13.*

[t] *Ad object. Vinc. resp. 3.*

us creator est: sed nemo ab eo ideo creatus est ut periret; quia alia est causa nascendi, & alia est pereundi. Ut enim nascantur homines, conditoris est beneficium; ut autem pereant, prævaricatoris est meritum.

God created some Angels not-predestinate unto eternall life whom he foresaw would runne themselves upon the rock of eternall death; concerning whom he decreed absolutely to permit their apostasie, and to damne them for their apostasie: and yet no man that understandeth what he saith, will say that God created them to the end he might torment them. There is the same reason of Non-election or Non-predestination of men; and it is as much against sound reason to say, that their Non-election inferreth, that God created them to the end he might damne and torment them.

The root from whence this grosse mistake springeth is this, That some falsely conceive, that God in the decree of Reprobation or Non-election doth by as effectuall means intend to bring men to their damnation as in the decree of Election he intendeth to bring others to salvation. But the thing is farre otherwise: salvation is a benefit undue to any man: therefore God may absolutely intend the bestowing of it upon any man, and the withholding it from any man: But damning or torturing of men

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in hell is a punishment; and therefore the inflicting thereof cannot be intended but with relation to a fault. Again, the means whereby men are brought to salvation, are *bona & dona gratuita*; and therefore they must be derived unto us by an influence and effectuall operation of God: But the means whereby men are carried unto damnation, are *mala spiritualia & voluntaria*, they are their own defective, and depraved actions; and therefore they are not means whereby God directeth them unto their damnation (who cannot be the authour of any sinfull act or defect) but they are the misdeserts which God permitteth them to fall into, and in the due punishment whereof he intendeth to exercise his justice. No *crueltie* therefore in the decree of Non-election or negative Reprobation.

God never *resolved upon the eternall destruction of an innocent soul:* But God resolved to permit some of those Angels and men whom he created innocent and righteous, to do that which procured their own destruction; and he resolved to preserve some others from procuring their own destruction, and infallibly to bring them to the state of glorification. And unto these different decrees we give the different names of *Election, Preterition* or *negative Reprobation.*

To Elect or Not-elect is an act of Gods

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Sovereigne power and absolute libertie; but To crown or damne is an act of *Judiciary power*, and proceedeth according to the tenour of the revealed Gospel. The one he doth, not taking mens different actions for the ground thereof: the other he doth according to mens different actions.

G The *Goodnesse* of God is as it were a firm tie upon him, to do no man injustice: but it tieth him not *in beneficiis gratuitis*, to do all the good unto every singular man which he could do without any violating of his Justice. He that shall avouch, that God could not have elected Cain or Judas unto glory, by preparing for them effectuall grace, *without wronging of his Justice*, maketh Election and Non-election to be necessary and not free acts in God. For the perfection of the Divine nature is such, as necessarily excludeth a clashing of any of his Attributes one against the other. And therefore if God should have *wronged his Justice* if he had not predestinated Peter, his Predestination was not an act of mercy but of necessarie justice: And if God could not have predestinated Judas without plain *wronging of his Justice*, then the Preterition or Reprobation of Judas was not an act proceeding from that libertie which God useth in the eternall preparation and temporall donation of his supernaturall benefits,

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but from such a necessary determination of the Divine will as could not do otherwise. I am sure this is new Divinitie; and I think it is untrue. The generall goodnesse of God unto all is sufficiently shewn by doing good unto all, and by wronging none: but it bindeth him not either to do or to intend the same measure of mercy unto all. He may therefore without any prejudice to his Goodnesse, in speciall mercy prepare for some from everlasting, and in time bestow upon them, that grace which he knoweth will and intendeth should infallibly bring them unto glory: This we call his decree of their Election. He may also without any prejudice to his Goodnesse or Justice, out of the libertie of his own will absolutely resolve not to prepare nor bestow upon some men that grace which he knoweth would bring them unto glory; and may further justly decree to permit such to fall into those sinnes which he knoweth will deserve and for whichhe decreeth to inflict upon them eternall torments: And this we call Non-election or negative Reprobation.

As for that wild fansie of *providing for* any men *their eternall misery*, and that *from everlasting, & before he thought of making them, or bestowing any good upon them*, we hold absolute Election and Reprobation, and yet utterly

utterly disclaim it. First, because it lieth not upon God to provide means for mens damnation, these springing from their own free and defective will. If he by the effectuall grace prepared in Predestination do not furnish them with the infallible means of salvation, they will voluntarily and infallibly furnish themselves with the means of their damnation, as the example both of angels and men non-elected doth clearly prove. Secondly, that conceit of *Before* and *Behind* in the everlasting decrees or cogitations of God hath no solid or reall truth in it. The immanent acts of Gods will and understanding are not one before and another after, as ours are which proceed upon discourse, though in things willed and seen there is *Before* and *After*, *First*, *Second*, *Third*, according to the nature of dependence. Last of all, no instant can be assigned in eternity, when God thought of *providing misery for his creature*, excluding the cogitation of *bestowing any good upon it:*

H For the objection of *Slaughtering beasts without injustice*, we grant it is of no force to prove that God may appoint many to be tormented in hell without all respect unto sinne: because the Slaughtering or Saving of beasts alive is no act of justice or injustice; but the Crowning of men in the kingdome of glory is an act of remunerative justice, and the

the Tormenting in hell an act of vindicative juſtice: and therefore both the one and the other are exerciſed according to that rule of remuneration and vindication whereunto God hath tied himſelf in his word. But to decree the infallible bringing of ſome angels and ſome men unto eternall glory, and to decree the infallible permiſſion of others to fall into the deſert of damnation, and thereupon to fore-appoint their eternall puniſhment in hell, is conſonant to the juſtice of God, and to the doctrine of Predeſtination and Reprobation, as it is delivered in the Scriptures, explained by S. Auguſtine and other orthodox Fathers and Writers of late time, and allowed by our Church.

If any man think that Non-election or negative Reprobation implieth, that ſome men were made to be tormented in hell for Gods abſolute pleaſure, and not for their own ſinne, he is in a foul errour. God made all things for himſelf and for the illuſtrating of his glory. And he eternally ſaw that he could illuſtrate his glory in moſt excellent manner, by making all men capable of ſalvation, and yet by permitting ſome men to incurre damnation. This he eternally and abſolutely decreed to do, by preparing ſpeciall grace for ſome, and beſtowing it upon them in due time he infallibly worketh their ſalvation: and theſe onely in Scripture are

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termed *men predestinated* or *elected*. And on the contrary, by not preparing and not bestowing effectuall or speciall grace upon others, they do wilfully and willingly work their own damnation and destruction: And these we call *not-elected, not-predestinated*, or (in the most harsh term) *reprobated*.

This doctrine taketh away all boasting in themselves from those which are saved; because it was Gods speciall grace mercifully and eternally prepared for them, and not their speciall goodnesse eternally foreseen, which caused their salvation. It taketh away also all pretense of murmuring against God, or traducing him as unjust and cruel. For no man is to be condemned upon this evidence, Because he was a man not-elected; Because he was a man unto whom speciall grace in the riches and height of Gods mercy was not afforded; but, Because he is convicted to have been sinfull and wicked, and out of his own free-will partly to have resisted and repelled the good motions of the Spirit of grace which were vouchsafed him, and partly to have abused those initiall gifts of supernaturall grace which God had actually conferred upon him.

And as for Calvine, who both whilest he lived & since his death hath been slandered to have been a defender of this position, *Deus maximam mundi partem nudo puróque voluntatis*

dantis sua arbitrio creavit ad perditionem, heare what he saith for himself, [u] *Etsi quid toti humano generi futurum esset Deus ab initio decrevit, hæc tamen loquendi ratio nusquam apud me occurrit*, FINEM CREATIONIS ESSE ÆTERNUM INTERITUM. And in the same treatise he granteth, that both angels and men were destinated to destruction [x] *futuræ defectionis respectu*. If therefore any writers amongst the Protestants have made the Creation of the Non-elect a means by God himself subordinated unto their damnation, and the Damnation of such an end desired and aimed at by God, and consequently the means of mens damnation (namely sinfull Corruption and voluntary Rebellion) procured or wrought by God as the authour thereof; they deserve rather to be branded then patronized by any judicious Divine. Yet it becometh orthodox Divines to be carefull as well in mainteining the free and speciall mercy of God in giving faith, repentance and perseverance to the Elect, as in mainteining the justice of God in the punishment and damnation of the Non-elect. The defenders of conditionate Predestination may suppose they clear themselves well in the latter; but we are sure they stick in the Semipelagian briers as concerning the former. For if God upon the foresight of mens faith and perseverance be induced to pre-

[u] *Vide Calo De ... Dei prov.* pag. 735.

[x] pag. 737.

 desti-

destinate them, Gods Predestination is no cause at all of faith or perseverance or any saving grace, this prevision not causing things, but supposing them as already produced by other causes.

I To dispute what God may do by his absolute sovereignty, is for the most part a fruitlesse disputation; especially in questions concerning his dealing with mankind: wherein having revealed in his word what he will do, and by what rule he will proceed, it is certain that now he can neither *annihilate* a sinner, nor *torment* a righteous man *in hell*, onely *to shew his sovereignty*. Not that he wanteth power or strength to do either the one or the other, but because his constant and immutable will hath decreed that sinners shall be tormented & not annihilated, & that righteous men shall be crowned not tormented. It is therefore utterly denied, that the absolute decree of electing some and not-electing othersome conteineth in it an antecedent decree *to inflict an infinite evil upon any guiltlesse creature.*

K This problematicall question is needlesse amongst those who so hold absolute Predestination and Reprobation, and so reject conditionall Predestination and Reprobation grounded upon the foreseen acts of mans free-will, that withall they hold the decree of damnation, whether of reprobated angels

gels or men, alwayes to carry a just respect unto their future corruption and rebellion. Calvine (howsoever ranked by this Authour) was plainly of this judgement: his words will shew it; [y] *Cùm de prædestinatione sermo habetur, indè exordiendum esse constanter semper docui, atque hodie doceo, jure in morte relinqui omnes reprobos, qui in* ADAMO *mortui sunt ac damnati; jure perire, qui naturâ sunt iræ filii: ità nemini causam esse cur de nimio Dei rigore queratur, quando reatum in se omnes inclusum gestant.* And lest that old cavill should be revived, That God appointed the reprobate unto their damnation before he considered them as lying dead in sinne and corruption, Calvine doth in this also clear himself, and subscribeth to the opinion of S. Augustine; [z] *Augustinum videt* [Pighius] *júsque similes, hoc est, pios omnes, qui Deum imaginantur, postquam universalem generis humani ruinam in persona Adæ præsciverat, alios ad vitam alios ad interitum destinasse.* We leave therefore those to wrangle amongst themselves, who think that God may without crossing his declared will, for his mere pleasure either annihilate an innocent man or torment him in hell. I perswade my self that neither the one nor the other can stand well with the goodnesse of God, as in the word it is made known unto men.

[y] De ætern. provid. pag. 710.

[z] Ibid. pag. 704.

For the question it self, Which is better

for any man, Annihilation or Torment, it carrieth a double improprietie of speech: first, in that it supposeth some kind of eligible goodnesse in things which rightly considered have none at all. For neither to be annihilated nor tormented have any goodnesse at all in them for him who is supposed to chuse the one before the other. Again, *non entis nulla affectio:* and therefore annihilation cannot be said to be good or bad, better or worse for any man; since all these terms require a subject or person in whom they must be verified, which by annihilation is become nothing.

L For *our Saviours speech*, It is according to the vulgar manner, who, when they see a man extremely mischievous or miserable use to say, *It had been happy for such a man if he had never been born.* And in the opinion of some good writers both ancient and modern, the words of our Saviour give no just occasion to raise a curious controversie concerning the *Goodnesse* or *Betternesse* of Annihilation and eternall Damnation. [a] Euthymius and Hieronymus interpret the words IF HE HAD NEVER BEEN BORN, *If he had perished in his mothers wombe.* And Cajetane, *Bonum erat Judæ si natus non fuisset, quia mortuus in utero incurrisset solùm pœnam damni*, &c. These words in this sense concern not absolute Annihilation, but Abortion,

[a] *Bar. tom. 4. lib. 2. c. 11. p. 45.*

on, much like those of Job, chap. 3. v. 11, 12, 13, 14. The question here then is not, Which of the twain is better or greater good; but, Which is the lesser of the two evils. And yet in this sense it is improper to say annihilation is the lesser evil, because it leaveth no subject wherein good or evil can be received. *To be nothing* is not more desirable then *To be in hell*: Both of them are extremely hatefull, and have in them *nullam rationem bonitatis aut appetibilitatis*.

M It is as much as if Christ had said, When Judas shall feel the eternall misery wherein to he shall be plunged, he will break out into that impossible wish, *O that I had never received a being!* If such a wish could take place, no degree of goodnesse or happinesse could thereby accrue unto the person, because the person thereby is made nothing.

N This Scripture will import thus much, That whereas *ablatio mali* hath *rationem boni*, the condition which removeth the greater evil is to the intellective appetite more welcome or desirable. Now the greatest evils imaginable, are, To be stained with sinne eternally, To be eternally subject to the wrath of God for sinne, and, To be eternally tormented for the same. A tormented soul therefore cannot upon a deliberate election desire to have never been, which it apprehendeth as merely impossible; but it may in

a passionate wish preferre the condition of not being before the condition of such a wofull being. And the reason hereof is, because mans understanding doth not onely conceive *ens & bonum naturæ*, but *ens & bonum rationis*. And thus though Not-being or Annihilation after being received, contein in them no positive or naturall goodnesse for which they can be desirable, yet they may be represented to the understanding as negations or ablations of the greatest evil, and so *per accidens* they may be wished rather then lying under those eternall evils before mentioned. But if in cogitation we separate the infinite evil of Sinne and of the Divine Hatred, and should leave a man under never so great torments, Annihilation were in right reason to be conceived a greater evil then those torments: neither ought a man to desire the losse of his being (in which many benefits both corporall and spirituall are involved) to escape the sense of pain by not being, which is a totall deprivation of all Gods benefits, and an abolition of the person who desireth it [b].

[b] *Vide Ruiz. De volunt. Dei, disp. 34. S. 3. n. 16 p. 620.*

O *Atheists* and *Epicures*, who believe no such thing as the Immortalitie of the soul, or enduring eternal punishments after death, will scoff and laugh at the question it self, and will be neither incouraged nor discouraged which way soever it be decided. Yet it

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is discretion in Divines so to temper their disputations that they give no occasion unto any of sleighting or extenuating the infinite misery of hell-torments, which no understanding of man conceiveth unto their full height.

Those who defend the state of man in Hell-torments to have more good in it, then the estate of Not-being or Annihilation, ground themselves upon this main reason, That *Ens & Bonum convertuntur*, and whosoever reteineth a being is not onely capable of good, but is actually indowed with some good; whereas that which is resolved into nothing, is neither indowed with any good, nor capable of the least good. And it is indeed *abusiva comparatio* to say, that Judas never created, or after his creation annihilated, is in a better case then Judas eternally tormented; because Judas never created, or Judas annihilated, cannot be compared with Judas existing, either in happinesse or unhappinesse. The former Judas is onely a feigned imagination in the brain, and hath no realitie answering the name of the person: the latter Judas is a reall subsistent person capable of reall happinesse or misery. *Non sunt comparabiles res quæ non sunt ejusdem generis. Omne comparabile est univocum.* Judas being is a true man, but Judas annihilated whom they put in the other scale of

comparison, is neither man nor creature, but a mere nothing clothed with an empty name.

P I make no question but the damned wish many things impossible, and amongst others (it may be) their own annihilation: not because they conceive the state of annihilation to be capable of good or bad, of better or worse, but because they conceive their present estate to be so bad, that the freeing the from the evils wherewith they are oppressed (upon what terms soever) would make it somewhat better: So that their perplexed understanding conceiveth themselves (and that truly) to be in an extreme miserable condition; & thereupon conceiveth (but falsly) that themselves should be in a better case were they once annihilated, whereas then themselves should no more be themselves, and therefore be no subject of more or lesse misery.

2 There is a great difference betwixt Death and Annihilation. Some dead man may properly be said to be in a bettter case after his death then he was whilest he lived: thus it fared with Lazarus; and thus it would presently have fared with Job, had God parted his soul from his body. But no annihilated man can properly be said to be in a better case then he was before; because a Better being supposeth some being which Annihilation contradicteth.

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Had God yielded unto Jobs passionate wish, the comparison would not have stood betwixt his Being and Not-being, but betwixt his Being miserably vexed in one state and his Being acquit from those vexations in another.

Though the Being of any thing is a kind of goodnesse, and the foundation or receptacle of all other good, yet take Being *præscindendo ab omni superaddita bonitate*, and burdened with all sorts of evil, and then there is in it no motive unto appetibility for a reasonable creature. This is clear in those externall things which we possesse and use. If a mans horse have the mere goodnesse of Being left him, and be troubled with manifold incurable diseases and perpetuall lamenesse, the owner rather desireth his not-being then his so-being. It is clear also in a mans bodily members; for no man is so in love with the bare Being of a leg or an arm, but if it want the goodnesse of strength and motion, and be affected with the evils of rottennesse and extreme anguish, he would rather chuse to lose the Being of those members, then to hold them under condition of a perpetuall and so ill affected Being. And to come to the soul it self, the mere Being thereof *in rerum natura*, utterly and eternally separated from the naturall & supernatural Wel-being thereof, and burdened with the evils of sinfull

full pollution, of the Divine deteſtation, and of the helliſh vexations, is not nor cannot be preſented unto the underſtanding and will of a damned man as an object lovely or deſirable. It is likely enough therefore, that all the damned are weary of their Being, and wiſh rather their Not-being: yet even to them in their wofull eſtate, Not-being is not *per ſe* and properly the object of their deſire, but onely *per accidēs*, in as much as the removall of evils hath *rationem boni*; and this they conceive will be effected in their annihilation. And the very ablation of evils is not properly and primarily deſirable for it ſelf, but it is deſired out of a love to thoſe oppoſite good things whereof thoſe evils have deprived a man: As he that deſireth to be freed from ſickneſſe, is properly in love with the Being of health, improperly with the Not-being of ſickneſſe: for that which hath no being cannot have a good being; and that which hath no kind of good being conſiderable in it, hath no power to draw the will to affect it. It is not therefore ſimply Not-being which any damned and tortured man preferreth and electeth before Being, but it is Not-being in pain and torments which he preferreth before Being in pain and torments. This is it which Saint Auguſtine intended in ſaying, [b] *Si quis dixerit, Non eſſe quàm miſerum me eſſe mallem, reſpondebo, Mentiris.* It

[b] *De lib. arbitr.* 3. 6.

It is better and more eligible to be in torture or pain for a little time then for a long time: But Not-being in it self is neither *bonum* nor *melius*, nor *eligibile* nor *eligibilius*.

R Men who kill themselves, do it out of an opinion that thereby they shall attein a lesser degree of miserable being; not out of desire of no being. It is also the abolition of all good, and of that good which all creatures strive to retein, namely their being. Torment in hell, with the concomitant evils, is the greatest evil or misery that can befall a reasonable creature: yet it is improper to say, that Not-being is a *lighter and lesser evil*, since Nothing is neither lighter nor heavier, neither good nor bad.

S If this be a good collection, it had been better not onely for the wicked, but for many of Gods saints, to have wanted a Being.

T The sense of the *degree of diminution*, and the not-sense of a *totall deprivation*, maketh an impatient man rather wish the latter then the former: but notwithstanding in judgement of right reason the *totall deprivation* may be the greater evil.

That which is made better then formerly it was, must be bettered by adding some perfection thereunto which formerly it wanted, or by taking some imperfection from

from it, wherewith formerly it was incumbred; and in both changes the subject must remain: Now Annihilation or Not-being bringeth no perfection to any man nor taketh any imperfection from him, but it taketh him quite away from being the subject either of good or evil: and therefore it cannot give a true denomination of being better or worse.

As for the rule, *Melius est esse quàm non esse*; it is most certainly and universally true. For otherwise God would never from *Non-esse* or out of nothing have produced all things which are into that Being or *esse* which they have, neither would he preserve the *esse* of men damned. Yet we confesse withall, that this or that particular person may be through his own default under so many evils contrary to his Well-being, that he may fansie a Not-being more eligible for him then that lamentable and wofull Being wherein he subsisteth. I call this a fantasticall rather then a reall and true election: For if such a man should be asked, What is it which you have preferred in your choice? he must answer, Nothing. [c] *Nam qui eligit non esse, profectò se nihil eligere, etiamsi hoc nolit respondere, convincitur.* Not-being therefore is but out of a mere deceived fansie of the man in torment conceived to be it which he preferreth before Being:

[c] *Aug. De lib. arb. l. 3. c. 8.*

Being: whereas in deed and truth it is (as Augustine speaketh) [d] *naturale desiderium quietis*, which is the desirable object the will of a damned man longeth for, and not the state *omnimodæ defectionis*, or *annihilationis*. Now he that desireth his ease or quiet, doth not aim at a Not-being, but at a Not-being-tormented. [e] *Nam quod quietum est, non est nihil; imò magis est quàm id quod inquietum est.*

[d] *Ibid.*

[e] *Ibid.*

Though we hold it an abusive comparison to say, *Judas is better when he hath no being, then when he hath an ill being*; yet because evils are measured by the degrees of the opposite good things whereof they deprive men, and supernaturall good things, such as are the fruition of God and heavenly joyes, are infinitely better then the fruition of naturall Being; we must needs judge the privation of supernaturall well-being, which consisteth in being eternally banished from the beatificall presence of God, and eternally tortured in hell, to be a greater evil then the losse of our naturall Being. If therefore God should put it to the choice of Judas, or any damned man, and say, Choose whether thou wilt have me abolish thee into nothing, or continue thy being as it is, in the state of sinne, and thy person as it is, in the state of enmitie with me, and thy body and soul in the state of endlesse torments; I think he would

would & should rather chooſe aboliſhment, annihilation or Not-being, then continuance of being ſo hatefull a perſon unto God, and ſo ſinfull and wofull a perſon in himſelf. And this is it, and all which may be inferred from the words of S. Hierome, or of our Saviour.

For all that a wiſe and patient man would think it better to have both his eyes alwayes aking then to have both quite put out.

If the compariſon of *better* and *worſe* be put to the diſordered judgement and will of the damned perſon, who looketh onely at himſelf, no doubt but he will judge that beſt which maketh moſt for his own eaſe: But if *better* and *worſe* be conſidered with reſpect of the true judgement of God, Judas his being tormented is better then Judas his Not-being. And if Judas himſelf in his choice of Being or Not-being had a well-ordered will, his Being (though in torment) would ſeem better, wherein he ſerveth to illuſtrate the glory of Gods power, truth and juſtice, then his Not-being, wherein he can be uſefull or ſerviceable to no good end. Not-being cannot be the ſcope of regulated election: for [f] *quod quiſque rectè eliget appetendum, cùm ad id pervenerit, neceſſe eſt melior fiat: melior autem eſſe non poterit, qui non erit. Nemo igitur rectè poteſt eligere ut non ſit.* It is therefore onely *amor inordinatus proprii boni*

[f] *Aug. De lib. arbitr. l. 3. c. 8.*

boni, which maketh a damned person preferre Not-being before being in pains and eternall torments.

Whatsoever be determined concerning the problematicall question it self; I willingly grant, that God had never such an *absolute antecedent intent of damning millions* of innocent men as this authour chargeth the Supralapsarians withall. And I further adde, That those who imagine the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation to be *secundùm nostrum modum intelligendi* before the decree of permitting, and consequently before the absolute prevision of mans sinne, do easily clear themselves from this accusation, as hath been already shown. Paulus Ferius hath these words tending to this purpose, ε *Voluit quidem Deus non beatificare Judam, sine ullo respectu peccati; tamen non habuit voluntatem infligendi pœnam, nisi propter peccata, quæ in eo prævidit.* And he sheweth there, that many School-men have imbraced this opinion. X

ε Schol. orth. cap. 28. p. 48.

He who in regard of Gods eternall and absolute decree of electing whom he pleaseth, and not-electing whom he pleaseth to passe-by, shall term God *a devourer* of those *souls* whom he permitteth to fall into eternall misery through their own default, neither speaketh nor thinketh so reverently of God as he should. God delighteth not in Y

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the slaughter of any man; but God willeth the just punishment of many men. God is willing to save all men, if they repent and believe. And God hath an absolute will of working repentance and faith in some men, and so of working their salvation. Were God thus desirous to save all men, he were not absolutely happy, for he wanteth part of his happinesse that wanteth his desires.

Too much pains hath been taken to prove a conclusion, which those who hold absolute Predestination and negative Reprobation may as safely grant as those who hold conditionall upon the foreseen good and bad acts of men; which Prosper himself opposed as a Semipelagian errour, and our Church hath alwayes rejected.

Treatise.

SECONDLY, this opinion (*A*) chargeth God with most Sinnes on earth; and maketh him the Authour, not of the first sinne onely that entred by Adam into the world, but of all other sinnes that have been, are or shall be committed to the worlds end: No murders, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, heresies, persecutions, or any other abominations whatsoever, fall out at any time or in any place, but they are the necessary productions of Gods almighty decree. The Scriptures, I am sure, teach us another lesson. *Psal.* 5. 4. *Thou art not a God* (saith David) *that hath pleasure in wickedness.* And the Prophet Esay telleth the people that when they did evil in the sight of the Lord, *they did choose the things which he would not. Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: But every man is tempted when he is drawn away with his own concupiscence.* And S. John having

Esay 66. 4.

Jam. 1. 13, 14.

referred

referred all the sinnes of the world to three heads, *the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life*, telleth us that they *are not of the Father, but of the world.* To which speeches let me adde the speech of Siracides, though not of the same authoritie; *Say not thou, It is through the Lord that I fell away: for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou, He hath caused me to erre: for he hath no need of the sinfull man.* Eccles 15. 12.

Pious Antiquitie hath constantly said the same, and pressed it with sundry reasons: Some of which are these that follow. If God be the authour of sinne, then

1 He (B) is worse then the devil, because the devil doth onely tempt and perswade to sinne, and his action may be resisted: but God (by this opinion) doth will and procure it by *a powerfull and effectuall decree*, which cannot be resisted. This is Prospers argument; [a] Who to some objecting that by S. Augustines doctrine, when *Fathers defile their own daughters, and mothers their own sonnes, servants murder their masters*, and men commit any horrible villanies, *it cometh to passe, because God hath so decreed*; answereth, that *if this were laid to the devils charge, he might in some sort clear himself of the imputation*; [b] *because though he be delighted with mens sinnes, yet he doth not, he cannot compell them to sinne*: [c] *What a madnesse therefore is it to impute that to God which cannot justly be fathered upon the devil?*

a *Prosper. resp. ad obj.* 11. *Vincent.*

b Quia etsi delectatus est furore peccantium, probaret tamen se non intulisse vim criminum.

c Quâ ergò insipientiâ, quave dementiâ definitur, ad Dei referendum esse consilium quod nec diabolo in totum ascribi potest, qui in peccantium flagitiis illecebrarum adjutor, non voluntatum credendus est esse generatorî

2 He cannot be a punisher of sinne: For none (C) can justly punish those offenses of which they are the authours. This is Prospers argument too; [d] *It is against reason to say, that he which is the damner of the devil, would have any man to be the devils servant.* This reason Fulgentius useth likewise; [e] *Illius rei Deus ultor est, cujus autor non est*, God is the avenger of that of which he is not the authour. Tertullian also before them hath said, [f] *He is not to be accounted the authour of sinne, who is the forbidder, yea and the condemner of it.*

3 He cannot be God; because he should not be just, nor holy, nor the Judge of the world, all properties essentiall to God. And this is S. Basils reason, who hath written a whole Homilie against this wicked assertion: [g] *It is all one*, saith he,

d *Prosp. resp. ad object.* 4 *Vincent.* Insanum omnino & contra rationem est, dicere, damnatorem diaboli & ejus famulorum velle ut diabolo serviatur. e *Fulgent. lib.* 1. *ad Manich. c.* 19. f *Tert. l.* 2. *cont. Marcion. c.* 9. Nec idem habendus est delicti autor, qui invenitur interdictor & condemnator. g *Basil. homil.* quòd Deus non est, &c. Tantundem est Deum asserere esse autorem peccati, & negare esse Deum.

to say that God is the author of sinne, and to say he is not God.

Upon these and the like considerations I may well conclude, That the opinion which chargeth the holy God with the sinnes of men, is neither good nor true. But this opinion doth so. For albeit the writers that have defended it (Piscator and a few more of the blunter sort excepted) have never said directly and *in terminis*, That God is the cause of sinne; yet have they delivered those things from which it must needs follow by necessary consequence, that he is so. For they (D) say,

1 That as the decree of Reprobation is absolute, so it is inevitable: Those poore soules which lie under it, must of necessitie be damned. [h] *It is* (saith Maslorate) *a firm and stable truth, That the man whom God in his eternall counsel hath rejected, though he do all the good works of the Saints, cannot possibly be saved.*

2 That without (E) sinne this decree of Reprobation cannot be justly executed. [i] *God* (saith Piscator) *did create men for this very purpose, that they might indeed fall: for otherwise he could not have atteined those his principall ends.* He meaneth the manifestation of his justice in the damnation of Reprobates, and of his mercie in the salvation of the Elect. Maccovius also saith the same: [k] *If sinne had not been, the manifestation of justice and mercie* (which is as much to say, as the damnation of Reprobates) *had never been.*

3 That therefore God decreed that Reprobates should unavoidably (F) sinne, and sinne unto death, that his eternall ordinance might be executed and they damned: [l] *we grant* (saith Zanchius) *that reprobates are held so fast under Gods almighty decree, that they cannot but sinne and perish.* A little after he saith, [m] *We doubt not therefore to confesse, that there lieth upon Reprobates, by the power of their unchangeable reprobation, a necessitie of sinning, yea of sinning unto death without repentance, and consequently of perishing everlastingly.* Calvine also saith that Reprobates obey not the word of God, partly

h *Maslor. Comm. in Joh.* 15. *v.* 2. Stat igitur firma sententia, Quæcunque Deus ante conditum orbem elegerit, eum non posse perire; quem verò rejecerit, eum non posse salvari, etsi omnia sanctorum opera fecerit: usq; adeò irretractabilis est sententia.

i *Piscat. l. cont. Schasm. pag.* 29. *thes.* 27. Deus hoc consilio condidit homines, ut re ipsâ laberentur: quippe

cùm nisi hâc ratione pervenire non potuerit ad fines illos suos principales.

k *Maccov. disp.* 17. *p.* 11. Locus misericordiæ & justitiæ manifestandæ nullus fuisset futurus, si peccatum non exstitisset.

l *Zanch. lib.* 5. *De nat. Dei, c.* 2. *De prædest. part.* 4. *Resp. ad post. arg. prope finem.* Damus reprobos necessitate peccandi, eóque & pereundi, ex hac Dei ordinatione constringi, atque ità constringi ut nequeant non peccare atque perire.

m Non dubitamus itaque confiteri, ex immutabili reprobatione necessitatem peccandi, & quidem sine resipiscentia ad mortem usque peccandi, eóque & pœnas æternas dandi, reprobis incumbere.

throug

through the wickednesse of their own hearts, and partly because [n] *they are raised up by the unsearchable judgement of God to illustrate his glory by their damnation.* I will end this with that speech of Piscator; [o] *Reprobates are precisely appointed to this double evil, to be punished ever lastingly, and to sinne, and therefore to sinne that they might be justly punished.*

4 That as he hath immutably (G) decreed that Reprobates shall live and die in sinne, so he procureth their sinnes in due time by his Almighty hand, partly by withdrawing from them grace necessary for the avoiding of sinne, and partly by moving and enclining them by his irresistible and secret workings on their hearts to sinfull actions. [p] Calvine saith, that devils and reprobate men are not onely held fast in Gods fetters, so as they cannot do what they would, but are also urged and forced by Gods bridle *ad obsequia præstanda*, to do as he would have them. And in the next chapter these are his words, [q] *That men have nothing in agitation, that they bring nothing into action, but what God by his secret direction hath ordered, is apparent by many and clear testimonies.* In the Section following he saith, [r] *And surely unlesse God did work inwardly in the minds of men, it would not be rightly said, that he taketh away wisdome from the wise,* &c. In those two chapters that which he mainly driveth at, is to shew, that God doth not onely behave himself privatively in procuring the sins of men, but doth also put forth powerfull and positive acts in the bringing of them to passe. And in his second Book and fourth chapter after he had said, that God may be said to harden men by forsaking them, he putteth in another way by which God hardeneth men, and that (he saith) cometh a great deal nearer to the proprietie of the Scripture-phrases, namely, by stirring up their wills: [s] God doth not onely harden men by leaving them to themselves, but *by appointing their counsels, ordering their deliberations, stirring up their wills, confirming their purposes and indeavours by the minister of his anger, Satan.* And this he proveth by the work of God on Sihon king of the Amorites, Deut. 2. 30. and then insinuateth the end too why God thus hardeneth men in their wicked courses, which is, That he might *destroy them*; [t] *Because God*

n *Calv. l. 3. Instit. cap. 24. Sect. 14.* Iusscrutabili Dei judicio suscitati sunt ad gloriam ejus suâ damnatione illustrandam.

o *Pisc. Resp. ad Dupl. Vorst. part. 1. pag. 220.* Reprobi ad utrumque hoc malum à Deo præcisè destinati sunt, ut in æternum puniantur, & necessariò peccent, & quidem ideo peccent quò justè puniri possint.

p *Calv. Instit. l. 1. c. 17. Sect. 11.*

q *Ibid. cap. 18. Sect. 1.* Quòd nihil efficiant homines nisi arcano Dei motu, nec quicquam deliberando agitent nisi quod ipse jam apud se decreverit, & arcanâ suâ directione constituat, innumeris & claris testimoniis probatur. r *Ib. Sect. 2.* Et certè nisi intus operaretur in mentibus hominum, non rectè dictum esset, auferre labium à veracibus, & à sensibus prudentiam, &c. s *Inst. l. 2. c. 4. sect. 3.* Ad exsequenda sua judicia per ministrum iræ suæ Satanam, & consilia eorum destinat quò visum est, & voluntates excitat, & conatus firmat. t Quia perditum Deus volebat, obstinatio cordis Divina fuit ad ruinam præparatio.

intended his ruine, he prepared him for it by his induration.

The ſumme of all theſe propoſitions is this; God who from all eternitie appointed many miſerable men to endleſſe and unavoidable torments, decreed for the bringing-about of their intended ruine, that they ſhould without remedie live and die in a ſtate of ſinne: and what he thus decreed from everlaſting, he doth moſt powerfully effect in time, ſo governing, over-ruling, and working upon the wills of thoſe reprobates, that they have no libertie or abilitie at all in the iſſue of avoiding their ſinnes, but muſt of neceſſitie commit them. Thus they teach: And therefore by juſt conſequence they make God the authour of ſinne; as it will plainly appear by theſe following conſiderations.

I. It is ordinary to impute ſinne to thoſe who have not ſo great a hand (*H*) in the production of it as hath the Almightie by the grounds of this opinion. For,

1. The devil is called a *father of lies*, John 8. 44. and by the like reaſon, of all other ſinnes; and therefore *he that committeth ſinne*, is ſaid *to be of the devil*, and *to be a child of the devil*, 1. John 3. 8, 10. and ſinne is called *a work of the devil, which the ſonne of God appeareth to looſe* verſ. 8. And why is the devil ſo called, but becauſe he doth egge and allure men by inward ſuggeſtions and outward temptations to fall into ſinne? This is all he doth or can do. But God doth much more, if he neceſſitate and by his decree firſt, and next by his powerfull and ſecret working in the ſouls of men, determine their wills irreſiſtibly to ſinne. For to determine, is infinitely more then barely to perſwade; for as much as ſinne muſt needs follow the determination, but not the perſwaſion of the will. God is therefore a truer cauſe of ſinne (by this doctrine) then the devil.

2. Wicked men are eſteemed authours of their own offenſes, becauſe they plot, purpoſe, chooſe and commit them, and are immediate agents in the acting of them. But God (by this opinion) doth more: For he (*1*) over-ruleth the projects and purpoſes of wicked men, and by an uncontrollable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, reſolutions, choiſes and actions preciſely that very way; ſo as they cannot chooſe but do as they do, whatſoever they may think to the contrary. They have indeed *potentiam in ſe liberam*, a power in it ſelf free, to chooſe what they refuſe, or to refuſe what they chooſe, to determine themſelves this way or that way as liketh them beſt;

best: but they have not *liberum usum*, a free use of this their power. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it self; and maketh them do those onely actions which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions have prescribed. More rightly therefore may God be called the authour of all those offenses: for [u] deeds whether good or bad, are owned more truly by him that over-ruleth them, then by the servile instruments that onely execute and do them.

u Opera magis pertinent ad imperantem quàm ad exsequentem.

3. Wicked counsellers (K) and they who allure and advise men to sinne, are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sinnes to which they are the perswaders, and have been punished for those misdeeds which others through their instigations have committed. Jezabel Ahabs wife was reputed and punished as the murderer of Naboth, because she counselled and contrived the doing of it, as we may see 1. Kings 21. 13, 25. But what is Counselling to Inforcing? Evil counsels may be refused; but an Almightie power cannot be resisted. God therefore that useth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of sinnes, is much more an authour of them then he that onely useth the other.

II. If we could find out a King (L) that should so carry himself in procuring the ruine & the offenses of any subject as (by this opinion) God doth in the effecting of the damnation and transgressions of reprobates, we would all charge him with the ruine and sinnes of those his subjects. [vv] *who would not abhorre* (saith Moulin) *a King speaking thus*, [x] *I will have this man hanged; and that I may hang him justly, I will have him murder or steal?* This King (saith he) should not onely make an innocent man miserable, *sed & sceleratum*, but wicked too; and should punish him for that offense, *cujus ipse causa est*, of which himself is the cause. It is a clear case. [y] Tiberius (as Suetonius reporteth) having a purpose to put certain virgins to death, because it was not *lawfull* among the Romanes to *strangle virgins*, caused them all to be *defloured by the hangman*, that so they might be strangled. Who will not say that Tiberius was the principall authour of the *defloureing* of those maids? In like manner (say the Supralapsarians) God hath a purpose of putting great store of men to the second death; but because it is not lawfull for him by reason of his

w *Molin. Anat. c.* 12. *De praedest. p.* 73. Quis non regem abominetur sic loquentem.

x Ego hanc hominem addico suspendio; sed ut justè suspendatur, volo patret homicidium vel peculatum.

y *Suetan. vit. Tiberij.* 61.

his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame, he hath decreed that the devil shall deflour them, that afterward he may damne them. It followeth therefore, that God is the main cause of those their sinnes.

III. That God (*M*) is the Authour of mens salvation and conversion, all sides grant: and yet he doth no more in the procuring of them, then these men report him to do in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation. The salvation and conversion of the Elect (say they) he hath *absolutely* and *antecedently*, without the foresight of any deservings of theirs, resolved upon, and by irresistible means in their severall generations draweth them to believe, repent and endure to the end, that so they might be saved, and his absolute decree accomplished. On the other side, the damnation, the sinnes and the finall impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleasure *peremptorily* decreed; that his decree he executeth in time, drawing them on by his unconquerable power and providence from sinne to sinne, till they have made up the measure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternal vengeance which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the course which God taketh for the conversion and salvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of Reprobates? And therefore what hindreth but that God (by their grounds) may as truly be styled the prime cause and authour of the sinnes of the one as of the conversion of the other?

The Fathers (*N*) thought it a plain case: and therefore they did generally make sinne an object of prescience, not Predestination, and bent the most of those arguments by which they refuted this foul assertion, against an absolute, irresistible and necessitating decree, as I could easily shew, but that I fear to be overlong. Onely I will cite some few of those authours words, whom the learned and reverend Bishop hath alledged in favour and for the defense of the Predestinarians and the mainteiners of Gotteschalks opinion.

The Church of Lyons in their answer to the positions of Johannes Scotus which he framed against Gotteschalk, hath these words, [2] *whosoever saith, that God hath laid a constraint or a necessitie of sinning upon any man, he doth manifestly*

[2] Bishop Usher his hist. of Gotteschalk. pag. 138.

Qui vim & necessitatem peccandi Deum imposuisse hominibus dicit, manifestè & horribiliter in Deum blasphemat, quem ad peccata compellendo atque autorem peccati esse confirmat.

manifestly and fearfully blaspheme God, in as much as he maketh him by affirming that of him, *to be the very authour of sinne.* Remigius Archbishop of that Church, explaining his Churches opinion in the point of Prescience and Predestination in seaven severall rules; in the fifth of those rules he hath these words to the same purpose. God (saith he) by his Prescience and Predestination hath laid a necessitie of being wicked upon no man, [a] *For if he had done this, he should have been the authour of sinnes.*

[a] *Id. ib. p. 173* Hoc enim si fecisset, ipse utique esset autor malorum, &c.

And thus (in my judgement) doth it plainly appear that by absolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cause of mens sinnes.

Many distinctions are brought to free the (*O*) Supralapsarian way from this crimination: all which (me think) are no better then mere delusions of the simple and inconsiderate, and give no true satisfaction to the understanding.

I. There is (say they) a twofold decree: 1. an *Operative*, by which God positively and efficaciously worketh a thing; 2. a *Permissive*, by which he decreeth onely to let it come to passe. If God should work sinne by an *operative* decree, then he should be the authour of sinne; but not if he decree by a *permissive* decree to let it come to passe. And this onely they say they maintein. *Distinct. 1.*

1. It is true that God hath decreed to suffer sinne: For otherwise there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder? He suffered Adam to sinne, *leaving him in the hand of his own counsel*, Eccles 15. 13. He *suffered the nations in times past to walk in their own wayes*, Acts 14. 16. And dayly doth he suffer both good and bad to fall into many sinnes. And this he doth, not because he standeth in need of sinne for the setting forth of his glory; for *he hath no need of the sinnefull man*, Eccles 15. but partly, because he is *summus provisor*, supreme moderatour of the world, and knoweth how to use that well which is ill done, and to bring good out of evil; and especially for that reason which Tertullian presseth, namely, Because man is made by Gods own gracious constitution a free creature, undetermined in his actions till he determine himself, and therefore may not be hindered from sinning by omnipotency, because God useth not to repeal his own ordinances. *Answ.* *Tertull. l. 1. contr. Marcion.*

2. It is true also, that a *permissive* decree is no cause of sinne, because it is merely extrinsecall to the sinner, and

hath no influence at all upon the sinne: it is an antecedent onely, and such a one too, as being put, sinne followeth not of necessitie. And therefore it is fitly (P) contradistinguished to an *operative* decree. And if that side would in good earnest impute no more in sinnefull events to the Divine power then the word *Permission* importeth, their main conclusion would fall, and the controversie between us end. But,

1. Many of them reject this distinction utterly, and will have God to decree sinne *efficaciter*, with an energeticall and working will. Witnesse that discourse of Beza, wherein he averreth and laboureth to prove, that God doth not onely permit sinne, but will it also: And witnesse Calvine too, who hath a whole Section against it, calling it a *carnall* distinction, invented by the flesh, and *effugium*, a mere evasion to shift off this seeming absurditie, That that man is made blind *volente & jubente Deo*, by Gods will and commandment, who must shortly after be punished for his blindnesse. He calleth it also *figmentum*, a fiction, and saith they do *ineptire*, play the fools, that use it. By many reasons also doth he indeavour to lay open the weaknesse of it, taxing those who understand such Scriptures as speak of Gods smiting men with a *spirit of slumber* and giddinesse, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts, &c. of a permission and suffering of men to be blinded and hardened. b *Nimis frivola est ista solutio*, saith he, This is too frivolous a glosse. In another place he blameth those that referre sinne to Gods prescience onely, calling their speeches *argutiæ*, tricks and quirks which Scripture will not bear; and those likewise that ascribe it to Gods permission: and saith, c *what they bring touching the Divine permission in this busines, will not hold water.*

2. They (Q) that admit the word *Permissive* do willingly mistake it, and while (to keep off this blow) they use the word, they corrupt the meaning. For 1. *Permission* is an act of Gods consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedome, and committing such sinnes day by day as they might have avoyded, and to which he proceedeth *lento gradu*, slowly and unwillingly, as we may see Psalm. 81. 11, 12. *Israel would none of me; so I gave them up*, &c. Ezek. 18. 39. *Go and serve every one his idols, seeing ye will not obey me;*

Colloq. Mompel. 2. per pag. 177.

Calv. Instit. l. 4. c. 18. Sect. 1, & 2.

b *Idem, ibid. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3.*

c Similiter quod de permissione afferunt, diluvius est quàm ut subsistat.

me, &c. Rom. 1. 21, 24. *Because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God: therefore God gave them up to their hearts lust, to vile affections, and to a reprobate mind.* Revel. 22. 11. *He which is unjust, let him be unjust still.* In these places and many more we may see, that persons left to themselves are sinners onely; and not all sinners, but the obstinate and wilfull, which will by no means be reclaimed. But the permission which they mean, is an act of Gods antecedent will, exercised about innocent men, lying under no guilt at all in Gods eternall consideration. 2. *Permission,* (*R*) about whomsoever it is exercised, obstinate sinners or men considered without sinne, is no more then a not-hindring of them from falling that are able to stand, and suppoſeth a possibility of sinning or not-sinning in the parties permitted: But with them it is a withdrawing or withholding of grace needfull for the avoiding of sinne, and so includeth an absolute necessitie of sinning: for from the withdrawing of such grace sinne must needs follow, as the fall of Dagons house followed Samsons plucking away the pillars that were necessarie for the upholding of it. Maccovius in two disputations, expounding this word *Permission*, circumscribeth it within two acts: the first of which, is a *subtraction* of Divine assistance necessary to the preventing of sinne. And having proved it by two arguments, that none may think he is alone in this, he saith, that he is compassed about with a cloud of witnesses, and produceth two: The first of them is our reverend and (*S*) learned Whitaker, some of whose words alledged by him are these, [d] *Permission of sinne, is a privation of that aid, which being present, sinne would have been hindred.* The second is Pareus; for saying that [e] *that help* which God withdrew from Adam, *being withdrawn, Adam could not so use his endowments as to persevere.* And this doctrine (saith he) is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of Pareus, *lib. De gratia primi hominis, cap. 4. pag. 46.*

Maccov. Col. Theol. disp. 9. pag. 10.

d *Pag. 15.* Permissio peccati est privatio auxilii Divini, quo posito peccatum impediretur.

e Subtracto auxilio Dei homo [Adamus] illis facultatibus ad standum bene uti non potuit.

Their permission therefore of sinne being a subtraction of necessary grace, is equivalent to an actuall effectuall procuring and working of it; (For *causa deficiens in necessariis est efficiens*, a deficient cause in things necessary is truly efficient.) and so is but a mere fig-leaf to cover the foulnesse of their opinion.

II. There are (*T*) two things (they say) in every ill act: 1. The *materiall* part, which is the substance of the action; 2. The *formall* part, which is the evil or obliquity of

Distinct. 3.

of it. God is the author of the action it self, but not of the obliquitie and evil that cleaveth to it: as he that causeth a lame horse to go, is the cause of his going, but not of his lame going. And therefore it followeth not from their opinion That God is the author of sinne.

Answ. 1. All sinnes receive not this distinction: because of many sinnes the acts themselves are sinfull, as of the eating of the forbidden fruit, and Sauls sparing of Agag and the fat beasts of the Amalekites.

2. It is *(K)* not true, that they make the decree of God onely of actions and not of their aberrations: for they make it to be the cause of all those means that lead to damnation, and therefore of sinfull actions as sinfull, and not as bare actions. For actions deserve damnation not as actions, but as transgressions of Gods law.

3. To the *Simile* I say, That the rider or master that first resolve first to slay his horse or knock him on the head, and then to make him lame that for his halting he may kill him, is undoubtedly the cause of his halting: and so if God determine to cast men into hell, and then to bring them into a state of sinne, that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine, we cannot conceive him to be lesse then the author as well of their sinnes as of those actions to which they do inseparably adhere, and that out of Gods intention to destroy them.

Distinct. 3. III. The will *(X)* is determined to an object two wayes. 1. By *compulsion*, against the bent and inclination of it; 2. By *necessity*, according to the naturall desire and liking of it. Gods Predestination (say they) determineth the will to sinne this last way, but not the first. It forceth no man to do that which he would not, but carrieth him towards that which he would: When men sinne, it is true they cannot choose; and it is as true they will not choose. It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine, That Gods decree is the cause of mens sinnes, but their own wicked wills.

Answ. 1. The Antients made no distinction between these two words *necessity* and *compulsion*, but used them in this argument promiscuously; and did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne, lest they should grant him hereby to be the author of sinne, as I have touched before, and shall intimate again afterward. Nor did the School-men put any difference between them, as may appear by the testimonie of Mr Calvine, *Calv. Instit. l. 2. c. 1 sect. 5.* who speaking of the School distinction of the Wills threefold liberty,

liberty, from *Necessity*, from *Sinne*, from *Misery*, saith, *This distinction I could willingly receive, but that it confoundeth Necessity with Coaction.*

2. That which necessitateth the will to sinne, is as truly the cause of sinne as that which forceth it; because it maketh the sinne to be inevitably committed, which otherwise might be avoided: And therefore if the Divine decree necessitate mans will to sinne, it is as truly the cause of the sinne as if it did inforce it.

3. That which necessitateth the will to sinne, is more truly the cause of the sinne then the will is; because it overruleth the will, and beareth all the stroke, taketh from it its true liberty, by which it should be lord of it self and disposer of its own acts, and in respect of which it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too, *αὐτεξούσιον, αὐτοκίνητον, ἀκώλυτον, a power which is (Y) under the insuperable check and controll of no lord but it self.* It overruleth (I say) and maketh it become but a servile instrument, irresistibly subject to superiour command and determination: and therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sinnes as proceed from the will so determined, then the will is. For when two causes concurre to the producing of an effect, the one a principall overruling cause, the other but instrumentall and wholly at the devotion of the principall; then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of its influx and impression produceth it, rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall, which is but a mere servant in the production of it. We shall find it ordinary in Scripture, to ascribe the effect to the principall agent: *It is not ye that speak*, saith Christ, *but the Spirit of my Father that speaketh in you*, Matth. 10.20. *I laboured more abundantly then they all: yet not I, but the grace of God which was in me*, 1. Cor. 15.10. And, *I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me*, saith S. Paul, Gal. 2.20. In these and many other places, the effect or work spoken of is taken from the instrument, and given to the principall agent. Which being so, though mans will work with Gods decree in the commission of sinne, and willeth the sinne which it doeth; yet seeing what the will doeth, it doeth by the commanding power of Gods almighty decree, and so it doeth that otherwise it cannot do; the sinne committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to mans will the inferiour as to Gods necessitating decree the superiour cause.

4. That

4. That which maketh a man sinne by way of necessity only, that is, with and not against his will, is the cause of his sinne in a worse manner then that which constraineth him to sinne against his will: As he which by powerfull perswasion draweth a man to stab or hang or poyson himself, is in a grosser manner the cause of that evil and unnaturall act, then he that by force compelleth him; because he maketh him to consent to his own death. And so if Gods decree do not onely make men sinne, but sinne willingly too, not only cause that they shall *malè agere*, do evil, but *malè velle*, will evil, it hath the deeper hand in the sinne.

Distinct.4. IV. Sinne (Z) may be considered *as Sinne*, or *as a Means* of declaring Gods justice in mens punishment. God doth not predestinate men to sinne as it is Sinne, but as a Means of their punishment. He is not therefore (say they) the authour of sinne.

Answ. 1. A good (Γ) end cannot moralize a bad action: it remaineth evil, though the end be never so good. *Bonum oritur ex integris*: End, manner, yea and matter too must be good, or else the action is naught. He that shall steal, that he may give an alms; or commit adultery, that he may beget children for the Church; or oppresse the poore, to teach them patience; or kill a wicked man, that he may do no more hurt with his example; or do any forbidden things; though his end be never so good, he sinneth notwithstanding: And the reason is, because the evil of sinne is greater then any good that can come by sinne; for as much as it is *læsio Divinæ majestatis*, a wronging of Gods majestie, and so *Divino bono oppositum*, directly prejudiciall to the good of almighty God, as much as any thing can be. This S. Paul knew very well: and therefore he telleth us plainly, that *we must not do evil that good may come of it*, Rom. 3. 8. Whosoever therefore willeth a sinne, though for never so good an end, he willeth that which is truly and formally a Sinne: And consequently God, though he will sinne for ends never so good, yet willing it with such a powerfull and effectuall will as giveth a necessarie being to it, he becometh authour of that which is formally sinne.

2. The members of this distinction are not opposite: For sinne (Δ) *as Sinne*, and in no other consideration, is *a meanes of punishment*. If God therefore willeth it as a Means of punishment, he willeth it as a Sinne; his decree is terminated at the very formality of it.

3. This

3. This distinction fastenieth upon God a further aspersion, and loadeth him with three speciall indignities more. 1. Want (Θ) of Wisdome and Providence. His counsels must needs be weak, if he can find out no means to glorifie his justice, but by the bringing-in of sinne, which his soul hateth, into the world, and appointing men to commit it, that so he may manifest justice in the punishment of it. 2. Want (Λ) of Sincerity and plain dealing with men. Tiberius (as Suetonius reporteth) having a purpose to put the two sonnes of Germanicus, Drusus and Nero, to death, f used sundry cunning contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death; and herein is justly censured for great hypocrisie. And so if God having appointed men by his absolute will to inevitable perdition, do decree that they shall sinne, that so they may be damned for those sinnes which he decreeth and draweth them into; he dissembleth, because he slaughtereth them under a pretext of justice, for sinne, but yet for such sinnes onely as he hath by his eternall counsel appointed as the means of their ruine. 3. Want (Ξ) of Mercy in a high degree; as if he did so delight in bloud, that rather then he will not destroy mens souls, he will have them live and die in sinne, that he may destroy them: Like to those Pagan Princes, of whom Justine Martyr *Apolog.* 2. two or three leaves from the beginning, saith, g *They were afraid that all should be just, lest they should have none to punish. But this is the disposition of barbarous men, rather then of good Princes.* And therefore farre be these foul enormities, and in particular this latter, from the God of truth and Father of mercies.

f *Sueton. in vit. Tiber. c. 54.* Varia fraude inducit ut concitarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur.

g Videmini vereri ne omnes colant justitiam, atque ita desint in quos animadvertatis. Verùm hæc cura sit magis carnificum quàm bonorum principum.

And thus notwithstanding these distinctions, it is (in my conceit) most evident, That the rigid and upper way maketh God the authour of mens sinnes as well as punishments. And so much for the first generall Inconvenience which ariseth from this opinion, namely the Dishonour of God.

Observa-

Observations premised for the more clear understanding and answering this Authours Objections.

THe opinion here aimed at is the doctrine of absolute Reprobation, concerning wch all disputes are frivolous, if it be not first agreed upon what is understood by these two words, *absolute Reprobation.*

Observ. I. For the understanding whereof, observe first, what our Church conceiveth under the term of *Predestination.* If a decree of God first beholding and foreseeing certain particular persons as believing and constantly persevering unto the end in faith and godlinesse, and thereupon electing them unto eternall happinesse, then we will grant that the Remonstrants (whom this Authour followeth) embrace the doctrine of the Church of England. But if in our XVIIth Article, God in his eternall Predestination beholdeth all men as lying *in massa corrupta*, and decreeth out of this generall tide of mankind, being all in a like damnable condition, to elect some by his secret counsel, to deliver them from the curse and damnation by a speciall calling according to his eternall purpose,, and by working in them faith and perseverance; then it is plain that the Remonstrants and this Authour have left the doctrine of the Church of England in the point of Predestination, and therefore may well

well be ſuſpected alſo in the point of Reprobation, which muſt have its true meaſure taken from that other.

Secondly, take notice, what the word *Abſolute* importeth, when it is applied unto the eternall and immanent acts or decrees of the Divine Predeſtination. Nor (as the Remonſtrants continually miſtake it) a peremptorie decree of ſaving perſons elected whether they believe or not believe, nor yet a decree of forcing or neceſſitating predeſtinate perſons unto the acts of believing, repenting, perſevering, or walking in the way which leadeth unto everlaſting life; but a gracious and abſolute decree of beſtowing as well Faith, Repentance and Perſeverance, as eternall life, upon all thoſe to whom in his everlaſting purpoſe he vouchſafed the ſpeciall benefit of Predeſtination. And that God can and doth according to his eternall purpoſe infallibly work faith and perſeverance in the elect without any coaction or neceſſitation of mans will, is agreed upon by all Catholick Divines, and was never oppoſed but by Pelagius. And this abſolute intending of eternall life to perſons elected, and abſolute intending of giving unto ſuch the ſpeciall grace of a perſeverant Faith, is that Abſolute Predeſtination which our Mother the Church hath commended unto us, and which we muſt defend

Obſerv. II.

fend against the errour of the Semipelagia
and Remonstrants, who strive to bring in
Predestination or Election wherein Go
seeth faith and perseverance in certain me
going before Predestination, and doth no
prepare it for them in eternitie by his speci
all act of Predestination, nor bestow it upo
them in due time, as a consequent effect o
his eternall Predestination.

observ. III. Thirdly it is to be observed, that our Church, in not speaking one word of Reprobation in the Article, would have us to be more sparing in discussing this point then that other of Election; quite contrary to the humour of the Remonstrants, who hang back when they are called to dispute upon Predestination, but will by no authoritie be beat-off from rushing at the first dash upon the point of Reprobation.

But further from hence we may well collect, That our Church, which by Predestination understandeth a speciall Benefit out of Gods mercie and absolute freedome absolutely prepared from all eternitie, and in time bestowed infallibly upon the Elect, would have us conceive no further of the silenced decree of Reprobation, then the Not-preparing of such effectuall grace, the Not-decreeing of such persons unto the infallible atteinment of Glory, the decreeing to permit them through their own default deservedly

deservedly and infallibly to procure their own miserie. All this is no more then God himself hath avouched of himself, [h] *misereber cui volvero, & clemens ero in quem mihi placuerit.* And that which the Apostle attributeth unto God Rom. 9. 15, 16, 17, 18.

[h] Exod. 33. 19.

Fourthly, this *non-prædestinatio, non-electio, præteritio* or *negativa reprobatio* (for by all these names Divines speak of it) doth as absolutely leave some out of the number of the predestinate, as Predestination doth include others within the same number. And the number of both formally and materially is so certain, that the diminution or augmentation of either is by the generall consent of orthodox Divines condemned for an erroneous opinion: though the Semipelagians spurned against this truth. If under the name of *absolute Predestination* any conceive a violent decree of God thrusting men into an estate of grace and glory, and under the name of *absolute Reprobation*, a violent decree of God thrusting men into sinne and miserie, let who will confute them: for their opinion is erroneous concerning the one, and blasphemous concerning the other. But under colour of opposing such imaginarie decrees, to bring-in a conditionate Predestination, to exclude this negative Reprobation, to settle them both upon prevision of humane acts, is opposite to the do-

Observ. 1 K.

ctrine of S. Auguſtine approved anciently by the catholick Church, and till this new-fangled age generally and commonly allowed and embraced both by the Romaniſts and by the Proteſtants. Penottus, who would fain denie negative Reprobation, yet is driven to confeſſe, [1] *Doctores communiter admittunt reprobationem negativam, docéntque communiter obdurationem, ſeu permiſsionem manendi in peccato uſque ad mortem, effectum eſſe hujus reprobationis.* If the common opinion of Divines be, That permiſſion of finall continuance under the guilt of ſinne followeth after the decree of this negative Reprobation, then this Authour together with the Remonſtrants, who acknowledge no decree of Reprobation but that which followeth upon previſion of mens finall continuance in ſinne, are wandred into a ſingular opinion of their own.

[1] *Lib. 7. cap. 17.*

Theſe things premiſed concerning the abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation which our Engliſh Divines maintein, and the conditionate Predeſtination and Reprobation which ſome of ours have lately received out of Dutchland, all objections ſo farre as they concern us are eaſily anſwered.

An Anſwer to the Objection, That this opinion chargeth God with mens ſinnes.

A THe doctrine of abſolute Predeſtination doth make God the Authour of mans holineſſe

holineſſe and happineſſe, of all ſaving grace wherewith he is indued here; and of that eternall glorie which he obteineth hereafter. And for this cauſe eſpecially we denie the Arminian Predeſtination built upon foreſeen acts of mans free-will, becauſe it doth not fully and truly acknowledge the ſpeciall mercie of God either in the election or ſalvation of the predeſtinate. But for the doctrine of abſolute negative Reprobation, we utterly denie, that it *chargeth God with or maketh him the authour of* any *ſinne*. It maketh God the determiner, not to prevent any mens ſinnes; which eaſily he could do, if he were reſolved to ſhew them ſpeciall mercie: but it maketh not God the authour or neceſſary producer of any mans ſinnes; which is a thing as unpoſſible, as for the ſunne to be the authour or producer of darkneſſe. And therefore we willingly ſubſcribe unto all which the *ſcripture* or *pious Antiquitie* have ſaid againſt this errour.

The compariſon made between God and the Devil is very odious and irreverent; and ſo much the more, becauſe it is grounded upon a falſe imagination, That whatſoever events come into act according to the eternall and abſolute decrees of God, are produced by an irreſiſtible power forcing the agents unto ſuch actions how wicked ſoever. But Gods providence doth farre

otherwise decree the production of good actions, and the permission of bad actions to be produced by defective agents. Of the former he is a powerfull and effectuall worker: Of the latter he is onely a voluntarie sufferer, and a powerfull and irresistible orderer or disposer. Thus God powerfully wrought Faith, Repentance, Perseverance in the will of Peter, according to his decree of absolute Predestination: and according to his decree of negative Reprobation, he suffered Judas to split himself voluntarily upon the rocks of Covetousnesse, Treacherie, Infidelitie, Impenitencie, and he turned those very sinnes to his own greater glorie. Predestination is a cause effectuall in the producing of all salutiferous actions; but Reprobation is no effectuall cause in the producing of any wicked actions: and neither the one nor the other implieth compulsion, coaction or necessitation to actions whether good or evil. And this was the effect of the answer which Prosper made to the Semipelagians, when they objected against Augustines doctrine of absolute Predestination, as the Remonstrants do now against ours. I wonder therefore that this Authour could not see, that Prosper, whom he alledgeth, holdeth this objection for a mere calumniation.

C We acknowledge with Prosper, that God

God punisheth not those actions whereof he is the authour or effectuall working cause: for such actions are alwayes holy and rewardable, not malitious and punishable: But God, who according to the doctrine of Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and all other orthodox Divines of that age, absolutely out of his own free mercie predestinated some unto grace and glory, and as absolutely out of his own free-will passed-by others, not-electing or predestinating them to saving grace and glory, is notwithstanding denied to be the cause of any mans sinne. Therefore in their judgement absolute Predestination and Reprobation maketh not God the cause of sinne.

Answers to the Arguments indeavouring to prove that the defenders of absolute Predestination and Reprobation make God the authour of sinne.

TO the first in generall we answer, that our Church in establishing absolute Predestination and absolute Non-predestination, and in rejecting that Election and Non-election which the Semipelagians anciently, and lately some Papists and some Protestants have founded upon the opposite acts of mens free-will foreseen by God from all eternitie, doth not tie us to maintein whatsoever Piscator, Marlorate, *Ad* 1. D

Maccovius, or any other private Doctour holding absolute Predestination and Reprobation hath uttered. We leave them as well as we do the Remonstrants, where they leave the old way, and stray into crooked by-paths.

More particularly; We grant the decree of negative Reprobation to be absolute: But we denie that thereupon it will follow, that the damnation of singular persons not-elected, or in this sense reprobated, is by way of necessitie and by virtue and efficacie of this decree imposed upon any. A great part of the Angels were under this decree of Non-election or negative Reprobation, and yet not one of them by virtue of this decree was necessitated unto damnation, but by an act of voluntary rebellion fell thereinto.

And if by *Necessitie* this Authour meaneth nothing but that which the Schoolmen term *necessitatem immutabilitatis*, then he must know, that the Election and Reprobation of singular persons such as it is acknowledged by the Remonstrants, is as certain from all eternitie, as immutable, and in this sense as necessarie as that which we defend.

Vid. Coll. Hag. Bertii, pag. 111.

Last of all, To inquire whether the decree of Reprobation be *evitable* or *inevitable* by men, is a strange *Quære*, since evitabilitie or inevitabilitie is a thing which may

may be well questioned in our own temporall acts, but in the eternall immanent operations or decrees of God, which were established before the foundations of the world were laid, it is improper to say they were inevitable by us, and false to say they were evitable. Take the judgement of a learned Jesuite (no favourer of the opinions of Calvine, Beza, or any Protestant Divines) concerning the immutabilitie of the Divine volitions or decrees: *Imperfectio foret, si Deus in futurum tempus reservaret decretum liberum.* And again; *Turpe Deo esset non statuere ab æterno quicquid facturus esset vel non facturus in tempore.* *Ruiz. De volunt. disp. 16. §. 2, 3.*

And for the immutabilitie of all such eternall decrees; *Si Dei volitio libera mutaretur, sequeretur per mediatam illationem mutatio Divinæ substantiæ.* And finally, he setteth down this generall conclusion; *In quolibet instanti temporis tam est simpliciter necessaria qualibet volitio Dei, etiamsi respiciat creaturas in tempore futuro producendas.* The Remonstrants therefore must either denie that the decrees of electing Peter and Not-electing or Reprobating Judas are to be accounted eternall volitions of God, or confesse that their debating of the Mutabilitie or Vitabilitie of all such decrees, proceedeth from ignorance of the very nature of that about which they contend. *Ibid. §. 7.*

Ad 2. E For the secret decree of absolute Election and Non-election, or (in other terms) of absolute Predestination and absolute negative Reprobation, they are to be distinguished from the revealed and published decrees of the Salvation of all singular persons upon condition of their faith, repentance and perseverance, and damnation of all singular persons, if they continue in unbelief and impenitencie. We acknowledge these latter to be the eternall and immutable decrees of God, as well as the former; and no man atteineth salvation, or incurreth damnation, but according unto these: But we say the Remonstrants erre in confounding these conditionate decrees, which make no distinction betwixt man and man, with the absolute decrees of Election and Preterition, which are distinguishing decrees. The decree of damnation cannot be *justly executed without* mans *sinne*, because God established from all eternitie no decree of damning any man but for sinne. As for the decree of Non-election, it had the same absolute dependence upon Gods free pleasure which the opposite decree of Election had.

Ad 3. F As the former, so this argument is grounded upon a false supposition, namely, That the decree of damnation is the selfsame with the decree of Reprobation or Non-election, which is onely that absolute decree

decree we now speak of. The eternall decree of Judas his damnation, or of the very devils, was never *in voluntate Divina* without the prevision of their sinnes, nor determined to be executed otherwise then for and upon their own misdeserts. But the Non-election or negative Reprobation of Judas and of the apostaticall angels, or (in plainer terms) the Not-preordaining them to the infallible attcining of eternall happinesse, and the decree of permitting them finally to lose eternall happinesse by their own deficient, voluntary, finall wicked actions, is such an eternall absolute decree of the Divine will, as dependeth not upon any foreseen acts of mans will, though it exclude not the eternall prevision of all future acts of men whatsoever. We grant not therefore, that by this absolute Reprobation, God decreeth that men not-predestinate should *unavoidably sinne*, that so they may justly and certainly be damned: but we grant that together with this absolute Non-election, God foreknoweth that persons not-elected will voluntarily commit those sinnes for which he intendeth to condemn them, and to glorifie himself in the manifestation of his justice upon them, and the more clear manifestation of his mercie towards the elect.

For harsh or false propositions of particular

ticular authours who dispute about Predestination and Reprobation, I will not justifie them. Onely I would have this Authour consider, whether their errours were a sufficient cause to make him runne into the contrary erroneous doctrine of the Remonstrants; who to avoid the absolute decree of Election and Non-election or Preterition thrust upon the world a decree founded upon the prevision of mens distinct acts, good or bad, thereupon making God distinguish them into Elect and Non-elect, or Predestinated and Not-predestinated. A mere Semipelagian doctrine, grounding Election and Reprobation upon the *merits* or *demerits* of men; as both the orthodox Fathers and Semipelagians used the words *Meriti* or *Meritum*, when the one contended that Predestination and negative Reprobation were mere acts of free Mercie and absolute Libertie, preparing for some denying to other the infallible means of beatitude; and the other would make them acts of the Divine Justice, passing differently upon both according to the foreseen difference of their future actions, good or bad: which the Ancients without scruple termed *merita* and *demerita*.

Ad 4. *G* The *Immutabilitie* of Gods eternall decrees is a thing unquestionable: But that God hath made any decree of Reprobation whereby

whereby Reprobates are necessitated or caused either to *live* or *die in sinne*, is utterly false. Negative Reprobation implieth no such causalitie. And as for the decree of damnation (which some call Positive Reprobation) it *procureth* no mans sinnes, though it import a necessitie of undergoing just punishment for sinne.

The peremptory decree of excluding men out of heaven and tormenting them in hell, is one thing; and the absolute decree of Permitting men by their own defective free-will to fail in the atteinment of heaven, and to fall into the torments of hell, is another. The former is a judiciall act or decree, and respecteth men as Gods eternall knowledge findeth them *in egressu ex hac vita*. The latter is an act of Gods absolute and sovereigne dominion, freely disposing of the preparation and donation or of the withholding and denying of that which he oweth unto no man, according to the libertie of his own will. *Quis tam imprudens qui dicat voluntatem excludendi efficaciter aliquem à fine, & voluntatem permittendi illum pro sua libertate deficere à fine, non esse voluntates distinctas.* *Penott. lib. 7. cap. 13. §. 4.* *Penott. lib. 7. 3. §. 10.*

What is alledged out of Calvine to prove that God, to effect his decree of absolute Reprobation, procureth or worketh in reprobates their sinnefull actions, proveth

no

no such matter. Calvine saith that the devils, *totámque improborum cohortem, non compedibus tantùm teneri ligatos, sed etiam ad obsequia præstanda freno cogi.* What could be spoke in this point more truly and judiciously? Is to hold them so fettered that they cannot move a finger without Gods permission, all one with procuring and by an irresistible power working in them their malitious actions? or rather a restraining and limiting of their wickednesse? Is *freno cogere ad obsequia sibi præstanda*, all one with compelling them to wicked actions? or rather, by the admirable act of Divine providence, making their disobedience to Gods revealed will serve to the fulfilling of his concealed will? Reade the whole Section, and you shall see the point admirably well expressed by learned Calvine, and quite mistaken or miserably wrested by this Authour.

For the other places cited out of Calvines works, they import thus much; That wicked men cannot bring to effect any witked action according to their own will, unlesse God hath foredecreed that such an act, for some good which he meaneth to draw out of it, should be acted here in this world. And furthermore, they import, *That God doth not onely behave himself privatively* in sinnefull acts and events, but that he

he therein exerciſeth *poſitive and powerfull acts*. The very decree of permitting that ſinne to be committed which lieth in Gods will to hinder, is a poſitive act of the Divine will, which is poſitively converſant about all the ſinnes of men, though not working them as effects, yet working upon them as materiall objects, and uſing them to ſuch purpoſes as make beſt and moſt for his glory. This is not a mere privative demeanour. And laſt of all, in the *ſtirring up of their wills*, even unto thoſe actions which are malitious in the doers, there may be and often is a poſitive act of God, and yet moſt pure and free from infuſing the leaſt drop of malice into the wills of ſuch wicked agents. It is a poſitive act of God, to ſtirre up a particular cogitation in the mind of a wicked man, which otherwiſe would never have come into his mind: It is a poſitive act of God, to order and diſpoſe the concurrence of all circumſtances according to his own good pleaſure. When God certainly foreſeeing that ſuch a cogitation good in it ſelf, or ſuch circumſtances in themſelves not bad, will infallibly through the inbred malice of wicked men ſtirre them up to wicked actions; God procuring ſuch thoughts to ariſe in bad minds, and ordering the concurrence of ſuch harmleſſe circumſtances to be preſented unto bad men,

is

is thereby even in the phrase of holy Scripture said to *stirre* them *up* to those actions.

I want paper-room here to explain this point of so deep consideration. I will onely say this on the behalf of Calvine, that he attributeth unto God no other positive act in the sinnes of men then the Scripture doth, and in no other meaning then it doth. And it were no hard matter to shew, that S. Augustine, the ancient Schoolmen, yea the very Papists and Jesuites themselves when they have railed against Calvine for making God the authour of sinne, are at length forced by evidence of Scripture to grant as many positive acts of God conversant about the sins of men, and if not in the same words, yet in words equipollent and as expresse as ever Calvine used. It is therefore a weak inference and a false collection which this Authour maketh from Calvines forenamed propositions. For God, who (according to Calvines doctrine) appointed no man to torments but onely in respect of his misdeeds, did not tie himself to bring about any mans ruine; neither did he thereby debarre himself from furnishing any wicked man with sufficient means and remedies; neither doth he so over-rule by any decree of his the wills of wicked and reprobate men, that their liberty is extinguished,

or

or a neceſſitie of committing this or that particular ſinne impoſed upon them. Theſe are dreams and fanſies which by the occaſion of the doctrine of abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation have riſen out of the addle heads of the Remonſtrants: they are no neceſſary conſequents ariſing from the doctrine it ſelf: And therefore by no juſt conſequent can it be proved or concluded, that abſolute Predeſtination and abſolute Preterition or negative Reprobation make God the authour of ſinne.

An Anſwer to the Conſiderations pag. 116, *&c.*

GOd hath no *hand* at all *in the production of ſinfull* actions as they have *formalem rationem peccati* or *mali moralis*, which conſiſteth in the deficiency or obliquitie of the will oppoſite to the ſtraight rule of Gods law. Of this defect or malicious crookedneſſe God neither is nor poſſibly can be a Phyſicall or Morall cauſer. But all ſinfull and defective actions have a *ſubſtratum peccati*; which is a naturall action of the mind, or of the body, or both. This naturall action whereunto the formall reaſon of ſinne cleaveth, hath a poſitive and reall being: and therefore it muſt be reduced unto God, as Auguſtine hath truly concluded againſt the Manichees; to whom he giveth H *Ad I.*

[a] *De duab. anim. cont. Manich. c. 6. in fine.*

giveth this admonition, [a] *Ut eos sequi malent qui omne quicquid esset, quoniam esset, quantúmque esset, ex uno Deo esse prædicarent.*

If any, disputing for absolute Predestination and Reprobation, make God the cause of that which giveth unto the free actions of men the formall reason of their sinne, let him be anathematized: But if they make God the cause of that inward or outward naturall action wherein this malitious defect of mans will is found, they hold nothing but what their very Adversaries are forced to grant. *Vide Penot. lib. 8. cap. 11. §. 9. p. 477. & Ruiz. De volunt. disp. 27. §. 3. num. 17. Ubi tres modos agnoscit quibus actionem peccati esse à Deo tradunt Scholastici.* And Suarez saith, *Omnes conveniunt proprio & reali influxu concurrere Deum ad hos actus liberi arbitrii ut reales actus sunt, etiamsi pessimi & intrinsecè mali sunt:* And yet [b] *Omnes etiam conveniunt, Deum absolutè, & simpliciter non esse causam peccati.* So Valentianus, [c] *Emitatem pravæ actionis omnes fatemur cadere in voluntatem Divinam cùm sit, & esse à Deo tanquam à causa universali concurrente cum voluntate humana.*

[b] *Opusc. l. 2. c. 1. p. 126.*

[c] *In 1. Aquin. q. 19. pag. 436.*

I wonder how that should be blasphemie when it cometh from Calvine or Beza, which is found divinitie when it cometh from their adversaries. As for that which

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is added, concerning Gods *necessitating by his decree*, and *the determining of mens wills to sinne*, and that *irresistibly*; they are chimericall fansies. For the absolute decrees of God determining amongst possible actions and events, which shall be and which shall not be, alter not the naturall operation of the agents. God absolutely decreed to give Peter faith, repentance, perseverance: and because these are good supernaturall acts, God was the true effectuall working cause of them all; yet not by way of necessitation, but by giving Peter that spirit which made him most freely perform them all. For wicked actions, which according to Gods eternall determinate decree come into act at the time appointed, as the betraying of Christ by Judas, the murdering of him by the Jews, in these and such like the Divine decree moveth no man, much lesse irresistibly determineth him unto those wicked actions: The devil and his own free-will are the onely moving and determining causes: But the Divine decree, which for the good of mankind and Gods glory fore-appointed the death of Christ, and willingly permitted these Agents to effect their malicious actions, powerfully so ordered all circumstances as God foresaw and foreknew would infallibly by the free and wicked actions of men effect the just

and holy purpose of God. Where then is the *irresistible necessitation of mans will*, which this Authour alwayes presumeth (and never goeth about to prove) must needs follow upon Gods absolute decrees of infallibly working good actions in the elect, and absolutely permitting and powerfully disposing of all the future bad actions which devils or men shall commit to the end of the world?

Ad II. I It is false that the doctrine of absolute Predestination and Reprobation maketh God either so to *over-rule* the supernatural good actions of the elect, *as they cannot choose but do as they do*, or the bad and wicked actions of the Non-elect. Absolute Predestination doth by the virtue of effectuall grace so rule and affect the free-will of the predestinate, that it causeth them freely to do as they do. And absolute Non-election or Reprobation doth so permit the reprobate to the guidance of their own defective will, that freely and upon a deliberate choise they do as they do. Neither do they onely think or dream they have such a freedome, but their own experience and conscience assureth them that they have it. And therefore Ruiz [4] hath not unfitly described the Divine permission, which is made an effect of negative Reprobation, to be *decretum manens in Deo quo decernit non impedire*

[4] *De scient. Dei, disp. 2. §. 1, & 3.*

impedire peccatum, & decernit aliqua bona facere, licet sciat illorum occasione committendum esse peccatum. And he further granteth that [c] all the sinnes of men in time to be committed, might be and *de facto* were foreseen by God, *in decreto hoc prædefiniente permissionem illorum.* And last of all he addeth, *Dei voluntate, consilio, decreto, definitione fieri peccatorum actiones, significat scriptura.* To which purpose he bringeth-in the very self-same places of Scripture which Calvine and our Protestant Divines usually alledge. By all which it appeareth how weakly and falsely, upon the infallibilitie of future actions decreed by God *quoad ipsum eventum*, the necessitation of mans free-will to the forenamed actions is collected.

[c] *Ibid.*

Augustine, who was a stiff mainteiner of the absolute decree of Predestination and Preterition, and a stiff opposer of the Semi-pelagian Election and Non-election founded upon good or bad actions of men eternally foreseen by God, doth every-where shake-off this Pelagian objection, That by such decrees mans free-will is necessitated, and all freedome extinguished.

He hath not onely *potentiam in se liberam*, but *liberum usum potentiæ*, who committeth his wicked actions with deliberation and election, and can upon other deliberation resolve to do otherwise, or to suspend such

wicked actions, and ceaſe from them for a time. Which freedome is evident in adulterers, thieves, and all manner of ſinners, who being reſolved to commit this or that ſinne, when they perceive ſome great danger, preſently chooſe to abſtein from it till they have fitter opportunitie to commit it.

As for the *predetermination of mens wills*, which this Author harpeth upon, it is a controverſie between the Dominicanes and Jeſuites: With whoſe Metaphyſicall ſpeculations our Proteſtant Divines love not to torture their brains. In brief we acknowledge no ſuch predetermination flowing from Gods abſolute decree, as either in good or bad actions taketh away the naturall dominion which free agents have over their own actions. And yet if this dominion be conceived ſo abſolute as that it excludeth the dominion of God over mans will, we hold it an erroneous fanſie.

Ad III. K God is our *Counſeller* either by his word or by his Spirit: by neither of theſe counſelleth he any man to commit ſinne.

Yea, but he *inforceth* wicked men, and *by an almighty power which cannot be reſiſted* cauſeth *the production of all their ſinnes*.

If the abſolute decree of electing ſome and not-electing others make God inforce the non-elected or reprobated unto any wickedneſſe, we grant that it maketh God the

the Authour of sinne. But this is *Petitio principii*, a miserable begging of that which will never be granted, and which this Authour perpetually presumeth to be a plain consequent of absolute negative Reprobation, but never dareth attempt the proving of it.

His errour springeth from ignorance of the different means and manner of the Divine operation in persons mercifully ordained unto eternall felicitie, and persons not comprised in this mercifull decree of Predestination, but passed-by and left by their own defective and wicked actions to plunge themselves into endlesse misery. Persons ordained unto eternall felicitie stand in need of the infallible direction and effectuall operation of the Almighty: Otherwise their own will is such a broken bow, as that by it they never attein the scope whereunto God hath preordained them. God therefore taketh upon himself to be a powerfull worker and authour of all those supernaturall acts whereby they tend unto the kingdome of Glory. But the case is quite otherwise with men not-elected. Defective actions cannot proceed from the operation of an almighty and holy God: they are the productions which defective causes of themselves freely bring forth, where they are not guided and acted by that speciall

grace wch guideth and acteth all Gods elect.

And notwithstanding, though God cannot be an Authour or a producer, much lesse an Inforcer, in regard of any sinfull action, yet God may be a Decreer, a Determiner, in permitting persons not-elected to fall voluntarily into sinnes, to continue voluntarily in them unto their lives end, and for them to undergo endlesse misery in another life. And this is all which can truly be inferred upon the decree of absolute Election and Non-election. Bonaventure in effect saith the same;

[t] Lib. 1. dist. 46. quæst. 5. [t] *Malum non subest potentiæ Divinæ producenti, subest tamen potentiæ providenti.*

The comparisons of a *King procuring the ruine of his subjects*, or of *Tiberius causing virgins to be deflowred, that so they might be strangled*, with God absolutely electing some both to the end and to the effectuall and infallible means of salvation, and absolutely not-electing others, but decreeing to permit them by their own default to fail in attaining salvation, is as frivolous as odious. For Gods absolute decree of Non-election doth neither make men miserable nor wicked, but onely (for ends best known to himself) absolutely willeth the permitting of such men to be the causes both of their own sinnes and miseries. Neither had God ever an absolute *purpose to put* any *innocent man to death*, or *to damne* any sinner, but upon the respect unto his foregoing sinnes.

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All sides grant that God is the Authour of mans salvation and conversion: But the Arminian side flatly denieth that God by the grace prepared for men in their Election or Predestination, is the authour or cause of any mans conversion, faith, perseverance, or salvation. Nay, they stiffly maintein that conversion, faith and perseverance to the last gasp are things foreseen by God in man before any man is elected or predestinated unto salvation by God. It is therefore clear, that according to the doctrine of the Remonstrants, Predestination or Election is no cause of any mans conversion: For an effect foreseen is never caused by that which followeth after it, but is rather the cause of that prevision, and of what is consequently done thereupon. Ad IV. M

The Remonstrants may justly be taxed wth that errout which this Authour goeth-about to fasten upon their adversaries. For in their opinion God doth no more in procuring the conversion of the elect then he doth in procuring the conversion of the reprobates, who notwithstanding remain unconverted. For procuring the conversion, faith, perseverance of Judas, God took order that sufficient means should be ministred unto him, God gave him a power to elicite the act of his conversion and those other supernaturall acts required unto salvation,

though God never absolutely decreed the conversion of Judas, or the making him a faithfull and perseverant Christian. Thus say the Remonstrants. In like manner (say they) God administred sufficient means of grace unto Peter, God gave him a power to convert, to believe, to persevere, but God never absolutely decreed the converting of Peter (or any man else) or the saving of Peter; but he left Peters conversion depending upon the contingent act of his own free-will; and upon the foresight of this contingent act God predestinateth Peter unto salvation. Just so he left the conversion of Judas, and upon the self-same terms he had decreed the salvation and the predestination of Judas. But to urge this no further: God doth much more in procuring the salvation of Peter then he did for procuring the salvation of Judas. And as for the procuring and working the impenitency or infidelity of reprobates, God doth not at all work any vitious dispositions or defective and sinfull actions in such men. Wicked habits or dispositions are diseases bred within mens own souls, not infused into them by the Physician of our souls: Wicked and sinfull actions are the productions of their own corrupted free-will, and not produced by any Divine operation working in them: for it is onely in good and holy actions that God

giveth

giveth us both the will and the deed. Yea but (say they) as God hath *absolutely and antecedently without the fore-sight of any deservings resolved by irresistible means to cause the elect to believe, repent and persevere, that so his decree of their salvation may be accomplished*; even so, in the doctrine of those that teach absolute negative Reprobation, God hath *of his alone will and pleasure peremptorily decreed the damnation and the finall impenitencie of reprobates*, and *by unconquerable power*, &c. In both this Authour is utterly mistaken. For the Elect; God hath absolutely and antecedently without any prevision of their merits, graciously elected and ordained them unto eternall life: And this hath ever been mainteined by Catholick Divines against Pelagians and Semipelagians, and is at this day the common doctrine both of the Protestant and Romane Church; though by some few it be gainsaid in both.

But for those words, *without the foresight of their deservings*, if by the name of *deservings* this Authour understandeth repentance, faith, persevering, and such supernaturall acts required to salvation; we grant it is not onely untrue but unpossible that God should decree the salvation of any man without the fore-sight of those acts; because in Predestination the effectuall and infallible

Vide Mald. Antiſ. pag. 9, 10. & 6. fallible producing of all thoſe acts is reſolv upon, and God cannot but from all eterni fore-ſee what himſelf hath from all eterni decreed to work. We deny not foreſigh of faith and perſeverance in the Catholic ſenſe, that is, as of effects and conſequen of the Divine Predeſtination or Election *Vide pag. 13, 14.* but in the Arminian ſenſe, that is, as of an tecedent motives, reaſons, cauſes or condi tions foreſeen in men, and drawing afte them the decree of Predeſtination.

As for thoſe terms *by irreſiſtible means* they are merely captious. It is ſufficient t eſtabliſh abſolute Predeſtination, that ſuch means are prepared for the predeſtinate *ut nullum durum cor reſiſtat*: whether there be a metaphyſicall poſſibilitie of reſiſtance left in them or no, let thoſe diſpute who love endleſſe wranglings.

Vide Mald. Antiſ. pag. 13. Now to come to the Non-elect: In their Preterition or negative Reprobation there is no decree involved of damning any man upon Gods *alone will and pleaſure*, but onely upon the guilt and miſdeſert of the perſons, whom the decree of negative Reprobation permitteth (and that with infallibilitie of the event) to procure their own condigne puniſhment. Neither doth God *draw* any man *on unto ſinne by an unconquerable power*; but he permitteth ſome men by the devil and their own luſts to be drawn from ſinne to ſinne,

sinne, till at last they perish in their sinnes; of whom *Perditio tua ex te* notwithstanding is most truly verified. The difference therefore which God in the course of his providence taketh with the Elect and with the Non-elect is as different as possibly can be imagined. The conversion, perseverance and salvation of the Elect, he worketh by such a speciall grace, as in his infinite wisdome he knoweth will, and out of his infinite goodnesse and mercy he decreeth shall work in them all those blessed and saving effects.

As for the finall sinnes and damnation of the Reprobate, the providence of God permitteth them both, whereas he could (as he doth in his Elect) hinder the one, and prevent the other. But as God worketh not their sinnes (being effects of a finite deficient and not of an infinite efficient cause) so he did never upon mere will and pleasure decree their damnation, as he did the salvation of his Elect. And therefore he cannot be called the authour of any mans sinne or damnation, though he may truly be styled the authour of all good graces and actions, as also of salvation unto all the Predestinate.

For the *Fathers*; It is most true that they deny a Predestination unto any sinfull acts. And the reason was that which was even now touched-upon, Because they conceived

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Predestination to be such a decree as proceeth from eternitie and in time infallibly and most effectually worketh all those graces and gracious acts whereby men are brought to eternall life. So that Predestination implyeth an effectuall production or operation of those good things which are intended unto the predestinate. Now because the evil of sinne cannot fall under the Divine causalitie or operation, the Fathers granted a *præscience* in God of all mens sinnes, but truly denied a *Predestination* of any mans sins, and as truly a *necessitation* or *necessitating decree* forcing any man unto sin. But what of all this? If there be no decree of Predestination forcing men unto sin, is there therefore no decree of negative Reprobation or Non-election, resolving to permit some finally to sinne and eternally to perish? Is there no decree of absolute Predestination, not permitting others out of their own defective will finally to continue in sinne and perish, and absolutely resolving to draw them out of the state of sinne, and advance them to the state of glory?

I conclude, that unlesse this Authour under the name of *absolute Reprobation* mean the absolute judiciary decree of Damnation, and an absolute decree of necessitating men unto the deserts of their damnation, he hath said nothing at all to evince that absolute

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Reprobation maketh God the Authour of sinne. If he mean such a decree when he fighteth against absolute Reprobation, he fighteth with his own shadow, and oppoſeth that which no judicious Divine will endeavour to uphold.

Of the Supralapſarians Diſtinctions.

THis term of *Supralapſarians*, which is truly faſtened upon ſome Proteſtant Divines, but falſely upon Calvine, if it deſigne all thoſe who place the decrees of Election and Reprobation before the Previſion or decree of permitting originall ſinne, it taketh-in Scotus and all his followers, it taketh-in a great number of the Romaniſts, for (if Suarez ſay true) it is the more common opinion amongſt them. This I note to ſhew the private ſpleen which our Remonſtrants carrie againſt ſome Proteſtant writers of good deſert in Gods Church, whom they fouly handle for the ſelf-ſame opinion which they wink at in the Romaniſts. But to come to their Diſtinctions.

The firſt Diſtinction of the Supralapſarians whereby they clear themſelves from making God the true cauſe of mens ſinnes though they teach abſolute Election and Non-election or negative Reprobation conſidered before the fall, is, That Gods decrees may be *Operative* or *Permiſſive*. This *Diſt. I.*

decree

decree of Reprobation is not a decree to work any mans sinfull actions whereby he incurreth damnation, but to let them come to passe by the free operation of his own will. This Distinction of Gods decrees is not denied; but it is objected by this Authour, That God *standeth in no need of mans sinne for setting forth of his glorie*; as if the doctrine of the Supralapsarians concerning absolute Election and absolute Non-election or Reprobation made sinne so absolutely needfull that Gods glory must suffer an eclipse if sinnes be not committed by his own procuring and working. But absolute Reprobation implieth onely, that God knew he could turn the sinnes of men and angels (yea and their damnation) unto his own glorie; and that he decreed so to do in some, not out of any necessitie of setting forth his glorie by permitting or punishing their sinnes, but out of his Free-will determining so to manifest his glorie. The glorie which eternally and essentially belongeth unto God, needeth not the creature it self, much lesse then the sinne of the creature. Gods glorie had been the same that it is if man had never been made; and so consequently if he had never sinned, if he had never been condemned unto Hell for sinne. Nay further, if no man had ever been elected, sanctified, or saved, Gods glorie is a

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thing wch could not possibly have been lessened or any way blemished. The outward and temporall manifestation of Gods glorie being in it self a thing of no necessitie in regard of God, it is fond to imagine that God standeth in need of any such means for setting-forth of his glory, seeing the very temporall setting-forth of his glory is a thing no way needfull unto him. We agree therefore, that God stands in no need of sin either for his glory as it is considered in it self, or as it is to be manifested unto the creature: For God in his infinite wisdome could (without the permission of sin) have found means enough for sufficient illustration of his own glory.

Two other reasons are assigned by this Authour of the permission of sinne: The one is, the great *good* which the most wise God foreseeth he can, and the most gracious God determineth that he will *bring out of the evil* actions of men. The other is, *because man is by God made a free Creature, undetermined in his actions till he determine himself, and therefore may not be hindered from sinning by ommipotencie.* The former reason we gainsay not: The latter is neither fitly nor truly set down. The full reason is, Because God who gave man a Free and yet a defective will, hath thought it fit that this will should produce her own acts *per modum liberi agentis*, and yet so that the defective-

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neſſe as well as the freedome ſhould be manifeſted. Now had not God eſtabliſhed ſuch permiſſive decree, the frailtie and deficiencie of the Creatures free-will could not have been diſcovered either in men or angels. Now it is falſe (which is ſuppoſed and here implied) that Gods determination of mans will unto every particular action is a neceſſary hindering of the libertie of the will unto all actions ſo predetermined. The Jeſuites themſelves, who oppoſe the Dominicanes in their Phyſicall Determination or Predefinition of mans will unto all acts of what kind ſoever, do notwithſtanding grant a Predefinition or Predetermination unto good ſupernaturall acts, and that without all impeachment to the libertie of mans will. To think therefore that God ſhould *repent his own ordinance* concerning mans libertie unleſſe he leave all his actions unto himſelf undetermined, and that Gods permiſſive decree is founded upon this reaſon, is a flat miſtake.

And here I muſt adde unto what hath been ſaid, That the Divine permiſſion which adhereth unto the decree of Reprobation may be underſtood two wayes. It may be taken either for that immanent and eternall decree *quo decernit Deus non impedire peccatum, & decernit aliqua bona facere, licèt ſciat illorum occaſione committendum eſſe peccatum;*

Ruiz. de ſcient. Dei, diſp. 26 §. 1

peccatum, and this is called *incrta permissio*: or for the temporall accomplishment of this decree, in producing those occasions and circumstances, good in themselves, which God foreknew would be abused unto sinfull actions, and permitteth so to be; and this is called *creata permissio*. Absolute Election and Reprobation cannot be defended without this absolute permissive decree: But this absolute permissive decree may and is easily and perspicuously defended by Divines both of our Church and the Romane from making God the cause or Authour of any mans sinne.

This is so clear that it is here confessed, that such a Permissive decree is *truly and fitly contradistinguished to an Operative decree*. But it is objected, that the Defenders of the absolute decree *in sinfull events ascribe more to the* operative *power of God then this permission importeth*. How is this proved?

I. Because *many* who defend absolute Predestination and negative Reprobation *do utterly reject this* former *distinction* of a Permissive and Operative decree. I dare boldly say not many, and I think not one man will be found who dareth utterly reject this distinction. And if some should, doth it therefore follow that the Doctrine it self of absolute Election and absolute Non-election maketh God the operative cause of

sinne, because some mainteining this Doctrine do ignorantly and falsely maintein together with it an erroneous opinion? As for Beza and Calvine, whom this Author challengeth to make God *to decree sinne with an energeticall and working will*, and *not only with a permissive*, and therefore to make God the cause of sinne, he should first have considered that the permissive decree concerning sinfull actions implieth an infallibilitie of the events so permitted. *Ruiz. De scient. disp. 69. §. 10.* *Posita permissione certissima est sinuritio peccati quod permittitur, & omnium circumstantiarum quæ permittuntur in illo.* Secondly it should have been considered, that there can be no infallible knowledge of such permitted events unlesse an Energeticall and Operative will be conjoyned with the Permissive will. But how farre forth is this energeticall will or decree conversant about sinfull actions whose event is decreed by a permissive will or decree?

First, It eternally decreeth and accordingly at the very time when sinfull actions are committed it giveth the sinner the power and use of understanding and Free-will, without which he could not sinne.

Secondly, God thereby eternally decreed to concurre, and accordingly at the instant doth concurre, *ad materialem actionem peccati*, which otherwise could not come into act or being. Thirdly,

Thirdly, God also decreed to make a collection and concurrence of those circumstances and occasions (good alwayes as they come from God) whereupon God foresaw that the sinner would infallibly fall into sinne.

Fourthly, God decreed to denie all such means as in his infinite wisdome he knew would have prevented such sinnes, and to afford them onely such means as he certainly knoweth they will voluntarily abuse unto the committing of sinne.

Fifthly, God limiteth and ordereth their sins, that they shall break forth in no other measure, at no other time, upon no other persons, then himself hath fore-appointed.

And lastly, God ordereth all the permitted sinnes of the reprobate to his own glory and the good of his elect.

All these may in a good sense be called operative decrees or volitions of God, and not barely permissive: In all these which are conversant about the sinnes of men, there is a positive will of God which doth not onely permit men to work their sinfull actions, but above and in those sinfull actions hath his own good and holy work. And this is that Energeticall will which Calvine and Beza attribute unto God in mens sinfull actions; which their very adversaries are forced to acknowledge. As for any

energeticall will which should so have a working in sinfull actions as that it should be the cause *quòd talis actio sit cum tali defectu*, or (in plainer terms) that should work the contrariety or repugnancy of the sinners will unto the law of God, this Calvine and Beza utterly disclaim. And as for the very terms which they use in referring sinfull actions unto the will of God, the very same in substance are used by all other Divines, though some in words are more strict then others. I now quote that of Ruiz, [g] *De voluntate, consilio, decreto, definitione fieri peccatorum actiones significat Scriptura.* And that of Penottus, [h] *Hoc solùm fit in mundo, & eo modo, & ad eum finem, Quod, & Quomodo, & ad Quem finem Deus vult illud fieri.* And, [i] *Ipsa Divina causalitas aliquo modo extenditur ad ipsa mala, non sicut ad effectum constituium in esse per ipsam Divinam causalitatem, sed sicut ad objectum circa quod versatur Divina causalitas, vel illud impediendo nè fiat, vel illud permittendo fieri*, &c. So that the question is not, Whether God have onely a permissive decree about sinfull actions; for most grant he hath also an operative decree: but all the difficulty is, In what manner and measure and by what means this decree hath his work upon the will.

[g] *De scientia Dei, p. 219.*

[h] *Lib. 8. c. 22 §. 2.*

[i] *Lib. 5. c. 9. p. 255.*

Calvine and Beza then might well *tax* all who grant onely a permissive decree concerning

concerning the events of sinne, and deny an operative, and truly avouch that many places in Scripture cannot be understood of a bare *permission*, but of necessity they import some kind of effectuall operation.

II. It is further objected, That the mainteiners of absolute Reprobation, though they *admit the name of a permissive* decree, yet *they corrupt the meaning*: For whereas *Permission is an act of Gods consequent or judiciary will*, they make it *an act of Gods antecedent will exercised about those who* as yet *lie under no guilt of sinne.* 2

It is true that there is such a permission as this Authour speaketh of, which is judiciary, and layeth hold onely upon those who have long abused the mercies of God: but he is deceived in thinking that no decree of Divine permission can be *antecedent unto the guilt of sinne.* The Non-elect angels were permitted to commit their first sinne; which could not possibly be a judiciary permission in punishment of any former sinne. Adam and Eve were permitted to fall into their first transgression; which permission cannot without evident absurdity be deduced from any foregoing or foreseen sinne of theirs. And to speak generally of all persons not-elected, the permissive decree of their finall perseverance in sinne must in reason be antecedent to the absolute prevision

of their impenitency. And though God may justly decree to punish the abusers of their free-will by letting them fall from one sinne to another, yet there can be no one sinne insisted upon in which the permissive decree of God is not antecedent to the prevision of the same sinne.

But let us hear what Calvines adversaries themselves say concerning this point of Permission. [k] *Voluntas permittendi peccata, permissióque ipsa, esse potest non propter culpam aliquam quasi in pœnam, sed ex sola libera voluntate Dei. Prius est Deum denegatione (specialium) auxiliorum permittere peccatum quàm peccatorem in illud incidere.* And this is properly that permissive decree or that Permission which we understand when we dispute about Non-election or negative Reprobation. Of this Suarez speaketh in this manner; [l] *Hinc intelligitur, voluntatem illam permittendi peccata reprobi, si ad totum ejus lapsum comparetur, non habere causam ex parte illius.* And Vasquez; [m] *Sicut prima vocationis nulla datur causa, ità neque permissionis in eo qui permittitur, postquam ab originali justificatus est. Nullum peccatum est quod non præcedat aliqua permissio, hoc est, Negatio vocationis congruæ quâ novit Deus peccatum impediendum si concederetur.* I could bring many more speaking to this purpose: but the mistake of this Authour is so evident in making the

k Molina, Quæst. 23. pag. 398, 399.

l Opusc pag. 178.

m In Im. qu. 23. Disp. 9 §. 4.

the permissive decree which cohereth unto Non-election or negative Reprobation to be a judiciary decree, that it needeth no further confutation.

He further telleth us, That *Permission is no more then a not-hindering of men from falling that are able to stand, and supposeth a possibility of not-sinning:* But those who defend absolute Reprobation make it *a withholding of grace needfull for the avoiding of sinne, and so including a necessitie of sinning.* R

In this dispute about absolute Predestination and Reprobation or Non-election, we are not to regard what every particular Doctour saith or writeth, but what is in deed and truth a consequent of the doctrine it self. And first we answer, That the permissive decree upon which Reprobation dependeth conteineth in it somewhat more then a bare not-hindering of men to fall into sinne, though it be no reall positive efficient or working cause of their sinne. For whereas God hath infinite wayes whereby he could prevent the sinnes of any Reprobate person, and that without forcing their free-will, it conteineth a positive and peremptory resolution of denying them all such grace as he knoweth would prove effectuall to their salvation were it afforded them. And which is more, it conteineth a positive decree of putting them into such circumstan-

ces, conditions or occasions as God knoweth will infallibly induce them to sinne. This is not done by a bare permission, but by some kind of operation. And this is out of all question amongst judicious Divines whether Protestants or Papists. And yet withall they maintein, that men thus reprobated, and thus permitted to fall into finall impenitency, thus placed by Divine providence in circumstances and conditions which he knoweth will by them infallibly be abused unto sinne and obstinacy in sinne, were not thereby spoiled of their possibility of standing, or of their possibility of not committing this or that sinne permitted. The Reprobation therefore which is mainteined by orthodox Divines, and the Permission thereunto annexed, importeth not a withholding of grace absolutely necessary for the avoiding of sinnes so permitted, much lesse a necessitating of sinners unto their severall sinnes, but a withholding of all grace which would be *de facto* effectuall unto the avoidance of sinne, and such an ordering of circumstances and occasions as God certainly knoweth will make them freely runne into their sinnes and obstinately continue in them.

Now whereas it is further objected, that *from the withdrawing of such grace sinne must needs follow*; we answer, That sinne doth infallibly

fallibly follow upon this Reprobation, permission, and withholding of effectuall grace; yet not an as effect floweth from the proper and true cause, but as a Consequent is deducted out of an Antecedent, by a true form of reasoning. As for example, if we reason thus, *God absolutely decreed to withhold from the non-elect angels all such effectuall grace as he knew would have upheld them, and without which he knew infallibly that they would fall away; and he further decreed to permit them to fall away: Therefore God by these his decrees necessarily caused their sinne*, it is a false collection or inference. But thus to argue, *God absolutely decreed*, &c. *therefore their sinne and voluntary apostasie certainly followed necessitate infallibilitatis*, this is a true inference.

That which occasioned the Remonstrants errour in this point, is an equivocation in the word *Cause* or *Causing*. For one may be said to be the cause of such an evil action or event, really, truly, and properly, when he doth directly work the production of that evil, or abusively, improperly, and falsely, when he doth not work as he could to the preventing and hindering of such an event. Thus ignorant men may suppose that when the sunne withholdeth his beams, it really & truly worketh or causeth that darkness, coldness, fogginesse, wherewith the aire is presently

presently possessed: but in truth there is no such matter.

2. And further we say, That this Reprobation or Permission whereof we speak in this controversie concerning absolute or conditionate Election & Non-election, implieth not a Subtraction of any graces or helps obteined, much lesse of any absolutely necessary to the preventing of sinne; but a Non-preparation, a Non-donation of such graces and helps without which God foresaw and foreknew that the Reprobates out of their own free and perverse will would infallibly delight and perish in their sinnes. The Subtraction of some measure of grace already given, and permission of a man to fall into more sinnes, in punishment of a former sinne voluntarily committed, is not alwayes a signe of Reprobation, nor of the permissive decree thereunto appendent. For many of the elect have thus been permitted to fall from one sinne into another, as David was from adultery unto murder; and yet at length all turned to his greater good. But when we speak of a permission inseparably and properly belonging to the Non-elect, it is not a Subduction of needfull grace *in pœnam peccati*, much lesse a working of any malicious qualitie in them whereby they are necessitated to sinne, but a Not-preparation or Non-donation of such

such grace without which God knoweth most infallibly that they will live and die in their sinnes. And this is it which S. Augustine intended when he said, *Deo reprobante non irrogatur aliquid quo homo fit deterior, sed tantum non erogatur quo fiat melior.*

For the saying of learned Whitaker, it is true, the permissive decree, as it properly concerneth Reprobation, being nothing else but a negation of all such gracious helps *quibus positis peccatum impediretur:* which must be understood of finall sinne, if it be applied unto the permission which is onely proper to the Non-elect: For the Elect oftentimes are denied such helps, which if they had been afforded, this or that particular sinne had certainly been prevented; and the Non-elect may have such help of grace afforded them, whereby they do actually avoid this or that sinne, unto the committing whereof they were before strongly inclined. 5

As for the phrase used by Pareus, *That Adam could not use his endowments to persevere;* This *non posse* is in Scriptures, Fathers, Schoolmen and all manner of Authours usually applied unto such actions wherein the Agents had a free power not to have done what they did. It is therefore a weak inference, to gather from the bare words *Necesse, Impossibile, Non posse, Non possibile*, or the like, a necessitation of mans will unto such

such acts, or an absolute impotency unto the opposite acts, as this Authour and the Remonstrants ordinarily do. Jerem. 13. 23. The Jews are said to be under the same impossibilitie of *doing good* which the Black-moor is of *making his skin white:* yet no necessitation of doing evil actions is thereby implyed. Joan. 12. 39. *Propterea non poterant credere*, &c. and yet according to Prospers determination, [n] *Non prædestinatus peritinfidelitate voluntariâ, non coactâ.* Matth. 18. 7. *Necesse est ut veniant scandala:* and yet the giving of scandals is not enforced upon any mans will. *Nemo potest corrigere quem Deus despexerit:* and yet the Reprobates continue incorrected in their sinnes through their own voluntary obstinacy. Rom. 2. 5. *Thou after thine hardnesse and heart that cannot repent:* and yet this CANNOT doth not free the wicked from voluntary impenitency. 2. Pet. 2. 14. *Having eyes full of adultery and that cannot cease from sinne:* and yet nothing hereby is implyed or intended which taketh away the freedome of mans will in committing sinne. The Fathers use the same words, and yet never intending thereby the destruction of free-will, or the necessitation unto any sinfull act. Augustine speaking of a wicked man saith, [o] *Cogenti cupiditati bonâ voluntate resistere non potest:* yet he never imagined a necessitation or coaction

n *Ad Cap. Gall. sent. super* 14.

o *Vide Ruiz De scient. disp.* 66. §. 1. *pag.* 634, &c.

on unto any particular sinfull act, *De perfect. Just. Resp.* 5. Speaking of Pharaoh, he saith he was so hardened, *ut obtemperare Deo non potuerit, Propos.* 62. *in Epist. ad Rom.* And he useth the same phrase concerning the Jews, *Tract.* 54. *in Joan.* and yet *non posse* in neither place importeth a coaction or necessitation of the will unto any sinfull act. Not to heap up any more allegations, it may be generally observed, That whersoever there is an infallible Divine prescience of any future act or event, there it is not unusuall to affirm that act to be necessary, and the opposite event to be impossible. And Ruiz giveth a reason of this manner of speech,

* *Quia infallibilitas actus est aliqua impotentia omittendi, & infallibilitas omittendi est aliqua impotentia operandi talem actum.* * *De scientia Dei, disp* 80. §. 6.

I have insisted the longer upon this because it is presumed alwayes a good inference against Calvine, Beza, or any of our Protestant Divines, *They say such an action or event is necessary, such an one is impossible, therefore they overthrow free-will, and put a necessitation unto sinne upon men not elected.* Whereas when Scriptures, Fathers, Schoolmen, and modern Papists use the same terms, our Remonstrants can give them a right interpretation.

To conclude, Albeit the Permissive decree do inferre an infallibility of finall infidelity

delity and impenitency in persons not-elected, and albeit in this regard their not-believing and not-repenting be sometimes termed necessary, and their believing and repenting unpossible, yet it ought not to be gathered from such phrases of speech, That God by taking away their liberty inforceth them upon their sinnes.

Dist. II. T

The second distinction opposed by the Authour is that which considereth in Sinne the *Materiall* and the *Formall*, which is, the substrate act, and the obliquity of the act, and so granteth God to be the cause of the materiall part, as it denieth him to be any cause at all of the formall, which is the repugnancy or disconformity which the will of the Agent hath with the law or will of God. This distinction is a sound and necessary distinction, and approved by all judicious Divines whether Papists or Protestants. P *De malo culpæ quoad substratum & materiale, quod est actio naturalis cui malitia annexa, nulla est difficultas in inquirendo & explicando quidnam illud sit, quoniam ex hac parte malum culpæ non est malum, sicut nullus actus naturalis est de se malus.* 9 *Omnes Theologi conveniunt, quod Deus est autor entitatis naturalis ipsius peccati.*

P Pet. Lib. 8. cap. 11.

9 Ibid. 477.

Against this is excepted, *That all sinnes receive not this distinction.* If all sinnes subsist in some actuall motion of the soul, body, or both,

both, and this motion abstractively considered be the materiall part of every actuall sinne, and hath God for the prime cause in whom we live, move, and have our being; then no sinne can be assigned wherein this materiall part may not be found. *In eating the forbidden fruit* the materiall part of the sinne in regard of the soul was the Appetition thereof; in regard of the body, the Mastication and Manducation and other bodily acts: Separate these from the formall part, which is *Modus appetendi*, and conteineth a repugnancy to Gods command, and God was the prime authour thereof. The Act of desiring and of eating must of necessity be reduced to God, without whom there neither is nor can be any motion of body or soul: but the disorderly Manner of desiring and eating contrary to the law of God, this is reducible (as being a defect) onely to the defective will of man. This is well observed by Ruiz; [r] *Aliqui modi se habendi in voluntate non reducuntur in Deum tanquam in causam, præsertim quando culpabilis est modus se habendi.* And more fully; [s] *Potest voluntas Divina amando quamlibet actionem sub ratione actionis non amare differentiam monstrositatis per quam positivè repugnat Divinæ legi.*

[r] De vol. disp 39. §. 3.

[s] Disp. 6 §. 2

He proceedeth in opposing this distinction, and saith that the defenders of absolute Election and Non-election make God an authour

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thour *not onely of the action but of the aberra-*
tion or formall obliquity thereof, in *making*
him the true *cause of those means which lead to*
damnation, which are *sinfull actions as sinfull,*
not as actions.

We answer, It is very true, the means which bring reprobated men unto their damnation are sinfull actions considered as sinfull or as repugnant to the law of God, and not considered barely and abstractively as actions: But we deny that the decree of reprobation maketh God a cause of those means or wicked actions whereby men procure their own damnation. For though Predestination maketh God a proper efficient cause of those means whereby men are brought to salvation, because they are good, holy, supernaturall acts; yet Reprobation maketh not God the cause efficient of those means which carry men unto damnation, because they are evil, impure, defective acts, & such as it is repugnant to the very essence and nature of God to be a causer of them. It is certain that infidelity, impurity, impenitency follow the decree of Reprobation, but they follow it not as means prepared or wrought by God for compassing the damnation of the Non-elect, but as the matter presupposed unto their just damnation, growing out of their own perverse free-will, *Deo*
permittente, prævidente, & circa hanc materi-
am

am justitiam suam vindicativam exercere decernente. We assent unto that judicious determination of Cajetane; [t] *Non est idē judicium de reprobatione & prædestinatione: quoniam in reprobatione est aliquid extra totum reprobationis effectum, scilicet culpa; non sic autem est in prædestinato, in quo totum ordinans ipsum in vitam æternam, est prædestinationis effectus.*

[t] *In 1m qu. 23 art. 5.*

For the *simile* retorted; If the decree of negative Reprobation be supposed by any to make God deal with men as the master is here said to do with his lame horse, we leave such wild imaginations to the forgers thereof, as not worth the trouble of confutation, being senseless and godless.

To what is here alledged we answer, That the Predestination of God doth not determine mans will to sinne either by Compulsion or by Necessity: Let them be different, or let them be the self-same, all is one to our present purpose. Predestination did not compell or necessitate Judas to betray and sell his Master: Predestination did not compell or necessitate Absalom incestuously to defile his fathers concubines: The like may be said of all other sinners who commit such sinnes upon deliberation, and so proceed to election, having in themselves a naturall power of understanding, whereby they were able otherwise to have deliberated, & thereupon otherwise to have chosen. And we see

Dist. III X

by experience that Traytours & Adulterers fully bent to commit such wicked acts, can and oftentimes do refrain putting them in practice upon better deliberation. This is a demonstration, that they can choose the doing or the forbearing to do such wicked acts: and when they choose to do them, it is not the decree of predestination which forceth or necessitateth them thereunto; but they are directed thereunto by the deliberate use of their understanding, and resolved to do such acts by the free election of their own corrupt will.

S. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius were all defenders of absolute Election and Non-election, and adversaries to that Election and Reprobation which the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians founded upon contrary good and bad actions foreseen in men, yet all of them disclaimed this Necessitation. Let Prosper speak for them all three;[n] *Qui dicit quòd qui Evangelicæ prædicationi non credunt ex Dei prædestinatione non credant, & quòd Deus ità definierit ut quicunq; non credunt ex ipsius constitutione non credant, non est catholicus. Non prædestinatus perit infidelitate voluntariâ, non coactâ.* That which is here determined concerning Infidelity, may as well be applied to Treachery, Adultery, or any other transgression of Gods law: for in all such actions *non-prædestinati pereunt transgressione voluntariâ, non coactâ.* The

[n] *Ad cap. Gall. sent. 14.*

The reasons which the Authour brings to prove that *what necessitateth mans will to sinne is the cause of sinne*, make nothing against S. Augustines doctrine of absolute Predestination, untill he can prove that such a Coaction or Necessitation doth absolutely follow thereupon. Which because it was an harder matter then he was able to undertake, he letteth it alone; and so may we his arguments.

Yet we must needs tell him his Philosophical fansie, That mans free-wil *is under the insuperable controll of no lord but it self*, is but unsound Divinity. It is under the insuperable controll of him that made it; & so fully, that Gerson was not afraid to use the word *Necessity* by this Authour so much abhorred; [x] *Etsi Deus non cogit liberum arbitrium, potest tamẽ inducere necessitatem ad illud volendum quod sibi placuerit*. And Abulensis; [y] *Stat libertas arbitrii cum Divina motione voluntatem nostram ad id quod vult applicante*. This S. Augustine termeth [z] *Omnipotentissimâ facilitate convertere, & ex nolentibus volentes facere*. If this doctrine of the supreme Dominion of mans will be mainteined, Gods supreme power in bending and turning mens hearts at his own pleasure, witnessed through the whole body of Divine Scripture, must be abandoned. Yet for all this we utterly deny that God by his insuperable & unconquerable power doth at any time make the wills of men not-predesti-

[x] *Part. 3. fol. 333.*

[y] *In 3. Reg. cap. 12.*

[z] *Epist. 107*

nate *servile instruments* unto the committing of sinfull actions. It is the devils suggestion, their own lustfull provocations, their voluntary wicked elections which make them servile instruments (not of God but of the devil) in committing their abominable sinnes. God maketh both the devil and them, even by their wicked actions, to be instruments unwittingly and unwillingly accomplishing his most wise just and holy purposes, and serving to the illustration of his glory.

The Divine dominion which Gods will hath over mans doth not nor cannot shew it self by any such *influx* or *impression* as should instill any malicious qualitie into mans will, or wrest and force it unto any malicious action; neither doth the decree of absolute Reprobation import any such matter. Whatsoever therefore is here further discoursed concerning this Necessitation and Servile usage of mans will by God unto the committing of sinnefull actions, we passe-by, as presumed and not proved to be a consequent of absolute Predestination and Reprobation.

The doctrine of Aquinas is in this point of Predestination and Reprobation far more sound then the doctrine of the Remonstrants: [a] *Aliter se habet reprobatio in causando quàm prædestinatio. Nam prædestinatio est causa & ejus quod exspectatur in futura vi-*

[a] Part. 1. quæst. 23. art. 3. ad 2m.

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ta à prædestinatis, scilicet gloriæ, & ejus quod percipitur in præsenti, scilicet gratiæ: Reprobatio verò non est causa ejus quod est in præsenti, scilicet culpæ; sed est causa derelictionis à Deo. Est tamen causa ejus quod redditur in futuro, scilicet pœnæ æternæ. Sed culpa provenit ex libero arbitrio ejus qui reprobatur & à gratia deseritur. If the Remonstrants could be brought to a true understanding of this short decision, all their quarrels were at an end.

Sinne is considerable either formally and in its own nature, *as it is sinne, or as it is a means of declaring Gods justice in mens punishments. God doth not predestinate men to sinne as it is sinne, but as a means of punishment.* This distinction is either not well conceived or at least not clearly expressed by this Authour. *Dist. IV. 2.*

Those who defend the decree of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do not say that God predestinateth any man unto sinne, but that God by his secret counsel ordaineth what sinnefull events he will permit to be brought into act, and what good uses he will applie them unto. Their distinction standeth upon these terms: That in sinnefull actions we may consider that which properly and formally maketh them faulty, namely their Repugnancie unto Gods law; and of this God is not the Au-

thour or cauſer: Or elſe we may conſider in them that which maketh them juſt puniſhments unto other men or unto the partie himſelf that committeth them, or profitable corrections; and thus God challengeth unto himſelf the cauſing of them. For example; The theft of the Sabeans and Chaldeans was a ſinne, as it was a wilfull and free taking away of another mans goods, proceeding from their own will, and contrary to the will or law of God: and thus their own malice and not any influx of God into their will cauſed this ſinnefull and deformed act: But the ſame ſinnefull outward act materially conſidered might be a puniſhment of Job, an exerciſe of his patience, and an experiment of his virtue unto the ſetting forth of Gods glory: and in theſe regards God taketh upon him the cauſing of it; *Deus dedit, Deus abſtulit.* The defiling of Davids concubines by Abſalom, as it was a ſinne contrary to Gods expreſſe law, had no other true cauſe then the defective free-will of Abſalom who committed it: But as it was a juſt puniſhment of David for his former defiling the wife of Uriah, God maketh it his proper act and deed; *Tu feciſti occultè, ego facturus ſum coram toto populo.* And the reaſon hereof is eaſily conceived: for *peccatum quatenus peccatum* is an unjuſt defective and monſtrous

2. Sam. 12. 11, 12.

action;

action; and therefore cannot be reduced unto God a moſt perfect agent, but unto man an unjuſt defective and diſordered agent: Yet *peccatum quatenus pœna* or *judicium*, as it is made a puniſhment or judgement lighting upon another, is a juſt and orderly action, and therefore reducible unto God the juſt Judge of the world. Suppoſe a Judge ſo ordereth the matter, that ſuch a traitour ſhall be ſtrangled or beheaded by ſuch an executioner: ſuppoſe withall that the ſame executioner ſtrangleth or beheadeth him not out of obedience to the Judge but out of the malice of his own heart: here the ſame act, which is the killing of a man, as it proceedeth from the wicked will of the executioner, is a ſinne, and not cauſed by the Judge; but as it is a puniſhment inflicted upon the traitour, it is good and juſt, and cauſed by the Judge himſelf. And this is all which Calvine maintaineth in ſaying, [b] *Pravos improborum affectus ad exſequenda ſua judicia deſtinat & regit Deus.*

[b] *De occulta Dei provid. pag. 747. I.*

Whereas it is objected, That *a good end cannot moralize a bad action, becauſe the evil of ſinne is greater then any good can come by ſinne*; it is true, if the bad action and the good end be both referred onely to the ſinner: But if the badneſſe of the action be referred onely to the ſinner as the proper

cause, and the goodnesse of the end or good use onely which God maketh of it be reduced unto God alone; then it doth moralize it, making it a just and good act so farre as it respecteth God the ordainer and causer thereof. Neither is the evil of a particular sinne greater then the good which God can extract out of it (for then he would never permit it) though it be greater then any good which a sinnefull man doth intend by it. That which the Jews did in putting Christ to death was *læsio Divinæ majestatis Divino bono oppositæ:* But that which God did in causing the punishment of our sinnes to light upon Christ was not *Divino bono oppositæ,* but such an action as tended to the setting forth of Gods goodnesse and glory. We do not grant therefore, that God for *any good end* either *willeth* or *worketh* any sinne *quà peccatum:* but we onely say, that God willeth, ordereth, causeth those outward actions or events whereunto sinne cleaveth *ex parte impiorum agentium,* as by him they are made just punishments or great benefits unto men.

A. Whereas it is yet further urged, *If God willeth the sinne as it is a means of punishment, he willeth it as sinne; for in no other consideration it is a means of punishment:* and so *Gods decree is terminated to the very formality of sinne;* here is a plain mistake. If God

God should will sinnefull actions as they are deserts of punishment unto the sinner himself, then it were clear he willeth them *sub formalitate peccati:* for they no otherwise deserve punishment then as they are formally repugnant to the law of God: But in willing the materiall acts of divers sinnes as they are inflictions of punishment upon other persons, they are good and just, as all Gods punishments are; and they have nothing to do with the formalitie of sinne, which is a privation of rectitude in the will of such sinnefull agents, and can be no otherwise caused then by themselves.

An answer to the Indignities.

TO the first we say, That *Ortus* and *Usus peccati* are things of a quite different nature. It is *want of wisdome* to cause sinne *quoad ortum*, or to be a cause breeding and acting it: But it is an high point of the Divine Wisdome, to cause sinne bred in the defective will of man and acted by the will of man, to be a just punishment either unto himself or others. And this is all which Cajetane intended upon 2. Kings 12. in denying God to be the authour of sinne as sinne, and yet granting that he may be the authour of sin *quà pœna peccati*. Which opinion of his, though it be quarrelled by some other Papists in regard of the word *Authour*, yet

yet it is defended by Canus *lib. 2. De Locis Theolog. cap. 4.* where he hath these expresse words, [c] *Rectè, ni fallor, dici potest Deus autor esse operis mali, non quà est malum culpæ sed quà est malum pœnæ.* But whether Cajetane and Canus have reteined *formam sanorum verborum* in terming God the authour of that sinne which he causeth and maketh to be a punishment either to the partie committing it or others, I do not decide; but I rather think they have not. As for our Divines, who think that partie only to be the true authour of sinne *ex cujus voluntate egreditur sub ratione peccati* or *quatenus peccatum*, they use not to term God the authour of any sinfull act or work; and therefore Calvine [d] deteſteth it as a prodigious blasphemy, *Maleficia non tantùm Dei volente sed etiam autore perpetrari.* But that God willeth and causeth *hominum maleficia* to be vindicative afflicting punishments to the offenders or others, which is *causare sub ratione pœnæ*, is generally admitted by all Divines: And it maketh not God the authour of them *secundùm rationem culpæ*, but the operative cause of them onely *secundùm ordinem quem illis indit ad finem providentiæ suæ.* And as God is more then a permissive cause in mens wicked actions as they do *subire rationem pœnæ* to themselves or others, so likewise as they become means of good

[c] *Resp. ad 7.*

[d] *De occulta Dei provid. in Resp. 5, & 6. pag. 736.*

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to others: [c] *Deus quasdam voluntates suas utique bonas implet per malorum hominum voluntates malas: Sicut per Judæos malevolos bonâ voluntate Patris Christus pro nobis occisus est.* In which regard the same S. Augustine speaking of Judas useth not the word, *permisit Deus*, but, *elegit ad fundendum sanguinem suum.* This is not out of want of wisdome to *bring-in sinne* for the glorification of his justice, but to cause sinne conceived in the wicked heart of man and acted by his wicked hand to become a means for manifestation of his justice. And therefore whensoever God concurreth to the causing of any outward sinnefull act as it serveth to any good end of his own intendment, he appointeth not men to commit (nay he forbiddeth them the committing of such acts) but he in himself decreed and fore-appointed his own permission, and therewithall the causing of all such reall and positive effects without which the act could not be produced, and of all such good ends or consequents as he produceth out of it.

[c] *August. Enchirid. ad Laurent. cap. 101.*

To the second we answer, That to will the event of sinfull actions for good ends argueth no *want of sincerity in Gods dealing with men.* As to will the torturing of martyrs by tyrants to the end that Christian religion might by their patient sufferings be advanced & Gods name glorified, or to will that Paul

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should

should be buffeted by Satan to the end his soul may be kept humble; is not to appoint the devil or tyrants inevitably to cōmit such actions *that so they may be damned for them*, as is falsely supposed, but to let loose the reins unto their wicked wills out of which these actions did voluntarily flow, and to cause whatsoever positive good can be conceived either in such materiall acts or from them.

z To the third: The permissive decree, or decree of Reprobation, as it respecteth the sinnes of Reprobates argueth no *want* at all *of mercy* in God, though it import a denegation of some mercy which God (were he so pleased) might have bestowed upon them: but here is no cruelty at all. *Aquin.* *Rationabiliter negatur quod nulla ratione debetur.* Neither doth it flow from a desire of *destroying souls*, or cause the wicked to *live and die in their sinnes*. All these are false inferences, and have been formerly confuted. And therefore we conclude, That it is not yet proved that the Doctrine of Reprobation maketh God the Authour of sinne.

The Treatise.

II *Inconvenience.* THe second inconvenience (*A*) is, the Overthrow of true religion and good government among men. To this this opinion seemeth to tend, for these reasons.

I. Because it maketh sinne to be no sinne indeed, but only

ly in opinion. We uſe to ſay, *Neceſſitie hath no law*: creatures or actions in which Neceſſitie beareth ſway, are without Law. Lions are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fiſhes to ſwimme, or any brute creatures to do according to their kinds, becauſe their actions are naturall and neceſſary: they cannot upon any admonition do otherwiſe. Among creatures indued with reaſon and liberty Laws are given to none but ſuch as can uſe their principles of reaſon and freedome: Fools, mad men, and children are ſubject to no law, becauſe they have no libertie. To men that can uſe their libertie Laws are not given neither but in thoſe actions which are voluntary: No man is forbidden to be hungry, thirſty, weary, ſleepy, to weep, to laugh, to love or to hate; becauſe theſe actions and affections are naturall and neceſſary: the will may govern them, but it cannot ſuppreſſe them. And ſo if To deal juſtly, To exerciſe charitie, &c. with their contraries, be abſolutely and antecedently neceſſary too, whether this neceſſitie flow from a principle within, or a Mover without, we are as lawleſſe in theſe as in the other. Now if Neceſſitie have no law, then actions in themſelves evil, if under the dominion of abſolute neceſſitie, are tranſgreſſions of no law, and conſequently no ſinnes. For *Sinne is a tranſgreſſion of the law*, 1. John 3. 4.

This that I ſay, hath been ſaid long ago. For Juſtin Martyr ſpeaking againſt the Deſtiny, hath theſe words, h *If it be by deſtinie* (that is, by abſolute neceſſitie; for that the Fathers do generally call by the name of *Deſtiny*;) *that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad.* A ſpeech like to this he hath a little after; i *It would ſeem*, if this be ſo, *that virtue and vice are nothing, but things are judged to be good or evil by opinion onely: which, as good reaſon teacheth, is very great injuſtice and impietie.* And ſurely well might he ſay ſo: For to what purpoſe was the Son of God made man, and being man, made a ſacrifice of ſinne? why was the miniſtery of the word and ſacraments ordained? to what end are heaven and hell propounded? why are exhortations, diſſwaſions, or any other means to hinder men from ſinne applyed, if ſinne be nothing but a mere opinion? Chriſt, the Chriſtian faith, the word and ſacraments, and whatſoever according to the Scriptures hath been done for the applying of the pardon for ſinne, are all but mere fables, my very impoſtures, if ſinne be nothing. And by conſequence it is no matter at all whether men be Chriſtians, Jews, Turks,

h *Juſt. Mart. Apol. 2. a little beyond the middle.* Si fato fieret ut eſſet aut improbus aut bonus, nec alii quidem probi eſſent, nec alii mali.

i Videretur verum eſſe, nihil eſſe virtutem nec vitium, ſed opinione ſolùm bona & mala judicari: quæ, ut vera ratio docet, eſt maxima impietas & injuſtitia.

Turks, or pagans, of what religion, or whether of any religion at all. Now whither tendeth this but to the overthrow of religion?

II. Because it taketh away (B) the conscience of sinne. Why should men be afraid of any sinne that pleaseth or may profit them, if they must needs sinne? or what reason have they to weep and mourn when they have sinned, seeing they have not sinned truly, because they sinned necessarily? The Tragedian saith, [k] when a man sinneth, *his destiny must bear the blame. Necessitie freeth him from all iniquitie.* Sinnes are either the faults of that irresistible decree that causeth them, or no faults at all. If either; then sorrow, fear, or any other act of repentance whatsoever, may as well be spared as spent. This conceit being once drunk in, religion cannot long continue: for the affections have been the strongest planters and are the surest upholders of it in the world: *Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor.*

[k] Fati ista culpa est: nemo sit fato nocens.

III. Because it (C) taketh away the desert and guilt of sinne. Offenses if fatall, cannot be justly punished. The reason is, because those deeds for which men are punished or rewarded, must be their own, under their own power and sovereignitie: but such are no fatall actions or events. Neither temporally nor eternally can sinne be punished, if it be absolutely necessary.

1. Not temporally; as God himself hath given us to understand by that law which he prescribed the Jewes, Deut. 22. 25. which was, That if a maid commit uncleanness by constraint, she should not be punished. His reason was, because *there was no cause of death in her*: what she yielded to, was through compulsion, being overborn by power: as a man that is wounded to death by his neighbour, so was a virgin in that case, a sufferer rather then a doer. This particular law is of universall right: No just punishment can be inflicted for sinne where there is no power in the partie to avoid it. The speech of Lipsius is but a mere crotchet contrary to reason, *Fatali culpæ fatalis pœna*, Fatall faults must have fatall punishments. Did Magistrates think mens offenses unavoydable, they would think it bootlesse and unreasonable to punish them. Nay not onely so, but we see by dayly experience, that Judges following the direction of reason, have very remisely punished such faults as have been committed through the power of headstrong and exorbitant passions: yea, we may read of some who have not thought it

fit

fit to punish such faults at all. Valerius Maximus telleth that Popilius a Roman Pretour sitting in judgement on a woman who had in a bitter passion slain her mother, because she had murdered her children, *neque damnavit neque absolvit*, neither cleared her nor condemned her. And Aulus Gellius reporteth of Dolabella the Proconsul of Asia, that when a woman of Smyrna was brought before him who had poysoned her husband and son for murdering a son of hers which she had by a former husband, he turned her over to the Areopagus, which was the graveſt and moſt renowned judgement-ſeat in the world. The Judges there not daring to acquit her being ſtained with a double ſlaughter, nor yet to puniſh her being provoked with juſt grief, commanded the accuſer and the offender to come before them an hundred years after. And ſo [1] *Neither was the womans fact juſtified, the Laws not allowing it; nor yet the woman puniſhed, becauſe ſhe was worthy to be pardoned.* If wiſe Magiſtrates have ſpared ſuch offenders as have been over-ſwayed with paſſions, which did but incline not determine them to their irregular actions, they would never have puniſhed any treſpaſſers, if they had thought them to be ſuch by invincible neceſſitie. Or if offenders did think that their offenſes were their deſtinies, and that when they murder, ſteal, commit adultery, make inſurrections, plot treaſons, or practice any other outragious villanies, they do them by the neceſſitie of Gods unalterable decree, and can do no otherwiſe; they would and might complain of their puniſhments as unjuſt, as Zeno's ſervant did: When he was beaten by his maſter for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjuſtly beaten, becauſe he was *fato coactus peccare*, conſtrained to make that fault by his undeclinable fate. The Adrumetine (*D*) Monks, miſled by S. Auguſtine, *Epiſt.* 105. *ad Sixtum Presbyterum*, (which he calleth a book wherein he ſetteth down his opinion concerning Gods grace) did ſo teach Grace that they denyed Free-will. And this S. Auguſtine confuted in his book *De gratia & libero arbitrio*. And thinking the grace of God (as S. Auguſtine taught) to be ſuch as could not ſtand with freedome of will, they thought that no man could be puniſhed for his faults, but rather prayed for that God would give him grace to do better. Againſt this S. Auguſtine directed his other book, *De Correptione & gratia*: In which diſcourſe though it be Grace that is ſtill named, yet Predeſtination is included. For as Kimedoncius ſaith truly in his

Preface

Val. Max. l. 8 c. 1.

Gell. l. 12. c. 7.

1 Neque abſolutum malieris veneficium eſt; quod per leges non licuit: neque nocens damnata punitàque, quæ digna veniâ fuit.

Preface to Luther, *De servo arbitrio*, between *Grace* and *Predestination*, there is onely this difference (as S. Augustine teacheth *l. De Praedest. Sanct. cap.* 10.) *That Predestination is a preparation of Grace, and Grace a bestowing of Predestination.* As Zeno's servant and these Monks do, so would all men judge, did they considerately think that men could not choose but offend. And what would be the resultance of such a perswasion, but an inundation of the greatest insolencies, & a dissolution of all good government?

2. Nor, if this be true, can sinne be punished eternally, or that tribunall be just on which the sentence of eternall fire shall be denounced against the wicked at the last day. To this I have the Fathers bearing witnesse generally and plainly. Tertullian hath these words, [m] *The recompense of good or evil can with no justice be given to him who is good or evil not freely but of necessitie.* S. Hierome saith, [n] *where necessitie domineereth, there is no place for retribution.* Epiphanius saith, [o] *The starres which impose upon men a necessitie of sinning, may be punished with better justice then the men themselves.* [p] *we place mens nativities under no fatall constellations,* saith S. Augustine, *that we may free the will, by which a man liveth either well or ill, from all bands of necessitie, because of the righteous judgement of God.* Prosper speaking of the judgement of God by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his works, saith, [q] *This judgement should never be, if men did sinne by the will and determination of God.* Fulgentius also saith the same; [r] *It is great injustice* in God *to punish him whom he doth not find but make an offender.* This was S. Bernards opinion too; [s] *It is onely a will free from compulsion and necessitie,* saith he, *which maketh a creature capable of reward and punishment.*

m *Tertull. lib. 2. contr. Marcion.* Cæterùm nec boni nec mali merces jure pensaretur ei qui aut bonus aut malus necessitate fuit inventus, non voluntate.

n Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus; nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur: Alioquin ubi necessitas est, nec damnatio nec corona est. o *Epiph. adversus haer. l. 1. haer. 5. num. 3.* Sanè quidem justiùs à stellis quæ necessitatem pariunt pœnæ repetantur, quàm ab eo qui quod agit ἀναγκάζομενος, necessitate adactus aggreditur. p *Aug. l. 2. contr. Faust. c. 5.* Et nos quidem sub fato stellarum nullius hominis genesin ponimus, ut liberum arbitrium voluntatis, quo bene vel malè vivitur, propter justum Dei judicium ab omni necessitatis vinculo vindicemus. q *Prosp. ad Obj. 10. Vinc.* Quòd judicium futurum omnino non effet, si homines Dei voluntate peccarent. r *Fulgent. l. 1. ad Mon. cap. 22.* Nec justitia justa dicetur, si puniendum reum non inveniſſe sed feciſſe dicatur. Major verò erit injustitia, si lapso Deus retribuat pœnam, quem stantem prædestinasse dicitur ad ruinam. s *Bernal. de grat. & lib. arb. p. 908.* Sola voluntas, quoniam pro sui ingenita libertate aut dissentire sibi aut præter se in aliquo consentire, nullâ vi, nullâ cogitur necessitate, non immeritò justum vel injustum, beatitudine seu miseriâ dignam ac capacem creaturam constituit, prout scilicet justitiæ injustitiæve consenserit.

Out

Out of these testimonies layd together may be collected three things. 1. That the Ancients did use to call a necessitie of humane actions good and bad by the name of *destinie*, from what externall cause soever this necessitie did arise. 2. That they did use these two words, *Necessitie* and *compulsion*, promiscuously: and therefore thought that necessitie as well as compulsion did take away the wills libertie. 3 (Which is for our present purpose) That they believed and contended that the judgements of God on sinners could not be just, if they were held by the adamantine chains of any absolute necessitie under the power of their sinnes.

I will therefore conclude this argument with the words of Epiphanius writing of the errour of the Pharisees, who believed the immortalitie of the soul and the resurrection of the dead, and yet held that all things come to passe by necessitie: [t] *It is*, saith he, *a point of extreme ignorance or madnesse rather, for him that confesseth the resurrection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of Gods righteous judgement, to say that there is any destinie*, any necessitie in mens actions. *For how can the righteous judgement of God and Destinie comply and stand together?* And (let me adde) how can the belief of this and true pietie stand together? For where this perswasion, That mens sinnes are necessarie, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgement, is rooted in, religion will quickly be rooted out.

[t] *Epiph lib 1. adv. har. to. 1. p. 35. num. 3.* Est illud verò extremæ cujusdam imperitiæ, nè dicam amentiæ, cùm resurrectionem mortuorum esse fateare, ac justissimum cujusque facti judicium constituas, fatum nihilominus esse ullum asserere. Qui enim duo ista convenire possunt, Judicium atque Fatum?

IV. It tendeth to religions overthrow, because it maketh the whole circle of a mans life but a mere Destinie. By it all our doings are Gods ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his Predestination, and all events in Kingdomes and Common-weals the necessarie issues of the Divine decree: All things whatsoever, though they seem to do somewhat, yet (by this opinion) they do indeed just nothing: The best laws restrain not one offender; the sweetest rewards promote not one virtue; the powerfullest sermons convert not one sinner; the humblest devotions divert not one calamitie; the strongest endeavours in things of any nature whatsoever, effect no more then would be done without them: but the necessitating over-ruling decree of God doth all. And if laws do nothing, wherefore are they made? If rules of Religion do nothing, why are they prescribed? If the wills of men do nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, scared from another? And if good endeavours and onsets do nothing (being excited, continued, limited, controlled, and every

way governed by an active, absolute and almighty decree) to what purpose are they used? Who seeth not plainly whither these things tend? to nothing more then the subversion of pietie and politie, religion and laws, societie and government? This did the Romanes see full well: and therefore they banished *Mathematicos* the teachers and abettours of destinie out of *Rome*. These and the like inconveniences which come from the upper way, did work so with Prosper as that he calleth him no Catholick who is of this opinion; [u] *Whosoever saith that men are urged to sinne and to be damned by the Predestination of God as by a fatall* (unavoidable) *necessitie, he is no Catholick.* They did also make the Arausicane Councel denounce a curse against such; * *That any are predestinated by the Divine power to sinne, we do not only not believe, but with the greatest detestation that we can, we denounce Anathema to such* (*if there be any such*) *as will believe so great an evil.*

Thus farre of my reasons against the upper and more harsh and rigorous way.

u *Prosp. ad Cap. Gall. sent.* 1. Quisquis igitur ex prædestinatione Dei, velut fatali necessitate, homines in peccata compulsos cogi dicit in mortem, non est Catholicus.

* *Concil. Arausc.* 2. *can.* 25. Aliquos ad malum Divinâ potestate prædestinatos esse, non solùm non credimus, sed etiam si qui sint qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione illis Anathema dicimus.

An answer to the second Inconvenience inferred upon the Decree of absolute Predestination and Reprobation.

THis Authours discourse concerning this second Inconvenience, which is the *Overthrow of* all *true religion and government amongst men*, and is divided into severall branches (taking up six pages at the least) is briefly answered thus; That whatsoever he hath discoursed concerning Fatall necessitie and Coaction of mens wills following upon the absolute decrees of Predestination and Reprobation, is a vain fansie of his own, a beggerly *Petitio principii*, which because he knoweth not how to prove, he never

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ver goeth about it. Let him prove that absolute Predestination and absolute Non-predestination or negative Reprobation draweth after it such a Necessitation or Coaction of mans will to good or evil, and we will presently renounce it. But when he cannot do this, to bring reasons and Fathers against the Coaction or Necessitation of mans will in actions good or evil, is pains taken to no purpose, as being a thing which no man defendeth. Let this brief replie therefore serve to this long discourse.

1. To his first reason. When he hath proved that men reprobated sinne as necessarily as *Lions prey*, *birds flie*, &c. and that men absolutely predestinated perform their holy and just actions by the same necessitie, let him explode absolute Predestination and Reprobation, and set-up instead thereof the Remonstrants conditionate Predestination and Reprobation upon foresight of mens opposite acts good or bad, and we will presently subscribe to his opinion.

2. To his second we answer, That absolute Predestination and Reprobation do no more *take away the conscience of sinne* then that conditionate Predestination and Reprobation which anciently the Semipelagians and of late the Remonstrants found upon prescience of mens holy or wicked actions. For as the eternall Prescience of God B

putteth no necessitation upon actions foreseen, no more doth the eternall Predestination of God. Gods decrees are immanent in himself after one manner, and the temporall effects or events decreed are produced by men after another, that is, contingently and freely according to the nature of the agents. They themselves feel and find this by their own experience in all predestinated events, and therefore Gods eternall and secret decrees cannot nor do not take away the conscience of mens sinnes. Judas his conscience told him that he had sinned in betraying innocent bloud, though the Scripture telleth us that *being delivered by the determined counsel of God foreknown, they took Christ, and by wicked hands they crucified him and slew him.* Aquinas resolveth the point thus; *Ordo prædestinationis est certus, & tamen libertas arbitrii non tollitur ex qua contingenter provenit prædestinationis effectus.* And this is the same which S. Augustine long before had taught; *Deus ità ordinat omnia ut proprios motus exercere sinat.*

Act. 2.23.

Vide Estium, in 1. Sentent. dist. 39. §. 7. pag. 136. C

3. To his third reason there needeth no answer: It is in effect the same with the former, and standeth upon this *petitio principii*, That all effects and events predestinated are fatall, and that the Agents have no libertie or choice in doing them: which is a grosse errour, and rejected by School-divines and by

by modern Papists as well as Protestants. His further amplifications are all to the same purpose, and therefore we let them passe.

What Augustine writeth for rectifying the judgement of the *Adrumetine Monks*, this Authour might have done well to have made use of for rectifying his own erroneous judgement. They supposed that absolute Predestination could not stand together with mans freedome unto actions predestinated; but Augustine taught them the contrary, and so reclaimed them. And we wish that this Authour would out of S. Augustine learn that his supposition is false and erroneous as theirs was. D

For the Fathers which he bringeth to prove that it is injustice to punish men for acts to which they are necessitated and enforced by Gods Predestination and Reprobation, we subscribe unto their judgement, and we retort it against this Authour thus: Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, Bernard, and others named by him, were defenders of absolute Election and Non-election, and yet they held that men elected were justly rewarded for their good acts, and men passed-by justly punished for their bad acts; and therefore they supposed not Coaction or Necessitation to follow upon Election and Reprobation.

The conclusion, that men in their own

actions *do no more then would be done without them by the necessitating decrees of God*, is altogether false and vain. For Gods decrees are not necessitating, though the events decreed are infallible; and they leave the wills of men to as much libertie as the Divine Prescience doth. And this is the generall opinion of Divines, though they differ about the manner of according mans libertie with Gods Predestination.

Treatise.

THe arguments by which for the present I stand convinced of the untruth even of the milder and lower way (*A*) too, I will take from these five following heads;

namely, from
1. Pregnant testimonies of Scripture, directly opposing it.
2. Some principall *Attributes* of God, not compatible with it.
3. The end of the Word and Sacraments with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it.
4. Holy endeavours much hindred, if not wholly subverted by it.
5. Grounds of comfort (by which the conscience in distresse should be relieved) which are all removed by it.

It is I. *Repugnant to* SCRIPTURE.

FIrst, it is repugnant to plain and evident places of (*B*) Scripture even *in terminis*, as will appear by these instances.

Ezek. 33.11. *As I live, saith (C) the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of a sinner; but that the wicked turn from his wayes, and live.*

And lest men should say, *It is true; God willeth not the death of a repenting sinner*, the Lord in another place of the same Prophet extendeth the proposition to them also that

Ezek. 18.32. perish; *I have no pleasure in the death of him that dyeth.*

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In this Scripture we may note three things:

1. Gods affection to men, set forth— Negatively; *I have no pleasure in his death that dieth.* Affirmatively; *but that the wicked turn.*

2. The persons in whose destruction God delighteth not; *wicked* men, such as for their rejecting of grace die and are damned. If God have no pleasure in their death, much lesse in the death of men either altogether innocent or tainted onely with originall sinne.

3. The truth of his affection; *As I live. Cupit credi sibi,* God would fain have us believe him, saith Tertullian, when he saith, *I will not the death of him that dieth:* and therefore he bindeth his speech with an oath. [x] *Happy are we for whose sake the Lord vouchsafeth to swear; but most unhappy, if we believe him not when he sweareth!* Tertull. lib. de pæn. c. 4. x O beatos nos, quorum causâ Deus jurat! ô miserrimos, si nec juranti Domino credimus!

Now if God delight not in the destruction of wicked men, certainly he never did out of his absolute pleasure seal up so many millions of men lying in the fall under invincible damnation: For such a decreeing of men to eternall death is directly opposite to a delight in their repentance and everlasting life.

God hath (D) shut up all in unbelief, that he might have mercie over all. Rom. 11. 2.

In these the Apostles words are two ALLs of equall extent, the one standing against the other; An ALL of unbelievers, and an ALL of objects of mercie. Look how many unbelievers there be, on so many hath God a will of shewing mercy. And therefore if all men of all sorts and conditions, and every man in every sort be an unbeliever, then is every man of every condition under mercy: and if every man be under mercy, then there is no precise antecedent will of God of shutting up some, and those the most, from all possibilitie of obteining mercy. For these two are ἀνίσατα and cannot stand together.

God so loved (E) the world, that he gave his onely-begotten Sonne, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, &c. John. 3 16.

God loved the world, saith the Text, that is, the whole lump of mankind: therefore he did not absolutely hate the greatest part of men. Again, God loved it fallen into a gulf of sinne and miserie: For he so loved them as to send his Sonne to redeem them; and a Saviour presupposeth sinne. He did not therefore hate the most of them lying in the fall:

for love and hatred are contrary acts in God, and cannot be exercised about the same objects.

Many expositours (I know) do take *world* here in a restrained sense, and understand by it the company of the Elect, or the world of Believers onely: But they have little reason for it, in my opinion. For,

First, I think there can be no place of Scripture alledged wherein this word *world*, especially with the addition of *whole*, as 1. Epist. of John chap. 2. vers. 2. (a place equivalent to this for the matter of it, and a comment upon it:) I say no place (I think) can be produced where *world* doth signifie onely the Elect, or onely Believers: but it signifieth either all men, or at least the most men living in some certain place and at some certain time, but without distinction of good and bad. Or if it be used anywhere more restrainedly, it is applyed onely to wicked and reprobate men, who in their affections are wedded to the world and its transitorie delights; and therefore do most properly deserve this name.

Secondly, Suppose it be granted, that *world* in some Scriptures is restrained to the Elect; yet it cannot bear this signification here: Because

1. The words then would have a senseless construction: For thus would they runne, *God so loved the elect*, &c. *that whosoever believeth in him should not perish*, &c. And if they runne thus, this would follow; There are two sorts of the Elect, some that do believe and shall be saved, others that do not believe and shall be damned: which is a division or distinction unknown in Divinitie.

2. Believers and Unbelievers, Damned and Saved, comprehend all mankind: for there is no man but he is one of these. Now *world* in this place includeth believers and unbelievers, the saved and the damned, as appeareth most plainly to him that layeth the 16, 17, and 18 verses together. Therefore it signifieth here all mankind without exception of any.

1. Tim. 2. 4. *who would (F) have all to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.*

In these words the Apostle delivereth two things: 1. That it is Gods will that men should enjoy a happy end, and be saved; 2. That it is also his will they should have the means, and make a good use of them in coming to the knowledge of the truth, that so they might be saved. There

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is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be saved; and therefore there is no absolute will that many thousand men shall die in unbelief and be damned.

Two answers are usually returned, which I confesse give me little satisfaction.

I. That by ALL here we are to understand all sorts, and not every particular man in those sorts.

It is true, that ALL is sometimes so taken in Scripture; but (I believe) not here: For the very context sheweth that we are to understand by it the individualls, and not the kinds. In the first verse there is a duty enjoyned; *I will that prayers and supplications be made for all men:* and in this verse the motive is annexed, *God will have all to be saved:* As if he should have said, Our charitie must reach to all whom God extendeth his love to. God out of his love will have all to be saved; and therefore in charitie we must pray for all. Now in the duty ALL signifieth every man: for no man, though wicked and profane, is to be excluded from our prayers. *Pray for them*, saith our Saviour, *that persecute you.* and, *Pray*, saith the Apostle here, *for kings and all that are in authority*, men in those dayes, though the greatest, yet the worst, the very Lions, Wolves and Bears of the Church: *Pray for them.* And if for them, then for any other. Thus in the duty it signifieth every man: and therefore it must have the same extent in the motive too, or else the motive doth not reach home, nor is strong enough to enforce the dutie.

II. The second (*G*) answer is, That God will have all to be saved with his *revealed* will, but millions to be damned with his *secret* will;

But if this answer stand, then (in my apprehension) these inconveniences will follow. 1. That Gods words (which are his revealed will) are not interpretations of his mind and meaning; and by consequence are not true: for the speech which is not the signification of the mind, is a lie. 2. That there are two contrary wills in God, a secret will, That many sonnes of Adam shall irrevocably be damned; and a revealed will, That all the sonnes of Adam may be saved. 3. That one of Gods wills must needs be bad, either the secret or the revealed will. For of contraries, if the one be good, the other is bad: and so of Gods contrary wills, if one be good, the other must needs be bad. For *malum est contrarium boni.*

Not

2. Pet. 3. 9. *Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, &c.*

H

This Scripture is not so liable to the exceptions against the former testimony. For it is a negative proposition, and must be taken distributively; and therefore speaketh that in plain terms which is contrary to absolute Reprobation.

That which is usually replyed, is, That the persons here spoken of, are the elect onely and such as truly believe; God is not willing that any of them should perish.

But the contrary appeareth in the text. For the persons here mentioned are those toward whom God exerciseth *much patience* and *long-suffering*, as it is in the words next going before. And who are they? Are they the elect? are they believers onely? No, but reprobates rather, who die for their contempt of grace. For it is apparent by Scriptures, that God doth patiently expect the conversion even of them that are never changed but die in their sinnes: as we may see 1. Pet. 3. 19, 20. where we reade that the *patience* of God was exercised towards those who in the dayes of Noah despised it, and went to prison, that is to hell, for it. Yea of all men reprobates are the truest and most proper objects of Gods patience, as we may see Rom. 2. 4. where S. Paul speaking of such as go on in sinne, and *treasure up wrath to themselves against the day of wrath*, saith, that God useth *patience* towards them *that he might lead them to repentance*. And Rom. 9. 22. *He endureth*, saith the text, *with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction*. In the fifth of Isaiah v. 2. and the 65. chap. v. 2. we may see the same thing. Reprobates therefore as well as others, nay rather then others, doth Peter here speak of, and saith that God would have none of them to perish: If they do perish, it is through their own fault and folly, and not Gods absolute pleasure, who would have no man to perish.

To these testimonies I may adde these (1) conditionall speeches:

1. Chron. 28. 9. *If thou seek him, he will be found of thee: but if thou forsake him, he will cast thee off for ever.*

2. Chron. 15. 2. *If you seek him, he will be found of you: but if you forsake him, he will forsake you.*

Gen. 4. *If thou do well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou dost not well, sinne lyeth at the doore.*

Heb. 10. 38. *The just shall live by faith: but if any man withdraw himself, my soul in him, shall have no pleasure, in him*; shall not like him: he shall be a reprobate.

By

By all these and many other places that speak conditionally (for ought that I can see) it is clear, that (K) God forsaketh no man considered simply in the fall, till by actuall sinnes and continuance in them he forsake God. Now if God reject no man from salvation in time and in deed till he cast off God, then surely he *rejecteth* no man in purpose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw would reject and cast off him. For Gods acts in time are regulated by his decrees before time: Ephes. 1. 11. *He worketh all things*, saith the Apostle, *according to the counsel of his own will*: and therefore there must be an exact conformitie between them as between *regulam* and *regulatum*, the rule and the thing squared thereby. By whatsoever therefore God doth in the world, we may know what he purposed to do before the world: and by his actuall casting men off when they grow rebellious and impenitent, and not before, we may certainly gather that he decreed to cast them off for their foreseen rebellion and impenitency, and not before.

Besides, it is in substance all one, to cast a man off indeed and to entertein a resolution to do it. Our *velle* and *facere* are all one in Gods account: and the reason is, Because where there is a deliberate and settled will, the deed will follow if nothing hinder. Much more is Gods will and deed all one, seeing his will is omnipotent and irresistible, and whatsoever he willeth directly and absolutely, is certainly done when the time cometh.

Well; all these plain and expresse Scriptures, with the whole course and tenour of Gods word, this opinion flatly contradicting, though it do (perhaps) shrowd it self in some dark & obscure speaches of holy Writ, I take it to be an untruth. For what S. Augustine saith in another case, I may safely say in this; *y Shall we contradict plain places, because we cannot comprehend the obscure? z A few testimonies*, saith Tertullian, *must receive an exposition answerable to the current of Scripture, not contrary to it.*

This is my first reason.

y Nunquid ideo negandum quod apertum est, quia comprehendi non potest quod occultum est. z Secundùm plura pauciora sunt intelligenda: & nè unus sermo subvertat alios, secundùm omnes potiùs quàm adversùs omnes intelligendus erit.

An Answer to the objections against the Lower way.

BEfore we come to answering particular objections we must put this Authour in remem-

remembrance of these few things which he hath not well considered.

1. First, whereas he troubleth himself with distinguishing the Supralapsarian and Sublapsarian Doctrine, calling them *Supralapsarians* who in ordering the eternall decrees of God concerning Election and Preterition or Reprobation place them before the consideration of the fall, and those *Sublapsarians* who place them after; this pains might well have been spared. For Priorities and Posteriorities in the eternall immanent decrees of God are but imaginations of mans weak reason, and framed diversly (nay contrarily) as well by Schoolmen and Papists as by Protestants or those which are termed Calvinists; and finally they have little or no use in this controversie, as hath been formerly shewed. Aquinas thought it no such matter of moment whether Predestination be considered before mans fall and state of miserie or after: [a] *Motus non accipit speciem à termino à quo, sed à termino ad quem. Nihil enim refert quantum ad rationem dealbationis, utrùm ille qui dealbatur fuerit niger, aut pallidus, aut rubeus: & similiter nihil refert ad rationem prædestinationis, utrùm aliquis prædestinetur in vitam æternam à statu miseriæ vel non.* And for Reprobation, he seemeth rather to incline to their opinion who place it in order of consideration

[a] *Part.* 1. *qu.* 23. *art.* 1.

tion before the fall in making it such a part of the Divine providence as permitteth some men [b] *deficere à fine*. So that this Distinction of *Supralapsarians* and *Sublapsarians* hath served this Authour to no other purpose but to the inculcating of the same objections again and again.

[b] *Ibid. art. 3*

2. Secondly, this Authour should have considered that there is no *medium assignabile ex parte Dei* betwixt the decrees of Predestinating some men and Not-predestinating some others; nor *ex parte hominum*, betwixt men absolutely predestinated unto the atteinment of life eternall and absolutely pretermitted and left infallibly *deficere ab adeptione vitæ æternæ*, which we call absolute Reprobation. As for example, let us suppose the number of mankind to be two millions of men: If out of these by the decree of election one million onely be infallibly appointed or ordained to eternall life, and these certainly and absolutely distinguished from others not onely *quoad numerum*, but *quoad personas*, who can denie but one million also, and those certain *quoad personas*, are as absolutely compriſed under the decree of Non-election or Reprobation as the others were under the decree of Election or Predestination?

It is true that the manner of Gods bringing the elect in time unto eternall life is by giving

giving them repentance, faith and perseverance; and the manner of Gods permitting the Non-elect to run themselves upon the rock of eternall death, is by suffering them to continue in their infidelitie and impenitencie. But the formall decree of Predestination conteineth an absolute eternall preparing of this effectuall grace for some; and the formall decree of negative Reprobation or Non-predestination an absolute eternall decree of not-preparing this effectuall grace for any others. From whence it is plain that the Divine prevision of finall perseverance in the elect, and finall impenitency in the non-elect, doth not nor cannot go before the forenamed decrees, as the Remonstrants imagine. Let him be judge who is no friend to Calvinists: [c] *Prædestinari est gratiam illam quam Deus novit in nobis effectum habituram nobis præparari: & non prædestinari, gratiam illam nobis non præparari.* No mention of foreseen faith or infidelitie in the one or in the other.

[c] *Vasq. in 1. qu. 23. dist. 95.*

Thirdly, I could wish this Authour had more advisedly weighed that proposition whereupon he groundeth his whole discourse, namely, That Gods eternall and absolute decrees of Producing such and such good actions in some men, and his opposite eternall and absolute decrees of Not-producing the same good actions in others, cannot

cannot stand with the liberty of mans will, but is a coacting and necessitating cause in mens doing or not-doing the foresaid actions. This he taketh as a *postulatum* unquestionable through his whole book: and if this be not freely granted him, he hath said little or nothing against absolute Predestination or absolute Reprobation. Now I must tell him, that this *postulatum* which he so boldly presumeth upon is generally held for an erroneous and false opinion. I will cite onely the testimonies of Calvine's & Beza's known Adversaries. *Bellarmine*; [d] *Credimus Deum absolutâ voluntate velle salvare multos, & absolutâ voluntate alios non velle salvare.* Here you see an absolute will in God to save some, and a negation of this absolute will in God concerning the salvation of others. Now what is this absolute will of saving some (which we call Predestination) but that speciall providence of God [e] *Quâ per infallibilia media in vitam diriguntur æternam?* Doth this absolute Predestination take away the freedome of the predestinate in the actions of repenting and believing? [f] *Respondeo*; *Potest ille liberè gratiam repudiare*; *sed certum est non repudiaturum, quia Deus vocabit illum sicut videt congruum illi esse ut vocantem non respuat.*

[d] *Tom. 3. De grat. & lib. arb. cap. 8.*

[e] *Ibid. cap. 9*

[f] *Cap. 15.*

Now for negative Reprobation; This is absolute as well as Predestination: [g] *Nulla datur*

[g] *Cap. 16.*

datur ejus causa ex parte hominum, sicut neque prædestinationis. Doth this Reprobation draw after it a coaction or necessitation unto wicked actions for which the Reprobates are afterwards condemned? No: [h] *Si peccat, liberè peccat, quia potest deponere pravum affectum si velit gratiæ Divinæ cooperari.* Bellarmine then was of opinion that absolute Predestination and Reprobation might be defended, and yet no necessitation of mans will thereupon inferred. Suarez; [i] *Si sermo sit de non-electione (quam nonnulli Reprobationem negativam vocant) verum est causam illius esse solam Dei voluntatem, nullâ exspectatâ causâ ex parte hominis.* But will not this Reprobation make all the evil and damnable acts whereinto the Reprobates infallibly fall subject to coaction and necessitation, by depriving the agent of his free-will in the exercise thereof? No; [k] *Divina providentia impletur interdum solâ permissione actuum liberorum, quando illi malè facturi sunt. Deus non est autor mali actûs*; but out of generall and speciall reasons flowing from his providence he so disposeth of causes and circumstances as he withall permitteth a wicked man by his free-will to abuse them unto evil actions. Ruiz proveth at large, [l] *Nullam esse causam ex parte nostra concessa aut negatæ prædestinationis.* Here you see absolute decrees of Predestination and Non-prede-

[h] *Bell. De lib. arb. l. 3. c. 6.*

[i] *De Auxil. 2. c. 5. p. 174*

[k] *Ibid. lib. 3 c. 17. p. 354*

[l] *Ruiz. De prædest. disp. 7. Sect. 4. & disp. 53. Sect. 8.*

predestination maintained, and yet all coaction or necessitation of the wills of persons not-elected, unto their sinfull actions is by him denied. *Vide De voluntate Dei, disp. 20. §. 5. pag. 223. Vide Aquin. par. 1. qu. 22. art. 4. & Cajet. ibid. & qu. 23. art. 3, & 6.*

Having thus laid open the false supposition whereupon this Authour hath founded his discourse, let us now consider the following reasons against absolute Reprobation.

Answer to his five Reasons against Absolute Reprobation: and First, to his Testimonies of Scripture.

WHereas these five reasons are bent generally against the Sublapsarian doctrine, he should have done well expressely to have excepted the doctrine of Augustine and all his followers of the Church of England, and many other Divines, who are Sublapsarians, and maintein the absolute decree of Predestination and Non-election or negative Reprobation, utterly rejecting the Remonstrants doctrine, who make these decrees of Predestination and Reprobation to follow upon the finall good or bad acts of men eternally foreseen of God. If his five reasons be intended against these, I see not how he can be excused from the opposing A

of the settled doctrine of our own Church. If they were intended onely against some particular Divines, either of forrein Churches or of our own, he should have called this discourse, *A disproving of their erroneous opinion who from the absolute decree of Non-election or Reprobation inferre an absolute prime decree of particular mens damnation.* Amongst which exorbitant Divines he sheweth himself to be one of the principall.

B Now to come to his testimonies of Scripture. The question being, Whether Gods eternall decree whereby men stand distinguished *in Electos & Non-electos*, or *in Prædestinatos & negativè Reprobatos*, be an absolute prime decree, or a subsequent decree built upon mens foreseen goodnesse and badnesse, all such testimonies as confound the judiciall decree of mans Damnation with the negative Reprobation, will be impertinent: For though the former be absolute, yet the latter is respective unto mans sinnes. Again, all such places as prove God hath a will of saving all men under this condition *If they believe and persevere*, and of Damning of no manbut for his iniquitie or infidelitie, prove sufficiently that the temporall bringing of men unto eternall life standeth upon conditionate decrees; and so likewise the temporall adjudging of men unto

unto eternall death: but they are of no force at all to prove that Election and Non-election are conditionate decrees, or to disprove an absolute decree of negative Reprobation. Last of all, such places as prove a generall love or a generall mercy extending to every singular man in the world, do not overthrow the decree of absolute Non-election; because love and mercy may be shown even to the Non-elect. This in generall. Now in particular to every testimony alledged.

To the first out of Ezek. 33. 11. and the 18. 32. we answer, This Authour quite forgetteth the very question in hand. When we dispute of that speciall providence which is called Predestination, and which concerneth the bringing of some men unto eternall life, and the freeing of them from eternall death, we speak of such a will as (by the confession of all Divines) standeth not upon uncertain conditions, but is most infallible and immutable, and that not onely *certitudine præscientiæ Divinæ* but *ordinis & causalitatis*, as the Schoolmen speak. Now the will spoken of in the testimonies alledged is that *voluntas simplicis complacentiæ*, or *voluntas conditionata*, which in regard of the good intended and promised unto men dependeth upon the good behaviour of their own free-will for the obtaining of life and *Ad 1. C*

avoyding of death. Notwithstanding, this will which extendeth unto all, it is the Divine will and decree, that in some men [m] *Creata libertas posit impedire effectus consecutionem; Et hoc vult permittere Deus propter majora bona.* So that this will of exempting Judas or Cain from eternall death under condition of *Turning from their wicked wayes*, and yet permitting them finally to run on in their wicked wayes, is so far from proving that they were not under any such decree of Reprobation, as we maintein that it evidently demonstrateth the truth thereof. It proveth strongly that neither mans sinne nor mans eternall death do fall *sub voluntate simplicis complacentiæ*: for then they should be *bona & amabilia per se*: But it proveth not but God may decree the permitting of some men finally to die in their sinnes, and eternally to be punished for their sinnes: wherein we place the decree of Reprobation.

[m] Ruiz. De volunt. 18. sect. 4.

The inference or collection, That *God delighteth not in the destruction of wicked men*, we willingly grant. For he is onely said to delight in that whereunto he hath a naturall inbred propension: But this putteth no necessary obligation upon God by speciall mercy to free all men from destruction, though he could most easily do it.

As for *sealing up of many millions under invincible*

invincible damnation; it doth manifestly import an invincible act of God thrusting men first into sinne and then into hell, and both out of his mere pleasure. We utterly deny that Reprobation inferreth any such dealing of God with men Not-elected.

And for the Scriptures alledged, or others of the same kind; they do not affirm a conditionate Election upon foreseen faith and perseverance, but they shew us [n] *Quid omnibus ad fidem & panitentiam adductis facere paratus sit Deus.*

[n] *Calv. De aetern. Dei Praedest. p.706.*

To the second. The main scope of this whole Chapter being to shew, That whosoever obteined salvation, whether Jew or Gentile, * obteined it by virtue of that free Election which worketh upon some, enlightning, mollifying and converting their hearts, leaving others to the voluntary blindnesse and hardnesse of their hearts; a man would think that nothing could have been picked from hence to establish Election and Non-election founded upon the good and bad acts of men.

Ad 2. D

* *vers.* 4, 5, 6.

But the Apostle expressely saith, That *God hath shut up* ALL *under unbelief, that he might have mercy upon* ALL. *The two* ALLS *are of an equall extent. How many unbelievers there be, on so many God hath a will of shewing mercie. And if every man be under mercy, then there is no precise will of shutting*

ting out any from possibilitie of mercie.

The Apostles meaning is this; That God in his providence permitted both Jews and Gentiles to be intangled in the guilt of just damnation, that so whosoever is saved might ascribe his salvation not to any foreseen merits or any good works of his own, but to the free mercie of God. So that every man being by nature sinfull and incredulous, all men lie alike at his mercie, and he may have mercy upon whom he pleaseth. The Apostle is so farre from affirming that God sheweth this speciall mercie unto all unbelievers which he sheweth unto some, namely the Enlightning of their dark minds, and the Mollifying of their obdurate hearts, that he saith the quite contrary; [o] *Electio consecuta est, cæteri vero excæcati sunt.* [p] *Maluit dicere Electionem quàm Electos, ut vim gratuitæ electionis innueret, à qua totum habent electi quod habent.* The Apostle meant not to contradict his former doctrine, [q] *Miseretur cujus vult, & quem vult indurat:* and not to make the mercy of Election of equall extent with the misery or guilt of sinne; but to shew that it is mercy on Gods part, and not worth or desert on ours, whensoever any saving grace is bestowed upon any of us all. And yet if this Authour plead for no more then a generall mercy, we will easily grant him, That all men are not onely

[o] *vers 7.*

[p] *Estius, in locum.*

[q] *Rom. 9. 18.*

ly in an eſtate needing mercy, or in a poſſibilitie of obteining mercie, but have an actuall participation of many and great mercies from the hand of almightie God. But when from hence he ſuddenly concludeth, That *there is no preciſe antecedent will of God of ſhutting up the moſt men from all poſſibilitie of obteining mercie*, he hath forgot the queſtion, He ſhould have concluded, Therefore there is no abſolute will of God mercifully electing ſome to the infallible atteinment of grace and glory, and by a negation of the ſame ſpeciall mercy leaving others through their own default infallibly to fall into finall ſinne and miſery. Till he conclude this he concludeth nothing againſt abſolute Reprobation or Non-election.

God ſo loved the world, &c. *Therefore he did not abſolutely hate the greateſt part of men.* Ad 3. E

We grant the concluſion, and more then he asketh: For God did not *abſolutely hate* any one man in the world. Neither will we make advantage of that opinion defended by many Schoolmen, [t] *Non proprie ſed ſimilitudinarie dici Deum odire.* But our anſwer is, That abſolute-Reprobation, which is nothing elſe but Gods abſolute will of denying the ſpeciall benefit of infallible direction unto eternall life, and permitting ſome men by their own defective free-will

[t] *Aquin. contra Gent. l. 96.*

deſervedly to fall under the miſerie of eternall death, is not an argument of hatred towards any man, but of a leſſe degree of love towards ſome men then towards others; which leſſe degree of love is ſometimes expreſſed by the name of *hatred*. Thus God is ſaid to *have loved Jacob and hated Eſau*,-and that *before they were born, or had done either good or evil*. [f] ODISSE *idem eſt quod* MINUS DILEXISSE. Thus Lea was ſaid to be *hated* by Jacob, becauſe ſhe was leſſe beloved then Rachel, Gen. 29. 31. In this ſenſe we grant that the decrees of abſolute Predeſtination and abſolute Reprobation do clearly prove that amongſt Angels and men God hath loved ſome more and ſome leſſe: but that he hath *abſolutely hated* any creature of his own making, they do not prove. *Diligis omnia quæ ſunt; & nihil odiſti eorum quæ feciſti*, Wiſd. 11. God hateth ſinne, becauſe he made it not: And this hatred doth *redundare in peccatorem quà talem*, becauſe God made him not ſo. But God hateth not *non-electum, non-prædeſtinatum*, or *negativè reprobatum quà talem:* neither doth he condemn him, or decree to condemn him *propter reprobationem*, which is Gods act, but *propter tranſgreſſionem*, which is mans act.

[f] *Vaſqu. in 1. q. 23. diſp 95. c. 8.*

Let us hear what Calvines moſt deadly Adverſaries the Jeſuites hold in this point:

[t] *Nullum*

[t] *Nullum Reproborum prosequitur Deus odio inimicitiæ, sed tantùm ejus peccatum odio detestationis.* Suarez [u] also maketh Reprobation a signe onely of a *lesse degree of love*, and not of an *absolute hatred*, as this Authour conceiveth. Nay Molina [x] himself maketh this Reprobation we now speak of to be onely a *lesser degree of love.*

[t] Ruiz. De Volunt. Dei, disp. 54 §. 3. Vide eundem, De Prædist. disp 2. §. 3. & disp. 8. §. 2. & disp. 15. §. 6.

[u] Opusc. 2. c. 5. §. 7. p. 174.

[x] Concord. Quæst. 23. art. 4. disp. 4. pag. 402.

Whereas it is further urged, That God did not onely *love the whole lump of mankind*; but that *he loved it* even after it was *fallen into the gulf of sinne and misery*, this also is granted. But to prove Gods love, it is sufficient that he extendeth his goodnesse unto every man, though he extend not the top and height of his goodnesse unto every man, which consisteth in the eternall preparation and temporall donation of such speciall grace as God knoweth infallibly will and decreeth infallibly shall bring them unto glory. Reprobation importeth a deniall of this rich grace and of this speciall love of God, but importeth no absolute deniall either of grace or love, much lesse an absolute hatred of any person not-elected, [y] *Deus diligit omnes homines, in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum: non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus. In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod est vita æterna, dicitur eos Odio habere vel Reprobare.*

[y] Aquin. 1. part. qu. 23. art. 3. resp. ad 1m.

We

We ſtand in no need of their expoſition who by the WORLD underſtand the *Elect*: Let them therefore defend themſelves if they can.

Ad 4. F

1. TIM. 2. 4. *Who would have all to be ſaved, and come to the knowledge of the truth.* Hence this Authour gathereth two things: 1. *That it is Gods will that men ſhould be ſaved*; 2. *It is his will that they ſhould make uſe of the means* of ſalvation, *that ſo they may be ſaved*; and *God hindereth* no man from *believing* and *being ſaved: therefore there is no abſolute will that thouſands ſhould die unbelievers and be damned.*

[x] *Ariba, p. 112.*

We anſwer, That [x] in this act or decree of Gods will, *Volo hunc ſalvum fieri*, or, *Volo hunc fidelem fieri*, is not compriſed or expreſſed the proper act of Predeſtination: but it requireth a further determination of the Divine will, [a] *ſcilicet, Volo hunc ſalvum facere; Volo hunc fidelem & perſeverantem facere.* That which includeth not the will of Predeſtination doth not exclude the oppoſite will of Reprobation, as it reſpecteth the ſame perſons, whether few or many: But this propoſition, *Volo Judam ſalvum fieri*, or this, *Volo omnes homines ſalvos fieri*, doth not include a particular Predeſtination of Judas or a promiſcuous Predeſtination of all men either unto the end or means of their ſalvation: & therefore the Reprobation of

[a] *Ruiz. De Prædeſt. diſp. 1. § 7. n. 12.*

of Judas and of many millions more may be defended, and yet the truth of this admitted.

If, but where God hath such a will as is here intimated (saith our Authour) there he is *no let* or hinderance to any man from believing, and so being saved.

These men have too high an opinion of the strength of mans free-will that conceive, if God will be pleased not to hinder them, they will upon such grace as is offered believe, and so attein eternall life. But as we (with the common consent of orthodox Divines) place Election and Predestination in such a will of God as infallibly worketh faith and infallibly guideth the elected unto eternall life, and not in the will of *Not-hindering* them from the means or end of their salvation; so we place the Non-election or negative Reprobation of others not in a will of *Hindering* them from believing or walking in the way which leadeth unto life, but in a will of Not-preparing for them and Not-bestowing upon them those infallible means which would certainly bring them to eternall life. He whom God thus permitteth to runne into perdition, to whom he giveth (as I may so term it) *pereundi licentiam*, it is clear he is not comprised within the number of the elect: and therefore (there being no middle

Ruiz. De Pred. disp. 2. §. 3. n. 10. & §. 4.

sort

ſort of men) it is as clear that he appertaineth unto the number of the Non-elect.

That which hath bred this mans miſtake, is, the not-conceiving of any difference betwixt the will of God termed *voluntas ſimplicis complacentiæ* and that which is termed *voluntas abſoluta* or *efficax*, which infallibly worketh that good which it willeth and intendeth unto any man.

Vide Ruiz. De volunt. diſp. 20. pag. 215, 216. &c.

Theſe two may well ſtand together; *Deus vult ut omnes credant & ſalvi fiant, voluntate Complacentiæ; Deus vult & decrevit permittere ut quidam increduli maneant, & ſalvi non fiant ſed pereant, voluntate Abſolutâ.* The former will is in effect but a conditionate will: As if the Apoſtle had ſaid, God will have all men to be ſaved, if all men ſhall believe in Chriſt: and to believe in Chriſt is an act ſo well-pleaſing and ſo agreeable unto Gods will that whereſoever it is found it ſhall be rewarded. But notwithſtanding the extent of this will unto all men, there is in God an abſolute will of permitting ſome to continue in their unbelief, and ſo periſh: and this we call Reprobation.

For the two Anſwers oppoſed by this Authour we need not much trouble our ſelves. If we underſtood the place *de voluntate efficaci & infallibiliter producente effectum volitum*, as many do, we would anſwer

ſwer with them, that by ALL of neceſſitie we muſt underſtand *genera ſingulorum*, not *ſingula generum*: But becauſe we conceive it ſpoken *de voluntate ſimplicis complacentiæ*, we allow the extent unto all, but deny that it contradicteth the decrees of Predeſtination or Reprobation: becauſe they imply a will in God of infallibly working or not-working the ſame in ſingular perſons.

For the ſecond Anſwer which he taketh upon him to confute, namely of the *revealed* and *ſecret* will of God; he ſhould firſt have rightly ſet it down, and then have tryed his ſtrength in confuting it. We ſay that there is in God a true will revealed in the Goſpel of Saving all men that ſhall believe; and a true will Liking, Embracing, Rewarding faith, holineſſe, perſeverance in all men whomſoever without any diſtinction of perſons: And this is the will called *voluntas ſimplicis complacentiæ*; which neither decreeth nor determineth any thing infallibly concerning the being or not-being of ſuch good acts in this or that ſingular perſon. This will we know; and therefore we call it his *Revealed* will. There is alſo in God a ſecert will of Bringing ſome men unto faith, unto perſeverance, unto the kingdome of heaven; of Not-bringing ſome others unto any of theſe, and of Permitting them to fall into the contrary evils through G

through their own default: This will we know not; and therefore we call it the *secret* will of Election and Reprobation. Notwithstanding the former will of God many millions of men are neither saved nor brought to the saving knowledge of the truth: but the latter will is alwayes answered by the infallible event. This no Divine can denie: And therefore under pretense of the former generall conditionate will, which is *voluntas Approbationis* in regard of the object, and which faileth of the event oftentimes in regard that many singular persons fail in performing the conditions, to go about the cancelling of a secret and more effectuall will of God, which decreeth the production of that good in some persons which he liketh and alloweth in all, is no fair dealing. Albeit therefore we grant a generall declared will of God for saving all men which shall believe in Christ, yet therewithall we maintein a speciall and secret will of God extended unto some part onely of mankind, purposing eternally and in time working faith and perseverance in all those which *de facto* are saved. [b] *Est pars quædam humani generis qua specialibus beneficiis ad æternam salutem provehitur.* And of these we say with Augustine, [c] *Tales erant futuri, quia elegit Deus prædestinans ut tales per gratiam ejus essent.*

Vide Ruiz. De Vol. disp. 19. §. 12, 13. & Penott. lib. 4. §. 20.

[b] *Prosp. De vocat. 2. 31*

[c] *De Prad. sanct. 1. 18.*

The

The inference, That *Gods word is not true unleſſe he will have all men to be ſaved*, is granted *de voluntate Complacente*, denied *de voluntate Decernente*. Unleſſe we admit of this diſtinction we make that word of God untrue, *Quicquid voluit fecit in cælo & in terra.*

Neither are theſe wills *contrary*; *Volo omnes fieri ſalvos*, *Volo omnes fieri credentes*; *Nolo aliquos facere ſalvos*, *Nolo aliquos facere credentes.* For the event proveth the truth of the latter, and the Scripture of the former. *Vide Ruiz. Diſput.* 17. §. 3. 5. *Auguſt. Enchir. ad Laur. c.* 97.

2. Pet. 3. 9. *God is patient towards us, and would have no man to periſh, but would all men ſhould come to repentance.*] This *is a negative propoſition, and muſt be taken diſtributively: and therefore it flatly contradicteth abſolute Reprobation.* *Ad* 5. *H*

Take it diſtributively, yet it no way contradicteth that abſolute Reprobation which is oppoſed to abſolute Predeſtination. Ruiz deſcribeth it thus; [d] *Reprobatio formaliter & ultimò conſtituitur per imperium intellectus Divini ordinantis tali modo per talia media cum talibus circumſtantiis permittendum eſſe peccatum, & finalem reprobati impœnitentiam, & propter illam ordinantis æternam ejus punitionem.* [d] *De Pred. diſp.* 2. §. 4.

If the Apoſtle had ſaid, God never decreed

creed to permit that any man ſhould finally periſh in his impenitencie, he had quite overthrown the difference which we make betwixt men predeſtinated and not-predeſtinated: but telling us onely what God would have us do and what God would not have us wilfully to run upon, here is nothing at all which maketh againſt abſolute Predeſtination or Reprobation. They are decrees conteining what God is reſolved to work in ſome men and not to work in others; theſe are words ſhewing what God would have men do or not do: and therefore they cannot be contradictorie or contrary one to the other. Powerfully to work the converſion of ſingular perſons, is a certain proof that they were never under the decree of the Divine Reprobation: But *voluntate complacentiæ* onely to will their converſion, and patiently to expect it, uſing ſuch means as they fruſtrate, is ſo farre from evincing that ſuch men were not under the decree of Reprobation, that it is a ſtrong argument to prove it. *Vide Eſtium in* 1. *Sent. Diſt.* 46. Malderus (a profeſſed enemie to the Synod of Dort) granteth [c] that the finall obduration or impenitencie of Reprobates is not a foreſeen antecedent condition but a following event of negative Reprobation. He was not of this Authours judgement then, who thinketh Gods patient expectation

[c] *In* 1^m 2^æ *quæſt.* 79. *memb.* 4. *p.* 247.

pectation must needs crosse the decree of Reprobation.

In a word; If this Authour will bring Scripture to overthrow the absolute decree of Predestination and Reprobation, he must bring such places as prove God hath not decreed the infallible conversion and salvation of certain singular persons, and God hath not decreed the permission of some mens obduration and perdition: which we know he can never do.

His sixth Testimony out of Scripture is taken from certain *conditionall* propositions, which promise Gods favour and eternall life unto men upon conditions; namely, *If they seek him, If they do well, If they believe, If they persevere*, &c. and which suspend his wrath and utter desertion upon their Sinning and Forsaking of God. Upon these premises whereas we expected this conclusion, *Therefore in God there is no eternall decree of absolute Predestination and absolute Non-predestination, Preterition or negative Reprobation*, he starteth aside from the question, and inferreth, That God *forsaketh or rejecteth from salvation no man in time and in deed till he* have first in time and deed *cast-off God*. Upon the truth of which conclusion we shall not much stand with him. *Ad 6. I*

But to answer more clearly to the point in hand, We must first consider that mere or

purely conditionall decrees or conditionall volitions agree not with the perfection of the Divine nature. [f] *Volitiones purè conditionales sunt alienæ à sapientia & prudentia Dei.* [g] *Voluntas Dei conditionata dici potest, non quia actu feratur in objectum sub conditione, sed quia ex illa voluntate quæ præsens est alia oriretur si conditio in objecto poneretur.* The speeches therefore above-cited out of Scripture do not imply a Conditionall will in God suspended for any moment of time, and then *post purificatam conditionem* becoming an Absolute and Effectuall will, as the like conditionall propositions do in us, who have neither knowledge whether the condition will be certainly performed or no, nor yet power in our selves to work the condition whereupon the future act of our will was suspended. But in God, who knoweth eternally what every man will do or not do, and who in himself hath an absolute power and freedome to make men do any good whereunto he maketh promise of reward, and to leave them to their own defective Free-will in doing those things for which he hath threatened desertion and destruction, these conditionall decrees or volitions must be farre otherwise conceived; namely, not *purely* but *mixtly conditionalia*, that is, grounded in some absolute revealed decree of God to the performance whereof he hath tied himself.

[f] *Ruiz. De volunt. disp 20. §. 1.*

[g] *Vasq. in 1m, disp. 83. pag. 511.*

Vide Ruiz. De scient. disp. 71. §. 7

Ruiz. De volunt. disp. 8. §. 7.

For

For example; It is an absolute decree of the Divine will published in the Gospel, *That whosoever repenteth, believeth, persevereth, shall be saved:* From hence is derived that mixt conditionall decree, *If Cain, if Judas, if any other repent and believe, they shall be saved.* Now such mixt conditionall decrees carry no contradiction to the absolute decrees of Election and Non-election or Reprobation. For who seeth not that these two propositions may well stand together, *I will that if Judas repent and believe he shall have remission and salvation; I will not give unto Judas the gift of repentance, of faith, and of eternall life?* The former conditionall proposition conteineth all which this Authour can truly collect from the testimonies alledged; and the latter doth as truly inferre that absolute Reprobation for which we contend. For the absolute decree of God resolving not to give faith, repentance, and eternall life unto Judas, is that which we understand by the word *Reprobation:* and this is never abrogated by any conditionall promise founded in any universall absolute decree of God.

Now for this inference, *That God forsaketh no man considered in the fall, till by actuall sinnes and continuance in them he forsake God*, (as before was intimated) it is not the concluding of the true question. Tempo- K

rall Desertion or Damnation is one thing; and Non-election or negative reprobation, another. Temporall forsaking is a withdrawing of grace or favour formerly bestowed upon a man in regard of his ingratitude and other sinnes. And here we assent unto Augustine & Prosper, the strong mainteiners of Absolute Predestination and oppossers of Conditionate; *Deus non deserit nisi desertus.* Temporall rejecting from salvation is an adjudging of men unto damnation as being liable thereunto for their own sinnes and misdeserts. And here we accord with the same learned Fathers; *Misericorditer liberat, justè damnat.* Now Reprobation is Gods absolute decree of not-preparing for some that grace which would preserve them from forsaking God, and consequently permitting them to lose eternall life; even as Predestination is Gods absolute decree of preparing for others that effectuall grace which will keep them frō falling away from God, & so consequently infallibly bring thē unto the kingdom of God. These decrees be they which we deny to be founded upon any different foreseen acts of men: and therefore we referre them to the absolute will of God. As for temporall Desertion or eternall Punition or Damnation of any man, we grant they all wait upon Sinne as the antecedent deserving cause thereof.

Whereas

Whereas this Authour further replyeth, *That Gods acts in time are regulated by his decrees before time; and therefore by what God doeth in the world we may know what he purposed to do before the world:* But he *actually casteth no man off till he grow rebellious and impenitent; therefore he decreed to cast no man off before his foreseen rebellion and impenitency.*

This reply runneth upon the self-same errour with the former, namely the confounding of the decrees of eternall Predestination and Preterition with the decrees of temporall Desertion and Damnation, which are founded upon distinct causes, and ought to be distinguished. But let us retort his reason against himself. *By what God doeth or not doeth in time we may know what he absolutely purposed to do before all time: but God in time gave to Peter repentance, faith, and eternall life; and God in time permitted Judas to die in unbelief and impenitency, and to incurre eternall death: Therefore he decreed before all time to give Peter all those benefits, and he decreed before all time to permit Judas to die in unbelief, impenitencie, and in an estate liable to damnation.* Grant this, and absolute Predestination is clearly granted. For as it were senseless to say Gods decree of giving faith and perseverance unto Peter was suspended upon Peters foreseen faith and perseverance, so as senseless it is to say the decree of permit-

ting Judas to die in unbelief and finall impenitency was grounded upon his foreseen unbelief and finall impenitency.

We may now conclude, That absolute Election and Non-election is surely founded in the authority of many and manifest places of Scripture; but for conditionall Election and Preterition, it hath neither many nor any, clear nor obscure.

Treatise.

II. *It is incompatible with Gods* ATTRIBUTES.

SEcondly, it crosseth *(A)* some principall Attributes of God; therefore it cannot be true. For God useth not to make decrees contrary to his own most glorious nature, and such as are incompatible with those excellent Attributes by which he hath discovered part of himself to men. *Voluntas Dei semper sequitur naturam suam*, is a rule among Divines, *Gods will alwayes followeth his nature.* The reason why, is given by the Apostle, 2. Tim. 2. 13. *God cannot deny himself.*

Two things are here to be premised:

I. That Gods chief *(B)* attributes are those perfections in the manifestation of which by acts conformable to them God is most glorified: which are Mercy, Justice, Truth, and Holinesse. For God is more honoured by the exercise of these among men then by the putting forth of his unlimited Power and Sovereignty; as a King is more renowned among his subjects for his equity, candour and clemency, then for his dominion and authority, or any thing that is done onely for the manifestation thereof. And there is good reason for it. For

1. Power is no virtue; but Holinesse, Mercy, Justice, and Truth are. Acts of Power are not morally good in themselves, but are made good or evil by their concomitants. If they be accompanied with Justice, Mercy, &c. they are good; if otherwise, they are naught. For *justum oportet esse, quod laudem meretur*; Nothing deserveth praise, unlesse it be just.

2. Power and Sovereignty may as well be shewed in barbarous and unjust actions as in their contraries. Saul shewed his Authority and Power to the full in slaying the Lords

Lords Prieſts; and Nebuchadnezzar in caſting the three children into the fiery furnace, and Daniel into the lions den; but no Mercy, nor Juſtice, nor any thing elſe that was good.

II. The ſecond thing (*c*) to be preconſidered, is, That Juſtice, Mercy, Truth, and Holineſſe in God are the ſame in nature with theſe virtues in men, though infinitely differing in degree; (as light in the aire and the ſunne are the ſame in nature, not degree:) and that which is juſt, upright and mercifull in men, is ſo in God too: And by theſe virtues in our ſelves with acts conformable to them, *tanquam ex pede Herculem*, we may ſafely meaſure what are ſo in God. For otherwiſe theſe things will follow;

1. The common and received diſtinction of Divine Attributes into *communicable* and *incommunicable* would fall to the ground. For againſt it this might be ſaid, That the Holineſſe, Mercy, Juſtice, and Sincerity, with other virtues that are in us, are not the perfections of God in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature.

2. Men cannot be truly ſaid to be [a] *made according to Gods image*; nor when they are regenerated to be [b] *renewed after the ſame image*, and to be [c] *made partakers of the Divine nature*. That picture cannot be the picture of ſuch a man, which doth not in his parts and lineaments truly reſemble him: no more can we be truly called the picture or image of God, if in our graces (in reſpect of which we are principally ſo called) there be not a lively reſemblance of Gods attributes.

a *Gen.* 1.27.
b *Col.*3.10.
c 2.*Pet.*1.4.

3. We may not ſafely imitate God, as we are commanded, [d] *Be ye perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect*: and [e] *Be ye holy, as I am holy*. Nor when we ſhew forth holineſſe, mercy, juſtice and ſincerity in our doings, can we be properly ſaid to imitate God, if theſe be one thing in God and in men another.

d *Matth.*5.48
e 1.*Pet.*1.16.

Theſe two things being thus premiſed, *viz.* That Gods Holineſſe, Mercy, Juſtice and Truth are foure of his chief attributes, in the exerciſe of which he taketh himſelf to be much glorified; and, That we are to meaſure theſe attributes by the ſame virtues in our ſelves: I come to the proof of my ſecond reaſon againſt abſolute Reprobation ſtated even in the mildeſt and moſt plauſible way.

It oppoſeth Gods principall Attributes; particularly

his { Holineſſe. Mercy. Juſtice. Sincerity.

Answer.

Whether Absolute Reprobation crosse Gods Attributes.

A WE grant that God *maketh no decrees contrary to his nature:* If therefore we must needs *crosse Gods attributes* unlesse we admit the Remonstrants conditionate Predestination and Reprobation, we will subscribe to it.

B We acknowledge these to be *chief attributes:* and therefore what contradicteth any of these we will presently renounce. As for an absolute *unlimited power* separated from Justice or other Divine attributes, we say with learned Calvine, [a] *Sorbonicum illud dogma in quo sibi plaudunt Papales Theologastri detestor, quod potentiam absolutam Deo affingit. Solis enim lucem à calore evellere facilius erit quàm Dei potentiam separare à justitia.* Nay it is as impossible for any unjust action to proceed from God, as it is for the Creatour to become a creature.

[a] *De eterna Dei Præd. pag. 728.*

C The second thing preconsidered is more doubtfull. For that may be unjust in men which is not unjust in God. As in a King it is an unjust action to set up Judges and Magistrates over the people whom he knoweth will unjustly oppresse them: it is not so in God. In a Man it is want of mercy not to hinder a desperate wretch from destroying him-

himself when easily he might do it: Not so in God. Under the name of *Virtues*, when we ascribe them to God, a permanent propension or inclination unto good actions conformable to the perfection of the Divine nature must be understood. I say a propension *in actu primo*. For if God had never wrought any outward work of mercy or justice, he had notwithstanding been as virtuous as now he is. He wanted neither mercy nor justice before he created the world.

We may safely affirm that there is an analogicall *conformity* betwixt Divine and humane virtues: but that there is an identity of nature, is not so easily to be proved. *Pictures* of men resemble those whose pictures they are: but they are not the same in nature with them. We may and must *imitate* God in the actions of such virtues as he hath commanded: but from hence it will not follow that the word *virtue* applyed to God signifieth the self-same thing which it doth when it is applyed to men. But to come to particulars: we will not contend about words. Let this Authour onely look to it that he take his measure right, which must be *resecatis omnibus omnium virtutum partibus quæ involvunt imperfectionem inferioritatis*, &c.

Treatise.

I. Repugnant to Gods Holinesse.

FIrst, it fighteth (A) with Gods Holinesse, and maketh him the principall cause of sinne in the greatest number of men. I know that the defenders of it do not think so. For the main reason which moved the Synod at Dort (B) and some other Divines before and since to bring down Predestination thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall, was that they might maintein a fatall and absolute Reprobation of men, & yet avoid this imputation as * Dr Twisse hath noted. But what they intended (for ought that I can see) they have not compassed. For it followeth evident enough even from their conclusions too, that of all the sinnes of Reprobates, which are the greatest number by many degrees, God is the true and principall authour.

* Dr Twisse Vind. Grat. l. 2. part. 1. c. 4. initio.

Two things (C) they say, wch taken together (me think) inferre it: 1. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they cannot avoid sinne. 2. That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it.

a Calvin. Instit. l. 3. c. 23. sect. 7. Non enim factum est naturaliter, ut à salute excideremt omnes unius parentis culpâ.
b Cunctos mortales in unius hominis persona morti æternæ mancipatos fuisse Scriptura clamat: hoc cùm naturæ nequeat asscribi, ab admirabili Dei consilio profectum esse minimè obscurum est.

I. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they cannot possibly avoid sinne: that is, into the estate of originall sinne, which consisteth of two parts: 1. The guilt of Adams transgression. 2. The corruption of nature. In both these they say mankind is interessed, not through the force and efficiencie of naturall generation, because we all derive our nature from Adam as our first principle; but by Gods free and voluntary order and imputation: a *It came not to passe by any naturall means* (saith Calvine) *that all men fell from salvation by the fault of our first parent:* b *that all men are held under the guilt of eternall death in the person of one man, it is the clear and constant voice of Scripture. Now this cannot be ascribed to any naturall cause: it must therefore come from the wonderfull counsel of God.* A little after he hath the same again with as great an emphasis; c *How is it, that so many nations with their children should be involved in the fall without remedy, but because God would have it so?* As roundly doth Dr Twisse affirm the same; d *The guilt of origi-*

c Quomodo factum est, ut tot gentes una cum liberis eorum infantibus, æternæ morti involveret lapsus Adæ absque remedio, nisi quia Deo ita visum est?
d *Twisse Vind. grat. l. 1. part. 1. digr. 4. v. 3. prope finem;* Originalis peccati reatus non nisi imputatione, lues non nisi propagatione ad nos derivatur: quorum utraque non nisi à liberi Dei constitutione proficiscitur.

nall

sinne is derived to us onely by imputation; the filth onely by propagation: and *both these onely by Gods free constitution.* A little before he hath these words, *The fault of our nature cometh from Gods free appointment: for he doth not act of any necessitie, but of his mere will onely impute the sinne of Adam to us.* To this purpose he speaketh a great deal more in the same place. To these sayings S. Bernard hath the like: Speaking of Adams sinne, he saith, *Adams sinne is anothers, because we knew not of it; and yet ours, because it was through the just though secret judgement of God reputed ours.*

eEtenim naturæ vitium non est cuiq; suum voluntate propria contractum, sed soli imputatione aut propagatione derivatum; quarum utraque fit voluntate Dei. Deus enim nulli necessitate, sed pro mera sua voluntate nobis imputat peccatum Adæ. f*Bern. Serm.* 1. *Dom.* 1. *post Epiph.* Aliena est, quia in Adam omnes nescientes peccavimus; nostra, quia etsi in alio, nos tamen peccavimus, & nobis justo Dei consilio imputabatur, licèt occulto.

And this that they say is agreeable to reason. For if we be fallen into the guilt of the first sinne and the corruption of nature, onely because we were in Adams loyns when he sinned and derive our being from him, then these two things will follow.

1. That we (D) stand guilty of all the sinnes which Adam committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were virtually in his loyns as well after his fall as before, and in every passage and variation of his life he was still a principle of mankind. But where do we reade that we are guilty of any other of his sinnes? To the first sinne onely doth the Scripture entitle that sinne and misery which entred into the world and invaded all mankind, as we may see Rom. 5. 15, 16, 17, &c.

2. That children (E) are guilty of the sinnes of all their progenitours, especially of their immediate parents: For they were in their loyns when they sinned, and more immediately then in Adams. But children are not guilty of their parents faults, nor obnoxious to their punishments, because they are their children, as we may see Exod. 20. 5. where God saying that he will *visit the sinnes of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation in them that hate him,* plainly implyeth, that children are not simply charged with their fathers sinnes, but conditionally if they be *haters* of God as their fathers were; if by imitating their wicked parents they become partakers of their sinnes. In Ezek. 18. 14. &c. The Lord signifieth thus much in his apologie against the cavill of the Jews. For first he saith, That if a wicked man beget a sonne that seeth his fathers sinnes, and doth not the like, he shall not die for the iniquity of his father. This implyeth that the derivation of being from the parent doth not render the child obnoxious to the punish-

ment

ment of the fathers sinne, nor consequently to the sinne. For the good child is not obnoxious, and yet the good child is equally in the fathers loyns with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and being from him. And then *vers.* 20. the Lord telleth them expressely thus much in two propositions: 1. Affirmatively, *The soul that sinneth, it shall die.* And that it may be known that he speaketh exclusively, Onely the soul that sinneth, shall die, he delivereth his mind 2. Negatively, *The sonne shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the sonne,* &c. Our Saviour in that wofull speech of his to the Pharisees, Matth. 23. 32,34. *Fulfill ye also the measure of your fathers. --- Behold I send unto you Prophets*, &c. *them ye shall kill and crucifie, that on you may come all the righteous blood,* &c. intimateth apparently, that the Pharisees were not inheritours of their fathers sinnes and punishments by birth; but by the commission and imitation of their fathers sinnes, they came to inherit both their sinnes and plagues. Miserable would our case be on whom the ends of the world are come, if children should be guilty of all their ancestours prevarications. What world of sinnes should we be to answer for, Personall sinnes, Parents, Progenitours sinnes, to a thousand past generations? A thing with no reason to be imagined. This is the first thing.

II. Secondly, they say (*F*) that God had immutably decreed to leave the farre greatest part of mankind in this impotent condition irrecoverably, and to afford them no power and ability sufficient to make them rise out of sinne to newnesse of life: and this decree he executeth in time: and both these he doth out of his onely will and pleasure.

Of this proposition there be three branches:

1. God decreeth to leave them. 2. He doth leave them. 3. He doth both out of his alone pleasure.

1. God (say they) hath (*G*) decreed to leave them without sufficient grace, and consequently under an everlasting necessitie of sinning. This is the very Helen which they fight for, the main act of that absolute Reprobation which with joyne consent and endeavour they labour to maintein.

Most of them cast their Reprobation into two acts: a *Negative*, which is a peremptory deniall of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall; and a *Positive*, which they say is a preordination of men thus left to the eternall torments of hell. Others among them define Reprobation by an act merely

merely negative, and call it *Non-electionem*, *decretum quo Statuit non eò usque misereri*, &c. Thus our Divines [a] in their Suffrage define it: and in their explication of the definition which they give, they say that the proper acts of Reprobation, as it standeth opposed to Election, are no other then a deniall of that same glorie and grace which are prepared in the decree of Election for the sonnes of God. But in this (*H*) they all agree, that by the decree of Reprobation grace necessary for the avoiding of sinne is flatly denied to Reprobates. And if at any time we hear them say that God hath gratified Reprobates with some grace; (for so saith *Walæus*, Reprobates are left [g] *under the common providence of God*, and consequently under some common endowments: And our Divines in the Synod say, [h] *Reprobates though they are not elected, yet receive many of Gods graces*) they are to be understood of such gifts and graces as are insufficient to make them avoid sinne, as we may see in these two cited places and many more.

[a] *Suffrag. Brit. Art. 1. de Repr. thes. 1.*

[g] *Wal. Defens. Anat. Armin. c. De Repr.* In statu pristino & sub exercitio arbitrii sui, & administratione communis providentiæ.

[h] *Suffr. Brit. thes. 4. de Reprob.* Hos etsi non electos, percipere tamen multa gratiæ Divinæ effecta non negamus.

2. God doth (*I*) actually according to his eternall and unchangeable decree leave the Reprobates in their severall times and generations, without his grace, under a necessitie of finall sinne and impenitencie. This is the second branch of that second proposition. And this must they needs say. For Gods decrees cannot be frustrated: What he purposed before time, without fail he doeth in time. I shall not need therefore to prove that they say so. Nevertheless, to let it be seen how positively and categorically they say so, I will give an instance or two. The Divines (*K*) of Geneva at the Synod among their *Theses* of Reprobation have this for one, [i] *Those whom God hath reprobated, out of the same will by which he hath rejected them, either he calleth not at all, or being called, he reneweth not throughly by the Spirit of regeneration, ingraffeth not into Christ mystically, nor justifieth*, &c. Like to this is the speech (*L*) of Lubbert, who speaking of Reprobates, saith, [k] *To them either he revealeth not the way of salvation, or giveth not faith and regeneration, but leaveth them in sinne and miserie.* The same Authour speaking against the position of the Remonstrants, *viz.* that *God doth supply to all men sufficient and necessary means of salvation, with an intention of sa-*

[i] *Act. Syn. Suffr. Genev. de Reprob.* Eosdem personas in tempore, ex eodem placito voluntatis vel non vocat, vel vocatos in Ecclesiam Spiritu regenerationis non renovat pe-

nissimè, non inserit Christo mysticè, non justificat, &c. [k] *Act. Syn. Suffr. Lubbert de Reprob.* Iis vel non revelat viam salutis, vel non donat eos fide & cognitione Jesu Christi, non regignit eos, non justificat, sed relinquit eos in peccato & miseria, &c.

ving

ving them, setteth down this antithesis.-- l God doth not minister to all men means needfull and sufficient to salvation and that with an intention of saving them. And to this his antithesis Polyander, Walæus, and Thysius, three other Professours of Divinitie in the Low-countreys, did set their hands.

3 God both (M) decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themselves, of his alone absolute will and pleasure.

This is the third branch. That they say so, witnesse the Suffrage of our English Divines; m We affirm, That this Non-election is founded in the most free pleasure of God. And, n That no man lying in the fall is past over by the mere will of God, is numbred by the same Divines among the heterodox positions. To this purpose also speak the Ministers of the Palatinate, o The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God.-- p That God passeth over some and denieth them the grace of the gospel, the cause is the same free pleasure of God. q God decreed to leave some in the fall, of his own good pleasure. Thus the Divines of Hessen. The proof of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time; r God doth in time leave some of mankind fallen, and doth not bestow upon them means necessary to believe, &c. and this out of his most free pleasure. This they joyntly affirm, and prove it by this reason especially; All men were looked-on as sinners: If sinne (N) therefore were the cause that moved God to reprobate, he should have reprobated or rejected all. But he did not reprobate all: Therefore for sinne he reprobated none, but for his own pleasure, in which we must rest without seeking any other cause.

Now from these two things laid together, viz. 1. That God did bring (O) men into a necessitie of sinning; 2. That he hath left the reprobates under this necessitie: it will follow that he is the authour of the reprobates sinnes.

1. Because *Causa causæ est causa causati*, The cause of a cause is the cause of its effect, (if there be a necessary subordination between the causes and the effect;) whether it be a cause by acts negative or positive: But God is the chief or sole cause (by their doctrine) of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates, namely their

l Deus non submittit omnibus hominibus necessaria & sufficientia media ad salutem, atque cum intentione servandi.

m *Suffr. Brit. art. 1. de Reprob. explic. thes. 1. orthodox.* Hanc non-electionem in liberrima Dei voluntate fundari dicimus.

n *Ib. thes. 3. heterodox.* Neminem post lapsum merâ Dei voluntate præteritum esse.

o *Act. Syn. Jud. Palat. thes. 3.* Causa reprobationis est liberrima ac justissima Dei voluntas.

p *Ibid. thes. 4.* Quòd Deus nonnullos præterit gratiâ prædicationis evangelii, ejus causa est idem beneplacitum sive eadem libera voluntas.

q *Judic. Theol. Hassiac.* Decrevit Deus quosdam in lapsu & miseria relinquere pro suo beneplacito. r Deus in tempore quosdam è genere humano derelinquit in miseria sua, nec media ad fidem & conversionem ipsámque etiam salutem obtinendam necessaria eis confert, &c. idque pro liberrima sua voluntate.

impo-

impotencie and want of supernaturall grace: Therefore he is (by the same doctrine) the true and proper cause of their sinnes.

2. Because *Removens (P) prohibens*, &c. That which withdraweth or withholdeth a thing which being present would hinder an event, is the cause of that event: As for example; He that cutteth a string in which a stone hangeth, is the cause of the falling of that stone; and he that withdraweth a pillar which being put-to would uphold a house, is the true cause in mens account of the falling of that house: But God (by their opinion) withholdeth from Reprobates that power which being granted them might keep them from falling into sinne: Therefore he becometh a true morall cause of their sinnes. [f] *In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed when it is done*, saith Tertullian.

[f] *Tertull. l. 1. contr. Marcion. c. 22.* In cujus manu est quid nè fiat, ei deputatur cùm jam fit.

It will not suffice to say, that God by withholding grace from Reprobates becometh onely an *accidentall* not (Q) a proper and direct cause of their sinnes. For a cause is then onely accidentall in relation to the effect, when the effect is beside the intention and expectation of the cause. For example; Digging in a field is then an accidentall cause of the finding a bag of gold, when that event is neither expected nor intended by the husbandman in digging. But when the effect is looked for and aimed at, then the cause (though it be the cause onely by withholding the impediment) is not accidentall; as a Pilote who withholdeth his care and skill from a ship in a storm, foreseeing that by his neglect the ship will be drowned, is not to be reputed an accidentall but a direct and proper cause of the losse of this ship. This being so, it followeth, that God by this act and decree of removing and detaining grace necessary to the avoiding of sinne from Reprobates, not as one ignorant and careless what will or shall follow, but knowing infallibly what mischief will follow, and determining precisely that which doth follow, namely, their impenitencie and damnation, becometh the proper and direct cause of their sinnes.

Whether

A.

THe absolute Reprobation which we maintein is nothing else but an absolute purpose in God of not-bestowing grace infallibly bringing unto glory upon some men, which he hath absolutely purposed to bestow upon others. And this we evidently ground upon the Doctrine of our Church, which acknowledgeth Predestination to be a speciall favour or benefit extended to a certain number known onely to God, from whence faith, perseverance and eternall life do flow as effects from the cause. And because the affirmation serveth to measure the negation, our Church speaking in the article nothing at all of Non-election or Non-predestination, leaveth it obvious to every mans understanding that all not comprised within the number of the elect must needs fall within the number of the non-elect, as being permitted *deficere à gratia & gloria* by their own default. And further, our Church in adding, *Notwithstanding the decree of Predestination and Election Gods generall promises must be received as they are propounded in the Gospel*, intimateth, That the decrees of Election & Non-election or Reprobation may stand firm *cum possibilitate ad eventus contraries* though not *cum eventu contrariu*. For

Peter

Peter notwithstanding his Predestination might have been damned if he had voluntarily continued in his impenitency, and Judas notwithstanding his Reprobation might have been saved if he had not voluntarily continued in his impenitency. The absolute decree of Election and Non-election are not contradictory to the generall condition all promises of salvation or threats of damnation. As therefore we condemne the opinion of the Remonstrants, who by reducing Election and negative Reprobation unto foreseen good and bad acts of men erre upon the one hand, so we condemne also their opinions who confound the decree of Damnation with this of Non-election, or who derive the causes of damnation, namely sinne, infidelity, impenitency, from the fore-named decree; which is to erre further upon the other hand. These things premised we will now go along with this Authour, and see how he proveth this absolute Reprobation or Non-election which we defend to oppose any of Gods principall Attributes.

He saith *it fighteth with his holinesse*, because *it maketh him the principall cause of sinne* in all persons not-elected or not-predestinated.

If he can prove this we yield. His nibbling at the *Synod of Dort*, and charging them

B

with *maintenance* of a *fatall decree*, is to little purpose. If he call that *fatall* which is certain and immutable, we are not afraid to affirm that all Gods eternall decrees are certain and immutable; and that very eternall decree of Reprobation which he imagineth to follow upon the foresight of mens finall impenitency is as absolute, as immutable, and in this sense as fatall as that which we defend. S. Augustine did not abhorre *Fatum*: [a] *Si propterea quisquam res humanas fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem Fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat.* Others admit the word, and give this definition of it, as Boethius; *Fatum est immobilis dispositio rebus mobilibus inhærens.* Aquinas; [b] *Fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus Divinitus provisos.* I might cite infinite Authours who rejecting *Fatum astrologicum* admit *Fatum Theologicum* or *Catholico sensu acceptum. Vide Parisiensem* 1. *part. De universo, part.* 3. *cap.* 24. *pag.* 746, 747. *Halensem part.* 1. *quæst.* 27. *Albertum part.* 1. *tract.* 17. *Durandum, lib.* 1. *dist.* 39. *quæst.* 4. I have quoted all these because this Authour through his whole book thinketh he hath beaten down absolute Predestination to the ground if he can but fasten the name or bare conceit of *Fatalitie* upon it.

[a] *De grat. lib.* 5. *c.* 1.

[b] *Part.* 1. *qu.* 116. *art.* 4.

As for the Synod of Dort, it considered not Predestination and Reprobation *in massa cor-*

corrupta to maintein a fatall decree. For consider it before or after the decree is alike fatall, if immutability of events decreed by God be termed fatality. And put it before or after, it neither way maketh God the principall cause of sinne: which is clear in non-elect angels, in whom Reprobation considered before the fall is by no judicious Divine conceived to make God the cause of their sinne.

But he goeth about to prove that absolute Reprobation maketh God the Authour of sinne, becaus some defenders thereof *say two things* from whence(he thinketh) it may be inferred That God is the principall cause of sinne. Suppose some who hold absolute Reprobation should therewithall hold not two onely but ten false tenents, is the falsity of these a necessary *medium* to conclude the falsity of the other? As if he that holdeth two false propositions, might not for all that hold a third which is true. C

His first Proposition wherewith he chargeth the defenders of absolute Reprobation, is, *That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they cannot avoid sinne, namely, into the estate of originall sinne*, and that both in regard of the *guilt* and of the *corruption*.

This is both odiously and falsely set down. No man holdeth that God brought Adams

posterity either into the estate of their guilt or of their corruption: but all maintein that it was Adam himself who by his voluntary prevarication inwrapped himself and his posterity both in the guilt and contagion of originall sin. *Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundũ intravit, & per peccatum mors.* So that both the sinne and the punishment were brought in by man and not by God. Or if a further cause must needs be found of bringing-in sinne and death, the devil must be charged therewithall. *Invidiâ diaboli*, &c. It is true, and acknowledged generally by Divines both of our Church and of the Romane, That it was not by any naturall necessity that Adam falling his posterity should be either universally tainted with originall sinne or liable unto death, but that both these depended *à libero Dei decreto*, or as some call it *à pacto*, wherein it was agreed that if Adam persevered in his righteousnesse he should transmit it to his posterity, if he rebelled he should make his whole posterity liable both to the corruption of sinne and danger of punishment.

Rom. 5. 12.

Wisd. 2. 24.

And that this Authour may see that others (who deny God to be the cause of sinne) do hold as much as *Calvine*, or Dr *Twisse*, I will quote him some Authours. And first to begin with the Master of the sentences; He teacheth that not God but Adam brought

brought men into their eſtate of ſinne. [c] *Per Adamum peccatum ſimul ac pœna tranſiit in poſteros. Ex Adamo damnationem ſimul ac culpam ſuſcepimus. Nemo naſcitur niſi trahens pœnam & meritum pœnæ. Ex Adami inobedientia emanavit & in poſteros demigravit.* So that there is no queſtion Who brought in this ſin: All the queſtion is, How it cometh to paſſe that ſo unavoidably and generally it layeth hold upon all the ſons of Adam. Here even the Romane Divines are driven to confeſſe with Calvine, that this dependeth upon a free conſtitution or decree of the Divine will: becauſe naturall propagation would not have ſtripped Adams poſterity of any habitual righteouſneſſe which God had beſtowed upon him, or charged them with the guilt of any ſinne perſonally committed by him, had not God enacted and conſtituted a decree that ſo it ſhould be. Vaſquez is clear of this opinion; [d] *Primo parenti ità fuit gratia & juſtitia donata, ut non tantùm ſibi ſed etiam poſteris tranſmittendam illam acceperit, non quidem ex natura rei, ſed ex Dei pactione.* And more plainly; [e] *Cauſa originalis peccati fuit primus parens ratione ſuæ tranſgreſſionis, non quidem phyſica & naturalis, quia nihil reale in poſteros traducere potuit virtute propriâ aut virtute peccati quod commiſit.* And a little after; *Negare non poſſumus ex voluntate ſola Dei conſtitutum fuiſſe ut gratia originalis traduceretur*

[c] *Lib. 2. diſt. 30.*

[d] *In 1m 2æ, qu. 23 diſp. 132. cap. 9.*

[e] *Diſp. 133. cap. 1.*

in posteros si Adamus in gratia perseveraret, & amitteretur si peccaret. Malderus also granteth that the contagion and guilt of Adams sinne is not derived unto his posterity but by Gods free constitution. [f] *Notandum, cùm Deus totum humanum genus in uno homine condidisset, indebitam naturæ justitiam originalem isti homini dedisse, non pro se tantùm, sed pro tota posteritate; adeò ut si ipse perseveravisset, omnes posteri nascerentur justi.* Paulò pòst; *Deus cum Adamo quasi pactum quoddam iniit, quo prævaricanti statueret non tantùm ipsi sed toti naturæ mortem animæ & corporis.* [g] *Fuit quoddam Dei decretum, ex quo decreto accessu peccati superfuit illud chirographum decreti contrarium nobis.* And last of all he addeth, [h] *Voluntarium voluntate primi parentis sufficere ad veri nominis peccatum in parvulo: est enim illa voluntas Adæ quodammodo voluntas parvuli, ex Dei decreto.* These and many more agree with Calvine, in attributing the unavoidable imputation of Adams offense and transmitting of his corrupted nature unto a voluntary and free constitution of God, in whose power and pleasure it stood (if in his wisdome he had seen it more fit) to have ordered it otherwise. If this decree make God the principall cause of sinne in Adams posterity, not onely Calvine but all other Divines lie open to this Authours accusation.

f *In 1m 2æ, qu. 81. art. 1.*

g *Ibid.*

h *Ibid. pag. 260.*

But he is utterly mistaken, and pinneth a false

falſe conſequent to a true antecedent. For though Gods will was the cauſe of making the former decree, That all Adams poſterity ſhould be liable to the loſſe of righteouſneſſe and puniſhment of ſinne upon Adams diſobedience, even as if themſelves had ſingularly and perſonally tranſgreſſed; yet neither God nor this decree of God was the cauſe either of Adams tranſgreſſion perſonally committed by himſelf, or of the corruption and guilt of damnation which ſeiſed upon his poſteritie. The law or decree, That if a noble man become a traitour, he with all his poſteritie ſhall be tainted in bloud, and ſtripped of the priviledges of nobilitie, is not the cauſe either of the fathers treaſon or of the childrens loſſe and puniſhment: but the true proper working cauſe thereof is the rebellious will and act of the father. Even ſo here, Gods decree revealed unto Adam, That if he ſinned all his poſteritie ſhould be liable to corporall and ſpirituall death, was ſo farre from being the cauſe of his ſinne or his childrens miſerie, that it was in its own nature a ſtrong retractive or preſervative to have kept him and his children out of ſinne and out of miſerie.

If Adams diſobedience (which was the onely true cauſe of his own and childrens miſerie) had followed as a neceſſary conſe-

quent effect upon such an antecedent law, then had God been the cause both of the sinne and misery wherein to he plunged himself and his children. But the law which enacteth a certain punishment against sinne committed, is by no wise man made the cause of sinne committed against that law, but a rule onely according unto which, if the sinne be committed, the punishment shall be inflicted. Albeit therefore *naturall generation* considered alone in it self without the fore-named free constitution of God, would not have propagated Adams sinne or misery unto his posteritie, yet we acknowledge (and so did Calvine) that it is now propagated by way of naturall generation, because God had enacted that Adam should beget children in his own likenesse, that is partakers of the same originall righteousnesse which he had, supposing he kept it, and partakers of his sinne, supposing he infected himself with the act and guilt of sinne.

D As for his objections; *if we be fallen into the guilt of the first sinne and the corruption of nature, onely because we were in Adams loyns when he sinned*, then *are we* in like manner *guiltie of all the sinnes he committed afterwards:*

We answer; Though Adams voluntary rebellion was the onely cause why he lost his originall righteousnesse both for himself

and

and for his children, and though his children be entangled in his sinne and guilt onely by being in his loyns when he sinned, or because they are his children, yet it will not follow that his posteritie *stand* in like manner *guiltie of all the sins which Adam committed from the fall unto his lives end.* The reason is; Because though naturall propagation be the means of conveying Adams sinne unto us, yet (as before was touched) it would not have done so had there not been a *liberum decretum* established by God to that purpose. And therefore Adams sinne can no further concern his posteritie then is regulated by God himself. Now the Divine decree or constitution did not so order it that any sinne of Adam should be imputable to all that were virtually in his loyns, but that his first sinne onely, in which he did *sustinere personam generis humani*, should be imputed. And therefore Aquinas excluding his after-sins committed when he was himself fallen and corrupted; saith, [i] *Secundùm fidem catholicam est tenendum quòd primum peccatum primi hominis transiit in posteros.* And he is so farre from collecting (as this Authour doth) that by being in his loyns his posterity becometh guiltie of all his other sinnes, that he accounteth it impossible. [k] *Impossibile est quòd aliqua peccata proximorum parentum vel etiam primi parentis*

[i] 1ª. 2æ, q. 81. art. 1.

[k] Art. 2.

tis (*præter primum*) *per originem traducatur.* Bellarmine giveth the reaſon; becauſe whilſt Adam ſtood inveſted with originall righteouſneſſe, *totius humani generis geſſit perſonam:* and therefore that firſt ſin which alone put him out of this eſtate was onely imputable to us, as being voluntary to us *voluntate primi parentis.* Malderus more clearly and punctually; [m] *Nulla peccata primi parentis præter primum per originem traducuntur in poſteros. Quando enim amiſit nobis ſemel juſtitiam, jam amiſit qualitatem capitis, & non amplius in ipſius tanquam capitis voluntate manſimus. Ratio eſt, quòd decretum ſive pactum Dei, quo in Adamo conſtituebantur poſterorum voluntates, non extendebat ſe ad alia ipſius peccata, utpote qui gratiam capitis moralis primo peccato amiſerat.* I might quote many more; but by theſe it is clear that whilſt this Authour thinketh he diſputeth onely againſt Calvine and Calviniſts, he oppoſeth the received doctrine of the Catholick Church.

De amiſſ. grat. 4. 10.

[m] *In 1^m 2^æ q. 81. art. 2.*

E

His ſecond inference, *That children ſhould be guilty of all the ſinnes of their* other *Progenitours,* is like the former, and upon the ſame grounds rejected by all Divines: and therefore it needeth no particular anſwer.

And when he goeth about by teſtimonies of Scripture to prove it, that they are not guiltie of their Parents ſinnes, he maketh himſelf

himſelf work in proving that which no man denieth.

All that I will ſay is this; That the Pelagians from ſuch teſtimonies of Scripture went about to overthrow the imputation of Adams ſinne unto his poſterity, and the derivation of his corruption; but for their pains they were held and condemned as hereticks. *Vide Bellarm. de amiſſ. Grat. lib. 4. cap. 8. & Mald. 1. 2. q. 81. art. 1. pag. 254.* where he bringeth in the Pelagian objections.

Our own IXth Article of Originall or Birth-ſinne inſinuateth a guilt and a corruption cauſed by Adams firſt tranſgreſſion; and yet our Church never taught that there was the ſame or like guilt proceeding from his after-ſinnes, or from the ſinnes of our other progenitours. *Vide Vaſq. in 1. 2. quæſt. 83. diſp. 135. cap. 2. p. 883.* Thus much of the firſt.

He would in the ſecond place prove that abſolute Reprobation muſt needs make God the principall cauſe of ſinne, becauſe the patrones thereof hold, *That God hath immutably decreed to leave the greateſt part of mankind in this impotent condition irrecoverably, and to afford them no ſufficient power to make them riſe out of ſinne: and this decree he executeth in time, and both theſe he doth out of his own will and pleaſure.* A bundle of words F

words, but little substance in them. We answer first in generall; That many who stoutly defend absolute Predestination and Reprobation, and oppose the conditionate Election and Preterition of the Remonstrants, do notwithstanding detest and confute that blasphemous errour, That God is the cause of sinne. Neither do I now speak this of Calvinists, but of Jesuites, Dominicanes and Romanists of all sorts. Again, the greater part of those who hold absolute Predestination and Reprobation and reject the Predestination and Reprobation which by the Remonstrants is founded upon prescience, do hold notwithstanding a generall sufficiency of grace, *Si per homines non steterit quo minus:* Which is all the Remonstrants themselves do defend.

As for the *executing of Gods decree out of his own will and pleasure*, I wonder it should be objected as false and offensive. For by Gods decrees concerning mans Election and Preterition absolute or conditionall, it is certain they are executed as they were enacted, that is, according to the will and pleasure of God, and not of the creature. But to come to his propositions particularly.

G His first. *God* (by those which oppose the Remonstrants conditionate Election and Reprobation, and make them both depend upon Gods absolute will) *is said to leave the*

Non-

[illegible] without sufficient grace, and consequently under an everlasting necessity of sinning. This is the Helen, &c.

The most of those who defend absolute Predestination and Reprobation say and teach, that God decreeth to leave no man unprovided of sufficient grace that repelleth it not by some demeritorious act of his own will. It is therefore a manifest untruth, that with joynt consent they labour to maintein that which with joynt consent a great number of them labour to confute. Again, they which maintein absolute Reprobation will no more grant that it putteth or leaveth any man under everlasting necessitie of sinning, then that absolute Predestination putteth men under a necessitie of not sinning. Gods decrees (as hath been often said and proved) carry along with them *necessitatem infallibilitatis quoad eventum*, but not *necessitatem compulsionis quoad modum agendi & eveniendi*. The decree of Reprobation left not Cain under the necessitie of killing his brother, nor Absalom under a necessitie of defiling his fathers concubines, nor Judas under a necessitie of betraying Christ: All these sinfull actions and the like are committed by Reprobates out of their own free election, having a power whereby they might have absteined from committing them. And therefore to think that the decree

Answ.

cree of absolute Reprobation must nec leave them under a necessitie of committi their severall sinnes, is a false and vain ima gination, as every mans conscience is abl to witnesse.

Those who *cast Reprobation into two ac* do not by the *negative* act thereof unde stand *a peremptory denyall of all grace*, but peremptory denyall of all such effectual grace as infallibly would bring them unto glory, and a peremptory permitting them in the use of grace to their own defective free-will. This negative Reprobation in the judgement of most Divines doth stand with the actuall administration of sufficient grace, and in the judgement of all it may stand with it, as it did in the Non-election of the apostaticall Angels. It is doubted both by some Protestants and Papists, whether sufficient grace be *de facto* prepared for and offered to all the Non-elect: But that Gods absolute decrees of Election and Non-election might stand firm though it were so, there is no great cause of doubt.

Vide Jacob. Bayum, Institut. lib. 1. cap. 116.

For the *positive* act, which this Authour describeth to be to *a preordination unto hell-torments*; those who comprise them both under this one word *Reprobation*, do notwithstanding make this act or decree respective unto sinne, as we have already shewed. As for those of our Church in this controversie;

versie; whether Predestination and Non-predestination be grounded upon the prime absolute will of God, or upon his prescience of good and bad acts to be performed by men, they do and must understand by the word *Reprobation* not the decree of damning any particular persons, but onely the absolute decree of not-preparing for them that effectuall grace *quâ certissimè liberarentur*, and of leaving them to such means of grace under which by their own default *infallibiliter ruunt ad interitum voluntarium*. Thus our English Divines in their suffrage have described it, and thus the reverend and judicious Bishop of Norwich conceived it, when he made both Remonstrants or Arminians and Contra-remonstrants or Puritanes (as he termeth them) to erre out of the true middle way which the Church of England holdeth in opposition to them both. In Election he maketh this the errour of the Remonstrants, That they ground the absolute decree of mens particular Elelection upon the prescience of their faith and perseverance (as this Authour doth) whereas that reverend Prelate holdeth with the Church of England, and S. Augustine, *Electio non invenit* ~~*eligendos*~~ *fidem, sed facit*. As for the errours of the Puritanes about Predestination or Election, he reduceth them to these heads, the excluding of the conditionate

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tionate decree or evangelicall promise, disordering of the decree of Predestination by bringing it in before the fall and the decree of Christs incarnation. As for the preparation and donation of such a speciall grace *per quam non solum possint credere et obedire si velint, sed & jam actu velint, credant, obediant*, he maketh it the proper fruit and effect of Election: whereas he granteth unto the Non-elect only *salutem gratiam quæ communem & sufficientem in mediis Divinitus ordinatis, si verbo Dei spiritui sancto deesse noluerint*. Unto which addeth that wherein all Divines of all sides agree, That God administreth this common grace with an externall and Infallible prescience that it will be rejected or abused by the Non-elect, and with an absolute decree of permitting it so to be; and then it is clear the English Divines with the Church of England *nec divertisse ad dextram in illorum sententiam qui ex præscita fide & perseverantia per liberam cooperationem arbitrii humani gratiæ prævenientis & sufficientis auxiliis instructi prædestinationem deducunt, nec ad sinistram declinasse in illorum opinionem qui promissionem generalem & gratiam sufficientem tollunt*, &c. They are the words of that reverend Prelate Dr Overall. To return to our Authour; Whereas he saith that all the defenders of absolute Predestination

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and Reprobation (that is, all who oppose the Remonstrants conditionate Election and Non-election) do agree, *that by the decree of Reprobation necessary grace for avoyding sinne is flatly denied to Reprobates*, it is quite otherwise. For saving grace, many confesse that *in causis universalibus* it is sufficiently prepared for all men: They confesse that under the Evangelicall covenant, *Si credideris, salvus eris*, every man hath a true claim unto eternall life: They confesse, that wheresoever is Christs Church, there is such a sufficient administration of grace as would have saved the Non-elect, had they not opposed a malignant voluntary act of their own will against the motions and operation of Divine grace; according to those words of our Saviour, John 3.17. & 12.47, 48. & Acts 13.46. Calvine saith as much; [n] *Mundi nomen iterum iterúmque repetit, nè quis omnino arceri se putet, modò fidei viam teneat.* We therefore, as well as the Remonstrants, grant a conditionall possibilitie of grace and salvation to all men: but here is the difference; We say the Elect by a speciall mercy of God are so guided and ruled that they and they alone perform the condition, and that the Non-elect are alwayes permitted to fail in the performance of the condition.

[n] *In Joh. 3.*

Now whereas this Authour saith, that whatsoever we speak of grace afforded to

persons Not-elected *must be understood of such grace as is insufficient to make them avoid sinne*, he is a very bad interpreter of our meaning. We think and teach, that God hath not prepared for them, and therefore never giveth unto them such grace as finally freeth them from sinne: but we say, that God doth give them oftentimes such a measure of grace as keepeth them from committing many particular sinnes whereunto they are prone and bent of themselves. We say further, that God giveth them such a measure of illumination, such excitations unto doing good and eschewing evil, as leaveth them convicted in their own consciences (whatsoever brabblers may say to the contrary) that wittingly and willingly they commit their severall sinnes, not out of *insufficiency to avoid* the acts of adultery, robbery, theft, deceit, &c. but out of malignity desirng and choosing to do them.

I For the second branch; Whereas he will have the defenders of absolute Non-election or negative Reprobation to say and hold, That *God doth actually according to his eternall and unchangeable decree leave the reprobates in their severall times and generations without his grace, under a necessitie of finall sinne and impenitency*, surely they never chose him to be their speaker. If this man will give them leave to speak for themselves, this it is they

ſay, That God doth in time according to his eternall decree withhold from all perſons Not-elected that ſpeciall mercie or effectuall grace which he knoweth would infallibly free them from finall ſinne and impenitency, and leaveth them (not without all grace, nor under a neceſſitie of living and continuing in the practice of their ſinnes, but) under grace committed (as the Remonſtrants would have it) to the dominion and good uſage of their own free-will, and under a permiſſion of their finall ſinning and impenitency out of their own free-will: From both which God infallibly foreſaw their finall impenitencie, and reſpectively thereunto decreed their eternall puniſhment.

But how doth he prove that they muſt needs ſay as he would have them? His reaſon is, Becauſe *Gods decrees cannot be fruſtrated: What he purpoſed before time, without fail he doth in time.* We agree that *quoad eventum* Gods decrees cannot be fruſtrated. But this impoſſibilitie of fruſtration ariſeth not from a neceſſitie put upon the agents to do thus and not otherwiſe (as this Authour perpetually but moſt falſely doth ſuppoſe) but from that infallible providence of God, who can and doth bring into act events decreed according to the nature of the next cauſes or immediate agents. Naturall agents work naturally in producing decreed events:

sary agents work necessarily: and free agents such as are Angels and men, work freely. It is a flat *Non-sequitur*, Events decreed cannot be frustrated; Therefore the agents are under a necessitie of sinning. And it is further to be considered, that albeit all Gods decrees are infrustrable, yet there is a main difference betwixt Gods decrees of producing good saving acts in his Elect, and of permitting the Non-elect to produce their wicked actions, and finally to continue in them. The former he doth by using his own hand in framing their hearts unto such good actions, and guiding their wills indeclinably in the voluntary practice thereof: but as for the latter, their wicked hearts are not wrought by God, nor their wicked wills guided by God unto their wicked actions, but they are permitted out of their own free-will to commit such wicked actions. Here is no necessity put upon the agents by either of the forenamed decrees.

K For the *Divines of Geneva*; they have set down nothing in their testimonie alledged, but either that God calleth not the Non-elect, or that he calleth them not *vocatione secundùm propositum*, which alwayes followeth Predestination, and draweth after it Justification, Sanctification and Glorification. In the first they speak of an Evangelicall vocation, by revealing Christ in the

the preaching of the glorious goſpel, which vocation experience ſheweth hath been denyed to many. °*Vocati non ſunt qui nec ſpem vocationis audiverunt.* In the latter they ſpeak of that ſpeciall grace which the Catholick Church hath defended againſt the Pelagians to be a ſpeciall gift, and not prepared for all nor given to all. *Vide Aug. De Præd. Sanct. cap. 9. & Epiſt. 167. Proſp. De Voc. 1. 13.*

° *Proſp. ad Cap. Gall. Reſp. 4. & Sent. ſuper 4.*

Lubbertus ſaith the ſame in effect, and no more. And S. Auguſtine hath ſaid as much *De grat. Chriſti contra Pelag. cap. 12.* And not he alone, but the Synod of Biſhops in Sardinia, *De gratia non dignè ſentit*, &c. For the other ſaying of Lubbertus, That *God doth not adminiſter unto all men neceſſarie and ſufficient means unto ſalvation, with an intention of ſaving them*; It is to be obſerved 1. firſt, That he doth not ſpeak of a proviſion *in univerſalibus cauſis*, nor of means ſufficient, *Si non defuiſſent ſibi, ſi non feciſſent inutilia interveniente libero actu propriæ voluntatis:* for all this he may well grant; but he ſpeaketh *de Mediis Divinâ providentiâ applicatis.* And here, if the Remonſtrants think faith to be a neceſſary means to mens ſalvation, and the word preached a neceſſarie means to the begetting of faith, they muſt (will they nill they) ſubſcribe to Lubbertus. 2. Secondly, it is

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Rom. 10.

worth the obſerving, That when the Remonſtrants have ſaid all they can for the univerſalitie and ſufficiencie of ſaving grace, they are forced by convincing arguments and evidence of Scripture to retreat unto the ſame univerſalitie and conditionall ſufficiencie which I ſpake of but now, and wherein no man oppoſeth them. Nay we are of opinion, that to have ſufficient means of ſalvation adminiſtred, which ſhall prove no otherwiſe effectuall then under this condition, *Si homines ſibi non deſint*, is an argument of the Divine Non-election: as on the contrary, not to have their ſalvation thus ſuſpended upon their own free-will, but upon that ſpeciall mercie of which S. Auguſtine ſpake when he ſaid, *Deus nullius fruſtrà miſeretur*, is a demonſtrative argument of the Divine Election. 3. Laſt of all, whereas Lubbertus ſaith that *God doth not adminiſter ſufficient grace unto all with an intention of ſaving them*, nothing more true, nothing more clear. For what God doth eternally decree or intend to do, that he in time infallibly doth: For *he doth all according to the eternall counſel of his own will.* But he doth not in time ſave the Non-elect by that ſufficient grace whereof this Authour ſpeaketh: therefore he had not an eternall intention of ſaving them by that grace which from all eternitie he knew would

would never ſave them. The intention of Gods will cannot but take effect; [p] *quia nec ipſe nec in mediis poteſt impediri.* An omnipotent will alwayes obteineth its intent, becauſe the willing is the working, the *Fiat* is the *Factum eſt.* Aquinas hath well expreſſed this efficacie of the Divine will, [q] *Eſt impoſſibile, quòd Divina voluntas non effectum conſequatur ſuum.* [r] *Quicquid Deus ſimpliciter vult, fit, licèt illud quod antecedenter vult, non ſemper fiat.* [s] *Cùm aliqua cauſa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus conſequitur cauſam, non tantùm ſecundùm id quod fit, ſed etiam ſecundùm modum fiendi.* This Authour therefore miſtaketh Lubbertus, who by the Divine *intention of ſaving* this or that particular perſon underſtandeth that abſolute will which never faileth in producing the effect willed, not a will affected with this exception, *Niſi per homines ſteterit quò minùs ſalventur.* The former intent of ſaving all men by the means of ſalvation tendered unto them, is onely denied; not the latter, which is improperly called the Divine intention of ſaving any man, becauſe it includeth an intention of permitting his own free-will juſtly to procure his ruine.

[p] *Vide Auguſt. Enchir. cap. 95, & De Cor. & Grat. c. 14.*

[q] *1. part. qu. 19. art. 6.*

[r] *Ibid.*

[s] *art. 8.*

We [illegible] come to the third branch; where his charge is this; That *God* (in our opinion) *decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themſelves of his alone abſolute will and* M

pleasure. If he mean the leaving of men Not-elected utterly forlorn of all such grace as would save them if themselves were not in fault, and the necessitating of them to their transgression and perdition, we acknowledge no such decree, no such manner of executing any Divine decree, no such absolute will and pleasure in God to follow upon the decree of Non-election. Our English Divines affirm that this Non-election is founded in the most free pleasure of God: So our Spanish Divines, our Italian Divines, French Divines (who never saw the Synod of Dort) and in a word, all Divines who know what they affirm when they dispute of Non-election or negative Reprobation. And yet neither the English Divines nor they ever dreamed of such a passing-over the Non-elect by the mere will of God as this Authour would fasten upon the decree of Non-election. He hath alreadie been fully answered, that the absolute decree of Non-election implieth not an utter denying of sufficient grace in the limited and conditionall acception of *Sufficiency*, which the Remonstrants themselves are content to admit of.

It is to as little purpose which he hath out of the *Palatine Ministers* Suffrage, or the *Divines of Hessen*, the sense of which propositions hath been already cleared, and

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the truth proved: and therefore we let them paſſe.

As for *ſinne*, which is conſidered equall in all men *tanquam communis affectio ſubjecti*, whether elected or not-elected, it is plain, that it maketh all and every man *reprobabiles*: but it muſt needs be out of his own pleaſure and free-will, that all being in a ſtate unworthie of the riches of Gods ſpeciall mercy, he ſhould notwithſtanding prepare it for ſome, and decree the giving it in due time, which we call their Predeſtination, and not prepare nor decree to beſtow it upon others, but to leave them under common grace, and to permit them to the deficient rule of their own will, which we call negative Reprobation. N

The ground of the Remonſtrants errour is a falſe fanſie, which they have enterteined into their underſtandings concerning the very nature, formalitie or eſſence of the decrees of Divine Predeſtination and negative Reprobation. For whereas in deed and in truth they are decrees finding all men in a miſerable and damnable eſtate, and out of it determining to bring ſome and to fit them for eternall happineſſe, and not to bring others by fitting them thereunto; theſe men make them decrees finding and ſeeing ſome by the acts of their own will fitted for heaven and hell, and thereunto appointing them accord-

according to their deserts and misdeserts. This is with Faustus the Semipelagian to make Predestination an act of remunerative justice, and to make Non-predestination or Non-election an act of vindicative justice: both which are rejected as erroneous not onely by Calvinists or Contra-remonstrants, but even by the common consent of the Romane Divines. God at the last day shall crown the Elect and condemne the Non-elect according to their finall perseverance in faith or infidelitie and impenitency. But this difference of their finall estates absolutely foreseen is a consequent not an antecedent to the decrees of Election and Preterition.

O I might passe-by what he further addeth upon his own false inferences, of Gods *bringing men into a necessitie of sinning*, and *leaving Reprobates under this necessitie*, because I have shewed no such thing can be deduced from that absolute negative Reprobation which we defend. But let us heare what he will say. He reasoneth thus; CAUSA CAUSÆ EST ETIAM CAUSA CAUSATI, *where there is a necessary subordination betwixt the cause and the effect, whether it be a cause negative or positive: But by the doctrine* of absolute Reprobation we make *God the chief or sole cause of the sinnes of Reprobates, namely through their impotency or want*

want of ſupernaturall grace. For the ordinarie Axiome, we admit it *ubi ſecunda cauſa non egreditur ordinem primæ*, that is, where the ſecond cauſe worketh or doeth any thing by virtue of that influx or motion that it hath from the firſt.

As for this diſtinction of *Negative* and *Poſitive* cauſing, it is obſcure and improper. The aire hath heat and light from the poſitive cauſing of the ſunne-beams; darkneſſe, fogginеſſe, coldneſſe followeth upon the negation of the ſunne-beams: and yet neither the ſunne nor his beams nor the retractions of his beams, are true or proper cauſes of coldneſſe or darkneſſe in the aire. The reaſon himſelf hath touched upon, Becauſe thoſe diſpoſitions or qualities in the aire iſſue not from the ſunne *per ſubordinationem effecti ad cauſam*, but out of the nature of the aire onely: That is a cauſe *per quam res eſt id quod eſt*. Thus the ſunne is the true cauſe that the aire is hot and light. If by virtue flowing from the abſent ſunne it be made dark, then might we call the ſunne a cauſe of the darkneſſe. In proportion we ſay the ſame of God: If from his decree of Non-election there flow any darkneſſe or pravity into mans will, or any crookedneſſe and ſinfulneſſe into his actions, there were ſome colour in terming him a negative cauſe of mans ſinne: But this he ſhall never be able to demonſtrate. He

He saith, that *God* by his decree of negative Reprobation *is the sole or chief cause of that impotencie and want of supernaturall grace which is the necessarie and immediate cause of all the sinnes which they commit.* Want of the grace of Predestination is neither chief nor sole, nor any cause at all of the sinnes of the Non-predestinate. Non-Election or negative Reprobation doth not involve any such impotencie of avoiding sinfull acts, or any such necessitie of committing sinfull actions, as this man imagineth. For though Preterition or Non-election be not a preparing or bestowing of such grace as would infallibly make men better, yet it must not be conceived to be the working of any thing in them whereby they are made worse. Again, though negative Reprobation be a deniall of such grace as doth effectually produce the faith, perseverance, and eternall happinesse of the Elect, yet it is no such absolute subtraction of grace as is a necessarie and immediate cause of any mans particular sinnes, or of his finall perseverance in sinne. The Non-elect Angels were under the eternall decree of negative Reprobation before they were created; yet were they not by want of sufficient grace at their creation made impotent to stand, much lesse constrained by any necessitie to rebell and sinne against God. Adam in the state of his

his innocencie was not predeſtinated to perſeverance; nay, (which is more) God had poſitively decreed the permiſſion of his fall: yet the want of a decree predeſtinating his perſeverance in that eſtate did neither affect him with an impotencie of ſtanding nor with a neceſſitie of falling. *Vide Proſp. ad Vincent. Reſp.* 10. 15.

REMOVENS PROHIBENS, That *which withholdeth a thing which being preſent would hinder an event, is the cauſe of that event: But God withholdeth from Reprobates that power which being granted might keep them from falling into ſinne: therefore he becometh a true morall cauſe of their ſinnes.* His major propoſition is a moſt inconſiderate and falſe aſſertion; which if he will juſtifie, he unanſwerably maketh God the cauſe of all ſinne. For no Divine will denie but it lieth within the compaſſe of Gods power to give unto any man that effectuall grace which both might and infallibly would make him freely and voluntarily believe and perſevere, and which both might and would infallibly hinder the event of unbelieving and finall perſeverance in incredulitie and impenitencie. And it is as evident, that God doth withhold from ſome that grace which being preſent would hinder thoſe bad events: Who ſeeth not what the concluſion muſt be, were the major propoſition P

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on true? Chriſt withheld from Lazarus that Divine operation which being preſent would have hindered the event of his death: Yet Martha ſaith onely unto him, *Lord, if thou haddeſt been here, my brother had not been dead.* She ſaith not, *Lord, thou diddeſt withhold a thing which if it had been preſent would have hindred this event of my brothers death: and therefore I find thee to have been the morall cauſe of his death.* If Judas had had a ſiſter, ſhe might truly have ſaid unto Chriſt, *If thou haddeſt been preſent in my brothers ſoul by the ſpeciall grace of Predeſtination, this might and would have hindered theſe woefull events of his ſinning unto death, of his dying impenitent in ſinne, of his being damned for ſinne:* But ſhe could not charge God to be the cauſe of thoſe events onely for withholding that which would have hindered them.

Joh. 11.

As for the example he uſeth, of *cutting a ſtring wherein a ſtone hangeth* and ſo *cauſing the fall thereof*, it were to ſome purpoſe if the decree of Preterition had been it which cut the ſtring, and ſo cauſed mans fall into ſinne. But it was the devil and mans voluntary defective act which cut the ſtring. Reprobation or Preterition was onely a decree of not giving ſuch a ſtring as neither the devil nor the ſinner himſelf ſhould be permitted to cut?

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As for that which he further urgeth, that God muſt needs be a *direct cauſe of the event* when it is not *beſide his intention or expectation*, We anſwer, that God is no otherwiſe ſaid to intend outward events then by providing orderly means for producing ſuch events. Non-election provideth no means of making men ſinne, and therefore it includeth no intention of God to make men ſinne, though it include a previſion of ſinfull events, and a decree to permit them. We ſay the ſame of expectation, which is onely metaphorically attributed unto God, and cannot reſpect wicked actions. God is ſaid even from the Non-elect *exſpectare uvas non labruſcas*, becauſe he affordeth them ordinary means for producing the one, but they themſelves by abuſe of the means are the onely cauſes producing the other. So that neither intention nor expectation of ſinfull events can be aſcribed to God, becauſe both have a reference unto good things not unto bad.

A Pilote withholding his care and skill from a ſhip in a ſtorm, foreſeeing it will be drowned, is a proper cauſe of the loſſe of the ſhip: therefore God by this act and decree of Reprobation, &c. I anſwer, If one pilote wilfully hath brought a ſtorm upon his ſhip, if wilfully he run her upon the rocks, though another look on and foreſee ſhe will ſplit herſelf, he maketh

maketh not himself a cause of her drowning, unlesse he were necessarily bound to preserve her. Thus the case fares betwixt God and the Non-elect: therefore he is no proper cause of their Sinne or Perdition.

Treatise.

2. *Contrary to his* MERCY.

SEcondly, it opposeth Gods Mercy. God (*A*) is *mercifull*: A part it is of his title, Exod. 34.6. *mercifull and gracious*. He is *Mercy* in the abstract, 1. Joh. 4.16. *God is love*; a *Father of mercies*, and *God of all consolations*, 2 Cor. 1.3. *a Saviour of men*, 1. Tim. 4.10. And thus the Church hath alwayes taken him to be: And therefore hath of old styled him in her Liturgy, *A God whose nature and property is alwayes to have mercy and to forgive*.

Two wayes is Gods mercy spoken of in Scripture, absolutely and comparatively. 1. Absolutely; and so it is set out (*B*) in high and stately terms. It is called *rich mercy*, Eph. 2. 4. *great kindnesse*, Jonah 4.2. *Abundant mercy*, 1. Pet. 1.3. *love* without *height* or *depth*, *length* or *breadth*, or any dimensions, love *passing knowledge*, Eph. 3.18. So great it is, that Jonah could not intreat him to punish the little, infant, harmlesse Ninevites with temporall death for the sinnes of their guilty parents, Jonah 4. 11. 2. Comparatively. With two things it is compared; 1. His own Justice, 2. The Love that dwelleth in the creature: and is advanced above both.

I. With his own Justice it is compared, and advanced above it: Not in its essence (for all Gods excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater then another) but in its expressions, and some things that have relation to it; particularly in these;

1. In its Naturalnesse (*C*) and Dearnesse to God. It is said of Mercy, it *pleaseth him*, Micah 7.18. But Justice is called *his strange work*, *alienum à natura sua*, Esay 28.21. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men*, Lam. 3.33.

2. In the frequent Exercise (*D*) of it self. He is said to be *slow to anger*, but *abundant in goodnesse*, Exod. 34. 6. Mercies are bestowed every day; judgements inflicted but now and then, sparingly, and after a long time of forbearance, when there is *no remedy*, 2. Chron. 36.15. *All the day long have I stretched out my hands to a gainsaying and rebellious people*,

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Esay 65. 2. that is, I have been patient a long time, and in that time I have not been idle, but employed in exhorting, promising, and shewing mercy, that so I might do you good. God waiteth a great while for the conversion of sinners, as mariners do for their tide: and at last with much ado, if there be a necessity, he chideth and fighteth.

3. In its (E) Amplitude or Objects to whom it is extended: *Visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the* THIRD *and* FOURTH *generation, but shewing mercy to* THOUSANDS, Exod. 20. 5. In these words God implyeth that his mercy reacheth further then his justice, and that look how much three or foure come short of a thousand, so much doth his justice come short of his mercy in the exercise of it.

4. In the Occasions (F) that move God to exercise them. It is a great matter that moveth God to punish, as we may see Gen. 6. 5, 6, 7, 12, 13. When the *wickednesse of man was great in the earth, and all flesh had corrupted his way*, then God thinketh of a flood. He would not destroy the Amorites till their *wickednesse was full. How oft would I have gathered thee* (saith Christ to Jerusalem, Matth. 23. 37. that is, I have not taken advantages against thee, nor upon the first, second or third unkindnesse cast thee off: small matters have not moved me to destroy thee, O Jerusalem. But how small an occasion doth God take to spare men? When he had examined Sodome, and found their sinnes to be answerable to the cry, yet then for ten righteous mens sakes would he have spared Sodome, Gen. 18. 32. Nay, he would have spared Jerusalem, if the Prophet could by his searching have *found one man who did execute judgement and seek the truth*, Jer. 5. 1. What a slender humiliation made him to spare wicked Ahab and his house a long time? 1. Kings 21. 29. And the repentance of Nineveh, whose wickednesse *cryed to the Lord for vengeance*, Jonah 1. 2. did easily procure her a pardon. Thus is Gods Mercy advanced above his Justice.

II. It is compared (G) also with the Affection of a father to his sonne, of a tender mother to her child, and of the most affectionate bruits to their brood, and set above them all. It goeth beyond a fathers to his sonne, Matth. 7. 11. *If ye that are evil, can give good gifts to your children, how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to them that ask him?* What doth this *quanto magis* imply, but that Gods love outstrippeth a fathers! And so it doth a mothers too,

Esay 49. 15. *Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion upon the sonne of her wombe? yea, they may forget, yet I will not forget thee.* Women are compassionate toward their children, because they are the fruit of their wombes, and a part of themselves: but most indulgent are they towards those children to whom they are Nurses as well as Mothers, to their sucking children: and yet mothers may forget even their sucking children: But as for God, he can never forget his children. Again, God compareth himself with one of the most affectionate females among unreasonable creatures, the Hen, Matth. 23. 37. *O Jerusalem, how oft would I have gathered thee, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings?* &c. No Bird (saith S. Augustine) expresseth such tender love to her young ones as the hen doth:

[t] No fowls discover themselves to be mothers so much as hens do. *Others, when we see them in their nests with their young, we know them to be mothers, but no way else:* but the hen discovereth her self to be so *even when her chickens do not follow her: her feathers stand up, her wings hang down, she clocketh mournfully and goeth feebly; so that we may know her to be a mother, when yet we cannot see her brood.* Such another speech he hath in another place, and concludeth it with these words, [u] *Our Lord did therefore compare himself to a hen* rather then to any other creature, because of her singular expressions of love to her young ones, even when they are out of her sight. By these things we see how highly the Scriptures speak of Gods mercy, especially in its expressions to mankind, to whom he hath born a greater love, and for whom he hath declared himself to have done farre greater matters then for the angels; the wisdome of God *delighting it self in the children of men, before the world was*, Prov. 8. 31. and gratifying them in the fulnesse of time with the assumption of their nature; Heb. 2. 16. and the redemption of their souls with his bloud, 1. Pet. 1. &c. Now with such a Mercy cannot stand such a decree: Absolute Reprobation being once granted, we may (me think) more properly call God a *Father of cruelties* then of *mercies*, and of *hatred* rather then of *love:* and the devils names, *Satan*, and Ἀπολλύων, an *adversary*,

t *Aug. tract. 15. in Joh. pag. 46.* Videmus nidificare passeres quoslibet ante oculos postros; hirundines, ciconias, columbas quotidie videmus nidificare; quos nisi quando in nidis videmus, parentes esse non agnoscimus. Gallina verò sic infirmatur in pullis suis, ut etiamsi ipsi pulli non sequantur, filios non videas, matrem tamen intelligas. Ità fit aliis demissis, plumis hispida, voce rauca, omnibus membris demissa & abjecta, ut (quemadmodum dixi) etsi filios non videas, matrem tamen intelligas.

u *Idem in Psal. 58 p. 212. B. C.* Quare ergò Dominus, nisi propter hoc, gallina esse voluit, in sancta Scriptura dicens, O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, quoties volui te congregare ut gallina, &c.

ſary, a *deſtroyer*, may be fitter for him then Σωτὴρ, *a Saviour*: which I tremble to think. Doth *mercy pleaſe* him, when he hath made a decree which ſheweth farre more ſeverity toward poore men then mercy? Is he *ſlow to anger*, when he hath taken ſuch a ſmall and ſpeedy occaſion to puniſh the greater part of men for ever, and for one ſinne once committed hath ſhut them up under invincible ſinne and damnation? Is his *mercy abundant*, doth it reach further then juſtice, when it is tuckt up ſo ſhort, limited to a very few ſelected ones, when a hundred for one at leaſt (take-in all parts of the world) are unavoydably caſt away out of his onely will and pleaſure? Or doth his *love paſſe knowledge*, when we ſee daily farre greater love then this in men and other creatures? What father (*H*) and mother (that have not onely caſt off fatherhood and motherhood, but humanity too) would determine their children to certain death, nay to cruel torments worſe then death, for one onely offenſe, and that committed too not by them in their own perſons, but by ſome other, and imputed onely to them?

But to deliver (*I*) things a little more cloſely; Foure things (in my conceit) being well and diſtinctly conſidered, do make it apparent that this decree is incompatible with Gods mercy. 1. That Adams ſinne is the ſinne of mans nature onely, and no mans perſonall tranſgreſſion, but Adams: It was neither committed nor conſented to by any of his poſterity in their own perſons. 2. That it was the ſinne of our nature, not by generation (as I have ſhewed) but by Gods own voluntary imputation. 3. That God did pardon it in Adam, (for ſo it is generally believed) who did actually and freely commit it in his own perſon. 4. That Chriſt came into the world to take away *peccatum mundi*, the ſinne of the world, Joh. 1. 29. That God either did or might have ſatisfied his wronged juſtice in the bloud of the Covenant for all mankind, and without any impeachment to juſtice have opened a way of ſalvation to all and every man. Theſe conſiderations (I think) being well digeſted, will make any man to think, that either there is no decree of (*K*) abſolute Reprobation, or that God is not mercifull to men at all, much leſſe more mercifull to them then to other creatures, but more ſharp a great deal and ſevere then he is to { 1. any creatures in the world. 2. the very devils themſelves.

1. Then to any other creatures. For they, even the baſeſt among them, though perhaps they have but a deſpicable being, yet they have ſuch being as is farre better then no being at all;

whereas men are determined by his omnipotent decree to such a wofull being as is a thousand times worse then no being at all. What man would have accepted of life, when first he entred upon possession of it, if he had known upon what lamentable conditions it was to be tendred? Or (did men firmly believe this doctrine) they would at a venture with Job curse their birth-day, be released willingly from the right of creatures, and desire their immortall souls might vanish into nothing. *Malunt extingui penitus quàm ad supplicia reparari*, as Minutius Felix speaketh in another case. And parents out of mere compassion to their children would wish that they might be born toads and serpents rather then men, creatures whole beings at last shall be resolved into nothing, rather then immortall spirits.

Minut. Felix, pag. 113.

2. To the very (*L*) devils also (supposing this decree) is God more mercifull then to men; and yet the devils are set forth in Scripture for the greatest spectacles of Gods irefull severity. In one thing this decree maketh most men and devils equall; *Utrisque desperata salus*, they are both sure to be damned: but in three things men are in a far worse condition by it.

I. In their (*M*) appointment to to hell, not for their own, proper, personall sinnes, for which onely the devils are damned; but for the sinne of another man that lived and sinned long before they were born.

II. In their (*N*) unavoidable destination to endlesse misery, under a colour of the contrary. The devils, as they are decreed to damnation, so they know it, they expect it, they look for no other: but men, who are appointed to wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of salvation, and made to believe that the whole businesse is put into their hands; so as if they perish, it is not *defectu misericordiæ*, because God will have no mercie on them, but *defectu voluntatis propriæ*, because they will not be saved: when yet indeed there is no such matter. Now if it be worse to be deluded in misery then simply to be miserable, then is the condition of men in this respect (by this decree) much worse then the state of devils.

III. In their (*O*) obligation to believe, and the aggravation of their punishment by not believing. The devils, because they must be damned, are not commanded to believe in Christ, nor is their punishment heightened by their not believing: but miserable men, who by this decree have no more liberty to escape hell then the devils, must yet be tied to believe in Christ, and

and have their torments increased if they believe not. These things being so, (I think) I may conclude with the words (P) of Prosper; x *He which saith that God would not have all men to be saved, but a certain set number of predestinate persons onely, he speaketh more harshly then he should of the height of Gods unsearchable grace.* Nay, he speaketh that which cannot stand with his infinite grace and mercy, especially to the sonnes of men.

x *Sent. super 8. c. Gall.* Qui dicit quòd non omnes homines velit Deus salvos fieri, sed certum numerum prædestinatorum, duriùs loquitur quàm loquendum est de altitudine inscrutabilis gratiæ Dei.

Nor doth that give me satisfaction which is usually answered, namely, that God by this absolute decree doth fully manifest (Q) his justice and his mercy too, his justice toward Reprobates, his mercy toward the Elect; and that it is necessary his decrees should so be ordered as that both these may be clearly declared by them. For, 1. Gods mercy is revealed to be *rich mercy, abundant, long-suffering*, surmounting justice, and *beyond understanding*. Now such a mercy set forth with such titles, clothed with such properties, is no wayes manifested by this decree. 2. Neither is Gods pure and spotlesse Justice set forth by it, as I now come to shew: This being my third argument drawn from Gods Attributes against absolute Reprobation.

Whether absolute Reprobation oppose Gods Mercie.

WHat the Authour discourseth in generall concerning Gods Mercie considered *absolutely, comparatively*, in its *naturalnesse*, in the *amplitude of its object*, &c. is to no great purpose, unlesse upon such antecedents this conclusion will certainly follow, Therefore Predestination and Reprobation cannot be absolute acts of Gods free-will, but must needs proceed according to his prevision of mens future acts and deservings. The weaknesse of these consequents shall in particular be shewed hereafter,

when I have first set down some generall considerations concerning the Mercie or Justice or other virtues in Scripture ascribed unto God.

Vide Ruiz. De vol. disp. 3. §. 3. Et disp. 35. §. 1.

And first we must know, That though the names of habituall virtues be attributed unto God, yet it is impossible that any such habits should truly and really belong unto the Divine will; *Quoniam habitus non dantur, nisi tanquam supplementa potentiarum earum quæ intra ordinem potentiæ non sunt perfectæ.* Unlesse therefore we hold Gods power of willing in it self to be imperfect and to want supervenient rectifying habits, we must not avouch with this Authour that Justice, Mercie, Holinesse, &c. are in Gods will the same in nature which these virtues are in men, and onely differing in degree.

Secondly, though in God there be a permanent inclination or naturall disposition to produce those outward effects which in us proceed from habituall virtues, as To endow his creatures with many good things, which we term Bountie or Liberalitie; To help them out of their miseries, which we term Mercie; To punish them according to their misdeserts, which we call Justice, and the like: yet God should not have been covetous or niggardly, had he never diffused drop of his bountie to any creature, but kept and enjoyed his goodnesse

neſſe within himſelf, as he did before the creation: He ſhould not have been cruel or unjuſt, had he freed no man out of that miſerie whereinto all mankind was fallen: neither ſhould he have wanted any virtue, or done contrary to juſtice, had he freed all men out of their miſerie, and brought them to eternall felicitie. The outward temporall acts therefore of Divine Juſtice or Mercie may be terminated or not terminated unto any man according to the abſolute free-will of the moſt wiſe God, and that without oppoſing any attribute of his. To this purpoſe Carthuſianus, [a] *Cùm Deus ſit bonorum omnium dominator, & in ipſum peccat qui peccat, ipſe poteſt plus conferre de bonis quàm ſit alicui debitum, & minus inferre de malis, ſeu totam pœnam relaxare, nec in hoc contra ſed præter inſtitutum facere. Vide Halenſ. part. 1. quæſt. 39. art. 4. & 5.*

[a] *In 4^m, diſt. 46. Vide de Aquin. part. 1. q. 2.*

Thirdly, it is to be obſerved, That howſoever mercie and juſtice are by us conſidered as diſtinct virtues or operations in God, yet his remunerative juſtice ſhould never find a fit object, had he not by ſome benefit of free mercie and grace himſelf fitted it thereunto: And this is the benefit which we call abſolute Election or Predeſtination. Neither ſhould his vindicative juſtice find any objects fitted for it to paſſe upon, had he been pleaſed to grant the ſaid free bene-

fit

fit to all men: And therefore we term the negation of this benefit or free favour, absolute Non-election, Preterition, or (in a more harsh word) negative Reprobation. The foreseen faith and perseverance of Peter had not made him an object fit by way of remuneration to be invested with eternall life, had not a former absolute and free act of Gods mercie fitted him with the gifts of faith, holinesse and perseverance. Aquinas hath well set down and demonstratively proved this theoreme, *Opus Divinæ justitiæ semper præsupponit opus misericordiæ, & in eo fundatur.* There is the theoreme it self: now for the demonstration. [b] *Creaturæ non debetur aliquid nisi propter aliquid in ea præexistens vel præconsideratum. Et rursus, si illud creaturæ debetur, hoc erit propter aliquid prius. Et cum non sit procedere in infinitum, oportet devenire ad aliquid quod ex sola bonitate Divinæ voluntatis dependeat, quæ est ultimus finis.* Let all the Remonstrants lay their heads together, and tell us what is *primum indebitum* which dependeth upon the will of God alone, but the grace of absolute Election or Predestination, for which we plead. Again, Judas his finall damnation had not been fore-appointed, had not his finall impenitencie been preconsidered. His finall impenitencie had not been foreseen, had that *primum indebitum* which dependeth onely

[b] *Part.* 1^a. *q.* 22. *art.* 4.

onely upon Gods absolute will and free mercie been bestowed upon him as it was upon Peter. [c] *Nam voluntas Dei quâ vult bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quòd illud bonum ab eo præ aliis habeatur.* And without all prejudice to his justice he might out of his absolute will thus have elected Judas, and by the grace of election have freed him both from finall impenitencie and eternall miserie. And therefore Carthusianus truly saith, [d] *Causa naturæ & proprietatum ejus est Divina voluntas: ideo totus ordo justitiæ originaliter ad Divinam voluntatem reducitur.* And again, [e] *Dico quòd Deus ordinavit* A *ad effectum prædestinationis, & non* B, &c. *Quamvis si voluisset, ità potuisset misericordiam manifestare in* B, *ipsum prædestinando, sicut in* A. All this tendeth to shew that the preparing and giving of that which we call *primum indebitum beneficium in ordine ad infallibilem vitæ æternæ consecutionem*, is an act of Gods absolute will and love or free mercie, and yet not contrary to his justice: and on the other side, the not-preparing and not-giving of the same benefit is also a decree or act of his absolute will, and yet no act of crueltie, or contrary act either to the nature of the Divine mercie or justice. But let us see how he will prove that absolute Reprobation cannot stand with the mercie of God.

[c] *Aquin. qu. 23. art. 4.*

[d] *In 4m, qu. 1a. dist. 46.*

[e] *In 1m Sent. dist. 41.*

His

His premiſes are theſe: *God is ſo mercifull, that mercie is a part of his title.* Gods mercie *abſolutely is ſet forth in high and ſtately terms*, RICH, GREAT, &c. Gods Love and Mercie is his *naturall work*, his Juſtice *a ſtrange work*: He is more *frequent in the exerciſe* of his Mercie then Juſtice: He *extendeth* it to more *objects*, upon leſſe *occaſions*, &c.

All this granted will not inferre this concluſion, Therefore Election and Non-election (or negative Reprobation) depend not upon Gods abſolute will, but upon the different foreſeen will and acts of men. What a vain labour is it to amplifie and exaggerate premiſes which are of no force to induce the concluſion intended, nay which for the moſt part are rather of force to overthrow it? Let us weigh the particulars.

God is mercifull. True: but the diſpenſation of his mercie is different, to ſome more, to ſome leſſe, according to the abſolute purpoſe and counſel of his own will. This abſolute Non-election is not a deniall of all mercie, much leſſe an act of unmercifulneſſe or crueltie. It is onely a purpoſe of not beſtowing upon ſome perſons that choice mercie and effectuall grace which would infallibly bring them unto glorie, and a permiſſion of them by their

their own free-will to abuſe thoſe means of ſalvation which are afforded them. And hereupon followeth Gods abſolute preſcience of their finall impenitencie, and his fore-appointment of them to their juſt puniſhment. The Maſter of the Sentences ſpeaketh fitly to this purpoſe; [f] *Reprobatio Dei quâ ab æterno non-eligendo quoſdam reprobavit ſecundùm duo conſideratur: quorum alterum præſcit, & non præparat, id eſt, iniquitatem; alterum præſcit & præparat, ſcil. æternam pœnam.* I would know what can be found in this negative Reprobation, *quâ Deus non-eligendo quoſdam reprobat*, which proveth him unmercifull. Not the negation *ſummi & indebiti beneficii*; for that is an act of abſolute libertie, not of crueltie and injurie: not the foreſeeing of their future iniquitie; for that is an act of the underſtanding, not of the Divine will: nor the reſolution to puniſh them; for that being with reſpect unto their ſinnes is juſt, not cruel.

[f] *Lib. 1. diſt. 40. lit. D.*

God is Mercie in the abſtract, a Father of Mercies: His nature and propertie is alwayes to have mercie and to forgive. Theſe and ſuch like places prove two things: Firſt, that acts of mercie flow unto us many times from Gods naturall bountie, unpromiſed, undeſerved, undeſired on our parts. But we anſwer, that this prime

prime mercie, which is not promised upon condition to any particular person, is at Gods own absolute will for the bestowing or withholding: and this we retort against the Remonstrants. For the mercie which sheweth it self in Election being of this kind, it is an errour to make either the bestowing or not-bestowing it to depend upon conditions foreseen or not foreseen in men. Secondly, the Scriptures above alledged prove that God extendeth his mercie at all times and to all persons indifferently according to the tenour of the promise: that is, He never faileth to forgive the penitent sinner, to bestow the crown of eternall life upon the faithfull and constant believers. If he could have alledged any Scripture which had avouched that it is Gods nature and propertie to give repentance, faith, perseverance to all men, he had quite overthrown absolute Election and Non-election: But since God, who could have prepared and bestowed the gift of faith and perseverance as well upon this man as upon that, and who according to his ordination and promise hath bound himself to forgive and to save this man if he repent, if he believe, if he persevere, as well as that, and yet neither decreed to give nor giveth to this as to that,

that, surely he hath elected some, and not elected others, out of his own absolute will and pleasure.

Gods mercy is *set out in high and stately titles*, RICH, GREAT, ABUNDANT, WITHOUT DIMENSIONS, &c. B

Most of these places speak of that rich and speciall Mercy which God hath extended to some in their effectuall vocation, justification, sanctification, and which he will most certainly extend towards them in their glorification; as will appear to any man that shall particularly weigh them. From these places if I should reason thus, *God hath shewed* GREAT, RICH, ABUNDANT *mercy unto some, in choosing them before the foundations of the world were laid, in effectually calling them, even when they were dead in sinne, in freely justifying them, in mercifully glorifying them; and he hath not done thus for many others: Therefore Election and Non-election depend upon the absolute will of God, and not upon the foreseen acts of men*, this were a good conclusion: But to conclude, *Therefore there is no decree of absolute Election and Non-election*, it is not onely inconsequent, but contrary to the premises. And yet further, if such places of Scripture should be applied to that *rich* mercy which God is ready to extend to every

every man who performeth the conditions of repenting, believing, perſevering, they make nothing againſt the decrees of abſolute Election and Preterition, unleſſe he can ſhew that God hath prepared the ſame riches of his mercy to make all men fulfill the conditions. For if this preparation be made for ſome and not for others, and that according to Gods abſolute will, and not according to the foreſeen differences of good and bad wills in men; this *rich* mercy of God which this Authour hath mentioned for the confuting of abſolute Election and Non-election is rather a confirming thereof.

C Mercy is more *naturall* and *pleaſing* unto God: vindicative Juſtice is *a ſtrange work.* *He doth not willingly afflict*, &c.

That is ſaid to be *naturall* and *pleaſing* unto God, which cometh originally from himſelf, & is not an act depending upon the miſdeſerts of the creature. But this *naturalneſſe* of Gods mercy and bounty doth not ſhew it ſelf in the outward effects thereof, as naturall agents do, who work according to the uttermoſt of their power, and as farre as the ſphere of their activitie can reach. Let bountie and mercy therefore be never ſo naturall to God, it forceth him not in the ſame meaſure and manner

to

to extend the effects of his mercy unto all, but he alwayes guideth the diſpenſation thereof according to the abſolute and free decrees of his own will: So that the naturalneſſe of his mercy hindereth not the limiting of that ſpeciall mercy which floweth from Election unto ſuch ſingular perſons as himſelf intendeth it unto; neither doth it forbid him to withhold the ſame from ſuch ſingular perſons as he hath decreed to paſſe-by in the diſpenſation thereof. And this abſolute libertie and ſupreme dominion which God hath in the preparing or not-preparing of effectuall grace, wherein the abſolute decrees of Election & Non-election do ſhew themſelves, is a thing as *naturall* and as *pleaſing* unto God as his Mercy.

As for vindicative Juſtice, it may be called a *ſtrange work*, becauſe it is *opus occaſionatum* by mans tranſgreſſion. But as Predeſtination is no act of remunerative Juſtice, no more is negative Reprobation or Non-election of vindicative Juſtice: but they are both acts of Gods abſolute dominion and free libertie, in giving or withholding his own according to his own will and pleaſure.

God is more *frequent* and forward *in the exerciſe* of his Mercy and Bounty then of his Anger and vindicative Juſtice. D

A ſtrange argument, grounded upon a manifeſt errour, namely, That the abſolute decree of Non-election is the exerciſe of Gods anger and vindicative juſtice upon perſons not-elected. There were Angels elected and not-elected according to Gods decree, before the world or Angels were made: but there was no exerciſe of anger or vindicative juſtice upon them till after they had rebelled. Non-election is an abſolute decree of withholding an undue favour, but it is no abſolute decree of inflicting any undeſerved puniſhment. Neither doth it follow from the abſolute decree of Non-election, that God is leſſe frequent in the acts of Mercy then of Anger. For though he have not exerciſed this ſpeciall act of Mercy, yet he exerciſeth daily innumerable acts of Mercy towards the Non-elect beyond all deſert of theirs.

E *In the amplitude of objects to whom it is extended* Mercy ſurmounteth Juſtice. God *viſiteth the third and fourth generation; ſheweth mercy to thouſands. His mercy reacheth as much further*, &c.

Shewing of mercy to thoſe which love God, and puniſhing thoſe which hate him, are the exerciſing of Gods remunerative and vindicative Juſtice according to his own ordination: But the preparing of that ſpeciall grace for ſome men which being given them

them cauſeth them to love God & conſtantly to walk with God; and the not-preparing the ſame for others is the act or decree of Election and Non-election. Now what a looſe and wild manner of reaſoning is this? *Remunerative Juſtice reacheth further then vindicative; therefore there is no abſolute decree of Non-election. Juſtice in the number of objects cometh ſhort of Mercy; therefore there is no abſolute decree of Non-election?* Juſtice muſt needs come ſhort of mercy, becauſe (though not the ſpeciall mercy of Election, yet) mercy, yea manifold mercies are beſtowed upon every ſingular man in the world. So that the Elected by ſpeciall grace being freed from becoming objects of Gods vindicative Juſtice, and both Elected and Non-elected being objects of his Mercy in divers meaſures and after divers manners, we may grant a larger extent of Mercy then of vindicative Juſtice, and yet without all prejudice to abſolute Election and Not-election. For as long as God dealeth unjuſtly or cruelly with no man, his dealing more mercifully with Peter in preparing effectuall grace for him by the decree of Predeſtination, and leſſe mercifully with Judas in not preparing for him ſuch grace by an oppoſite decree of Preterition, is no deniall of the generalitie of his mercy, but an affirmation of more mercy to one

then to another. [g] *Misericordia respicit absolutè Divinum effectum, non concernendo aliquam æqualitatem in ipso. Unde secundùm majorem vel minorem misericordiæ effectum dicitur misericordiùs cum uno quàm cum alio agere.* And yet he deals unmercifully with no man.

Carth. in 4. dist. 46. qu. 1.

In the occasions that move God to exercise F Mercy or Justice, Mercy hath the preeminence. *It is a greater matter that moveth God to punish, a smaller,* &c.

All this is quite beside the question, unlesse it be first proved that Preterition, Non-election or Non-predestination are acts of vindicative Justice. This hath formerly been denied, and as yet was never proved; and therefore whatsoever is here discoursed of Gods deferring punishments, of small occasions which he taketh to hold his hand, and the like, are impertinent.

Gods mercy or love *is compared with the* G *affection of a Father*, nay, *of a tender Mother*, and *with the most affectionate females*, as with the *Hen*, &c. *Now with such a Mercy cannot stand a decree of absolute Reprobation.*

This Authour (by his continuall manner of speech) seemeth to attribute unto God such a naturall affection towards men as is found in Fathers, Mothers, in Birds and brute Beasts towards their young. But we must know first, that [h] *Misericordia ponitur in Deo, non secundùm affectum, sed secundùm effectum.*

h Halens. part. 1. q. 29 memb. 1.

tium. 2. Secondly, as where love or pitie is found *secundùm passionis affectum*, there it doth the uttermost it well can in relieving the persons pitied or loved; so where it is onely *secundùm relevationis effectum*, there it worketh more or lesse according to the free determination of the agent. Thirdly, the naturall affection of love or pitie towards their young ones doth not in brute beasts so equally determine their affection, but they inwardly may bear and outwardly may shew more affection and more effects of their affection to one then to another. And in men the naturall affection of love doth not so determine Fathers or Mothers, but it leaveth Jacob free to love Joseph more then his brethren, and to give unto him more effects of his love then unto the rest: It leaveth Rebecca free to love Jacob more then Esau, and to do more for him then for Esau. If the naturall-affection in Beasts towards their young ones excludeth not all difference of more and lesse in their love; if the naturall love of Parents to their children be no hindrance but they may shew more effects of this love to one, and lesse to another; then God, in whom Love or Mercy are effections and not affections, may freely both in naturall and supernaturall things do more for some, and lesse for others. The decree therefore of Non ele-

ction or negative Reprobation, being not a decree which denieth all effects of Love or Pitie to the Non-elect, but a decree onely denying them that high and choice effect of infallible direction unto eternall life, this decree may well ſtand with the Mercy and Love of God.

For thoſe inferences therefore, that if *abſolute Reprobation be granted, God may more properly be called a Father of crueltie,* ἀπολλύων, I marvel how he *trembled to think* of them, and never trembled to utter them. That wherein he perpetually is miſtaken, is the making of Non-election or negative Reprobation a vindicative act, the confounding it with the judiciall ſentence of Damnation, the conceiving it to work in the Non-elect an invincible neceſſitie of committing ſinne, with ſuch other monſtrous fanſies which he taketh for principles needing no proof; whereas they are ſuch groſſe errours as need no confutation. Non-election taketh not up Gods Mercy ſo ſhort, but every man in the world hath a ſhare in it, though not an equall ſhare. And if Gods Mercy & Love muſt be underſtood *ſecundùm effectum* and not *ſecundùm affectum*, let him find out any man or any creature in the world which hath conferred ſo many and ſo great effects of mercy and love upon his young ones as God did upon Cain, Judas, or any other reprobate, and then let him advance their love above the love of God.

An Anſwer to his objections taken from imputation of originall ſinne.

What Father or Mother would determine their children to certain death, for one onely offenſe, and that committed too not by themſelves in their own perſons, but by ſome other, and imputed onely unto them? H *Object.*

Three things are here preſuppoſed: Firſt, that God in his decree of Reprobation dealeth with the greater part of men after ſuch a cruel manner as is deſcribed. Secondly, that he doth this for no perſonall offenſe committed by themſelves. Thirdly, that he doth it for a ſinne or offenſe imputed onely unto them. Grant him all this, and then he conceiveth abſolute Reprobation cannot ſtand with the mercy of God. But all his three preſuppoſals are falſe. The decree of negative Reprobation is no *determination* of any man *to cruel torments worſe then death*, but an abſolute determination immanent in the Divine will of not-beſtowing upon ſome angels and men that ſpeciall effectuall grace which would certainly bring them to the incomprehenſible joyes of eternall life. And the judiciall decree of Damnation unto eternall torments is a diſtinct decree from this of negative Reprobation, and dependeth reſpectively upon the guilt of the partie preconſidered, who for it is juſtly to be puniſhed, as hath already *Anſw.*

been shewn. Again, whereas he supposeth that Adams sinne cannot be truly accounted a *personall offense* in his posteritie, both the Scripture and the common consent of Divines run against him. For though it be not personall in the same sense wherein actuall sinnes done by men having the use of reason and free-will are said to be their personall actions, yet it is in another sense voluntary and personall, because it was so done that every singular person of mankind is involved in that very voluntary sinne and in the guilt of punishment or death due thereunto. So

Rom. 5. saith the Apostle, *Sinne and death entred into the world by one.* but how? *In quantum in eo omnes peccaverunt.* And again, *By one mans*

1 Part. 2. qu. 105. memb. 1. pag. 296. *disobedience many were made sinners.* Halensis to this purpose saith, [1] *Secundum Augustinum concedimus quòd non punitur parvulus pro culpa patris, sed pro culpa sua, propriè loquendo. Non enim dicit Apostolus quòd solum Adam peccavit, sed dicit quòd omnes peccaverunt in Adam. Erat enim in Adam non solum voluntas unius singularis personæ, sed voluntas universalis naturæ. Adamo cadente à justitia originali, cecidit etiam qualibet voluntas posterorum. Caret enim voluntas cujuslibet illa rectitudine quam habuisset si Adam stetisset.* Aquinas and Cajetane hold Adams sinne to be voluntary unto all his posteritie, [2] *in quantum sunt membra Adami.* Bellarmine, [1] *Peccavimus*

k 1ª 2æ qu. 81. art. 10. 1 De amiss. grat. l. 5. c. 18.

cavimus alienâ voluntate, id est, Adami: quæ tamen voluntas nisi fuisset aliquo modo totius naturæ, ac per hoc etiam nostra, nullo modo verè peccavisse diceremur. Last of all, Malderus (as professed an enemy to the Synod of Dort as this Authour) dareth not deny Adams first actuall transgression to be voluntary in regard of every singular person propagated from him. [m] *Patet voluntarium voluntate primi parentis sufficere ad veri nominis peccatum in parvulo. Est enim illa voluntas Adæ quodammodo voluntas parvuli ex Dei decreto.* Last of all, whereas he taketh it for granted, that *Adams sinne is onely imputed* unto his children, and so they are *determined to death* and eternall *torments for a sinne onely imputed*, he is contrary to the judgement of the Catholick church. For it is generally held against the Pelagians, That as Adams sinne was the sinne of every person that was a member of him, so likewise Adams crookednesse of will was not barely imputed but actually propagated to every singular person derived from his loyns.

[m] *In 1^m 2. qu. 81. art. 1 pag. 260.*

But this Authour promiseth to come *more closely* to the point: let us follow him as closely. The reasons which he is now to presse, are in effect the same which have before been urged and answered, and therefore a shorter answer will serve.

1

Adams sinne is the sinne of mans nature onely, *Object. 1*

onely, and no mans personall transgression but Adams; It was neither committed nor consented to by any of his posteritie in their own persons.

Answer. Adams first sinne committed in the state of innocency, wherein by Gods appointment *gesit personam generis humani*, was every mans personall sinne, and was consented unto by every mans will; becaufe in Adam there was not onely the will of one singular man, but the universall will of all mankind and of every singular person, as before hath been declared. And I would fain know, if Adams first transgression was his onely and no mans else, how every singular person is by God himself for that very transgression esteemed liable unto death. Durandus answereth the doubt: Though it were not [p] voluntary *actu personali infantium* (who were not yet *in rerum natura*) yet it was voluntary *voluntate primi hominis, quæ fuit interpretativè voluntas omnium.* And if God himself and the catholick Church interpret this will of Adam in disobeying Gods commandment to be so farre forth our personall sinne, that every singular person standeth culpable of it, and liable unto punishment for it, we must not give credit either to the old Pelagians or new Remonstrants, when they tell us that such a decree cannot stand with Gods mercy.

[p] *Lib. 2. dist. 30. qu. 2.*

That

That it was the ſinne of our nature, not by generation, but by Gods own voluntary imputation. *Object.* 2

Originall ſinne ſometimes noteth that voluntary and free tranſgreſſion of the Divine commandment whereby Adams perſonall diſobedience made every ſingular perſon a ſinner in the ſight of God, as before hath been ſaid. Sometimes again it noteth that corruption or pravity of the will and of the whole ſoul which remained in Adam after his rebellion, and which by him is traduced unto every ſingular perſon deſcending naturally from him. Neither of theſe becometh the ſinne of any particular perſon otherwiſe then by generation, though not without a free conſtitution of Gods will. And as for the latter, it is in all ſingular perſons of mankind, not onely by imputation but by reall inheſion or contagion, as the whole Church confeſſeth. *Anſwer.* *Vide Bellarm. De Amiſſ. grat. 5. 17.*

God pardoned Adam who did actually and freely commit it in his own perſon: for ſo it is generally believed. *Object.* 3

God pardoned Adam, but no otherwiſe then upon his repenting and believing in the promiſed Seed: which being acts performed by him after he had loſt his originall juſtice, in them he ſuſteined not the common perſon of mankind, and therefore they were available onely to himſelf. Any of his poſteritie *Anſwer.*

steritie upon the same conditions shall assuredly obtein the like pardon. The conclusion which he should prove is this, *Absolute Non-election or negative Reprobation cannot stand with Gods mercy:* His reasons are, *Adams sinne is the sinne of mans nature onely; It is ours, not by generation, but by imputation: It was pardoned in Adam.* Were all these true, shew me any necessary connexion betwixt the premises and the conclusion, and take the cause.

Object. 4 *Christ came to take away the sinne of the world; God either did or might have satisfied his wronged justice in the bloud of the Covenant for all mankind, and have opened a way of salvation unto every man.*

Answer. Christ by shedding his bloud redeemed the world of mankind, satisfied Gods justice, and obteined a way of salvation for every man: But God never intended that the outward act should presently put every man in possession of pardon or of a state of justification and salvation. But the way which he opened for every one of us to partake the fruit of our redemption and of his plenary satisfaction, is by repentance and faith to come and lay hold of the Redeemer. The decrees of Election and Non-election are no obstacles unto the doing of this, or exceptions against any man which shall do this, and therefore they may stand in their full force though

though this last consideration of his be admitted.

Admit of *absolute Reprobation*, and we make God *lesse mercifull to men then to any other creatures.* K

Admit not onely of absolute Non-election, which (as hath been often said) is neither any penaltie nor any misery of the creature not elected, but let us further admit, that angels and men not elected or negatively reprobated do alwayes infallibly draw upon themselves by their own default extreme and endlesse misery; yet it will not follow that God hath been lesse mercifull unto such persons not elected (suppose Cain or Judas) then to the brute creatures. First, because in every person not elected there are innumerable effects of Gods mercy and goodnesse whereof the other creatures are uncapable. Secondly, because what effects of Gods goodnesse or mercy are found in the other creatures, are mercies or benefits rather bestowed upon men for whose uses they serve, then upon the creatures. Now these serving to the use of the Non-elect, as much and oftentimes more then of the Elect, the mercy or goodnesse of God imparted to the creatures redoundeth more unto them. Suppose therefore the creatures are in a better condition of being then the Non-elect finally bring themselves unto, yet

yet this good being of the creature is a mercy of God principally exhibited unto the men who have the use thereof. But this loose manner of reasoning cometh from the false conceit, That Non-election is the determining of persons not-elected by an omnipotent decree to their wofull being: Whereas Non-election or negative Reprobation is an eternall decree in the will of God of not doing that for the advancement of some men unto a supernaturall blessed being which he hath freely and graciously determined to do for others, and conteineth not any thrusting of them into a wofull being by an omnipotent operation, but a permitting them to fall into such a wofull being by their own voluntary default and transgression.

As for his questions, *What man would have accepted of life, if he had known upon what lamentable conditions it was to be tendered? or* who would not *curse the day of his birth,* if he did firmly believe that there were any absolute decree of Election and Non-election?

To the former I answer, That eternall Election and Preterition are no capitulations with the creature, no conditions tendered unto the creature, but onely immanent absolute resolutions in the Creatour. And yet if God had revealed unto Cain

or

or Judas the decree of his Preterition when they firſt entred upon poſſeſſion of this life, it had not been an act of right reaſon or an orderly will to have refuſed it with many other good things freely given unto them by God, for fear of a future bad condition which they might caſt themſelves into by their own voluntary wickedneſſe. If God had revealed his decree of Non-election to the angels which proved apoſtaticall, it had been folly and madneſſe to have refuſed that excellent being which God beſtowed upon them, for fear of that wofull being which by his permiſſion they brought wilfully upon themſelves. Laſtly, God in his wisdome hath made the decrees of Election and Non-election ſecrets to be concealed onely in his own boſome: and therefore it is vain and idle to frame arguments upon ſuppoſal that God ſhould make them revealed and commonly known to ſingular perſons.

Now to his latter queſtion; Who, if he did believe the decrees of abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation, would not *curſe his birth-day?* &c: I anſwer, No well-inſtructed Chriſtian who underſtandeth what the abſolute decrees of Election and Preterition do import. If the decree of Reprobation imported a neceſſary cauſing of any mans ſinnes by the Divine powerfull operation,

ration, or an absolute decree of damning any singular person, whether innocent or sinfull, whether a believer or not-believer, there were some reasonable motives for men Not-elected, knowing such a decree, to curse their birth-day. But this false imagination hath been often refuted. [o] *Non sicut præparavit Sanctos ad justitiam percipiendam, sic præparavit iniquos ad justitiam amittendam; quia pravitatis præparator nunquam fuit.* I adde Carthusian; [p] *Bonum subjacet providentiæ Divinæ tanquam ordinatum & causatum ab ea: ideo prædestinatio est causa gratiæ & gloriæ. Sed quoniam malum culpæ non subjacet providentiæ Divinæ ut intentum & causatum, sed solùm tanquam præscitum & ordinatum, hinc reprobatio est solùm præscientia culpæ, non causa*, &c. Lastly, the eternall decree of Reprobation (as the Remonstrants themselves hold it) is as unchangeable, as fixed, as certainly drawing after it the wofull being of Cain and Judas and all other Reprobates, as that which we admit. We may therefore ask of the Remonstrants, What man would *accept of life*, or who would not *curse his birth-day*, if he knew that upon an eternall and infallible præscience of his finall impenitencie God had passed the sentence or decree of his Reprobation?

[o] *Lomb. l. 1. dist. 40. D. & dist. 41. E.*

[p] *Lib. 10. dist. 40. qu. 3. pag. 580. Vide Aquin. part. 1. qu. 23. art. 3.*

L *Suppose* absolute Reprobation, and *God is more*

more mercifull unto the very devils then unto men. They are *equall* onely *in* this *one thing*, UTRISQUE DESPERATA SALUS; *but in three things men are in worse condition then the devils.*

The decree of Non-election or absolute negative Reprobation truly understood is a deniall of speciall mercie which by Gods power and free-will might have been prepared both for men and devils, and might have been bestowed upon them as well as it was for and upon the elect. The withholding of this mercie is no unmercifull cruel decree, no vindicative or punitive act: and therefore it is a bad consequence to say, *God was lesse mercifull to men then to the devils; Therefore cruell or unjust to either.* More or lesse mercie is a confession of mercie unto both: and therefore from *lesse mercie* to one then to the other to conclude *crueltie* or *injustice* towards either, is to inferre a conclusion contradictory to the premises.

Whereas he further saith that the decree of Non-election or absolute Reprobation is equall to men and devils in this, *quòd reddit salutem utrisque desperatam*, he is quite besides the matter. For the decree of distinguishing angels into Elect and Non-elect was established *in voluntate Divina* before the creation of either, and at the instant of their

their creation (notwithstanding the forenamed decree) their salvation was so farre from being desperate or impossible, that it was most easie and possible, and never was desperate till their wilfull rebellion had made it so. What more easie to be obteined then that which cannot be lost unlesse the partie himself by a wilfull act of his own lose it? Upon these terms stood the salvation of the Non-elect angels, now (by their own default) devils. As for the decree of non-election concerning men; it made the salvation of no children of Adam desperate as they are considered in him according to his estate of justice and innocencie; for in that he had both a possibilitie and a sufficiencie to have atteined salvation for himself and them. Neither doth it now make any mans estate desperate, as he is considered lying in the fall: for by Christ sufficient means of salvation are provided for all sinners whatsoever; and God *secundùm legem ordinariam* may apply them to any singular person whatsoever, whilest he is *in statu viæ*. And he now adjudgeth no man to the wofull estate of torment or damnation in hell, that doth not willingly put himself out of the way which leadeth unto heaven. It is not the secret and eternall decree of Non-election or Reprobation which maketh God do this; but the open

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acts of mans voluntary rebellion cause his damnation and torments in hell. Nothing doth or can make any mans salvation desperate but his own desperate wickednesse and obstinate wilfulnesse. ¶ *Cùm dicitur quòd reprobatus non potest gratiam adipisci, non est hoc intelligendum secundùm impossibilitatem absolutam, sed secundùm impossibilitatem conditionatam, quæ non tollit libertatem arbitrii.* ¶ *Aquin. part. 1. qu. 23. art. 3.*

But let us now see how he will prove that *God is more mercifull to devils then to men*, supposing the absolute decree of Non-election or negative Reprobation.

Men were *appointed to hell, not for their own proper personall sinnes, but for the sinne of another that sinned before they were born:* whereas *the devils are damned onely for their own proper personall sinnes. Ergò.* *Object. 1*

This Authour runneth continually upon one string, and that continually quite out of tune. For whereas the question is concerning the eternall immanent acts or decrees of Election and Preterition or negative Reprobation, he alwayes talketh of the judiciary decree of Damnation, or *appointment* of men and angels unto hell-fire. The eternall decree distinguishing angels into Elect and Non-elect was neither grounded *Answ.*

upon the righteouſneſſe of the one nor upon the wickedneſſe of the other; though the judiciall decree diſtinguiſhing them *in glorificandos & damnandos* were reſpective to the loialtie of the one and rebellion of the other. The ſame we ſay of men. As for the very damnation of men not-elected, it is for a proper and perſonall contagion of ſinne, and for a tranſgreſſion which God and the catholick Church eſteemeth to belong perſonally to every child of Adam, as hath been already declared. We muſt not therefore be ſo addicted to the new-fangled opinions of the Remonſtrants, treading in the very footſteps of the Pelagians, as for their ſakes to think the condemning of men for originall corruption and Adams tranſgreſſion, is hard, unmercifull, cruel dealing; ſince the Scriptures and the judgement of the catholick Church and of our own particular Church hath acknowledged this decree. And yet were all granted which this man asketh, this concluſion would not follow, *Therefore God is more mercifull to angels not-elected then unto men.* For the *more* or *leſſe* mercie of God muſt not be weighed by any one ſingular act or decree of God towards angels and men, but by the univerſall courſe of his dealings with both. Now caſt all the mercifull decrees and dealings of God with men

men into the one balance, and all the mercifull dealings of God with devils into the other, and it will easily appear that God hath shewed more mercie to any non-elected or damned man then to any of the non-elected angels, now damned devils.

Men not-elected are *unavoidably destinated* unto *endlesse misery under a colour of the contrarie*; whereas *the devils decreed unto damnation, know it, expect it, look for no other. But men are fed up with hopes of salvation, and made believe*, &c. *Object. 2*

Non-election is not a destinating of the person not-elected unto endlesse miserie or torment: Nay, the non-elected angels were, notwithstanding their eternall Non-election, at their creation sufficiently ordinated (though not infallibly predestinated) not onely to have avoided endlesse misery, but to have atteined endlesse felicitie. So the Preterition or eternall Passing-by of some men, and electing others, was no destinating of the Non-elected unto hell-torments. For notwithstanding these distinct eternall decrees, at Adams creation, both himself, and in him all and every particular child of his, was sufficiently ordinated (though not infallibly predestinated) unto the avoiding of hell-tor- *Answ.*

ments, and to the atteining of eternall happineſſe.

Whereas he maketh the caſe of the non-elected angels better then of men, becauſe they *know* and *expect damnation* (he might have added, *and feel the torments of damnation*) and men not-elected are *fed up with vain hopes, and made believe that* they cannot periſh but *defectu voluntatis propriæ*; We anſwer, Firſt, That thoſe which are now damned devils, were not damned for their Non-election, or becauſe they were not elected from eternitie, but for the temporall act of their apoſtaſie. And the ſame we ſay of men not-elected. Secondly, we anſwer, That the now-damned devils did not *know* or *expect* their damnation when they were firſt created, and whileſt they were *viatores*; though now they be under damnation, they muſt needs both know it and feel it. And the ſame we ſay of men not-elected. Thirdly, Whereas he ſaith devils are in a better caſe, becauſe they are out of hope, and men are *deluded* with vain and impoſſible *hopes of ſalvation*, he is deceived in both. The devils themſelves, though not-elected, were in a farre better caſe when at their firſt creation they had hope of happineſſe, then they are being quite out of hope under the ſtate of their irrecoverable damnation. And Judas though

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eternally not-elected or eternally reprobated in Gods decree, yet he was in a better condition whileſt he lived upon earth in the companie of Chriſt, and might hope for happineſſe, then now he is actually damned and out of all hope. And laſtly we anſwer, That the Non-elect are not thereby appointed to wrath, but the wrath of God layeth hold upon them for being children of Belial and diſobedience, and not for being perſons not-elected. And it is moſt true, that if they periſh, they periſh not *defectu miſericordiæ Divinæ*, who hath offered them means of grace, pardon, and ſalvation; but *defectu voluntatis propriæ*, wherein there is alwayes found a voluntary pravity, a neglect, a contempt, or a wicked abuſe of the means of ſalvation tendered unto them. This Authours ſaying onely, *There is no ſuch matter*, is no materiall proof.

Men not-elected or reprobated are *obliged to believe, and their puniſhment aggravated by not believing: the devils* are free from ſuch a *command*, &c. *Object.* 3

A ſtrange argument to prove God *leſſe mercifull* to men not-elected then to devils already damned, becauſe he offereth ſalvation to the one under condition of faith in Chriſt, which he never would do to the other. Some there were that turned *Anſw.* 0

the grace of God into *wantonneſſe*; but the Remonſtrants onely go about to turn it into *cruelitie*. Thoſe who have ſo farre forth a power of being ſaved by faith in Chriſt, that the event is hindered onely by their own malignant rebellious will, have more libertie and poſſibilitie to eſcape hell then the devils, unto whom ſalvation after their fall was upon no condition ever offered.

P We ſay with Proſper, *God would have all men ſaved*: but we ſay not with the Remonſtrants, That *God would have all men predeſtinated or elected.*

2 As for the *manifeſtation of Gods juſtice and of his mercie*, no man ſuppoſeth that the immanent ſecret eternall decrees of Predeſtination and Reprobation can in themſelves manifeſt the juſtice and mercie of God; but in the temporall effects and conſequents they ſerve to ſet forth Gods mercifull dealing with the Elect and his juſt dealing with the Non-elect, *miſericorditer liberando hos, juſtè damnando iſtos.*

Treatise.

THirdly, this absolute Reprobation is incompatible with Gods Justice. 3 *Against Gods* JUSTICE.

The Lord (saith *(A)* David) *is righteous in all his wayes*, Psal. 145. *The judgements of the Lord* (saith Solomon) *are weight and measure*, Prov. 16. 11. exact and without exception. So apparently just is God, that he offereth the justice of his decrees and wayes to the triall of humane understanding: Esay 5. 3. *Judge, I pray you, between me and my vineyard.* Those to whom the vineyard was committed, slew their masters heir being sent unto them: *What will the Lord of the Vineyard, think ye* (saith Christ) *do therefore, when he cometh, to those husbandmen?* Matth. 21. 40. In which words he appealeth to their judgement. Nay, he is content to prove himself and his dealings to be just by plain and evident arguments, Ezek. 18. 25. &c. *Are not my wayes equall, and yours unequall, O ye house of Israel?* And he permitteth Abraham when he was in his greatest humilitie, acknowledging himself to be but dust and ashes, yet to reason with him about the equitie of his doings; *Wilt thou slay the righteous with the wicked? Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?* Gen. 18. 23, 25. And Moses also is suffered to argue Gods justice in the same manner; *Shall one man sinne, and wilt thou be wroth with all the congregation?* Numb. 16. 22. In a word, so evidently just is God in all his proceedings, that many both good and bad, who have felt his justice, have cleared God, and deeply charged themselves. Witnesse Ezra, Nehemiah, and Daniel in their ninth chapters, and Adonibezek, Judg. 1. 7. and the Emperour Mauricius, who having seen his children butchered, and waiting every minute for the bloudie stroke of death, brake out into these words, [y] *Righteous art thou, O Lord, and just is thy judgement.*

y *Osiand. Eccl. hist. cent. 6. pag. 261.* Justus es, Domine, & justum est judicium tuum.

With this inviolable justice of God cannot absolute Reprobation (of such especially as are commanded to believe and are called to salvation) be reconciled. My reasons *(B)* are these.

I. Because it maketh God to punish the righteous with the wicked.

The Supralapsarians say directly in plain terms, that God decreed to destruction men considered without sinne, and therefore yet righteous. And the Sublapsarians say as much

in effect 3 for they say two things: 1. That God did lay a necessitie upon every man of being born in originall sinne, as I have noted before; 2. That he hath a determined for that sinne to cast away the greatest part of mankind for ever. And so they make God to do that by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other say he did by one. This is so clear a case, that Calvine with some others have not sticked to say that God may with as much justice determine men to hell the first way as the latter. See *Instit. l. 3. c. 23. §. 7.* where against those who denie that Adam fell by Gods decree, he reasoneth thus; All men are made guiltie of Adams sinne by Gods absolute decree alone: Adam therefore sinned by this onely decree. [a] *What letteth them to grant that of one man which they must grant of all men?* And a little after he saith, [a] *It is too absurd that these kind patrones of Gods justice should thus stumble at a straw and leap over a block.* God may with as much justice decree Adams sinne and mens damnation out of his onely will and pleasure, as, out of that will and pleasure, the involving of men in the guilt of the first sinne and their damnation for it: that is the substance of his reasoning. To the same purpose speaketh Maccovius; *From hence we may see*, saith he, *what to judge of that opinion of our adversaries*, viz. *That God cannot justly ordain men to destruction without the consideration of sinne.* [b] *Let them tell me which is greater, to impute to one man the sin of another, and punish him for it with eternall death, or to ordain simply*, without looking at sinne, *to destruction:* Surely no man will denie the first of these to be the greater. *But this God may do without any wrong to justice: much more therefore may he do the other.* To these consenteth Dr Twisse, and saith, [c] *If God may ordain men to hell for Adams sinne, which is derived unto them by Gods onely constitution, he may as well do it absolutely without any such constitution.* And it is most true, it is all one in substance, simply to decree the miserie of an innocent man, and to involve him in a sinne that he may be brought to miserie. Neither of these decrees (I take it) are just.

2 Quid eos prohibet fateri de uno homine, quod inviti de toto humano genere concedunt? Quid enim tergiversando luderent operam?

a Bonos istos justitiæ Dei patronos perplexos hærere in festuca, alias verò trabes superare, nimis absurdum est.

b *Maccov. disp. 18. p. 16.* Nam dicant, quæso, nobis quid majus sit, imputare alicui culpam alterius, & propter ipsam illum morte æternâ plectere; an verò ordinare ad interitum. At hoc potest sine ulla læsione justitiæ suæ: ergò multò magis potest illud posterius.

c *Dr Twiss. Vind. grat. l. 2. dis. 1. pag. 15.* Quod potest Deus intercedente liberâ suâ constitutione, illud etiam absolutè potuit vel sine aliqua constitutione intercedente.

II. The second reason why it is (C) against Gods justice, is, because it maketh him to require faith in Christ of those

to

to whom he hath precisely in his absolute purpose denied both a power to believe and a Christ to believe in. That God bindeth Reprobates to believe as well as others, it is the constant doctrine of Divines: Among whom Zanchius deliverеth it for a Thesis, [d] *Every man (especially he that professeth Christ) is bound to believe that he is chosen in Christ to salvation; every man without exception, even the reprobate himself: and if he believe it not, he committeth a most grievous sinne above all others.* This he proveth by that speech of Christ, John 16. 9. *The Spirit shall convince the world of sinne, because they believe not in me.* Reprobates therefore are bound to believe. Mr Perkins also saith something to the same purpose; [e] *Every one in the Church by virtue of this commandment* BELIEVE THE GOSPEL *is bound to believe that he is redeemed by Christ, as well the reprobate as the elect, though for a different reason: the Elect, that by believing he may be saved; the Reprobate, that by not believing he may be without excuse: and this out of the very purpose of God.*

But now they cannot in *(D)* justice be bound to believe, if they be absolute Reprobates, for three causes.

1. Because they have no power to believe: they want it, and must want it for ever. God hath decreed they shall never have any to their dying day. *Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia*, No man can be justly tyed to impossible performances. Because no man can flie like a bird, or reach heaven with the top of his finger, therefore God cannot with justice exact of any the performance of these actions: nor can he of Reprobates the obedience of Faith, if it be not possible to them.

2. Because it is *(E)* not Gods unfeigned will they shall believe. No man will say that it is Gods serious will that such a man shall live, when it is his will that he shall never have the concourse of his providence and the act of preservation. Nor can we say that God doth in good earnest will that those men should believe, whom he will not furnish with necessary power to believe. It may rather be said, it is Gods unfeigned will they shall not believe, because it is his will they shall want power to believe. For it is a Maxime in Logick, *Qui vult aliquid in causa, vult effectum ex ista causa profluentem,*

d *Zanch. l. 5. De natura Dei, cap. 2. q. 1. de prædestinatorum.* Quisque mandato Dei tenetur credere se ad salutem æternam in Christo fuisse electum; maximè autem is qui fidem in Christum profitetur. Cùm dicimus unumquemque teneri hoc credere, neminem, nè reprobos quidem, qui neque unquam credent nec credere in Christum possunt, excipimus; & nisi credant, gravissimè omnium peccant.

e *Perk. lib. De Præd. pag. 89. obiect. 3.* Quisque in Ecclesia mandato Dei CREDE EVANGELIO tenetur credere se redemtum esse per Christum, etiam improbus perinde ac electus, sed aliâ tamen & aliâ ratione: Electus tenetur credere, ut credendo particeps fiat electionis; reprobus, ut non credendo fiat inexcusabilis, etiam ex intentione Dei.

tum,

tem, He who willeth a thing in the cause, willeth the effect that necessarily floweth from that cause. Now if it be the certain will of God that Reprobates shall in no wise believe, he cannot with reason and equitie tie them to believe: for then he tieth them to an act contrary to his determinate will.

3. Because they have (F) no object of faith, no Christ to believe in. *Credere jubet, & fidei nullum objectum ponit*, He commandeth to believe, and affordeth no object to believe in: this soundeth not well. The devils have no part in Christ or the new covenant: we will not therefore say that God can justly bind them to believe, or punish them as transgressours of the covenant because they believe not: How then can we say that God can justly require faith of Reprobates, or destroy them for not believing, if they have indeed no more part in Christ or in the covenant then the devils have? If a man should command his servant to eat, and punish him for not eating, and in the mean time fully resolve that he shall have no meat to eat, would any reasonable man say that such a man were just in the command or punishment? Change but the name, and the case is the same. Again, that Christ died for Reprobates (by the doctrine of absolute Reprobation) is a lie; and can God justly bind men to believe a lie?

This is the second reason.

III. The third reason why the absolute decree infringeth Gods justice, is, because it will have him (G) to punish men for omission of an act which is made impossible to them by his own decree: not by that decree alone by which he determined to give them no power to believe, having lost it; but by that decree also by which he purposed that we should partake with Adam in his sinne, and be stripped of all that supernaturall power which we had by Gods free grant bestowed upon us in Adam before he fell.

These are the reasons which move me to think, that this absolute decree is repugnant to Gods Justice.

Three things are usually answered.

I. That Gods wayes may be very just, and yet seem unjust to mans erring understanding: and so is this decree, though flesh and bloud will not yield it to be so.

This answer (H) I take to be false, and the contradictorie to it to be true; namely, That nothing is truly just which humane understanding purged from prejudice, corrupt affections

tions and cuſtomes, hath in all ages, places and perſons judged to be unjuſt. The reaſon is, Becauſe God hath by the light of nature, and thoſe generall impreſſions of good and evil, honeſt and diſhoneſt, juſt and unjuſt, made in the hearts of men, ſufficiently inſtructed and enabled them to judge what is juſt and what is not. When a thing is done, reaſon ſo qualified is able to ſay, This is juſt, or, This is unjuſt, whether it be done by God or man. For (virtues in men being but the image of thoſe perfections that dwell in God) Juſtice in men and God are for ſubſtance but one and the ſame thing, though infinitely differing in degree, as the greater and leſſer light. That this power is ingraffed in men, God himſelf (who beſt knoweth with what endowments he hath beautified his creature) hath ſufficiently ſignified in thoſe Scriptures where he calleth on men to be judges of the equitie of his wayes: *Judge, I pray you, between me and my vineyard*, Eſay 5. *Judge, O ye houſe of Iſrael; are not my wayes equall, and your wayes unequall*? Ezek. 18. 25. God would never put them upon the triall of reaſon, if he had not made it able to examine them. The incarnation of the Sonne of God, his birth of a virgin, his dying, the reſurrection of the bodie, and ſuch myſteries as are peculiar to the Goſpel and the proper objects of the Chriſtian faith, God hath not offered to the triall of our underſtandings, but rather derideth thoſe that preſume to judge of them by reaſon: 1. Cor. 1. 20. *Where is the ſcribe? where is the wiſe? where is the diſputer of this world*? And the reaſon is, Becauſe theſe things being ſupernaturall, and therefore not diſcernable by naturall power, man is no competent judge of them by his naturall underſtanding, nor may adventure upon the triall and judgement of them with leſſe danger then Uzzah looked into the ark: for *ſcrutator majeſtatis opprimetur à gloria*, He that prieth into Gods majeſtie, will be overwhelmed of his glorie. But of the juſtice of his decrees and wayes he maketh him a judge, becauſe the common notions of juſt and unjuſt being imprinted in nature, he is able by naturall reaſon to apprehend what is juſt in Divine acts as well as in his own.

II. It is anſwered, That theſe decrees are ſet down in Scripture to be the will of God; and therefore they muſt needs be juſt: For Gods will is the rule (*1*) of all righteouſneſſe.

To this anſwer I have theſe things to replie.

1. This rule in Divinitie is much abuſed by the maintainers of abſolute Reprobation, and may not be admitted in their

their ſenſe and meaning. For Gods will is not a *rule of juſtice* to himſelf, as if things were therefore juſt becauſe he willeth them and worketh them: but his juſtice rather is a rule of his will and works, which are the expreſſions of his will. He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them, becauſe they are agreeable to that juſtice which dwelleth in the Divine nature. As he maketh nothing which hath not *potentiam objectivam*, a power of being created without implying contradiction to himſelf or any thing in him, ſo he willeth and doeth nothing but that which may be willed or done *ſalvâ juſtitiâ*, without wrong to his juſtice. S. Hierome ſpeaking of the Prophet Hoſea's taking a wife of fornications, Hoſ. 1. 2. ſaith it was done *in typo*, typically, not really; *quia ſi fiat, turpiſſimum eſt*, becauſe if it had been indeed done, it had been a moſt foul thing. But thou wilt anſwer (ſaith he) *Deo jubente, nihil turpe eſt*, God commanding it, nothing is diſhoneſt. *Thus much we ſay*, ſaith the Father, *That God commandeth nothing but what is honeſt: but he doth not by commanding diſhoneſt things, make thoſe things honeſt which are abominable:* plainly giving us to ſee what he thought, viz. that God doth not will a thing, and ſo make it good; but willeth it becauſe it is in it ſelf good antecedently and before the act of Gods will about it. And thus much doth Zanchie (though a rigid mainteiner of abſolute Reprobation) not obſcurely confeſſe in his Treatiſe *De natura Dei*: Where he letteth fall ſuch ſpeeches as make Gods juſtice antecedent to his will, and therefore the rule of it, rather then a thing regulated by it: [f] *Neither can God will any thing*, ſaith he, *which is not juſt.* And again, [g] *The Princes pleaſure hath the ſtrength of a law, is a rule*, ſaith he, *among the Canoniſts: but* [h] *this is true, where the King is juſt, and willeth nothing but what is juſt.* In which words he plainly maketh the juſtice of the King antecedent to that will of his which muſt be a law. Many more ſpeeches he uſeth there to the ſame purpoſe. Gods will therefore is not a rule of juſtice to himſelf. To whom then? To us. For by it we are 1. to ſquare all our thoughts, words, and deeds; 2. To examine them when they are ſpoken and done: *Primum in aliquo genere eſt regula poſteriorum, & ſupremum inferiorum.*

Hieron. Proam. in Hoſeam.

f *Zanch. l. 3. De nat. Dei, c. 4. qu. 9. theſ. 2. Neque aliquid velle poteſt quod juſtum non ſit.*

g Quod placet principi, legis habet vigorem.

h Ibi maximè verum eſt, ubi rex juſtus eſt, & nihil vult niſi juſtum. Quantò magis in regno Dei, &c.

2. I reply, That theſe abſolute (K) decrees of mens inevitable ſalvation and damnation are no parts of Gods revealed will. The Scriptures teach us no ſuch matter. And therefore to ſay they are, is but a mere begging of the queſtion.

2. It hath alwayes been ordinary with falſe teachers to make Gods word a father to their falſe opinions, that they may ſtand the faſter and winne the greater credit. The Papiſts ground their Tranſubſtantiation, and the Lutheranes their Conſubſtantiation and Ubiquity upon the Scripture, HOC EST CORPUS MEUM, *This is my bodie*, Matth. 26. And the defenders of abſolute Reprobation do ſo too: They make their cauſe to be Gods, and entitle his word to it, becauſe they ſee it is the ſureſt way to defend it; being herein like to ſome contentious people, who being in law and having a bad cauſe which they are like to loſe, they entitle the King to it, that they may the better uphold it.

3. Abſolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revealed will. The reaſon is, Becauſe it is odious to right reaſon, and begetteth abſurdities. For *nulla veritas parit abſurda*, no truth begetteth abſurdities. Divers truths are revealed in Scripture which are above but not contrary to right reaſon, whether they be matters of faith or life. Faith and Reaſon, Nature and Scripture are both Gods excellent gifts: and therefore though there may be a diſproportion, yet there can be no repugnancy between them. The worſhip which God requireth is *cultus λογικὸς*, a reaſonable ſervice, Rom. 12. 2. and the word of God is *γάλα λογικὸν καὶ ἄδολον*, *milk reaſonable and without guile*, 1. Pet. 2. 2. Theſe things therefore being laid together; it will appear to be but a mere ſhift and evaſion, when abſolute Reprobation is proved to be unjuſt, and therefore unworthy of God, to ſay, *Gods will is the rule of juſtice: this is part of Gods revealed will; and therefore moſt juſt, whatſoever reaſon may cavill and ſay to the contrary.*

III. Their third anſwer is, That (*L*) God is not bound to reſtore men power to believe, becauſe they once had it and have loſt it through their own fault; as a maſter is not bound to renew his ſervants ſtock, if he have waſted it by bad husbandry.

This anſwer doth not ſatisfie me. For I grant that God is ſimply and abſolutely bound to no man, becauſe he is *agens liberrimum*, a moſt free diſpenſer of his own favours, where, and what, and to whom he will; and no man is aforehand with God: *Quis prior illi dedit ut retribuatur?* Who hath given unto him, and it ſhall be recompenſed again? Rom. 11. 35. But yet he is conditionally bound: For he hath determined and tyed himſelf three wayes eſpecially,

1. *Deter-*

1. *Decernendo*, by Decreeing. The Almighty is eternally subject to his own ordinances, or else he should be mutable. And therefore what gifts soever he hath decreed to men, he is bound to give them by virtue of his own decree.

2. *Promittendo*, by Promising. We use to say, *Promise is debt*: It is justice to perform what it was free to promise. And whosoever he be that promiseth and payeth not, is guilty of a trespasse (witnesse Ananias and Sapphira) and unworthy of the kingdome of heaven, Psal. 15. 4. If therefore God hath made a promise of any gift or grace to men, his promise bindeth him to performance.

Nam semel emissum volat irrevocabile verbum.

3. *Legem ferendo*, by Giving men a Law to keep which without supernaturall grace they can no more keep then they can eat a rock. By such a law the supreme Lawgiver bindeth himself to his people to give them such power as may enable them to keep that law, or else he becometh (as the evil servant in the parable styled him) *a hard master, reaping where he sowed not*, and the very true and proper cause of the transgression of that law. We shall find God alwayes giving strength when he giveth a command. When he commanded the creatures to *increase and multiply*, he gave them a multiplying vertue: When Christ bade the lame man *arise, take up his bed and walk*, he put into his limbs an abilitie of walking. When Adam had a spirituall law given him to obey which without spirituall strength he could not, God gave him strength answerable to the law, as Divines agree, consenting to that noted speech of S. Augustine, That Adam had *posse non cadere*, though he never had *non posse cadere*, a Power and Possibilitie though no Necessity of continuing in obedience.

That I may bring this home to my purpose, I say, That God is bound to restore unto men power to believe, supposing these things that follow: 1. That he hath vouchsafed to enter into a new covenant of peace with men, when he needed not; 2. That in that covenant he requireth obedience at mens hands, even at theirs that perish; 3. That he promiseth eternall life to every man, if he obey and keep the covenant; 4. That he punisheth the disobedient with everlasting death. These particulars supposed, the most free God, who is absolutely bound to none, is engaged to give ability of believing unto men: Nor can he justly without his gift punish the disobedient, any more then a Magistrate having

having put out a mans eyes for an offense, can command this man with justice to reade a book, and because he readeth not, put him to death; or then a Master (that I may return the Simile in the answer) when he hath taken away from his servant the stock which he hath misimployed, can afterward exact of him a just imployment of the same stock, and punish him because he imployeth it not.

I conclude therefore, That the absolute and inevitable Reprobation of such men as are called to believe in Christ, and punished if they believe not, is utterly repugnant to the Justice of God, and therefore can be no part of his word.

Answer.

Whether absolute Reprobation may stand with Gods Justice.

WE have often said, that by absolute Predestination and absolute Reprobation or Non-election we understand onely that eternall immanent act whereby God doth freely and absolutely purpose to give unto some of Adams posterity that effectuall grace which shall infallibly bring them unto glory, and whereby he doth as absolutely out of the sovereigne freedome of his own will purpose not to give effectuall grace unto others, but to permit them under the means of common grace *deficere ab æterna beatitudine*. These are the decrees which we affirm to be absolute, and which we deny to be conditionate or dependent upon the different temporall acts of men, foreseen eternally by God. If this Authour will overthrow these absolute decrees, he must not go about

about to prove that God cannot justly decree the damnation of any man but with respect to his foreseen sinnes, which we have alwayes acknowledged; but he must oppugne that of the Apostle, *Miseretur cujus vult, & quem vult indurat*, and he must say that God had never any absolute decree of bringing Peter by the way of faith, repentance, holinesse, and perseverance unto the kingdome of heaven, but onely out of Peters free-will he foresaw him a penitent, faithfull, holy, perseverant man unto the last gasp. And he must likewise defend, that there was no absolute decree in God of withholding from Judas that effectuall saving grace which was mercifully prepared for Peter, and had it been prepared for Judas, would as infallibly have wrought his salvation as it did Peters. Here is the very knot of the controversie, which this Authour in his whole book never cometh near. But now let us come to his discourse of the Divine Justice: Whereunto before we give particular answers, some things must be premised in generall.

Justice in a generall sense is an equality or conformity *cum obligatione seu debito cujusq;*: And he is just that hath a constant and perpetuall will of giving unto every one his due.

[a] *Albert. p. 1, tract. 19. qu. 77. pag. 181.*

Now because the[a] words *debet* and *debitum*

do not properly agree unto God, the vertue of Justice must needs belong unto him otherwise then unto men: And injustice must not be ascribed unto him, in doing many things, or not doing, in which we should be unjust if we should use the like libertie. Gods Justice is, [b] *Agere secundùm condecentiam bonitatis aut veracitatis suæ.* Whilst he doeth this, though he tie not himself to the rules of humane justice, it is blasphemy to charge him with cruelty or injustice. From whence we inferre these corollaries which are undeniably true. 1. That God may without any injustice absolutely decree from all eternity to give in time more naturall gifts, more civil honour, more supernaturall graces and mercies to one man then to another, without all respect to foreseen differences of goodnesse or badnesse in the persons. The reason, Because it neither crosseth his goodnesse nor his truth. 2. That God cannot justly subject men to the torments of hel but for their sinnes and finall ending of their life in sinne. The reason, Because if he should either punish an innocent man or a penitent sinner, he should do an act contrary both to his goodnesse and truth. And this is onely it which may be termed injustice when we speak of God.

[b] Ibid.

Unto the places of Scripture which he setteth in the front of his discourse, I an-

A

ſwer in a word, That Predeſtination and Non-predeſtination, or Election and negative Reprobation, as they concern this or that ſingular perſon, are not promiſed or revealed: and therefore to elect Peter and not to elect Judas is not contrary either to the goodneſſe or truth of God, and ſo not to his righteouſneſſe or juſtice. For thoſe places of Scripture which aim at Gods vindicative juſtice, as it is threatned onely againſt men guilty of ſinne, they no way concern the point in queſtion. For the abſolute diſtinct decrees of the Divine Predeſtination or Preterition are no acts or parts of his vindicative Juſtice, but they are free and abſolute acts of that ſovereigne dominion which he hath in preparing and diſpenſing the effects of his goodneſſe (which by promiſe are due to no man) according to the rule of his abſolute will and pleaſure.

B All which he ſaith in the 312 page requireth no new anſwer: It all runneth upon the old and uſuall miſtake of the decree of Damnation inſtead of the decree of Non-election or negative Reprobation. Non-election or negative Reprobation is no decree of damnation, neither in the *Sublapſarians* nor *Supralapſarians* opinion, neither did it lay a *neceſsity* of originall or actuall ſinne upon any man.

[c] *De occult. Dei provid. reſp. ad 2m.*

It is Calvines opinion, [c] *Lapſum Ada non fortui-*

permissum fuisse, sed occulto Dei decreto ordinatum. God foresaw Adams fall: he had power to have hindered it, but he would not, because himself had decreed otherwise. This is the effect of Calvines doctrine. But as for the *involving of men in sinne and damnation out of his onely will and pleasure*, these are consequents falsely inferred upon Calvines doctrine, by himself disclaimed, and formerly refuted. [d] *Totum illud de nudo puróque Dei arbitrio ex malitiæ officina productum est.* It was not Gods absolute decree of Preterition but Adams voluntary act of rebellion which brought sinne and the guilt of sinne upon himself and all his posterity. God having justly decreed that Adams children should participate with him in his state of righteousnesse, did as justly decree that they should also participate in the state of sinne.

[d] *Ibid. resp. ad 1m.*

If this Authour deny the propagation of sinne from Adam, he must acknowledge himself a Pelagian. If he say it is unjust, which all Divines acknowledge to have happened according to the decree of God, I see not how he can clear himself from that crime wherewith he chargeth others.

His whole discourse concerning originall sinne and the propagating thereof unto all mankind, is erroneous, in that he falsely presumeth that the Divine decrees must needs be effective or causative of all the events decreed:

creed: Whereas if the events be actions sinfull, Gods decrees are permissive and ordinative, not decrees of causing, much lesse necessitating, such evil actions, as hath been often told him. Be it granted that it is *all one in substance to decree the misery of an innocent man, and to involve him in a sinne that he may be brought to misery:* We deny that the opposite decrees of Predestination and Preterition are decrees causing any innocent mans misery, or decrees involving, that is, (as this man understandeth it) necessarily causing any mans sinne whereby he is brought to misery. For in Calvines opinion (with whom now he dealeth) the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation find all men in the state of sinne and miserie: That which cometh after is never the cause of that which went before. As for those who consider Election and Preterition before the absolute prevision of sinne, they will never grant that negative Reprobation or Non-election was the adjudging or decreeing of innocent angels or men unto eternall misery or punishment, but a decree of permitting innocent angels and men to incurre eternall misery and punishment, and of not delivering them or freeing them out of that miserable estate. He is but dim-sighted in this controversie, who seeth not a formall difference in these decrees: So that God may justly do the one, though

though he cannot without crossing the ordinary revealed course of his Justice do the other.

His second reason why absolute Reprobation is against Gods Justice, is, *Because it maketh God to require faith in Christ of those to whom he hath precisely in his absolute purpose denied both a power to believe, and a Christ to believe in.* And Zanchy saith, *That every man is bound to believe that he is chosen in Christ to salvation,* &c. *Object. C*

I hold it improper to say that God commandeth or bindeth any man to believe his own Predestination or Election, though some learned Divines spake in that manner. My reason is, Because we are bound by way of command to believe that onely which the Prophets and Apostles were bound to preach unto us: Now Gods Ministers never had, neither now have, any commission to preach the Predestination of this or that singular person unto any man, though they are bound in the judgement of charity to exclude no singular person out of the number of the elect. That which the Ministers of the Gospel require of us for the atteining of salvation is faith in Christ: and that which they command us concerning Predestination or election, is not the immediate believing of it as of an article of faith which they have in commission to preach unto us, *Answ.*

but the doing of those things from whence *à posteriori*, the Spirit of God bearing witnesse unto our spirit, we come to have a comfortable and lively perswasion or assurance of our Adoption and Predestination: So that this perswasion, assurance, or believing of a mans singular Election, is rather *solatium* then *mandatum*, a comfort which God by his holy Spirit worketh in those who endeavour to live a sober, just and godly life, then a command which God by his Ministers enjoyneth this or that man particularly to believe.

As for believing in Christ, we grant that God by the Ministers of the Gospel commandeth all men to whom Christ is preached to believe in him: And in this command our common and wel-known conditions of being sinners and standing in need of a Saviour are onely to be respected, not the distinct unknown conditions of men in Gods eternall and secret counsel predestinated or not-predestinated.

D But why is this command unjust *quoad non-electos*? The decree of Preterition neither taketh away any *power* of doing well, wherewith persons not-elected are endued; as we see verified in the non-elect angels, who were not stripped of their power of standing by Gods decree of Not-electing them: neither is it a decree binding Gods hands

hands from giving them sufficient grace to do many good acts, which they wilfully refuse to do. For Sufficient grace may stand with Non-election or Reprobation; though Effectuall grace doth not, as Divines commonly teach.

And last of all, for *power of believing*; I would know what power many millions of men have to believe in Christ (though reprobated no otherwise then the Remonstrants acknowledge eternall Reprobation) who never heard nor ever shall heare of Christ? When he hath shewed me what power of believing these men have, I will more easily shew him that any not-elected person living in the Church hath the same, if not a nearer and greater.

As for his terms of *Possibilities* and *Impossibilities*; they are so full of equivocations that it is hard to ground a good argument upon them. That is not impossible for any *Viator* to do for doing whereof it is possible for God to give sufficient grace. Now it is easie for God to give any not-elected person sufficient grace to repent and believe without any infringing of the eternall decree of his Non-election. Again, that is not to be judged absolutely impossible for a man to do which, if himself by a voluntary act of his own hindred not, might by him be done. And thus we say the Non-

elect have a power or possibilitie to believe or repent at the preaching of the Gospel: which power might be reduced into act, if the voluntary frowardnesse and resistivenesse of their own hearts were not the onely hindering cause. Other power then this the Remonstrants know not how to find in all those whom themselves acknowledge to be under the immutable decree of eternall Reprobation. In their opinion therefore as well as in ours, when God commandeth reprobated or non-elected persons to repent, believe and finally to persevere, his commands should be contrary to justice, because supposing the perverseneſse and voluntary resistance of their wills (which God hath decreed to permit) their believing and persevering is impossible.

E

Object. *It is not Gods unfeigned will they should believe, because he will not furnish them with necessary power to believe*; and therefore *he cannot justly tie them to believe: For then he should tie them to an act contrary to his determinate will.*

Answ. Gods *unfeigned* will is that will of approbation wherein he maketh known to us in his holy word what he would have us do and what he would have us not do. God was as farre from feigning or simulation when he called Cain and Judas to repenting and believing as when he called David and Peter.

Peter. But there is another will of God, whereby he decreeth in himself infallibly to produce the good acts of repenting in David and Peter, and to permit Cain and Judas out of their own perverse wills to continue in their unfaithfulnesse and impenitencie. This will is not revealed unto men, nor known till it be effected; and therefore feigning or simulation being *ad alterum*, it is ridiculous to charge these decrees with simulation. So that if God *voluntate approbante* doth unfeignedly like those things which he commandeth, there is no feigning in that will. If God *voluntate decernente* do infallibly work or not work according to his own secret counsel, there is no falsitie in that decree neither. Nor is there any contrarietie in these wills: for many actions are in their own kind and nature well-pleasing unto God, which notwithstanding God hath not determined to produce in this or that man. And yet we hold not that God hath determined to produce any bad actions in men, as impenitency, unbelief, or the like; because God willeth not that perversenesse or pravitie which is the effective or productive cause of them; though he hath decreed the permission, or not remotion, of that pravitie *in omnibus non electis*. [e] *Deus est causa non-appositionis gratiæ quodammodo, scilicet per modum quiescendi, non agendi.*

[e] *Altisiod. lib. 1. c. 19. p. 22. b. Vide Carthus. in 1m, dist. 10 q. 3.*

The

F

Object. The decree of Reprobation or absolute Non-election is unjust, *because* the non-elect *have no object of faith, no Christ to believe in*, and yet they are *commanded to believe.*

Answ. Christ is an object of faith unto all who have a possibilitie and promise of salvation. *Si crediderint*, *Si perseveraverint*; these promises are generall, and shall be truly performed unto all and every singular man that performeth the covenants. Non-election or negative Reprobation is not an absolute denyall of Christ as an object of faith to be propounded unto any man, nor a deniall of salvation unto any man performing the condition; but a deniall of that speciall grace and mercy without which God foreseeth they will trample the bloud of the covenant under their feet, and resolveth to permit them through their own voluntary wickednesse so to do. Such men have part in the covenant, and are capable of the benefit of the covenant, if they perform the articles of the covenant: And the elect themselves are no otherwise capable of the benefit thereof then by believing and persevering. Here is the difference; The elect have faith and perseverance infallibly wrought in them by the grace prepared for them in their Predestination; the non-elect, having not such effectuall grace prepared for them, continue voluntarily in their sins and

and unbelief. What the Remonſtrants have to ſay againſt this I know not: I am ſure S. Auguſtine ſaith, [f] *Poſſet Deus horum voluntates convertere, quoniam omnipotens eſt; poſſet planè. Cur ergò non fecit? Quia noluit. Cur noluerit penès ipſum eſt.* Neither are ſuch men in the ſame *caſe* with the *devils*: For unto them Chriſt is not propounded for a Saviour upon any conditions: unto them God giveth no means inducing them to repentance; no encouragement, though they ſhould repent: And yet (if [g] Leſſius, no enemy to the Remonſtrants doctrine, may be credited) the devils, if they might have had but that favour the non-elect have, would have repented, and not traduced it for crueltie and injuſtice as the Remonſtrants do.

[f] *De Gen. ad lit.* 11. 10.

[g] *De perf. Divin. lib.* 13. *fol.* 31.

And that this Authour may ſee that the Contra-remonſtrants put a difference betwixt the damned devils and the reprobates, *dum ſunt in ſtatu viæ*; In the Collation at Hague, [h] *Non negamus Chriſtum*, ſay they, *mortuum eſſe pro omnibus. Etſi infideles promeriti ſunt condemnationem, tamen eſt adhuc via & ratio per quam condemnationem poſſunt evadere, nimirum, ſi credant: Neque enim ulli homini præcisè reſecta eſt ſalutis ſpes. Poteſt peccator aliquis, etiam antequam credat, ſcire Chriſtum pro ſe mortuum eſſe, quod ad ſufficientiam meritorum attinet, imò verò quoad*

[h] *pag.* 124. p. 154. p. 155. p. 156.

quoad applicationem, ſi crediderit. The Remonſtrants dare not promiſe ſalvation unto any perſons reprobated according to their decree founded upon previſion of their finall infidelity and impenitency, but under theſe conditions, *Si crediderint & pœnituerint.* We aſſure them of ſaluation under the ſame conditions, notwithſtanding the abſolute decree of their Non-election. The Remonſtrants cannot aſſigne any grace or gracious operation of the Spirit of God which may ſtand truly with that decree of eternall Reprobation which they admit, and will not ſtand with that which we admit. It is therefore as true that Chriſt died for all men according to our doctrine of Predeſtination and Reprobation as according unto theirs.

G *Object.* Abſolute Reprobation maketh God unjuſt, becauſe it maketh *him puniſh men for omiſsion of an act which is made impoſsible by his own decree*, &c.

Anſw. A fallacy obtruding that for a cauſe of mens ſinne which was no cauſe. Gods decrees go before the events decreed: But *in malis* it is onely *anteceſsio ordinis non cauſalitatis.* The decree of Reprobation as the Remonſtrants put it, is eternall and immutable, it is antecedent to their act of ſinning or misbelieving, which are all temporall; and yet they would ſay we wronged them

if

if we ſhould charge that eternall decree with cauſing their temporall rebellion or deſtruction. They wrong us as much. For let Reprobation be abſolute or conditionate, it leaveth the ſame poſſibilities and the ſame liberty unto the agents. And there are the ſame difficulties in according the libertie of mans free-will with the infallible preſcience of God, which are in according it with the abſolute decrees of his Predeſtination. Thoſe who are verſed in the writings of the ancient Philoſophers, Divines or Schoolmen, cannot be ignorant of this, though ſuch as have confined their reading or (at leaſt) their belief to Arminius, Corvinus, and men of that ſtamp, think when they have founded Gods eternall Predeſtination and Preterition upon an eternall preſcience that they have removed all difficulties.

Vide Ruit. De ſcientia Dei, p. 252, 253, &c. & 265. 273. 285.

To his oppugning our anſwers pag. 314, &c.

H

For the decrees of Election and Reprobation; they have not reference to any capitulations, conditions, or promiſes, whereby God tieth himſelf to do thus or thus: but they are immanent eternall decrees, for affording or not affording *indebita beneficia*, or for affording them in greater or leſſer meaſure, according to the abſolute will and free pleaſure of God the giver.

There is no well-inſtructed underſtanding

ding that will conceive it contrary to juſtice, or contrary to mercy, for God in things of this nature to do as he will with his own. No humane underſtanding purged from prejudice, corrupt affections, corrupt opinions and other impediments of right judgement, will think it unjuſt for God abſolutely to decree the bringing of ſome men and angels unto eternall bleſſednesſe by preparing for them and beſtowing upon them ſuch means as he knoweth will and determineth ſhall bring them thereunto. And this we call abſolute Predeſtination. Nor will he think it unjuſt for God abſolutely to decree the permitting of ſome other angels and men to loſe eternall bleſſednesſe by their own default, and to decree the putting them under ſuch an order of providence as he infallibly knoweth they will abuſe to the procuring of their certain miſery. And this we call abſolute Reprobation. Neither of theſe are decrees of remunerative or vindicative juſtice: they are not grounded upon any antecedent promiſe or indentment: And therefore his whole diſcourſe to prove that Gods juſtice is the ſelf-ſame with the civil or morall juſtice of men, is here altogether impertinent. I paſſe it over therefore with this animadverſion, That if he extend divine juſtice to all acts and decrees of his abſolute will, where by faithfull promiſe he hath not

bound

ound himſelf to do the one way or the other, he will ſhew himſelf much mistaken, if he accuſe God of injuſtice for every act which would be very unjuſt were it done by men. Pride, fulneſſe of bread, abundance of idleneſſe, neglect of the poore, were the ſinnes for which Sodome was burned with fire and brimſtone from heaven: But poore ſucking infants guiltleſſe of the ſame crimes were by God adjudged to undergo the ſame flames. Put this to the triall of reaſon, and it will ſeem cruel and unjuſt. Young indiſcreet children for calling a Prophet *Baldpate*, were caſt by God unto the bears: If an earthly judge ſhould condemne children to be caſt unto the bears or lions for the like fault, put him upon the triall of reaſon, and the judge himſelf will be found to have done contrary to juſtice, and to have deſerved puniſhment. And to end in that example of infants, ſo often urged by this Authour; If an earthly king or judge, being able to hinder, ſhould ſuffer thouſands of his harmleſſe infant ſubjects to be tormented with pains, to be vexed by devils, to be ſnatched away with ſudden death, he would be deemed careleſſe, unjuſt, cruel: God ſeeth, and oftentimes ſuffereth all this to befall poore little babes, being moſt able to prevent it: call theſe doings of God to triall of humane reaſon, and it will never be able rightly

Ezek. 16. 49.

rightly to examine them. It is folly therefore to suppose that whosoever hath but the brain of a reasonable man, is able to fathom the depth of Gods just judgements. We say rather with learned and modest Saint Augustine, [1] *Cujus judicia nemo plenè comprehendit, nemo justè reprehendit.*

This Authour disliketh that we make Gods will such a *rule of righteousnesse* as that we may certainly inferre, *God willeth and worketh this; Therefore it is just he should so will and work:* Or, *God willeth not or worketh this; Therefore it is just he should neither will it nor work it.*

But he deceiveth himself, First, in that he will needs parallel and square the Divine justice unto the rule of civil and humane justice, not onely where God hath brought upon himself *debitum fidelitatis*, by promising or covenanting to do thus; but where he hath reserved unto himself *liberrimam potestatem* of doing or not doing, of doing this or the contrary. For example, if God should not shew mercy upon every sinner that repenteth, reason would say he dealt not justly; as it saith of men when they break their promise: But if God decree to soften one mans heart, and give him the grace of repentance and perseverance, and not to give the same graces to another, here it is not right reason, but blind and bold reason,

1 *De civit. l. 2. c. 23. Vide l. 20. c. 2. & Gers. De cons. Theol. l. 1. prosd 2.* Judicia tua, ô Deus, abyssus multa, *Psal. 36.*

I

reason, which chargeth God with injustice. If God strike a petty sinner presently and spare a grand sinner till he be old in wickedness, suffering him to do much mischief, and knowing that he will do much mischief if he be spared, neither the sudden striking of the lesser sinner nor the longer sparing of the greater is contrary to Divine justice: and yet such dealing is not according to the rule of humane civil justice allowable.

Secondly, this man is deceived, in supposing the Justice of God (which is to do nothing contrary to the goodness of his own nature) to be such a rule as restraineth him, if he will be just in his dealings, to one part of the contradiction. The rule of justice which tieth men to do justly, is such a rule as sheweth them unjust when they do otherwise. But (as I noted formerly) in things where there is no expresse covenant or promise on Gods part, if he should pretermit that which he doeth, and do that which he pretermitteth, if he should deal more mercifully with this man then he doth, or more severely with that, there were no injustice in it, nothing unbeseeming the Divine goodness. Impossible therefore it is to reduce Gods justice in his decrees or acts to the rules of reason or humane justice; since when these judge a decree or an action to hold square wth the rule of justice, they judge the preter-

mitting of it or doing the contrarie to be an act of injustice. But it fareth not so with God: and therefore by the generall consent of all Divines the opinion of Abulandus tending to this purpose is exploded: and the Master of the Sentences concludeth against him, [k] *Deus potest dimittere quæ facit, & facere quæ dimittit.* God had not been unjust, if he had stricken David with sudden death in the midst of his adulterie; neither was he unjust in forbearing him and expecting his repentance. Gods will was just in executing present vengeance upon Herode for accepting the profane acclamation of the flattering people; and Gods will had been just if he had decreed to have forborn him longer and to have given him repentance. God needeth not rules of humane justice. [l] *Justitia Dei essentia sua est, quæ regula omnium est, & nulli regulatur.* Gods will is *ordinatissima in se, & propter hoc non indiget ordinante. Ordo enim ordinante non indiget.* And Carthusianus; [m] *Totus ordo justitiæ originaliter ad Divinam voluntatem reducitur. Quicquid Deus vult, justum est, nec propriè ejus voluntas restringitur justitiâ.* And our Anselmus telleth us, [n] That when God punisheth wicked men, that it is just, because it is agreeable to their deserts; and when he spareth them, it is just too, because it is agreeable with his own godnesse. No man therefore looking at the rules

k *Lomb. lib. 3. dist. 43.*

Acts 12.

l *Alliss. tract. 19. quæst. 77.*

m *In 4. dist. 46. qu. 1.*

n *Prosc. 10*

rules of humane justice onely, can say of God, as we may of an earthly Judge, *If he decree this, he decreeth justly; if he doth this, he doth justly: but if he decreeth or doth otherwise, he decreeth or doth unjustly*; because where God hath not limited himself in his manner of dealing with men by his revealed word, there that is alwayes ° just *quod actualiter volitum est à Divina voluntate, & quia actualiter volitum est à Divina voluntate.* It is true, God cannot decree nor will any thing but *salvâ justitiâ*; that is, He can do nothing *contra justitiam*: yet he may decree and do many things *præter justitiam*: he may freely decree and do many things where *salvâ justitiâ* he might as freely have decreed and done the contrary. Gods will revealed is a rule of justice to us, & he commandeth us nothing contrarie to this rule: But Gods own absolute will is it which regulateth his dealings with us in all those things where he hath not made himself as it were a debter by some revealed ordinance of his own making. Now the Predestination of Abel and the Preterition of Cain were decrees regulated by no former promises or indentments: and hence it followeth that it had been no act of injustice in God which way soever he had decreed. Hence Suarez, ᵖ *Cùm causa omnium æqualis esset, hunc elegit Deus suo arbitrio, illum non elegit.*

° *Vide Scot. lib. 4. dist. 46. qu. 1.*

ᵖ *Opusc. l. 2. c. 5. p. 174.*

K To his further reply we say, That the decrees of absolute Predestination and Preterition do no more draw after them an *inevitable damnation* of any man then the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation which the Remonstrants admit of. This hath been already proved, and therefore whilest he supposeth this, he beggeth a false principle which must never be granted him. We confesse that absolute Reprobation clogged with those calumnies which he layeth upon it, of Making God the *cause of sinne*, of Necessitating mens wills unto their *inevitable damnation*, must needs appear odious unto right reason: But it is calumniation, not right reason, which imposeth these consequents upon the absolute decrees of Election and Non-election. Right reason rightly illuminated and sanctified will never forbid a Christian to believe that God without any injustice might absolutely have elected and predestinated many whom he hath left *inter non-electos*, and might absolutely have left *inter non-electos* many whom he hath predestinated.

L What he saith to our third answer, is quite besides the cushion. First, because we maintein that the absolute decrees do no more hinder God from giving any man a *power* of believing, or eschewing this or that sinne, then the conditionate decrees for which

which he striveth. Secondly, because for Election and Non-election, and for the preparation of effectuall grace flowing from the one and denegation of effectuall grace following the other, God was not tied either way by any revealed *ordination* or *promise*, as this Authour erroneously conceiveth.

As for Gods *law which cannot be kept without supernaturall grace*; we say, Men are as capable of any supernaturall grace, considered under the absolute decrees maintained by S. Augustine and by the Church of England, as considered under the conditionall decrees of late framed by Arminius and embraced by the Remonstrants.

For his further pains in labouring to prove that God is *bound to restore unto men power to believe*; it needeth no answer till he have proved that the decree of Reprobation as it is fansied by the Remonstrants, affordeth God this libertie, and as it is taught by us bindeth Gods hands. We have declared already, that the decree of absolute Non-election or negative Reprobation may stand with sufficiency of grace; and doth stand in our opinion with that kind of sufficiencie which the Remonstrants themselves are forced to flie unto. For they never dare maintein, that God giveth unto every man reprobated in their sense *proximam po-*

tentiam credendi; nor dare they maintein a ſufficiency of ſaving grace adminiſtred and beſtowed upon every ſingular perſon in the world. But they come in with limitations & exceptions; *In cauſis univerſalibus, Niſi per eos ſteterit, Niſi defecerint gratiæ oblatæ*, and the like. All this we can admit as well as the Remonſtrants, and turn it to our advantage. For as it is a proof of abſolute Predeſtination or Election, to have ſuch grace prepared for a man as abſolutely effecteth the end to which it is given; ſo it is a proof of abſolute Non-election or negative Reprobation to have ſuch grace onely prepared and given to a man as through the default of his own will worketh not that good end to which it ought to have ſerved.

I conclude therefore, That abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation are no more contrarie to the Juſtice of God then the Arminian Predeſtination and Reprobation founded upon the previſion of ſuch good or bad acts as men will do after they are born into this world.

Treatiſe.

4. *Oppoſite to God's* TRUTH.

FOurthly, it oppugneth the Truth and Sincerity of God. *God is a God of truth*, Deut. 32. 4. *Truth it ſelf*, John 14. 6. ſo called, becauſe he is the fountain of truth, and the perfection of truth without the leaſt mixture of falſhood. *The ſtrength of Iſrael cannot lie*, 1. Sam. 15. 29. *Let God be true, and every man a liar* (ſaith the Apoſtle:) *that he might be juſtified in his ſayings, and overcome when he is judged*, Rom. 3. 4.

Rom. 3.4. that is, Men may lie; for all men are liars: but God can never lie. If any man would go about to challenge him with untruth, his challenge would easily appear to be a calumny: The truth of God like the glorious sunne will break through all the clouds of false accusations that seek to obscure it. *Simile gaudet simili*, Like loveth his like: *God loveth such as are true of heart*, Psal. 51. 6. and hath an hypocrite in utter detestation: and therefore he must needs be true himself. No man (for ought I know) doubteth of it. But by absolute Reprobation God is made untrue and hypocriticall in his dealings with men, and in all matters apperteining to their eternall state; particularly, [1] in his Commands, [2] in his Offers of grace and glory, [3] in his Threats, [4] passionate Wishes and Desires of mens chief good, and [5] in his Expostulations, and Commiserations also.

I. In his (*A*) Commands. For by this doctrine God commandeth those men to repent and believe whom he secretly purposeth shall not believe. [1] *Though God command reprobates to believe the gospel, yet he will not have them believe*, saith Piscator. Now whom God commandeth to believe & repent; those he willeth outwardly should believe and repent; for by his commandments he signifieth his good will and pleasure: and he must inwardly and heartily will it too, or else he dissembleth. For words, if they be true, are an interpretation of the mind: when they are not, they are mere impostures and simulations.

[1] *Lib. contra Schafm. pag.* 60. Etsi reprobos mandat Deus ut evangelio credant, non vult tamen ut credant.

II. In his (*B*) Offers of grace and glory, which he maketh to such as refuse them and perish for refusing them, as well as to those who do accept them to their salvation. This is evident, Esay 65.2. *I have spread out my hands all the day long.* To whom? *to a rebellious people.* and Matt. 22. we reade, that those men were invited to the wedding that came not. & Acts 3.26. there it is said to the Jews who had *denyed Christ*, as vers. 14. *To you hath God sent his sonne Jesus to blesse you, in turning every one of you from your iniquities. How oft* (saith Christ) *would I have gathered you?* speaking of such as neglected their visitation, and so lost their salvation. It is evident also by reason. For as many as are under the commandment, are under the promise too, as we may see Acts 2.38,39. *Repent, and be baptized every one of you, and ye shall receive the gift of the holy Ghost: for to you and your children is the promise made.* In which words Peter maketh the command and the promise of equall extent, both universall. And there is cause

why: For he maketh the promise his motive to perswade obedience to the command: and it would not have reached home, if it had not respected all those to whom the command was given. No man, reprobate or other, thinketh any lesse. Every man that heareth the Gospel preached, taketh himself to be under the gracious offer of eternall life, and upon these thoughts hath some desires, some hopes of it, and stirreth up himself to forsake some pleasing sinnes which otherwise he would not part with, and do some unwelcome duties which otherwise he would not do. But now Gods meaning is (by this doctrine) that the most of those to whom he offereth his grace and glory, shall have neither. And so Piscator saith,

k *De prad. cont. Schasm. pag.* 74. Gratia non offertur à Deo singulis (licèt vocatis) animo communicandi eam, sed solis electis.

k *Grace is not offered by God even to those who are called, with a meaning to give it, but to the elect only.* In the same book he hath such another speech; l *Though God in words protest he would have reprobates to believe, yet indeed he will not have them.* They make God to deal with men in matters of salvation as the poets feigne the gods to have dealt with poore Tantalus: They placed him in a clear and goodly river up to the very chin, and under a tree which bare much sweet and pleasant fruit that did almost touch his lips: but this they did with a purpose that he should tast of neither: for when he put his mouth to the water to drink, it waved away from him; & when he reached his hand to the fruit to have eaten of it, it withdrew it self presently out of his reach, so as he could neither eat nor drink. Just so dealeth God with reprobates, by their doctrine: He placeth them under the plentifull means of salvation, offereth it to them so plainly that men would think they might have it when they will, and yet intendeth fully they shall never have it, withholding from them either the first grace that they cannot believe, or the second grace that they cannot persevere. Did not those gods delude Tantalus? Yes doubtlesse. And if God do so with reprobates, what doth he but delude them and dissemble with them in his faireſt and likeliest offers of salvation that he maketh them? And this do Zanchius and Bucer grant by evident consequence, as appeareth by a speech or two of theirs, which cannot stand with their conclusion, and therefore (I suppose) fell unwarily from them. Zanchius telleth us roundly, that every man who is called, is bound to think that he is elected, otherwise he doth offer great injury to God, and m *accuse him of lying, which saith to him in his word, that he desireth his salvation, and for this cause hath called him.*

l Non vult Deus reprobos credere, licèt linguâ profiteatur se velle, *pag.* 143.

m *Zanch. l.* 5. *De nat. Dei, cap.* 2. Perstringere Deum mendacii, qui illi in verbo dicit se velle salutem ejus, & in hunc finem ad Christum vocasse.

In

which speech he plainly implyeth, that if God call a man when he hath absolutely rejected, he doth but delude him when he calleth him. The like speech hath Bucer; [a] *A man must believe that he is predestinate, or else he maketh God to mock him when he calleth him.* A man therefore that is not predestinate but an absolute reprobate, when he is called to salvation, is but deluded: It is the necessary resultance of their speeches. If a creditour should resolve upon no terms to forgive his debtour one farthing of his debt, and yet make him offers to remit the whole upon some conditions, and bind his offers with a deep and solemn oath; would not we say that he were a rank dissembler and a mere deluder of his poore debtour? We can say no lesse of God, if it be true that he hath irrevocably decreed at no hand to save such particular men, and yet promiseth and sweareth that he will save them if they will believe his promises and repent. What can such oathes and promises be but mere delusions of miserable men?

[a] Bucer. in c. 8. ad Rom. qu. de prad. Primum quod Deo debes, est ut credas esse te ab eo prædestinatum. Nam id ni credas, facis eum tibi, cùm te ad salutem vocat per evangelium, illudere.

III. In his (C) Threats and Comminations also by this doctrine is God made to be hollow and deceitfull. For against what sinnes are threats denounced? Alwayes against actuall sinnes: We never read that they are thundered out against us for originall sinne: They intimate therefore that the sinnes for which men go to hell, are their actuall transgressions. But if it be true that God decreed men to hell for originall sinne, that which those threats import and signifie is not true, and so God is not sincere in them. Besides, all threatnings imply that the evil threatned may be avoyded: for therefore are they denounced, that men might by them be brought to repentance, and so escape the evils threatned: But if some men be peremptorily ordained to destruction, then their destruction cannot be prevented: and so the threatnings of damnation in this respect also do signifie an untruth, and God in them dealeth not plainly with men.

IV. In all the (D) other things before mentioned is God full of guile too (by this opinion) namely, in his 1. Passionate Wishes, that even those men might repent that repent not, and might be saved that through their impenitencie are not saved. Of these we reade, Deut. 5. 29. *O that there were such a heart in them to fear me, that it might go well with them.* and Psal. 81. 11. *O that my people had hearkened, and Israel had walked in my wayes,* &c. and Esay 48. 18. *O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandments,* &c. 2. In his mournfull Expostulations. Esay 5. 3. *Judge, I pray you, betwixt*

betweene me and my vineyard: what could I have done more for my vineyard? And Jerem. 2. throughout the whole chapter, eſpecially verſe 31. *Have I been a wilderneſſe to Iſrael, or a land of darkneſſe?* and verſe 32. *Can a maid forget her ornaments, or a bride her attire? yet my people have forgotten me dayes without number.* Ezek. 33. 11. *Turn ye, turn ye: why will ye die, O houſe of Iſrael?* 3. In his mekings Commiſerations of the wofull condition of fooliſh men who would not be reclaimed. *How ſhall I give thee up, O Ephraim? how ſhall I deliver thee, O Iſrael? My repentings are kindled together, my heart is turned within me,* Hoſ. 11. 8. *O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, which killeſt the prophets, and ſtoneſt them that are ſent to thee,* &c. In all theſe there is but little ſinceritie, if there be a ſecret reſolution that the moſt of thoſe towards whom thoſe wiſhes, chidings and pitifull bemoning are uſed, ſhall be damned without remedie. Gods faireſt offers, his ſweeteſt invitations, his greateſt ſympathies, and ampleſt curteſies, if this doctrine be true, come little ſhort (I think) of Abſaloms feaſt, Joabs congie, the kiſſe of Judas, and the hyena's tears. For in all theſe *aliud animo vult, aliud verbis ſignificat,* he ſaith one thing and meaneth another, and therefore diſſembleth.

Nay, the whole Miniſtery (wherein God commandeth, offereth, chideth, entreateth, lamenteth, &c.) if this be true, is but a mere impoſture, a giving of words without any meaning of anſwerable deeds, and an impoſture ſo much the greater, by how much the ſhew of kindneſſe is the heartier. For how can a good thing be offered with ſtronger ſhews of a good meaning, then when it is offered with exhortations and intreaties to accept it, with clear demonſtrations of the excellencies of it, with unfeigned wiſhes that the parties to whom it is offered would accept it, and bitter lamentations for their folly in refuſing it? With all theſe inforcements is Gods tender of ſalvation to reprobates accompanied, and therefore in ſhew moſt heartie and ſerious. In a word, thus ſpeaketh (E) God (by his doctrine) to reprobates in the miniſterie; *O ye reprobates, once moſt dearly beloved of me in your father Adam, but now extremely and implacably hated, and by mine eternall and uncontrollable order ſealed up under invincible ſinne and miſery; amend your lives, and believe in the name of mine only-begotten Sonne. If ye repent and believe not, there is no remedy, ye muſt be damned: but if ye repent and believe, ye ſhall be ſaved; though your ſinnes*

be

red as scarlet, I will make them as white as wooll. Think that I would have you dies for I swear, As I live, I not the death of him that dyeth; I would have no man perish, but all to come to repentance. I beseech you therefore be reconciled. I have cryed and called unto you, I have long time waited upon you, that ye might repent, and still am I knocking at the doores of your hearts for entrance. O that there were a heart in you to fear me and keep my commandments, that it might go well with you for ever. What shall I do unto you? how shall I intreat you? will ye not be made clean? When will it once be? Can God speak thus to reprobates, who by his own decree shall never repent nor be saved, without the deepest dissimulation?

That which is usually said to clear the absolute decree from this crimination, is, That God wisheth the salvation of the reprobate seriously, but not absolutely: he would have those men saved who are not saved, but yet upon condition they will repent and believe: And therefore, though they do perish, yet God is candid and sincere in his offers of salvation to them: for therefore do they perish, because they perform not the condition, and not because God offereth not salvation seriously unto them.

But this answer is too short. It is true (*F*) indeed, God will have all men to be saved upon condition onely that they will believe and repent, according to that speech of S. Ambrose, *Deus vult omnes salvari, si & ipsi velint*, God would have all to be saved, if they themselves would. For if he would absolutely have it so, what can hinder it? who hath resisted his will? And it is true likewise, that a conditionall promise may be serious as well as an absolute: but then the condition must be possible to them to whom the promise is made, and the performance of the condition must be a part of Gods will as well as the salvation promised; or else the promise cannot be candid and sincere. *Conditio est oblata potestas aliquid eligendi*, A condition is the offer of a power of choice. Where there is no libertie of choice afforded, there is no true condition appointed. In substance it is all one to offer a courtesie under a condition (*G*) not possible, and not to offer it at all; and in circumstance it is much worse. In substance all one. The Lawyers tell us that a contract made *sub conditione impræstabili nullus æstimatur*, under a condition not possible, is esteemed no bargain. And the Logicians rule is, That ° a conditionall proposition which hath an impossible

° Conditionalis propositio quæ habet annexam conditionem impossibilem, æquipollet simpliciter neganti.

possible condition annexed to it, is equivalent to a bare negation. It is all one for me to offer a piece of money to a blind man upon condition he will open his eyes and tell me what piece of money it is and what stamp it hath, and to deny it flatly to another: For the one hath it no more then the other. And it is all one for a man that hath a daughter to bestow in marriage, to tell her suiter, *I will give you my daughter, if you will span the earth, or touch the heavens with your finger*, and to tell him plainly, *Set your heart at rest; I will never bestow her upon you:* For the suiter speedeth both ways alike. And it is in circumstance a great deal worse. For it is a deniall under colour of the contrary, a deniall joyned with a scoff, a derision, as was that of the Jebusites, 2. Sam. 5. 6. who told David that he should not enter into the fort of Zion *except he took away the blind and the lame.* Their meaning was, They would never deliver it up unto him: and because they thought it impossible for him to take away the blind and the lame, they told him if he did so, then they would yield it up. It was an ironicall and scoffing deniall of his demand. If the King should make an unrepealable law, that no Germane should be made a citizen of London or free denison of the Kingdome, and then make a decree to give some bountifull gratuities, but to the citizens of London or to the subjects of the Kingdome onely, and to none but them; and yet for all this should command it to be proclaimed, that he will give them to the Germanes upon condition they will be made freemen of London, or be incorporated into the Kingdome: would not any man say, that the King in this case did dissemble and delude the poore Dutchmen? And if any should say, there would be no dissembling in it; for if they would become citizens or subjects, they should have the promised gratuities: a man might truly answer, that therefore the King doth counterfeit and cosen them, because he maketh a tender of them upon a condition not possible by his own decree. In like manner, if God have made a decree, that such men shall never believe, and yet offer them heaven on condition they will believe; it may most truly be said, that God doth not onely denie them heaven, but denie it with a bitter derision, which is farre from that candour and goodnesse that dwelleth in him.

And thus have I shewed the contrarietie of this opinion to foure principall Attributes of God: which is my second generall reason against it.

Answer.

Answer.

Whether absolute Reprobation oppugne the Truth and Sinceritie of God.

WE grant it is impossible for God to be either *untrue* in his sayings and promises, or *hypocriticall in his dealings* or actions: And here we might in one word cut the sinews of his whole discourse with this generall Answer, That the eternall decrees of Election and Reprobation, as they were terminated unto singular persons before they had any being in nature, are not uttered or declared by any revealed word, promise, ordination, or convention made betwixt God and us. Be the decrees therefore whereby some are elected eternally, others eternally non-elected, never so absolute, they cannot *oppugne* the *truth* of Gods word or fidelitie of his promise, where no word or promise was ever revealed or made to any man. As for Gods dealings and temporall actions with men, there is no more difficultie in clearing them from hypocrisie holding Election and Reprobation as we do, then there is, holding it as Arminius doth.

But let us come to satisfie his particular objections. First, absolute Reprobation argueth not hypocrisie in God, commanding belief or repentance unto any man. The reason

reaſon is, Becauſe when God commandeth any thing which is good, juſt and holy, he truly and unfeignedly liketh and loveth ſuch actions, and can do no other, his own naturall goodneſſe and holineſſe terminating *voluntatem Divinæ complacentiæ* unto all holy actions by whomſoever performed. If God ſhould command any perſon not-elected to believe, to live ſoberly, juſtly and godlily in this preſent world, and ſhould diſlike him for ſo doing, here were diſſembling: but to command Cain or Judas to repent and believe, though God from all eternitie purpoſed to denie them that ſpeciall effectuall grace without which he knew they would never repent or believe, here is no diſſembling. Gods commands intimate what is well-pleaſing unto him, if it be done, not what himſelf by ſpeciall grace prepared for ſome men hath eternally and infallibly purpoſed to make them do. God is not truly ſaid to purpoſe that the reprobate ſhould not believe, unleſſe it could be ſhewed that the cauſes of their unbelief flow from his eternall decree or purpoſe of Non-election.

Corvinus. The Remonſtrants will not denie that the decree of Cains or Judas his Reprobation was both eternall & immutable; neither can they affirm that God eternally and ſecretly in his own counſels purpoſed to make them repent

repent or believe, but onely to administer such graces unto them as should either convert them or leave them inexcusable. We say the same: and therefore a secret purpose of making them not believe, can be no more fastened upon our doctrines then upon theirs; because that is onely a defect or an omission, and therefore must be reduced onely to the defective will of man, and not to Gods will or purpose, which cannot be the cause of deficiencie.

Secondly, absolute Reprobation doth not oppose Gods truth in his offers of grace and glorie to such as refuse them and perish for refusing them. If it did, the Remonstrants were in no better case with their Election and Non-election or Reprobation founded upon an eternall infallible prescience, then we that found the distinct decrees upon Gods absolute will. For this prescience supposed, Arminius himself granteth an eternall, immutable and absolute decree, [a] *quo Deus decrevit singulares & certas personas salvare & damnare.* And reason telleth us, that every conditionall proposition, *purificatâ conditione, transit in absolutam.* God therefore, who eternally saw Judas as finally impenitent, and with whom Judas his finall impenitencie was not considered as a future uncertain condition, but as a thing certain and present, according to the Remonstrants

B

[a] *Decl. sent. pag.* 47.

Vide Coll. Hag. 111.

Remonstrants own doctrine) could passe other then an absolute decree of Reprobation upon him. Now if this decree hindereth not the offers of Divine grace unto any man, nor falsifieth the universall promises, no more doth the other. For the absolute decree of Election as we conceive of it is not of this form or tenour, *I will save Peter whether he will believe or not believe, repent or not repent*, but, *I will save Peter by preparing for him such speciall grace as shall infallibly cause him to believe and repent.* And the decree of Reprobation is not thus to be conceived, *I will damne Judas whether he believe or not believe, repent or not repent*; for this were contrary to the truth of the evangelicall promises: but thus, *I am absolutely determined not to give unto Judas that speciall grace which would cause him to believe and repent; and I am absolutely purposed to permit him to incurre his own damnation by his voluntary obstinacie and finall impenitencie.* These promises or indentments upon which the temporall atteinment of salvation is suspended, or the temporall incurring of damnation, are as universall, as firm, as truly on Gods part performed according to our doctrine of absolute Election and Preterition as according unto theirs.

For grace offered; *Gods meaning* must alwayes be interpreted according to the known

known nature of the means, and not according to the unknown will of God concerning the infallible event or succesſe of the means. Gods meaning when he offereth any grace unto men, is, that they ſhould perform ſuch actions whereunto ſuch grace conduceth: And his meaning when he promiſeth glorie to any man if he believe and perſevere, is, truly to perform it if he do ſo. But it is not alwayes Gods abſolute will to cauſe men to uſe his grace unto their own good, nor to cauſe them to perform thoſe conditions unto which eternall glorie is promiſed. If the Remonſtrants will have nothing termed *Gods meaning* but this abſolute will, in their opinion as well as in ours it will follow that God had no meaning to give Cain or Judas ſaving grace or glorie.

As for his *poeticall* fiction, it will make no more againſt us then himſelf; becauſe there is no power or grace by his conditionate Predeſtination and Reprobation afforded unto perſons not-elected, which may not be as well afforded according unto our doctrine, as we have often already ſhewed.

For *Zanchius* and *Bucers* opinion concerning the command of *believing* a mans ſingular *Election* or *Predeſtination*, I have formerly expreſſed my judgement, which I ſubmit unto the learned. If there were

ſuch a neceſſarie univerſall command, onely upon this reaſon, becauſe the grace of vocation is infallibly fruſtrated by all the Non-elect, this being true as well in the Remonſtrants opinion as ours, this mandate of *believing* a mans ſingular *Election* would reach unto them as well as unto us. And all which they talk of *mere deluſions* of men not-elected (in regard there is an eternall purpoſe of God to permit them to make all grace offered unto them fruitleſſe) fighteth againſt themſelves as much as againſt us. For they dare not denie this evident truth; and they acknowledge an eternall, an immutable, irrevocable decree of Reprobation as well as we. Which decree being eſtabliſhed (as they would have it) upon the eternall Divine Preſcience before the foundations of the world were laid, they are as abſolutely reprobated at the time of their calling according to their opinion as ours.

For his compariſon of a *Creditour* and a *Debtour*, it hath no more force againſt abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation then againſt that Predeſtination and Reprobation which himſelf admitteth: For the conditionall offer of pardon ſtandeth alike firm unto both. As for the power of believing, whether Judas be conſidered as eternally reprobated upon the eternall preſci-

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ence or otherwise, nothing hindereth but God may give him the same power both wayes. Last of all, for the decree of Damnation, it is every whit as *irrevocable* in Arminius his new opinion as in the opinion of S. Augustine. If then the offer of grace and salvation unto men eternally and irrevocably reprobated be not merely delusorie in their opinion, no more is it according to our doctrine.

For Gods *threatning* of punishment against sinne, I wonder how this Authour dareth restrain it onely to the *actuall* sinnes committed by this and that singular person. *Mortem morieris*, was in the judgement of the Catholick Church a punishment denounced against Adams posterity as well as against himself; and by that personall sinne of his every singular person descending from his loyns is by nature the child of wrath. And, if this Authour will give us leave to believe our ix^th Article, that corruption of nature which we draw from Adam deserveth Gods wrath and damnation. Unto what manner or degree of punishment infants unregenerate are condemned, we will not curiously debate; but for this mans reasons who goeth about to exempt them from all sinne and punishment, they savour so rankly of Pelagianisme that we will not meddle with them.

C

Rom 5.14.

Eph.2.3.

Vide Calvin in Hispanis cap. 14. 1.

D For Gods *Wiſhes, Expoſtulations, Commiſerations*, and the like, it will not follow that they are feigned and mere deluſions, becauſe the eternall immanent decrees of Election or Reprobation are abſolute and unchangeable: For were it ſo, the Remonſtrants can no better defend themſelves from theſe objections then we. But it muſt here be firſt of all conſidered, that *Reprobatio æterna nihil ponit in reprobato*. It putteth onely in God a firm decree of permitting ſuch perſons to fall into finall ſinne, and for it a firm decree of condemning them unto eternall puniſhment. This being granted on all ſides, it cannot reaſonably be conceived that God ſhould properly be ſaid to wiſh the repentance or ſalvation of Cain, Judas, or any not-elected perſon. They are (as before hath been touched) things in the firſt conſideration ſimply good; and therefore *ſimplex complacentia Divina* doth properly agree unto them: and that is all which can be truly inferred from ſuch wiſhes, either in our doctrine or the doctrine of the Remonſtrants. And this is enough to defend them from being deluſory, though God have eternally decreed to permit Cain and Judas to abuſe the means of repentance, and to continue in their impenitency.

For *Expoſtulations*, we ſay they imply *diſplicentiam Divinam* againſt ſuch perſons and actions

actions as crosse the revealed law of Gods will: and this is a true and not feigned displeasure: But they do not import that God wanted power to have converted such persons, and to have wrought their wills unto the practice of the contrary good actions, had he eternally decreed to shew them this speciall mercy. Neither do they import that God had made no such decree of denying or withholding from Cain and Judas that speciall grace without which he knew they would rush upon their everlasting perdition.

As for the Divine *Commiseration* of sinners, it sheweth that their death and damnation are not things primarily well-pleasing unto God: but it sheweth not that God must become an hypocrite and a dissembler, if he have eternally decreed to permit them to incurre death & damnation by their own default. For Gods mercy being *actio subleuantis* and not *passio condolentis*, it tieth him not to do all he can for redeeming any man out of his misery; but his action is ordered and limited by his own free-will. It is the height and riches of Gods mercy which from everlasting hath prepared for the Elect onely, and in time bestoweth upon them onely that speciall & effectuall grace which infallibly bringeth them unto glory. It is a lower degree of mercy (and yet true mercy

too) which is shewed to the Non-elect or Reprobate, in preparing for them and bestowing upon them such means of grace as by their own default are made ineffectuall.

And it is not contrary to Divine mercy to decree this permitting of them to the deficiency of their own free-will, that so the Elect may see what a broken reed they lean upon, who will have the eternall decree of their Election and Salvation founded on their own foreseen good acts of repentance, faith and perseverance, and not upon any speciall mercy of God predestinating them to these good and gracious acts, and so infallibly bringing them unto the kingdome of glory.

To discover briefly the main point wherein this Authour deceiveth himself in this whole discourse, it is this; He thinketh all is feigned and hypocriticall which God doeth or offereth unto men not-elected *in ordine ad salutem*, if he have eternally decreed to permit them to fail in the use of such means and to continue impenitent, if he have eternally decreed to condemne them for this their voluntary rebellion. Other absolute Reprobation then this we defend not: and if this maketh Gods dealings with the Non-elect hypocriticall, we must deny the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation,

or

at least deny them to be eternall, which no judicious Divine will ever do.

For his speech uttered in the person of God, from whence he would inferre, that if in the decree of Reprobation it be certain & immutable that Cain, Judas, or any other persons not-elected, shall never repent and be saved, then all which God saith or doeth for the converting or saving of such persons is *deep dissimulation*; many errours may be descried in those few lines. E

First, he supposeth the eternall acts and decrees of Predestination and Reprobation to be uncertain *quoad eventum*, and to be mutable in time into the contrary. A grosse errour even in the school of Arminius. Secondly, he supposeth Non-election or Reprobation to be an act of *hatred* towards angels and men not-elected; which hath been proved false. Thirdly, he imagineth the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation to *seal* men *up under a necessity* of doing well and being saved, or of sinning and being damned: whereas they stand well with freedome of mans will. Fourthly, he implyeth that whereas God useth means to effect any good end in men, if he have eternally decreed to permit them to abuse those means, & to condemne them eternally for abusing them, that this argueth *dissembling* in God. All these erroneous imaginations discover

themſelves in that ſhort ſpeech. And that which yet more diſcovereth the weakneſſe of his inference; The eternall and immutable decrees of Predeſtination and Reprobation (as they are conceived by the Remonſtrants themſelves) ſhould make all Gods temporall ſayings and dealings with reprobated perſons, feigned and hypocriticall, if there were any manner of ſtrength in his manner of reaſoning.

F The abſolute decree of Reprobation truly underſtood doth no more oppoſe the truth of Evangelicall *promiſes*, then the Arminian or Remonſtrants Reprobation: neither doth it make the *conditions* one jote leſſe *poſsible* then theirs: neither doth it deny any *will* in God of ſuch mens converſion or ſalvation which they according to their opinion can truly affirm to be in God. We profeſſe ingenuouſly, that the eternall decree of Non-election or negative Reprobation, doth put *in mente aut voluntate Divina*, an abſolute deniall of that ſpeciall effectual grace whereby the Creatour intendeth to bring his creature infallibly unto glory. And if the Remonſtrants ſay that the eternall Reprobation of ſingular perſons (as it is laid down by themſelves) doth not contein the ſame negation, they ſay that which they are never able to maintein. Let us clear this by example.

Before

Before the foundations of the world were laid, and before the angels were created, by an absolute decree of the Divine will they were distinguished *in Electos & Non-electos*. For all this the not-elect angels had a possibility of not-rebelling against God, a possibility of atteining eternall happinesse had they not rebelled, a sufficiency of Divine grace given them to have preserved them from rebellion, had they not by a voluntary act of their own abused that grace. And to come to the eternall and immutable decrees of Predestination and Reprobation, as they concern singular persons *quoad numerum numerantem & numeratum*, eternally and immutably distinguished *in electos & reprobatos*; This eternall decree hindered not God from creating Adam with a sufficiencie of grace, with a possibilitie of standing, and by standing of preserving his posterity in the state of righteousnesse, and so bringing them to an estate of happinesse.

So that it is evident, that Sufficiency and Possibility of grace and glory may stand together with the absolute decree of Non-election.

As for particular persons considered in the estate of sinne wherein all mankind now lieth, the decree of Reprobation maketh not repenting and believing *impossible conditions* G

unto

unto them: It is some voluntary intervenient act or omission which maketh them so. And if this Authour term their finall repentance *impossible*, because never any of the Non-elect repented and by repentance attained salvation, he must yield that even that eternall decree of Reprobation upon prescience, which himself admitteth, maketh their repenting, finall believing, and salvation impossible. His rule of law therefore *de conditione impræstabili* doth no more concern us, who place the distinct decrees of Predestination and Reprobation before the absolute prescience of mens finall perseverance and mens finall impenitency, then it doth those that bring them in after. For possibilities and impossibilities are just the same, and neither greater nor lesser, in the one way then in the other. If the decree of Preterition or Reprobation were a decree of forbidding or hindering any mans repenting & believing, or a decree necessitating the wills of men to obstinacy and infidelity, his *simile* of a Kings *unrepealable law* were to some purpose: But this being altogether false, that is altogether frivolous, because no such *impossibility* is caused by Gods decree of Reprobation.

THirdly, it is contrary to the use and end of Gods gifts bestowed upon men: Which gifts are of two sorts: 1. Gifts of Nature; our Creation, Sustentation, Preservation, together with Health, Strength, Beauty, Wisdome, &c. 2. Gifts of Grace; which have a more immediate relation to everlasting life, and are means either of purchasing salvation or of applying it. Means of purchasing it, are the coming of Christ into the world, and the Sacrificing of himself on the crosse. Means of applying it, are the Ministery of the word and Sacraments, the Long-suffering of God, the Enlightening of ments understandings, the Plantation of many excellent virtues in their hearts, with many more of the like sort. Now of these endowments of Nature and Grace what the true use and end is, the Scripture doth plainly and particularly shew us.

III. *It is contrary to the use and end of* GODS GIFTS *to men.*

First, for gifts of Nature, we find (*A*) them bestowed upon all that have them, for the encouraging and enabling of them to serve God and save their souls. For Acts 14. 16, 17. the Apostle saith, that God (even in those times in which he suffered the Gentiles to walk in their own wayes, & withheld from them the light of his holy word) did give unto the people of the world *rain from heaven and fruitfull seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladnesse*, and in so doing he left not himself among them *without witnesse*. This implieth, that therefore he gave them these good things that he might make himself known unto them, and so might draw them to glorifie him according to the knowledge which they had of him. Acts 17. 26. the Apostle saith directly, that therefore men are made and placed in this world and appointed to their severall times and dwellings, *that they might seek and find God*, that is, that they might serve him and save their souls. For what is it to seek God but to serve him? and what is it to find God but to enjoy his face and favour here and in heaven? To this purpose Prosper, p *Therefore*, saith he, *it every creature made and ordained especially, that mankind, which is indued with knowledge and abilitie to discourse,*

p *Prosp. De voc. Gent. l. 2. c. 4. p. 828* Cœlum quippe, ael terra, & mare, omnisque creatura quæ videri & intelligi potest, ad hanc præcipuè dispositæ est humani generis utilitatem, ut natura rationalis de contemplatione tot specierum, de experimentis tot bonorum, de perceptione tot munerum, ad cultum & dilectionem sui imbueretur Autoris, implente omnia Spiritu Dei, in quo vivimus, movemur & sumus.

might

might by the sight of so many goodly sorts of creatures and the taste of so many blessings be drawn to the love and service of his and their Maker. And a little after he saith, in the same chapter, [q] *Look of what use the Law and Prophets were to the Israelites, of the same use were the gifts of Creation & Providence to the Gentiles.* God never intended to deal with the Gentiles as the foul-mouthed Manichees said he dealt with the Jews, to feed and fat them up with outward and mere common blessings, as so many hogs and swine with husks and akorns, but to draw them up by these to an expectation of better things and a carefull endeavour to please God, that so they might obtein them. The end of all creatures and of all created gifts bestowed upon man is subordinate to the end of man. Mans end is to glorifie God upon earth, and enjoy perpetuall society with him in heaven; and the end of those gifts is to direct and encourage man to atchieve that high and excellent end to which his Creatour had appointed him.

[q] *Ibid.* Quod ergò in Israel per constitutionem legis & prophetica eloquia gerebatur, hoc in universis nationibus totius creaturæ testimonia & bonitatis Dei miracula semper egerunt.

Now for the gifts of grace, they likewise are given to all them that enjoy them for the same use and end too.

For I. first, Christ came into the world, not that he might be a rock of offense at which the greater part of men should stumble and fall, but to shed his bloud, and by that bloud to purchase salvation for all mankind, not onely for those who are saved, but for those also who through their wilfull unbelief and impenitencie are not saved; as we may see John 3.17. *God sent his Sonne* (saith the Sonne) *into the world, not to condemne the world, but that the world through him might be saved.* In which words the end of his coming is set down 1. Negatively, *not to condemne the world*; 2. Affirmatively, *but that the world through him might be saved: and therefore very fully.* The like speech we have John 12.47. *I came not to judge the world, but to save it.* These negations joyned with affirmations shew that the salvation of all men was the onely end of Christs coming, the end exclusively: no other end was properly intended by it but this. *The Sonne of man came to seek and to save what was lost,* Luke 19 10. Therefore he came to save every man; for every man was lost. And Acts 3. 26. *To you* (saith S. Peter) *hath God sent his Sonne Jesus; to blesse you, in turning every one of you from your iniquities; every one of you,* you that reject him as well as you that receive him. The end then of Christs coming into the world was the Salvation of all and every man therein.

II. The ministery of the Word and Sacraments is given also

also and appointed for the same end, and is in its own proper nature and use an instrument of conveying the Spirit of regeneration to those that live under it, and to all those. Better proofs for this I cannot have then those which our reverend Diuines (B) at Dort gathered to my hand. Esay 59. 21. *This is my covenant with them, saith the Lord, My Spirit that is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor seeds seed for ever.* HINC PATET (say they) *From these words it appeareth, that the word and Spirit are joyned in the ministery of the word with an inseparable band, by the promise of God. Hence is is that the Ministers of the new Testament are called* Ministers not of the letter but of the Spirit; *not of* the letter that killeth, *but of* the Spirit that giveth life, 2. *Cor.* 3. 6. *And the ministery of the Gospel is called* διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος, the ministery of the Spirit, *in the same place, vers.* 8. *Hence also is the Gospel called* χάρις σωτήριος Grace bringing salvation, *Tit.* 2. 11. *and* λόγος καταλλαγῆς, the word of reconciliation, 2. *Cor.* 5. 19. To these let me adde 1. Pet. 1. 23. where the word is called *the seed of the new birth*; and 2. Cor. 5. 20. where Ministers are called *embassadours for Christ to beseech men to be reconciled to God.* They are so called, to shew that the word preached is by Gods appointment an instrument to make men new creatures, and that the proper matter of Ministers errands is reconciliation with God, and the naturall fruit of it is in Gods intent not the obduration and destruction but the conversion and salvation of men. The same Authours out of John 15. 22. IF I HAD NOT COME AND SPOKEN UNTO THEM, THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE HAD SINNE, do say *it is evident, that Christ in his preaching did administer so much inward grace as was sufficient* (C) *to convince those that rejected the Gospel of positive unbelief, and render them obnoxious to just punishment*; and by good consequence (say I) so much as sufficed by their good husbandry to have converted and saved them: for that grace leaveth none without excuse which is not sufficient to convert them. I will conclude what they say of this gracious intention of God in the ministery of the word with that speech of Prospers cited by them in the same places: *They that say that all those to whom the Gospel is preached (even those that obey not the Gospel) are not called to grace, they say an untruth; God looked for Grapes,* saith the text, Esay 5. 2. What doth this imply, but that it was

Suffrag. Brit. pag. 30, 31. art. 2. Thes. 5

1 *Prosper. ad cap. Gall. resp. ad obj. 4.* Non omnes vocari ad gratiam eos, quibus omnibus evangelium prædicatur, non rectè dicitur, etiamsi sint qui evangelio non obaudiant,

Gods

Gods principall aim in the husbandry which he bestowed upon the Church of Israel, that it should bring forth good fruit, though in the event it did not? *How oft would I have gathered you*, saith Christ to Jerusalem, Matth. 23. 37. *These things*, saith he, *have I spoken to you, that ye might be saved. But ye will not come to me, that ye might have life*, John 5. 34. 40. in those words intimating no lesse then this, That it was his full intent by his preaching to gather and to save those very particular men that in the end were not gathered nor saved through the contempt or neglect of Christs ministery.

Touching the (D) Sacraments, this is also the use and end for which they were ordained: as we may see, Luke 7. 30. where we have these words, *But the Scribes and Pharisees and trepounders of the Law despised the counsel of God against themselves, and were not baptized of John.* In which words this much is evidently included, That it was Gods counsel & purpose in Johns baptisme to bring them to Christ, and in him to heaven. So much also is said of his baptisme, Mark 1. 4. *John did baptize in the wilderneſſe, and preach the baptiſme of repentance and remiſſion of ſinnes.* If this were the end of Johns, much more is it the end of Christs baptisme: it being more excellent then Johns was, not in substance, but in the fulnesse of grace administred and dispensed by it. *All that have been baptized into Christ* (saith the Apostle) *have been baptized into his death*, Rom. 6. 3. *All ye that have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ*, Gal. 3. 27. The very phrases then used shew that Baptisme is in its originall intention an instrument of uniting men to Christ, and giving them communion with him in the benefits of his death. *Except a man be born again of water*, saith our Saviour, *and of the Spirit, he cannot* &c. John 3. 5. In which words are these two things: 1. The necessitie of regeneration, *Except a man be born again*. 2. The working cause of it: Efficient, *the Spirit*; Instrumentall, the Sacrament of Baptisme, there called *water* from the outward matter of it. Baptisme therefore is appointed to be a means of regeneration to all those that are baptized: & doth effect it in all who do not put an obstacle in the way to hinder it. So much doth the Apostle ascribe to Baptisme, Eph. 5. 26. and for this cause doth signifie it with this title, *The laver of regeneration*, Tit. 3. 5. I will shut up this with Act. 2. 38. where Peter saith, *Repent, and be baptized every one of you for the remiſſion of ſins*, plainly implying, that therefore is Baptisme ordained to be received, that those who do receive it might have their sins remitted.

This

This is also Gods intent in the Lords Supper. *This is my body*, saith Christ, *and this is my bloud*, Matth. 26. 26, 27. in those words teaching us, That in that Sacrament there is an exhibition of Christ and his benefits intended on Gods part, and received of those by whom no obstacle is interposed: and therefore doth the Apostle call it in expresse words, 1. Cor. 10. 16. *The communion of the body and bloud of Christ.*

For this end also is the Patience (E) of God (another singular dignation of God) exercised among men: as we may see Rom. 2. 4. *Despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse and forbearance, not knowing that the bountifulnesse of God leadeth thee to repentance? but thou after thy hardnesse and heart that cannot repent, heapest-up wrath to thy self*, &c. In these words may be noted for our purpose 1. Gods intent in forbearing sinners; which *is the leading of them to repentance*, and so on to salvation: for repentance is *per se ordinata ad salutem*, by him ordained to salvation, as a means to the end. 2. The persons to whom God intendeth this good by his forbearance: And they are such as *despise the riches of his goodnesse*, and have *hard and impenitent hearts*. 3. The issue and event of this their contempt of Gods patience, and that is *a treasuring-up of wrath unto themselves against the day of wrath*. Out of all which layed together ariseth thus much, That God by sparing wicked men who have hard and impenitent hearts, intendeth their everlasting good, though they by the abuse of his patience and refusall to repent do treasure-up unto themselves wrath and misery everlasting. The like to this is delivered in 2. Pet. 3. 9. *God is not slack*, saith Peter, (*as some men count slacknesse*) *but patient toward us?* that is, us men. And why patient toward us? *because he would have none to perish.* The end therefore of Gods patience is mans Salvation and Repentance.

In the last place those other gifts of God, by which mens understandings are enlightened and their souls beautified, namely Knowledge, Faith, Repentance, Fortitude, Liberality, Temperance, Humility and Chastity, and such like, are bestowed upon all that have them (among whom are many who prove reprobates in the end) that by the exercise of them and continuance in them they might come to eternall life.

That reprobates are adorned with many of these graces, appeareth by sundry Scriptures, especially Heb. 6. 4. where the Apostle saith, That it is *impossible for them that have been enlighten-*

Lightned, tasted the heavenly gift, been made partakers of the holy Ghost, tasted the good word of God and the powers of the world to come, if they fall away, to be renewed by repentance. The graces which the Apostle here speaketh of, are not ordinary and common, but speciall and excellent graces, Illumination, Faith, a Relish of Gods word, and a Taste of heavenly and the persons spoken of are apostates, such as are under a possibility of falling-away for ever (for upon a danger impossible cannot be built a solid exhortation) and consequently reprobates; and the thing intimated, is that upon apostates and reprobates are these excellent gifts many times bestowed. The like speech we have Heb. 10.26. *For if we sinne willingly after we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sinne*, &c. From whence we may collect, That men who sinne willingly and unpardonably may receive the knowledge of the truth, yea and be sanctified by the bloud of the Testament and the Spirit of grace, vers. 29. In the 2. Pet. 2.20. *They* may, saith Peter, *escape the filthinesse of the world*; that is, be washed from their former sinnes by repentance: *The unclean spirit* may *go out of* them, Matth. 12.43. They may *receive the word with joy*, Matth. 13. 20. And many more excellent graces they may have besides. Now all these vertues and graces are not therefore given unto that they (F) might abuse them, and so purchase to themselves the greater damnation; or that they might do good unto others with them, but none to themselves: but rather that (as by the former gifts of nature, so) by these of grace they may obtein salvation. For if God aim at this in those gifts that are farther off, much more in these which make those that have them (like the young man in the Gospel) *not farre from the kingdome of heaven*. My proof for this I borrow of our Divines (G) at the Synod, who in their Suffrage have these two positions: 1. [f] *There are certain internall works preparing a man for justification, which by the power of the word and Spirit are wrought in the hearts of men not yet justified; such as are the Knowledge of Gods will, a Sense of sinne, Fear of punishment*, &c. that is their first. 2. Their second position is this, [t] *Those whom God by his word and Spirit affecteth after this manner, those he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth to*

[f] *Suffrag. Belg. pag. 41. thes. 2. & pag. 43. thes. 3.* Sunt quædã effecta interna ad conversionem prævia, quæ virtute verbi spiritûsque in nondum justificatorum cordibus excitantur; qualia sunt, notitia voluntatis Divinæ, sensus peccati, timor pœnæ, cogitatio de liberatione, spes aliqua veniæ. [t] Quos Deus, mediante verbo, per Spiritum suum in hunc modum afficit, eos ad fidem conversionémque, verè & seriò vocat & invitat.

conversion.

perſion. Out of theſe two *theſes* thus much ariſeth, That God worketh the knowledge of his will, the ſenſe of ſinne, fear of hell, hope of pardon, and conſequently many other excellent graces in the hearts of men, that by theſe they may be converted, and ſo eternally ſaved.

We ſee by theſe things what end God aimeth at in his gifts of men.

But there are ſome Scriptures that ſeem to ſay the contrary; namely, Rom. 1. 20. where God is ſaid to reveal himſelf to the Gentiles by the creatures, *εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀναπολογήτους, that they might be without excuſe.* and Luke 2. 34. Simeon ſaith of Chriſt, that *he is appointed for the falling and riſing again of many in Iſrael.* and 1. Cor. 1. 23. *I preach Chriſt*, ſaith S. Paul, *to the Jews a ſtumbling-block.* and 2. Cor. 2. 16. *We are the ſavour of death to death*, &c. By theſe places it ſeemeth that God giveth theſe things to ſome to make them ſtumble and that they might be left without excuſe. What ſhall we ſay therefore to theſe places?

Of all theſe places in generall I may ſay this, That they are to be underſtood of the end which is many times effected by theſe gifts of God, and not of the end which is primarily intended in them; and they ſhew what Chriſt, the word preached, and the gifts of nature and grace are occaſionally to ſome men through their voluntary rebellion againſt God and his ordinances, and not what they are intentionally in Gods firſt thoughts and reſolutions. He intendeth them for their good, though many times they receive them to their hurt. It is with Gods ordinances and gifts (and that very often too) as it is ſometimes with phyſick; It is given (*H*) by the Phyſician for the patients good, but many times through the diſtemper of his body it doth him hurt: And as it is with the ſunne; God intendeth by the ſhining of it the enlightening and clearing of men and other creatures in this inferiour world; and yet ſome men are hurt by the light of it, others are ſcorched by the heat of it accidentally, by reaſon of the climates wherein they live, or the ill-affectedneſſe of their eyes and bodies. So the bleſſings of God, which out of his abundant goodneſſe are beſtowed on men for their eternall good, through their ill frame and temper of heart do effect their hurt: partly becauſe lighting on naughty hearts, they loſe their edge; for *quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*: and partly becauſe of the ſeverity of God, who as he hath an antecedent and gracious will to do men good, ſo he hath a

consequent and judiciarie will of giving-up obstinate men to their own hearts lusts, and of permitting them to dash against Christ and other means of eternall life, and so to fall into endlesse miserie and mischief, as we may see Psal. 81. 11, 12. and Rev. 22. 11. Which made Prosper say, [u] *They that have despised Gods inviting will, shall feel his revenging will.* Now if this be the meaning of these Scriptures, then do they not thwart that which hath been said of Gods gracious intent of promoting the eternall good of men by his blessings bestowed upon them. For *argumentum ab eventu ad intentionem Dei non valet*: because no sinfull event is properly under Gods decree, but his prescience onely, or at most under a permissive decree; and many things happen in the world which are beside the antecedent and principall purpose of God: not because there is any want of power in God, but because his will is oftentimes conditionall, and therefore not effected because the condition is not performed.

But by the opinion of absolute Reprobation the gifts both of Nature and Grace have another (*I*) end: Either God doth not mean them to those that perish, although they do enjoy them, because they are mingled in the world with the Elect, to whom onely they are directed; or if he do, he meaneth they shall have them, and be lifted up by them above the common rank of men, *ut lapsu graviore ruant*, that their fall may be the greater. And so much is said by the chief defenders of it. [x] *God sendeth his word to reprobates*, saith Calvine, *that they might be made more deaf; he setteth up a light before them, to make them the blinder; he giveth them a remedy, that they might not be healed.* And, [y] *It should not seem absurd unto us*, saith Beza, *that God should offer his grace in the word and Sacraments to some reprobates in the Church, not to this end that they might be saved by it, but that they might be lesse excusable then others, and obnoxious to the severer punishment.* Speeches like to these hath Maccovius in his Disputations, [z] *Christ*, saith he, *knocketh at the hearts of reprobates, who he knoweth neither can nor will open unto him; not that he may*

u *Prosp. Resp. ad object. 16. Vincent.* Qui voluntatem Dei sprevérunt invitantem, voluntatem Dei sentient vindicantem.

x *Calv. Instit. l. 3. c. 24 n. 13.* Ecce, vocem ad eos dirigit, sed ut magis obsurdescant; lucem accendit, sed ut reddantur cæciores; doctrinam profert, sed quâ magis obstupescant; remedium adhibet, sed nè sanentur. y *Bez. Pralud. in c. 9. ad Rom. p. 434.* Absurdum videri non debet, Deum reprobis quibusdam, qui in Ecclesia Dei versantur, gratiam suam in verbo suo sive etiam per sacramenta sua offerre, non eum in finem ut per eam serventur; sed contrà, ut minus habeant excusationis quàm reliqui, & tandem gravius puniantur. z *Macc. disp. 14. pag. 11, 12.* Pulsat Christus ad ostium reproborum, quos novit nec posse nec velle aperire; non ut intret, sed partim ut exprobret illis impotentiam suâ ipsorum culpâ contractam; partim ut condemnationem in illis augeat, &c.

enter

enter in, but partly that he may upbraid them for their impotence, and partly that he may increase their damnation. And immediately after to a place in John, 15.22. he giveth this exposition,[b] *Therefore did God speak to them, that by the contempt and hatred of his Sonne they might procure the greater damnation.* In another place likewise of his Disputations he speaketh the same thing foure or five times over very positively; [c] *God doth propound his word to reprobates for no other end then that they might be left without excuse.* [d] *If the Gospel be considered in respect of Gods intention, the proper end of it, and not the accidentall, in reference to Reprobates is their inexcusablenesse.* And very consequently do these writers speak to their main conclusion. For how can God intend the means or gifts of grace for the salvation of them whom he hath by his absolute eternall decree rejected utterly from grace and glorie?

More particularly *(K)* by this Doctrine,

I. Christ came not into the world to procure the salvation of them that perish, because they were inevitably ordained to perish.

II. The word of grace is not sent to them; or if it be, it is sent that they might slight it or contemne it, and so increase their damnation by contemning of it. Which being so, these inconveniences will arise; 1. That God is a *(L)* mere deluder of miserable men, whom he calleth to salvation in the name of his Sonne by the preaching of the word. For what else can he be that fairly pretendeth their good whom he fully intendeth to ruine? 2. That Ministers *(M)* are but false witnesses; because in their ministerie they offer salvation conditionally to many whose damnation is determined absolutely. 3. The Ministerie of the word cannot leave men without excuse. For Reprobates may have this just *(N)* plea; *Lord, dost thou punish us for not believing in thy Sonne, when thou didst call us to believe by the preaching of thy word? Why? thou didst decree to leave us (wofull men) in Adams sinne, to give us neither power to believe, nor a Christ to believe in. How canst thou justly charge us with sinne or increase our punishment for not believing in him whom thou didst resolve before the world was that we should never believe in?* Certainly that [e] Ministerie *giveth men a fair excuse that is given for no other end then to leave them without excuse.*

b Nimirum ideo locutus est iis, ut ex contemtu odióque Filii unigeniti gravior condemnatio esset.

c *Disp.* 2. *p.* 3. Deus reprobis verbum suum proponit, non alio fine quàm ut inexcusabiles reddantur.

d *p.* 16. Si Evangelium consideres ratione intentionis Dei, finem ejus esse per se & non per accidens inexcusabilitatem ratione reproborum.

e Neq: enim ea fingi potest homines reddere inexcusabiles per verbum & Spiritum vocatio, quæ eo tantùm fine exhibetur ut reddat inexcusabiles, *Suffrag. Brit. de* 3. *&* 4. *art. de Antecedaneis ad Convers. thesi* 3. *pag.* 43.

III. The Sacraments (*O*) also (by this opinion) do signifie nothing, seal-up nothing, conferre nothing to such as are not saved; but are mere blanks and emptie ordinances at the best unto them, not through the fault of the men, but by the primarie and absolute will of God.

IV. Lastly, Gods other gifts (*P*) which he bestoweth upon men, of what nature soever they be, are to the most that receive them in Gods absolute intention, 1. Unprofitable, such as shall never do them good in reference to their eternall condition; 2. Dangerous and hurtfull, given them not out of love but extreme hatred; not that they might use them well, and be blessed in so doing, but that they might use them ill, and by ill using of them procure to themselves the greater damnation. God lifteth them up (as the devil did Christ) to the pinnacle of the temple, that so they might fall; and loadeth them with knowledge and other goodly endowments, that with the weight of them he might sink them down to hell. And so by good consequence, Gods choicest gifts are intended and used as snares to intrap mens souls. Men that have them have little cause to be proud of them; for they are the more unhappy because they have them: or small reason to be thankfull for them, or to love the giver of them, but to hate him rather; because they are but giftlesse gifts, of the same nature with a griping usurers bountie, Jaels courtesie, Sauls marrying of Michol to David, or a bait for a poore fish which she swalloweth with a hook to boot:

Munera magna quidem misit, sed misit in hamo:
Num piscatorem piscis amare potest?

Answer.

Whether the decree of absolute Reprobation be contrary unto the use and end of Gods gifts bestowed upon men.

IN the following discourse concerning the *end and use of Gods gifts* these generall points are to be premised:

1. First, That if we speak exactly and properly, [a] *Nihil aliud à Deo est finis Dei*, *sed*

[a] *Aquin. part. 1. qu. 19. art. 1.*

sed ipsemet est finis respectu omnium quæ ab eo sunt. It is therefore a false imagination to think that the Divine will is moved by any thing but by it self. And as God himself is the end *cujuslibet volitionis Divinæ*, so is he likewise *cujuslibet operationis Divinæ.* Prov. 16. 4. *The Lord hath made all things for his own sake, yea the wicked for the day of evil.*

2. Secondly, it is to be noted, That albeit Gods eternall volitions or decrees depend not upon any temporall object or causes as the prime motives thereunto; yet God by his eternall absolute decree may and doth ordain that this event in the temporall execution shall not follow but upon that going before: as, that the benefit of eternall life, in the actuall introduction unto the heavenly kingdome, shall depend upon the acts of repenting, believing and persevering; and that the punishment of eternall death, in the actuall abjection of men into hell, shall depend upon their own finall impenitencie and sin-guiltinesse. This is not to make the eternall decrees of Election and Reprobation dependent upon the foreseen contingent acts of mans freewill, as the Remonstrants do; but to make temporall events, acts, or things, one to depend conditionally upon another for their being or not-being in time, which we willingly acknowledge.

3. Thirdly, It is to be obſerved, That when we ſay this or that is the end of ſuch an action of God or of ſuch a gift of God, we muſt not conceive that it was the end which cauſed the Divine volition, but it is the end whereunto men ſhould uſe ſuch gifts, and the benefit which they ought to make of ſuch temporall gracious actions vouchſafed unto them. So that when we ſay, God giveth or doth ſuch a thing to ſuch an end, the meaning is, The things conſidered in their own nature, as they come from God, have a fitneſſe or aptneſſe to produce ſuch an end. And thus God is ſaid in his gifts or actions to intend an end two wayes: The one is in the order of common Providence, where the means have a naturall fitneſſe to produce ſome good end, though abuſed by men they oftentimes produce the quite contrary, God foreknowing it and decreeing to permit it ſo to be. The other is the order of ſpeciall Predeſtination, where ſuch gifts or actions of God have not onely a fitneſſe in their own nature to produce ſuch good effects or ends, but they have from the abſolute will of God an efficacitie actually and infallibly producing thoſe intended ends. Of this intention onely that rule muſt be underſtood, [b] *Quicquid Deus ſimpliciter vult, fit*; and that of Cajetane, [c] *Nullus ordo deficiens à proprio in-*

[b] *Aqu. in 1. part. qu. 10. art. 6.*

[c] *In 1m, qu. 23. art. 6.*

tento

vente cadit sub prædestinatione.

4. Lastly, no decree of God can truly be said to crosse the good end whereunto his gifts ought to be used, unlesse it can be proved that by such a decree the abuse of them is inforced or at least caused in wicked men. As for example; The honour and exaltation of Pharaoh unto a kingdome was a gift or a good means fitting him to the administration of justice; yet he abused it unto oppression: The plagues inflicted upon his countrey were fit means to have humbled him, and to have made him yield unto Gods command; yet he turned them to greater pride and obstinacie: Yet because no decree of God caused the obstinate wickednesse of Pharaohs heart, the decree of permitting him to abuse such gifts unto his own destruction was not contrary unto the use or end whereunto those gifts and actions of God had a fitting ordination in their own nature. These things premised we come unto our particular answers.

What he saith concerning the *gifts of Nature or Grace*, namely, That they are given for the good of those upon whom they are bestowed, we willingly yield. And therefore we let the 363 and, 364. pages passe without contradiction. Onely let this be remembred, That the intent, which is measured by the nature of A

the means, for the event is often frustrated by the default of mans will, and yet Gods simple and absolute will never frustrated. Nay, it was Gods absolute will to permit some men to fail in reaping that good which by such means was intended unto them. Neither doth this inferre any contrarietie or crossing betwixt Gods Decrees and his Gifts or Graces. We do not therefore deny that mans salvation is the end of those means, gifts and graces which God offereth unto any man *in ordine ad suam salutem*: But we affirm that this may stand with an eternall absolute decree of not-preparing for some men any such effectuall grace as God knoweth would easily convert and save them, and with an absolute decree of permitting them by their own voluntary rebellion to incurre eternall damnation. And this is the absolute decree of Reprobation, which is not contrary to the end of Gods gifts: because to permit men to abuse them, doth neither alter the nature of the gift nor the ordination which it hath in it self to produce such an end, nor cause the sinner to turn those good means to his own perdition.

B *Our Divines at Dort* did truly teach, That the word, and the illuminations and motions of Gods Spirit, are ordained by God for the producing of repentance and faith in mens hearts, and for the saving of their

their souls. And they further taught, That where such spirituall and supernaturall means fail to produce those ends, no positive, actuall, proper or true cause can be alledged besides their own defective and rebellious will.

The saying of Prosper is unadvisedly brought-in by this Authour. For every man knoweth that Prosper, as well as his Master S. Augustine, held absolute Predestination and Preterition or negative Reprobation; and therefore in his opinion the absolute decree of Reprobation is not contrary unto any ends which God hath in bestowing the means of grace and salvation upon those which abuse them: For it is impossible that God should crosse himself in his decrees, gifts, or actions. Again, Prosper, in affirming a *gracious vocation* to be afforded unto all those who have been enlightned by the *preaching of the Gospel*, doth imply, that where the Gospel was never preached nor Christ known, there is no such vocation unto saving grace. How this will agree with Arminius his new-moulded Predestination and Reprobation, who in his third decree bringeth-in God decreeing [d]*media ad resipiscentiam & fidem necessaria sufficienter & efficaciter administrare*, it will passe this Authours cunning to tell us. Prosper propoundeth a question which had been here more fit for this

[d] ~~Doct.~~ Decl. Sent. pag. 47.

this Authour to have mused upon, namely
[e] *Cur hoc donum sine quo nemo salvus est, ab eo qui omnes salvare vult, non omnibus conferatur.*

[e] De voc. l. 1. c. 1.

C As for that *sufficiencie of grace* which our Divines at Dort granted to accompany the preaching of the Gospel, it doth little advantage the Remonstrants, who undertake to prove a sufficient administration of saving grace where the sound of the Gospel and the name of Christ was never heard of. And they acknowledge no decree of Reprobation where such an administration hath not gone before. This is more then the Divines at Dort or the Jesuites at Rome dare avouch. But let us grant, that sufficient means to produce faith, and repentance and salvation were administred to every singular person in the world, yet the absolute decrees of Election and Non-election may stand firm and good. For he is absolutely predestinated to whom God administreth grace with a mercifull intent of making it effectuall unto salvation: and he is absolutely not-predestinated or rejected, to whom God in time administreth grace with an absolute purpose of leaving the good successe to the *good husbandry* of his own free-will, which is in nothing more careless or prodigall then in misspending, wasting and quenching Gods grace. [f] *Ità humana natu-*

[f] Prosp. De vocat. l. 1. c. 6.

in primi hominis prævaricatione vitiata, etiam inter beneficia, inter præcepta, & inter auxilia Dei, semper in deteriorem est proclivior voluntatem, cui committi non est aliud quam dimitti. So that if in the establishing of the eternall decrees of Election and Reprobation God had been a foreseer onely or a looker-on how every man cōmitted to the freedome of his own will would behave himself in the using of grace sufficiently administred, the whole world (if Prosper tell us true) had been under the decree of Reprobation.

That is said to be Gods *aim* in bestowing means of grace upon any man, which the nature of the grace should lead a man unto, though God in giving that grace had not a simple and absolute will to make it effectuall unto the salvation of the receiver; nay, though God had an absolute will of permitting the receiver to abuse it finally to his own damnation. Where Gods will is thus affected, there administration of grace may and doth stand with eternall Reprobation.

Touching the *Sacrament of Baptisme*, or any other benefits which God affordeth unto men not-elected; the end intended, is the good effect whereunto they were ordained. But with this end of the thing it self may stand an absolute decree of God, of leaving any man

D

man to abuse them unto a contrary end. And in this consisteth that absolute decree of Reprobation which we defend.

I wonder this Authour should make Baptisme a *necessary means unto regeneration*, and so consequently unto the atteinment of salvation; since millions of children, capable of no other known and revealed means of salvation or regeneration, have not this means by Divine providence administred unto them, or so prepared for them that by any humane care or industrie it is appliable unto them. For from this must needs follow an absolute Reprobation of such children, and not a conditionate, grounded upon their foreseen bad acts. As for those who by Gods goodnesse are ingrafted into some visible Church, we concurre with him, that Baptisme is appointed to be a means of regeneration; and that it is so indeed where no *obstacle* is found in the person baptized.

For the *Lords Supper* we say the same. And if he instance in a thousand other particulars, our answer will be, That Gods revealed ordination or intention that we should use such means unto such a *good* end, may stand with an absolute eternall unrevealed will of God To withhold from some men that more speciall grace which would *de facto* make them use Gods grace unto that good

[illegible]od end whereunto it is ordained, and hinder them from abusing it to their destruction.

Let the Remonstrants grant us an absolute decree preparing from all eternitie effectuall grace, and in time mercifully working the conversion and salvation of Peter and Paul, and we desire no other absolute decree of Predestination. And let them grant us in God an eternall will or decree of not-preparing effectuall saving grace for Cain and Judas, and of not-working by his speciall mercy their conversion, but permitting them to continue in their obduration, and we urge no other absolute Reprobation. How they can deny this I know not, unlesse they will deny that of the Apostle, [g] *Cujus vult miseretur, & quem vult indurat.* Which induration is by some of our adversaries referred to this decree of Reprobation which we avouch, and was usually so applyed by S. Augustine. *Vide Ruiz. De Præd. & Repr. disp.* 2. §. 2. *num.* 3. *p.* 19. where he hath these words, *Non esset libera prædestinatio, si non esset libera negatio prædestinationis. Porrò, negatio prædestinationis esset ipsa reprobatio negativa.* And Malderus [h] ingenuously acknowledgeth these two eternall absolute decrees, the one of preparing saving grace for the predestinate, and of making it infallibly effectuall unto their salvation; the other of prepa-

[g] *Rom.* 9.

Vide Penot. pag. 414. *disp.* 38. §. 4.

[h] *Antisyn. pag* 9. 10, 11, 12, 13. *usq; ad* 21.

preparing for the non-elect such helps of grace onely as God eternally foresaw would never bring them unto salvation, albeit their damnation was not intended by God, but onely with respect unto their foregoing sins. And for these eternall distinct decrees of Election and Non-election or negative Reprobation, he foundeth them not upon any different foreseen acts of men, but subscribeth to Prosper, *Cessat opus, cessat meritum, nihil editur impar*; and doth in these few words quite contradict the Remonstrants Election, [i] *Homines non ideo quia perseverantes sunt, sunt electi; sed quia electi sunt, perseverant.* [k] *Aliter Deus in hac vita agit cum electis, aliter cum reprobis. Reprobis offert quidem suam gratiam, sed efficaciter non facit ut acceptent oblatam. Quòd autem eam sibi oblatam acceptet electus, fructus electionis est. Permittit reprobos cadere, & in suo lapsu in finem usque manere jacentes*, &c. I might adde the ancient Schoolmen, who acknowledge the eternall distinct decrees of Election and Reprobation without founding them upon the contrary foreseen acts of men, as this Authour with the Remonstrants do. All the forenamed Authours, with many more which might be cited, acknowledge an ordination of such means and graces as are afforded to the Reprobate unto the ends by this Authour urged; and yet withall

[i] *Pag.* 12.

[k] *Pag.* 13. *Vide eundem in* 1m, 2a, *qu.* 111. *pag.* 486.

shall they acknowledge an eternall absolute will in God of permitting them to abuse them to their own destruction. In their judgement therefore such an absolute eternall decree is not contrary unto the end of Gods gifts bestowed upon persons not elect. Lessius, a stiff defender of Predestination and Reprobation founded upon prescience of mens finall perseverance or finall impenitencie, when he is pressed with the argument taken from that speciall vocation of the Predestinate, which is termed *vocatio secundùm propositum*, he is forced to confesse, that others *dicuntur vocati non secundùm propositum, quia non est tale propositum in Deo ad cujus impletionem illa vocatio referatur. Huic tamen non repugnat, quin sit in Deo sincerum propositum & desiderium salutis eorum conditionatum, si gratiæ cooperari velint.* Opusc. De Prad. & Repr. pag. 573.

I marvel how it should be *contrary unto the end of Gods graces or gifts*, when we say, According to his eternall decree he calleth the Predestinate or Elect with an absolute purpose to make the means of grace effectuall to their salvation; and he calleth the Reprobate, *non secundùm tale propositum*, but onely under a conditionate decree, *Si gratiæ cooperari velint*, which from all eternitie he foreknew they would never do. I say, it is a marvel, how the same thing avouched by us should be *contrary to the use and end of*

Gods

Gods graces bestowed upon such men, affirmed by themselves, no such inconvenience should follow upon it. Molina himself, when he cometh to the point, granteth in God such eternall distinct decrees of preparing effectuall grace for some and not-preparing for others, as inferre absolute Predestination and Reprobation in the sense wherein we defend it, and contradict that conditionate Election which the Remonstrants defend, depending upon an antecedent absolute prevision of the future good and bad acts of men. His words are these; [m] *Punctum verò prædestinationis & abyssus inscrutabilis Divini consilii in eo sunt posita, quòd cùm Deus infinitas alias providendi non-prædestinatis rationes noverit, quibus in eadem ipsorum libertate in vitam devenissent æternam, fuissentq; proinde prædestinatizitem; infinitas alias noverit rationes providendi prædestinatis, quibus suâ libertate beatitudinem amitterent, fuissentque reprobi: pro sua tantùm libertate, & non pro qualitate usûs liberi arbitrii prævisi, nè ut conditione quidem sine qua non, eum providendi modum utriusque elegerit per quem prævidit illos in vitam æternam pro sua libertate non perventuros*, &c. If it be not *contrary to the end and use of Gods gifts*, out of his own free-will to provide for some men no other grace but such as he eternally knew would never bring them to eternall life;

[m] *De Conc. pag.* 368.

how doth it crosse the end of such gifts & graces as are temporally afforded to the Non-elect, that God hath made an absolute decree to permit that abuse of grace which he could have prevented, and which he foreknew from all eternity would follow if by more speciall grace it were not prevented? *Vide Jacobi Baii Institut. lib. 1. c. 118, 119, &c. usque ad 125.*

The end whereunto Gods long-suffering should serve, and whereunto it is fitly ordinated, is the *leading of men to repentance.* But there is no contradiction betwixt these two propositions, *The end of Gods admonition and patience towards Cain, was to lead him unto repentance; God had absolutely decreed, not to give unto Cain that speciall effectuall grace without which God knew he would continue finally impenitent.* In this decree Non-election is involved, and this is antecedent to the absolute prevision of Cains finall impenitencie; and yet it made not the means of grace offered unto him deluſorie or contrary to any decree of Gods will. E

The decree of negative Reprobation hindreth not but the gifts bestowed upon such persons may have a proper and fitting *ordination* unto the attainment of eternall life, *si tali gratiæ cooperari velint.* Thus were they ordinated in the non-elect angels, although before they were created God had

absolutely decreed to permit their voluntary apostasie, and to punish them for it with eternall misery. Thus the end of those excellent gifts and graces which Adam had bestowed upon him in his state of innocence was to continue him in obedience to Gods will, and so to bring him with his posterity unto eternall life; and yet God had eternally decreed to permit both him and them to fall into the guilt of eternall death. Divine eternall decrees therefore, whereupon may infallibly be inferred the abuse of grace temporally offered, do not crosse the end for which such grace is administred to persons not-elected. The Jesuites themselves cannot deny, that the eternall decree of negative Reprobation is [n] a negation *illorum medium quibus Deus præscivit adhibendum fuisse consensum; hujúsque primam causam esse liberam Dei voluntatem.* To which purpose are these words of S. Augustine, [o] *Quibus non vult subvenire, non subvenit; de quibus in sua prædestinatione occultè quidem sed justè aliud judicavit.* And elsewhere, [p] *Si vellet ipsorum (nempe non-prædestinatorum) misereri, posset ità vocare quomodo illis aptum esset, ut & moverentur & intelligerent & sequerentur.* All these acknowledge an absolute eternall decree of withholding all such grace from all persons not-elected as God knoweth would effectually convert them and save them.

[n] *Ruiz.*

[o] *De bono Pers. c. 11.*

[p] *Ad Simpl. lib. 1. qu. 2.*

And

And yet for all this they all agree that those gifts and means of salvation which he is pleased to afford them, have a true and due ordination unto the bringing of such men to faith, obedience & eternall life. They have indeed no infallible ordination to such an end; for then they were consequent fruits of Predestination: but this hindreth not, but they may have a true ordination, as all such means have which by the Divine more common providence and generall love are instituted and afforded for the good of men, howsoever by the voluntary perverseness of the wicked they are turned to their own hurt. And therefore God may truly say to these as the Apostle did to the Galatians, *Quis vos impedivit, non obedire veritati?* It was not Gods eternall decree of denying more abundant and effectuall grace, nor his eternall absolute decree of permitting them voluntarily to abuse the grace bestowed upon them, from whence this contrary usage of Divine grace was necessitated or effected. That is but a cavill of the Remonstrants. Learned Prosper pointeth us to the true and onely cause of this inverting Gods benefits contrary to their proper end; [r] *Quæ beneficia licèt obduratis nihil remedii & emendationis attulerint, probant tamen aversionem eorum non Divinæ fuisse constitutionis sed propriæ voluntatis.*

[q] Gal. 5. 7.

[r] De vocat. Gent. lib. 2. cap. 13.

F No grace or gift is bestowed upon any man for this very end, that he may abuse it; but many excellent graces and gifts have been temporally bestowed upon angels and men not-elected with an eternall decree or purpose of God Not to keep them from abusing them, Not to keep them from incurring eternall death by abusing them. This is that decree of Reprobation which we admit: and if this Authour can rightly inferre that this is *contrary to the end and use of Gods gifts*, we will subscribe to his conditionate Election and Reprobation. If he hope to inferre this conclusion, his premisses must be, *Every absolute decree of God to permit the finall abuse of any of his good gifts or graces, is contrary to the use or end of bestowing them upon men: But that decree of absolute negative Reprobation which we defend is an absolute decree*, &c. ERGO, *it is contrary*, &c. The major proposition will be denied by all judicious Divines, and can never be proved by the Remonstrants. [r] *Non institutio bona rei, sed exorbitatio reprobanda est.*

[r] *Tertull. adverſ. Marc. l. 1.*

That God willeth the good of men in bestowing any good gifts or graces upon them, needed no proof at all: We have alwayes willingly granted this proposition. Yet for the true understanding thereof it must be observed, That when we say, This is Gods *will*, This is Gods *aim* or *intent*, these

these words have not alwayes the same signification. This Authour by confounding the divers meaning of these and the like words doth strangely intangle himself through his whole discourse. First therefore, any thing is said to be *according to Gods will*, which considered in it self is according to the goodnesse and pureness of the Divine nature. This is a perpetuall and necessarie volition in God, *quâ Deo placet omne bonum*. And this [t] *simplex complacentia* towards all good actions of men, or events unto men, is possible *circa creaturas omnes etiam nunquam futuras*: For there is no goodnesse imaginable, which hath not an agreement with the good will of God, which we call *amorem simplicis complacentiæ*. [u] *Satis constat hujusmodi complacentiam Dei versari circa pœnitentiam, gratiam & gloriam possibilem Judæ aut cujuslibet damnati*. But this is not it which we now speak of. 2. Secondly, God is said to *will*, *desire*, or *aim at* that good, for the obteining whereof he affordeth fitting means, though withall he willeth that it shall be in the liberty of the creature to hinder & frustrate those means, & though he have absolutely decreed to permit the creature to abuse them unto his own destruction. This is that which usually is termed by Divines *voluntas antecedens*, *voluntas conditionata*, *voluntas simplicis complacentiæ*.

1.

[t] Vide Ruiz. De vol. disp. 6. §. 2. pag. 38.

[u] Ruiz, disp. 19. pag. 214.

2.

And thus God is ſaid to *aim-at* or to *will* and *deſire* the converſion, juſtification and ſalvation of thoſe who never ſhall be converted, juſtified, or ſaved. Neither muſt we think that by theſe men Gods omnipotent will is croſſed, becauſe his *voluntas ſimplicis complacentiæ* is not fulfilled. For the abſolute will of God was, that in ſuch perſons their own free-will might hinder the good effect of his gifts and graces, which he was abſolutely reſolved to permit for

3. ſome greater good. Laſtly, there is a will in God which ſtrictly and moſt properly is called *voluntas beneplaciti* or his *abſolute will*, which is not onely a liking of the good willed unto the creature, and an ordering of fit means whereby the creature (if his own free-will hinder not) may attein it; but a mercifull decree of ſo ordering the means and the very will of the creature, that it ſhall infallibly and infruſtrately obtein the good end whereunto ſuch means were accommodated. And of this will Ruiz truly affirmeth, [x] *Sola hæc voluntas abſoluta ſimpliciter amplectitur objectum, & ideo ſola ſimpliciter & abſolutè meretur nomen voluntatis Beneplaciti.* We grant therefore, that in the ſecond acception of the word *will* God truly willeth, liketh, deſireth the repentance, faith, perſeverance, and ſalvation of all to whom the Goſpel is preached and Chriſt offered.

x Diſp. 18. §. 4. p. 185.

offered. But in the last and most proper acception, God willeth the perseverance and salvation onely of his Elect, in whom he never ceaseth working till the happy effect be produced.

Our Divines at Dort granted a true and serious will in God according to the second acception of the word *will*, but not according to the last. Which will *simplicis complacentiæ* may stand with absolute Reprobation. G.

If this Authour can be content to acknowledge that for a true, serious and no delusorie will, which affordeth the creature means of repenting, believing and being saved, though under an eternall absolute decree of permitting the finall disobedience and perdition of the creature, we will free him from the trouble of answering the places of Scripture, and with him embrace the interpretation of Damascene, who telleth us, that albeit the Scriptures do in such places seem to make Gods benefits causes of mans sinne and ruine, yet they must be understood [y] ἐκβατικῶς not αἰτιολογικῶς.

[y] *De orthod. fide, lib. 4. cap. 20.*

A *Physician* doth give his patient physick with an absolute will to cure, so farre as his skill and abilitie will stretch: But God doth not alwayes give the means of salvation unto all men out of his absolute will: for then all should be cured and saved. [z] *Omnia quæcunque* H

[z] *Psal. 135.*

cunque voluit Deus, fecit in cœlo & in terra. Fulgentius giveth the reason; * *Quia cui semper subest cùm velit posse, non aliud est in illo velle quàm posse.*

* 1. ad Mon. c. 12.

The will of God inviting or moving men to perform such good acts as tend to their salvation, is Gods true and serious will, though he have not decreed by such means to produce their salvation: This will is often despised by men to their own damnation. But there is a will not onely ordaining means to the end, but of causing men to use the means unto the consecution of the end. And thus by giving them speciall grace God willeth the kingdome of glorie onely unto the Elect. The former will is not to be baffled with the name of dissimulation, because this latter is onely it which bringeth men unto glorification. And we further adde, That the Reprobates in resisting the former will, which is *vera voluntas simplicis complacentiæ*, do alwayes fulfill the latter, which is Gods absolute will of permitting this resistance, and of gathering out of it a greater illustration of his own glorie.

Vide Baii *Institut. lib.* 1. *cap.* 104, *&c. & c.* 115, 116.

The *blessings* and means which God *out of his goodnesse* afforded to the angels, to Adam, and which he continually affordeth unto wicked men, by the *ill frame of their hearts* may be and have been turned to their own hurt; and yet we cannot but acknow-

ledge

ledge in them *an antecedent and gratious will to do them good.* But we do acknowledge, over and above this will of complacencie, an absolute will of efficiencie, by which God hath mercifully decreed to work in some persons the will and the deed, and by the means of grace *de facto* to bring them unto glory. These two different manners of willing and working the salvation of men, do demonstrate an absolute will in God of Saving some, which we call the absolute decree of their Election; and an absolute will of Permitting others to draw upon themselves damnation by voluntary abusing the means of grace, which we call absolute Reprobation. Chrysostome (who is no depressour of mans free-will) was not ignorant of this absolute will of God, turning & bending mans which way he pleaseth: *Si Deus volnerit, nullus impediet*[b]. And of this will S. Augustine speaketh,[c] *In cœlo & in terra non quædam voluit & fecit, quædam verò voluit & non fecit, sed omnia quæcunq; voluit fecit.* And S. Hierome, speaking of the Samaritanes, saith,[d] *Si voluisset, ex indevotis devotos fecisset.* And that prayer of Basil is famous, [e] *Malos, quæsumus, bonos facito; bonos in bonitate conserva. Omnia enim potes: quem enim volueris, salvas: & non est qui resistat tibi.* Since therefore the Scriptures, and the Fathers, and all orthodox Divines, who confesse

[b] *Plura vide hom. 2. in Psal. 50.*
[c] *Ench. cap. 97.*
[d] *Apud Petr. Diac.*
[e] *De incarn. c. 8.*

confesse that to be a true will which by affording ordinary means aimeth at the [f] *Sanctification* and [g] *Salvation* of all men, do notwithstanding intimate unto us an absolute will eternally predestinating and in time infallibly working the salvation onely of some men; it is but a weak kind of reasoning, from the affirmation of the one to conclude a negation of the other.

[f] 1. Thess. 4. 3.
[g] 1. Tim. 2. 4.

7 The doctrine of absolute Election and Reprobation inferreth, That God had not an absolute will by those means of grace which he bestowed upon the non-elect angels or men to bring them unto glorie; and that he had an absolute will to permit themselves to abuse them, to the procuring of their own eternall miserie: And yet he that should say, that God by giving the non-elect angels such excellent indowments, or by giving Cain and Judas such fatherly admonitions, did in those means aim at their destruction, speaketh both ignorantly & profanely. For the aim of God, and the end of any good gift which he vouchsafeth unto men, is to be measured by the nature of the gift it self, and not by the perverse use which God suffereth the receivers to make of it.

Calvine usually speaketh in the Scripture-phrase, even in those points which seem harsh to the ears of the Remonstrants. But this

this Authour having before truly explained how such phrases are to be understood, namely of the end whereunto Reprobates alwayes finally abuse them, and not of the end whereunto God hath ordained them, he had done much better to have afforded Calvines words this charitable construction. And as for *Beza*; he denieth not a proper and true ordination of the Divine grace unto the effecting of salvation in all to whom it is afforded, nor a true will of complacencie in God, that by them it should be used to that good end: but he denyeth an absolute will in God of saving them by that grace; and he sheweth the end which the wicked alwayes come to by abusing it, which is, *ut gravius puniantur*. That Calvine had no other meaning, appeareth by these words of his, which shut-up the section out of which the former are taken; *Quid sibi vult Dominus eos docendo à quibus nè intelligatur curat? Considera unde vitium, & desines interrogare. In verbo enim qualiscunque sit obscuritas, satis tamen semper est lucis ad convincendam impiorum conscientiam.* The drift of Calvine is not to affirm that God worketh either by any positive action, or by proper ordination of his word unto any such end, that deafnesse, blindnesse, senselessenesse whereunto the Reprobate grow onely by their own default: But because

cause God, who could soften their hearts, and would if they were in the number of his elect, hath ordained not to do it, this ordination is intimated by the event which perpetually followeth upon it, namely, deafnesse, blindnesse, &c. So that all which Calvine intendeth is this, [h] That where God hath not comprised men within his mercifull decree of Predestination, there he hath decreed to hold off his hand from effectually opening their ears and eyes; and then *sua vitio obsurdescunt*, &c. And Beza had no other intent, but to shew, [i] That the word preached unto the Reprobate, *non ita usquè conjunctum cum Spiritûs ministerio, ut illos verâ fide, quâ propriâ notâ electi à reprobis dignoscuntur, Christo ut palmites frugiferos inserat.* Whence followeth that woefull event, *ut justo exitio devoti magis ac magis reddantur duri.*

[h] *Vide* S. 14, 15. *ubi mentem suam explicat.*

[i] *Beza, Opusc. p. 30. & de Praedest. disp. pag. 434.*

For *Maccovius*; if his speeches tend to shew the intentionall end of the gospel preached, and not the eventuall successe, we utterly disclaim his opinion. For God properly intendeth no end of his volitions or actions but himself; unto whose glory all things have *naturam mediorum*, not *intenti finis*. The intention therefore of means by God unto any lower or inferiour end, is nothing else but the fitnesse of such means considered in themselves (and not abused)

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for the producing of that end: And this intention is not altered by the decree of Reprobation; for that decree as it is immanent and eternall *in voluntate Divina, nihil ponit in reprobato*: And when the temporall execution cometh, It putteth no malice into his will, it putteth no necessitation unto wicked actions upon his will; it onely putteth in God an absolute will of not-giving effectuall grace, and of not-working in him salutiferous actions; whereupon followeth *Perditio tua ex te*.

Answers to his more particular objections.

THe doctrine of Reprobation upon prescience denyeth not Reprobation to be an eternall, unchangeable, irrevocable decree of God, and therefore as *inevitable* as that which we referre to the absolute will of God. As for *Christs coming into the world to save* sinners, it was not to save the Elect, but under conditions of repentance and perseverant faith: And no decree of Reprobation excludeth any man from salvation, provided alwayes that he repent and believe. K

But the Reprobate (in our doctrine) *inevitably* die impenitent and unbelievers. Infallibly they do: but no more *inevitably* then in theirs. I think, neither this Authour nor any Remonstrant will shew himself so ignorant,

ignorant, as to affirm that any one man eternally reprobated according to their sense did ever die a true penitent and a perseverant believer.

For *the word of grace*, it is in our doctrine *sent* unto all men to whom it is sent, no otherwise then it is in theirs. In both opinions it hath (in its own nature) an ordination to produce repentance, faith, salvation in all who obey, &c. In neither opinion it is sent to any not-elected with an absolute will of God to make it effectuall unto their salvation, by working in them repentance, faith, true obedience. So that our doctrine is in this farre more sound then theirs; that we introduce such an Election and Reprobation as suspendeth all saving good actions of the Elect upon the speciall mercie and effectuall operation of God himself, and all wicked acts of the Non-elect upon their own perverse and rebellious free-will; whereas the Remonstrants[k] suspend both alike upon mans naturall free-will, making God, as in the evil acts of the Reprobate onely an eternall foreseer or looker-on; so in the salutiferous acts of the Elect, namely their repentance, believing, persevering, they ascribe unto God onely an intuitive prescience of what they will do, but they deny any absolute eternall decree, or any temporall operation flowing from such a decree, and causing

[k] *Vide Coll. Hag. pag. 91, 92, &c. 95.*

ing them to repent, believe, and perſevere. Corvinus is ſo confident herein, that he doubteth not to affirm, [1] *Certum eſt, nullius converſionem præcisè intendi. Duo ſines ſunt ſpiritûs*, &c. So that the Remonſtrants, who at firſt pleaded for Gods *intention* of converting and ſaving all men, come about at laſt to plead againſt his abſolute will and *intention* of converting and ſaving any man.

[1] *Corv. Reſp. ad Bogerm. pag.* 263.

L.

For his collection, *That God is a mere deluder*, if he *call men to ſalvation by Chriſt, whom he intendeth to ruine*; we ſay, That if God ſhould call men to ſalvation by Chriſt, intending to ruine them though they obediently anſwer to his calling, this were deluſion: Or if God calling them to ſalvation by faith in Chriſt, ſhould intend to ruine them by forcing or cauſing their impenitencie, infidelitie and diſobedience, this were worſe then deluſion. But if God in time calleth to ſalvation by Chriſt thoſe whom before all time he decreed to permit to their own faultering and defective free-will for production of the very act of repenting and believing, and who he foreſaw would voluntarily continue in their impenitencie and unbelief, and whom with reſpect to this their finall impenitencie and infidelitie he from all eternitie deſtinated unto everlaſting puniſhment; here is no deluſion at all:

all: And if there be, the Remonstrants in a poore case, who must of necessitie according to their doctrine of Reprobation yield unto all this, and according to ours we need yield to no more.

M God hath *absolutely determined* from all eternitie to permit some men to incurre *damnation* for contemning the *conditionall* promises offered by the *Ministers*. The Ministers *witnesse* nothing but this, That God will save every man that believeth in his Sonne. Where is there any *falsehood* in this testimonie? where any contradiction to the forenamed determination? where any *absolute determination* contradicting the *conditionall offer of salvation*? Let any Remonstrant shew it in our doctrine, and I will presently shew it followeth as well in his.

N His *pleasir Reprobans* will not hold good. For (as hath been already often proved) Reprobation taketh away no power from persons reprobated according to our doctrine which it taketh not away according to theirs. It debarreth not God from giving any power to believe, or repent, or perform any good act, being admitted according to our doctrine, which it will permit him to give according unto theirs. For Reprobation may stand with Possibilitie of obeying God and being saved, as it did in the angels reprobated; it may stand with Sufficient grace:

grace: but the truth is, neither in the Remonstrants opinion nor in ours it ever doth or can stand with Effectuall grace. Before the world was, God had resolved never to give unto Cain or Judas or any other person reprobated according to the Reprobation allowed by the Remonstrants, that speciall grace which should cause them to believe in Christ, and free them from their voluntary impenitencie. Yet it is a false assertion, That God willeth they should never believe, never repent: For here the word *Will* noteth *voluntatem complacentiæ*; and the acts of believing and repenting are alwaies well-pleasing and agreeable unto this will of God, though it be his eternall absolute will in some men not to work them.

The *Sacraments* in the Remonstrants opinion, do not *seal* an infallibilitie of speciall grace or salvation unto any man reprobated from before the foundations of the world were laid: for then they should seal a manifest falshood. But let them shew any grace or benefit which a reprobate may partake by the Sacrament, and is according to our doctrine excluded from it, *without his own default, onely by the absolute will of God*, and then he speaketh to some purpose. O

Gods *gifts* by the decree of Reprobation are neither made *unprofitable* nor *dangerous*. For (as hath been formerly manifested) the P

decree of Reprobation changeth not the proper nature or true ordination of Gods gifts towards persons not-elected. If we speak of the future event onely, it is most true, that they will *never do them good in reference to their eternall glorification*. And this Authour cannot truly affirm that ever they shall, unlesse he can also truly affirm that some men reprobated, as the Remonstrants hold Reprobation, become afterwards glorified or saved. And yet he will not grant, that God out of *hatred* giveth his gifts unto reprobates, *that they should use them ill, and so be damned*: No more will we. It is a weak or rather *non-consequence*, That *Gods choicest gifts are* by God *intended as snares unto men* reprobated by his eternall decree, because he hath decreed to permit them so to abuse those gifts, and hath decreed to withhold from them that speciall mercy and effectuall grace which onely maketh men *de facto* use Gods grace to the atteining of salvation. So that I may now conclude, There is no one amongst so many objections brought against Reprobation, as we teach it, that is of any validitie: or if it be, it maketh as much against that eternall immutable decree of Reprobation which the Remonstrants themselves are forced to acknowledge.

My fourth generall reason against this absolute Reprobation is, It is a hinderance to Piety. It is a doctrine that serveth greatly to discourage holinesse and encourage prophanenesse: It maketh Ministers (by its naturall imporment) negligent in their preaching, praying, and other services which are ordained of God for the eternall good of their people: It maketh people careless in hearing, reading, praying, instructing their families, examining their consciences, fasting and mourning for their sinnes, and all other godly exercises: In a word, it overthrowes the very sinews of religion, and pulleth away the strongest inducements to a holy life. Therefore it is no true and wholesome doctrine.

IV. *It is prejudiciall to* Piety.

That it doth so, it will appear by these reasons that follow.

1. It taketh (*a*) away Hope and Fear; Hope of attaining any good by godlinesse, Fear of sustaining any hurt by wickednesse: and so it taketh away two principall props of Religion. This reason may be resolved into these two branches.

1. Hope and Fear uphold Godlinesse. Were it not for these, it would come to ruine: by these use men strongly led on to vertue, and withheld from vice. Hope doth *excitare*, stirre men up to begin, and *corroborare*, strengthen them in the doing of any good action begun. By this hope of heaven did our Saviour stirre up himself to *endure the crosse, and despise the shame*, Heb. 12. 2. By this he heartned his disciples to do and to suffer for his sake, Matth. 5. 11. and Matth. 10. 32. By this have all the godly in all ages encouraged themselves in well-doing: as we may see in generall, Phil. 3. 10. Col. 1. 9. Tit. 2. 12, 13. and in particular, Heb. 11. Abraham left his country and kindred at Gods call, *because he looked for a citie whose builder and maker was God*, vers. 8. 9, 10. Moses left all the *pleasures* and *treasures of Egypt*, *and endured afflictions with the people of God, because he saw him that was invisible, and had respect to the recompense of reward*, v. 25. 27. The Martyrs (*b*) endured racks, gibbets, horns, sword, fire, with a world of other torments, *because they looked for a better resurrection*, vers. 35. Paul endeavoureth *always to keep a clear conscience*, through the hope which he had of a blessed resurrection, Acts 24. 15. All the noble and heroick acts of active and passive obedience have sprung from the

hope of eternall glory. Souldiers, Merchants, Husbandmen, all are whetted on by hope to diligence in their callings, as dayly experience sheweth us. Hope, saith Aquinas, *confert ad operationem*, conduceth to action: and he proveth it, first by Scripture, 1. Cor. 9. 10. *He which eareth and thresheth, must ear and thresh in hope.* and then he proveth it by a two-fold reason: 1. From the nature of Hopes object, which is *bonum arduum & possibile haberi*, some excellent good attainable by industry. *Existimatio arduii excitat attentionem*, Hope to get that by pains which is conceived to be a thing of worth, stirreth up to pains-taking. 2. From the effect of Hope, which is *delectatio*, an inward pleasure, which the party that liveth under hope is affected with by his hope. There is not any man which hath an inward contentment and satisfaction of heart in the work he hath to do, but goes on merrily. The Hope of heaven therefore is a great encouragement to piety.

Aquin. 1. 2. qu. 40. art. 8.

The Fear (C) of hell also is a strong curb to hold men in from impiety: And therefore (saith one) God hath planted in men a fear of vengeance, that by it, as the ship by the rudder, the soul may presently be turned aside from any rocks, gulfs or quicksands of sin, when it is near them, & may steer its course another way. For this cause *fear of God* and *abstaining from evil* are often joyned together in Scripture Job 1. 1. Exod. 1. 17. and the want of this fear is made the root of all licentiousnesse in sinning, Gen. 20. 11. Nor doth fear only hinder a bad action, but it promoteth a good. It hindreth a bad action directly, because it is *fuga mali*, a flying from that evil of misery which is annexed to the evil of sinne: and it promoteth a good action accidentally, because men think that they are never so safe from the mischief which they fear, as when they are exercised in such employments as tend to the getting of a contrary state. *Work out your salvation* (saith the Apostle) *with fear and trembling*; implying that the working out of salvation goeth not on handsomely, except the fear of missing it be an ingredient into the work.

2. The second (D) branch of this reason is, That by the absolute decree Hope and Fear are taken away. For Hope is properly exercised about *bonum possibile haberi*, some good thing which may be obteined, not which must be obteined of necessitie: and the object of Fear is *malum possibile vitari*, an evil that may be escaped. For *metus est fuga mali*, fear is a fleeing from evil; and therefore supposeth the evil to be avoydable.

voydable. For no man will flee from an evil that cannot be prevented; but will yield up himself to it, as Cesar did his body to the murderers in the senate-house. Now, by this decree, heaven and hell are not objects possible but necessary: Heaven shall unavoydably be obteined by those that are elected, and hell must as certainly be endured by those that are reprobated. For men have no power to alter their eternall states: All men by this decree are precisely determined *ad unum*, to one state, to necessary salvation or necessary damnation, without any power or liberty to choose whether.

And from hence this conclusion is clear, That the absolute decree taketh away the chiefest inducements to holinesse and deterrements from wickednesse, and consequently hindereth a godly life exceedingly.

II. The injuriousnesse of this doctrine to a godly life may further appear by these considerations that follow, one depending upon another.

1. Absolute and peremptory (*E*) decrees are inevitable, whatsoever the things be about which they are exercised: and mens everlasting states if they be absolutely determined, are altogether undeclinable. *Stat fati lex indeclinabilis*, The law of Destiny is undeclinable. And the reason is, Because it hath an inevitable cause, the adamantine decrees of almighty God, which are indeclinable two wayes. 1. Irreversible, lyable to no repeal (as the statutes are which are made in our Parliaments) but farre more unalterable then the laws of the Medes and Persians. *As I have spoken, so will I bring it to passe: I have purposed, and I will do it*, Esay 46. 11. Men do many times bite-in their words again, because they utter things rashly; and do repeal their statutes and ordinances, because they see some inconvenience in them being made, which they could not foresee: but God never calleth in his decrees, because they are all made in great wisdome. 2. Irresistible. It lyeth not in the power of any creature to disannull them, *who hath resisted his will?* Rom. 9. 19. *Our God is in heaven: he doth whatsoever he will*, Psal. 115. 3. Whatsoever is once concluded by his absolute will, is no wayes alterable by the will of man. It is more possible for a man to hinder the rising of the sunne or to stay his course in the heaven, to stop the revolutions of the yeare, and overturn the whole course of nature, then to make the least change in any of Gods absolute decrees.

2. Mens actions (*F*) about ends and things determined by

an absolute decree are vain and fruitleſſe: And the reaſon is, Becauſe they cannot make them otherwiſe then they are determined to be. It is abſolutely decreed, the devils ſhall be damned: Were it not a fruitleſſe thing in them by prayers, teares, and endeavours to ſeek to alter it? It is alſo ſimply decreed, that the ſoul of man ſhall be immortall: Is it not a labour in vain for any man to uſe means that his ſoul may be annihilated? It is ordained that the ſunne ſhall rule the day, and the moon the night; that the one ſhall finiſh his proper courſe in a yeare, the other in a moneth: Would not a mans endeavour to make an alteration in theſe things be unprofitable and ridiculous? Without doubt it would. So likewiſe in vain do men labour to obtain everlaſting life and avoyd eternall death, if there be no power and liberty in their hands to chooſe life or death; but muſt of neceſſity take that which is aſſigned them, be it life or death: For by their labour they effect juſt nothing. If they be abſolutely appointed to deſtruction, their hearing, reading, praying, alms-giving, and mourning for their ſinnes cannot poſſibly procure their ſalvation: damned they muſt be: And if they be abſolutely ordained to ſalvation, their neglect of holy duties, their ignorance, their love of pleaſures, and continuance in a courſe of ungodlineſſe cannot bring them to damnation: they muſt be ſaved. If ſo many ſouls in a pariſh be in this manner decreed to heaven or hell, the Miniſter (θ) preacheth in vain, and the people heare in vain. For there cannot one ſoul be ſaved by all his or their pains which is ordained to hell, nor one ſoul be caſt away by his or their negligence which is appointed to heaven. *It is hard for thee*, ſaid Chriſt to Saul, *to kick againſt pricks*, that is, to endeavour by thy perſecutions and ſlaughters to root out my Church out of the world, becauſe the preſervation of it is abſolutely decreed in heaven: teaching us by that ſpeech, that a mans labour in any thing whatſoever is never profitable, except it be exerciſed about an end attainable thereby, and without which the end may be loſt.

3. Men are not willing to be employed in fruitleſſe actions, if they know it. *I ſo runne*, ſaith S. Paul, *not as uncertainly; ſo fight I, not as one that beateth the aire: But I keep under my body, and bring it into ſubjection, leſt that by any means, when I have preached to others, I my ſelf ſhould be a caſt-away.* The meaning is, I endeavour to keep Gods commandments; I fight with the temptations of the devil, the allurements of the world, and mine own corruptions; I keep my

body

body low by watchings and fastings and other severe exercises of holy discipline. But *cui bono?* Do I all this at randome? uncertain whether I shall obtein any good or prevent any mischief hereby? No; but I do this, as one that is sure (*H*) that by so doing I shall attein everlasting life, and without so doing I cannot avoid eternall death: intimating in these words the common disposition of men, which is, to labour where some proportionable good is to be gotten, or evil prevented; otherwise to spare their heads and hands too. To be imployed in fruitlesse (*I*) affairs, is both a Folly and a Misery. 1. A Folly: For *de necessariis nemo sapiens deliberat*, No man useth deliberation about things necessary, saith the Philosopher. And our Saviour speaking of things above our power, *Cur estis solliciti?* saith he to his disciples, Matth. 6.27. Luke 12.25,26. *Why take ye thought* about such things? Which is as much as if he had said, It is an argument of folly in you to trouble your selves about such things as lie not in your power. 2. It is a Misery in the opinions of all men, as the fable of Sisyphus implyeth; Who (as the Poets feigne) is punished in hell for his robberies, with the rolling of a great stone to the top of a steep hill, where it cannot rest, but presently tumbleth down again. The morall of that fable is, That it is torment, and a torment fit for hell, for a man to be set about any work that is fruitlesse and in vain. Men will rather be exercised in high and hard imployments that produce proportionable ends, then pick straws, play with feathers, or with Domitian spend their times in flapping and killing of flies, or do any other easie work which endeth in nothing but aire and emptinesse, except they be fools or self-tormentours. And therefore when Balaam once *saw that the Lord had fully determined to blesse Israel*, and that all his sorceries could not effect the contrary, he presently gave over and set no more enchantments. And reason teacheth every man to do the like. If any man were fully possessed with a perswasion that his temporall estate were determined in heaven, and that he should be worth just so much, neither more nor lesse; he would conclude in his thoughts, that his care and pains could nothing profit him, nor his idlenesse impoverish him: and so would quickly be perswaded to take his ease. And were it evident that every Common-wealth had *terminum magnitudinis*, a condition appointed for it which could not be altered, and a fatall period which could not be avoided, then would the King call no Parliaments, use no privy Counsellours, make no laws and or-

Num. 24.1.

dinances for the preventing of a Kingdomes ruine, or the procuring of its prosperitie and continuance, (for it would be to little purpose, as once a famous privie Counsellour told our late Queen Elisabeth) but would follow the Poets counsel,

Manilius.

Solvite mortales animos, curisque levate,
Totque supervacuis animum deplete querelis:
Fata regunt orbem, certa stant omnia lege.

From these three premisses (*K*) layed together it followeth directly, That the doctrine of an absolute decree, which determineth mens ends precisely, is no friend at all to a godly life. For if events absolutely decreed be unavoidable, if mens actions about unavoidable ends be unprofitable, if in unprofitable imployments men will have no hand willingly; whosoever they be that believe and consider this, will have nothing to do with the practice of godlinesse: For their ends being absolutely pitched and therefore unavoidable, they will conclude that their labour in religion will be unprofitable, and so will not labour in it at all.

III. That which hath been said may be yet confirmed by two witnesses. The one of them is (*L*) Mr Calvine: Who in his Institutions hath these words; [f] *If any man*, saith he, *should speak thus to the people, If there be any among you that believe not, it is because ye are ordained to destruction; this man would not onely cherish slothfulnesse, but wickednesse also.* Which is as much to say (me thinks) as this, If a man should set forth the doctrine of Reprobation in its colours, and explain it to people in a clear and lively fashion, he would hereby open a doore to liberty and profaneneſse. The other witnesse is a man of another stamp, the miserable Landtgrave of Thuring: Of whom it is recorded by Heisterbachius, that being by his friends admonished of his vitious conversation and dangerous condition, he made them this answer, [g] *If I be elected, no sinnes can bereave me of heaven; if I be reprobated, no good deeds can help me to heaven.*

f *Instit. l.3. c.23. sect.14.* Si quis ità plebem compellet, Si non credidis, ideo sit, quia jam Divinitus exitio prædestinati estis; is non modò ignaviam fovet, sed etiam indulget malitiæ.

g *Helf. l.1. De memor. hist. c.27. p.g. 38.* Si prædestinatus sum, nulla peccata poterunt mihi regnum cœlorum auferre: si præscitus, nulla opera mihi illud valebunt conferre.

I conclude therefore, That by this opinion (which is taught for one of Gods principall truths) Religion either is or may be made a very great loser: which is my fourth generall Reason against it.

But there are three things which are usually answered to vindicate this opinion from this crimination. First, That many (*M*) of them which believe and defend this doctrine, are holy and good men: and therefore of it self it openeth no way for liberty

liberty of life, but through the wickednesse of men who use to pervert the sweetest and surest truths of Scripture to their own damnation.

The like defense to this did the Epicures of old make in favour of their sensuall and swinish doctrine; which was, That happinesse consisted in pleasure. They said that many of their sect were honest men: and so much Tully granteth to be true, but with exception still against their doctrine; [h] *I take*, saith he, *Epicurus himself to be an honest man: yea and many Epicures have been and are faithfull in friendship, square and constant men in all conditions of life, ordering themselves and their lives not by pleasure but by duty.* But (saith he) [i] this proceeded not from the principles of their opinion, but from their own virtuous inclination: and the *force of honesty by their so doing, appeared to be more prevailing in them then the force of pleasure*, which they pleaded for. A little after he hath other words to the same purpose; [k] *As other mens doctrines are esteemed to be better then their deeds, so these mens deeds seem to me to be better then their doctrines.* Like to this answer of Tully to the defenders of Epicurisme, will I shape mine. It cannot (I confesse) be denied that many of this opinion are godly men: but it is no thanks to their opinion that they are so (the true and naturall genius of which is to (N) beget sloth, to drown men in security, and to countenance carnall liberties;) but to something else, either to Gods providence, (who will not suffer this doctrine for his own glories sake and the good of men to have any great stroke in their lives;) or to mens incogitancy, who think not of reducing it *ad praxim*, to practice, and drawing conclusions out of it, but rest in the naked speculation of it, as they do of many others; or lastly, to some good practicall conclusions which they meet with in the word of God and apply to their lives (as they do not the former deductions;) such as these are for example, *Be ye holy as I am holy. Without holinesse no man shall see God. If ye consent and obey, ye shall eat the good things of the land. Godlinesse hath the promises of this life, and of the life to come*, &c. And hence we may learn to measure this opinion, not by the lives of some few of the men that hold it, but by the sequeles which the Logick even of simple men, if they should apply their brains to consider it, would fetch out of it. No man that hath throughly suckt it in and understandeth the force of it, but will either quite relinquish it, or live according to the naturall importment of it, that is, licentiously.

h *Cic. l. 2. De finib. bon. & mal. pag.* 117. Ac mihi quidem videtur quòd ipse vir bonus fuit: & multi Epicurei fuerunt, & hodie sunt, & in amicitiis fideles, & in omni vita constantes & graves, nec voluptate sed officio consilia moderantes.

i Hoc videtur major vis honestatis, minor voluptatis.

k Atque ut cæteri existimantur dicere meliùs quàm facere, sic hi mihi videntur meliùs facere quàm dicere

Secondly,

Secondly, it is said, that albeit this doctrine teach, That men are absolutely elected or absolutely reprobated, yet 1. It telleth no man who in particular is elected, who rejected. 2. It teacheth that men must get the knowledge of their Election by good works, and so by consequent doth rather encourage then stirre holy and honest endeavours.

For answer to the first of these 3 The ignorance (*O*) of a mans particular state (in my judgement) doth not alter the case a jote. For he that believeth in generall, that many, and they the greatest company without comparison, are inevitably ordained to destruction, and a few others to salvation, is able out of these two generall propositions to make these particular conclusions, and to reason (*P*) thus with himself; *Either I am absolutely chosen to grace and glory, or absolutely cast off from both. If I be chosen, I must of necessity believe, and be saved: If I be cast off, I must as necessarily not believe, and be damned. What need I therefore take thought either way about means or end? My end is pitched in heaven, and the means too: my finall perseverance in faith, and my salvation; or my continuance in unbelief, and my damnation. If I lie under the necessity of believing and being saved, or of dying in unbelief and being damned, in vain do I trouble my self about means or end: I have my* Supersedeas; *I may take mine ease, and so I will: enough it is for me to sit down and wait what God will do unto me.* Thus (it is likely) did Tiberius (*Q*) reason with himself. For Suetonius reporteth of him, that he was [1] *the more negligent in religion, because he was fully perswaded that all things came to passe by destiny.* And in this manner (it is to be feared) do too many reason in their hearts, and by this very ground (though they will not perhaps acknowledge it) encourage themselves in profaneness. Though men cannot hide their wickednesse, yet they will hide their grounds which flesh them in it, either through modesty, or to avoid some further ignominy: *The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God,* Psal. 14.

1 *Suet. de vit. Tib. cap. 69. pag. 180.* Circa Deos & religiones negligentior, quippe addictus Mathematicæ, persuasioni{s}que plenus omnia fato agi.

To the second I answer, That men ordinarily will not think the getting of the knowledge of their Election (if that be all) worth all those painfull duties of religion that are to be performed, and all those sweet and pleasing sinnes which are to be relinquished: They will rest contented without it for a while, rather then pay so dearly for it: and the rather, because 1. When they have gotten it, it is in most but a weak and conjecturall knowledge, obscured with many clouds and uncertainties,

ties. 2. It must be maintained with a great deal of paine and care, or else it will be lost again. To the retaining of it is required a continuall indeavour to keep a clear conscience, which is irksome and tedious. Men therefore had need of a stronger motive to obedience then this is, or else they will do nothing.

Thirdly, they that defend and teach this absolute Reprobation (say they) do earnestly exhort men to good works, and deny that any man can be saved, except they live honestly.

So much was also said in the behalf of Epicurus, *viz.* That he denied that any man that lived not honestly, could live pleasantly. But Tully answereth roundly, [m] *As if I cared what he affirmeth or denieth: this I ask, what is meet for him to say who placeth happinesse in pleasure.* And so it mattereth not what these men teach, but what they should teach if they will speak consequently to their own conclusions.

m *Cic. Offic. l. 3. propè finem.* Quasi ego id curem quid ille aiat aut neget? illud quæro, quid ei qui in voluptate summum bonum putat, consentaneum sit dicere.

An Answer to his fourth Reason, That it is prejudiciall to Pietie.

IF absolute Predestination and Reprobation taken in that true sense which formerly hath been explained, be of it self subject to these mischiefs, we will renounce it; or if it be more subject then their conditionall Predestination and Reprobation, presupposing onely that the decrees of Election and Reprobation are eternall and unchangeable *quoad singulares personas electas aut non-electas*; which no Remonstrant will or can deny who understandeth what the very terms of the Divine Election and Reprobation do import.

That *Hope* and *Fear* lead men unto virtuous actions, and restrain them from vitious

A

actions,

actions, we confesse: There needed not so much pains for proving of that which no man denieth. But the solemne practice of this Authours is, to be large in proving an antecedent which would have been granted without further proof, and to presuppose or beg the consequence which he is unable to make good.

B The *Martyrs* did not *endure racks, gibbets, lions*, &c. out of an hope that upon prescience of faith and perseverance they were elected or predestinated before the foundations of the world were laid, whereas others out of Gods eternall prescience of their finall impenitencie and infidelitie were passed-by, (which is the Election and Reprobation onely allowed by the Remonstrants) but out of a certain belief grounded in the revealed word, that whosoever persevereth unto the end shall be saved. This hope of persevering is no lesse (nay it is more) strong in those who fetch their faith and perseverance from the speciall mercy of God extended unto them in their Predestination, then it can be in those who fetch their Predestination from Gods foresight onely of faith and perseverance, upon the condition of generall grace growing out of mans own free-will.

Yea, but (saith the Remonstrant) I am utterly ignorant what God hath decreed con-

concerning me in his secret counsel of Predestination; this therefore can afford me no hope of salvation. I demand, Art not thou as utterly ignorant what God hath eternally foreseen concerning thee in thy conditionate Predestination? how then can more hope arise from this then from the other?

If a Remonstrant shall further reply, I am uncertain whether it be Gods will to give me the grace of perseverance or no, and therefore I cannot build my hope of salvation upon his unknown will. I demand again, Art thou certain that thine own free-will, with help of that grace which is offered thee, will make thee persevere in faith and godlinesse unto thy lives end? how then canst thou build thy hope of salvation upon the prescience of that which is more uncertain then the other? Heare this very objection long ago answered by S. Augustine; [a] *Incerta est mihi (inquit) de meipso voluntas Dei. Quid ergó? Tuáne tibi voluntas de teipso certa est, nec times? Qui videtur stare, videat nè cadat. Cùm igitur utraque voluntas incerta sit, cur non homo firmiori quàm infirmiori fidem suam, spem charitatémque committit?* And Prosper giveth the same answer in effect; [b] *Absit à vobis ideo desperare de vobis, quoniam spem vestram in Deo habere jubemini non in vobis.* We do not say therefore that hope of salvation

[a] *De Præd. sanct. c. 11.*

[b] *Ad excerpt. Genuens. Resp. 9.*

vation or future blessednesse can spring from an immediate knowledge of that Election which we ascribe unto Gods absolute decree: And we do say, that no more hope can arise to any man from the immediate knowledge of that Election which the Remonstrants ascribe unto the conditionate decree founded in Gods eternall prescience. In both opinions therefore, if we will have a lively hope of attaining the heavenly kingdome, it must immediately arise from an experimentall sense in our selves that we are walking in that way which leadeth unto the heavenly kingdome, and from a stedfast perswasion that God our Father will, notwithstanding our own weaknesse and all our mightie enemies, bring us safely unto the heavenly kingdome. And for this latter, our doctrine of Election or Predestination, built upon mere mercy, affordeth farre better hope then theirs, built upon mere prescience. c

a See Jer. 32.38, &c. John 10. 28, 29. & Phil. 1.6.

Now for the *curb of fear*; it is as *strong*, and more strong, *to hold men in from* vitious actions, in our doctrine, who held faith and repentance and holinesse of life to be the fruits or effects of Predestination, then in the Remonstrants, who hold the Divine Predestination to be rather an effect of mans free-will preconsidered or foreseen by God as believing and persevering in faith and godlinesse.

godlineſſe. For ſuppoſe a man ſomewhat carefull of his ſalvation; he will be fearfull of living wickedly, when he beleiveth that no man ſhall *de facto* eſcape the torments of hell but he whom God out of mere mercie hath predeſtinated, and that no man can have any comfortable aſſurance or taſt of his Predeſtination, unleſſe he have firſt a true conſtant endeavour to do good and eſchew evil. Suppoſe a man careleſſe and unmindfull of his ſalvation; yet if he hold the forementioned doctrine, he muſt needs be many times in the midſt of his lewd courſes ſtricken with fear of hell, when he ſeeth none of thoſe fruits in himſelf which he holdeth to be the effects of Predeſtination unto life and the onely means to bring him to heaven. On the other ſide; Take a man of the Remonſtrants opinion, though not altogether careleſſe of his ſalvation; yet he need not greatly to abſtein in the preſent from vitious actions for fear of hell-torments or eternall damnation, becauſe his Predeſtination dependeth upon his own free-will to the very laſt moment of life; and he hath ſuch a ſtrong perſwaſion of a continuall power which he hath in his free-will to repent and believe, that he will not in all likelyhood be very fearfull of enjoying the pleaſures of ſinne for a ſeaſon. Suppoſe a Remonſtrant careleſſe of ſalvation; this doctrine, That

Re-

Reprobation is founded upon prescience of what a man shall be found doing at the very last moment of his life, will make him more careless: for no man, but in his hopes of future amendment is overfavourable to himself, and so lesseneth the present fear which his wicked life might otherwise raise up in him.

D For the *second branch of this reason* whereby he goeth about to prove that absolute Predestination and Reprobation destroy both Hope and Fear; it is grounded upon an errour confuted and rejected by the common consent of all Divines, namely, That the eternall decrees of God concerning future events do make the contrary events unpossible, do make the temporall and immediate agents to do all they do out of an absolute necessitie, having no liberty *in modo agendi* to abstein from so doing or to do the contrary. Were this true, the Remonstrants, who acknowledge eternall and absolute decrees upon presupposall of an eternall absolute prescience, should by their doctrine destroy hope and fear as well as we. For the Divine eternall prescience of future actions or events inferreth as absolute a certainty, immutabilitie, necessitie of such events, as the decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do. And therefore the Schoolmen are as much troubled in answering the que-

question, *An præscientia Divina, vel providentia, necessitatem afferat rebus præscitis*, as in the other, *An prædestinatio Divina imponat*, &c. And the Philosophers, who never dreamed of Predestination or Reprobation, were yet much troubled to shew how any thing could be *fortuitum* or *contingens*, admitting an eternall and infallible prescience of all future events in God. Aquinas first enquireth [d] *Utrùm providentia rebus provisis necessitatem imponit?* And here it is that subtil Cajetane is driven to confesse, *In ignorantia sola quietem invenio.* And concerning Gods eternall Knowledge of future contingents he had before moved the like difficulties, *Quæst.* 14. *art.* 13. concerning Gods eternall Will, *Quæst.* 19. *art.* 8. The like may be found commonly in all the Schoolmen. So that if this Authour, or any other Remonstrant, will but take the pains to consider how the School-Divines clear the eternall and infallible Prescience, Will and Providence of God from imposing fatall necessitie upon events foreseen, willed, provided, he may with the same facilitie know how to clear the eternall absolute decrees of Predestination and Reprobation from imposing upon mens actions any fatall irresistible necessitie. As Gods absolute prescience doth not take away the possibility of the contrary action or event, no more

[d] 1. Part. q. 22. art. 4.

doth his absolute decree. [e] *Scita à Deo*, saith Aquinas, *sunt contingentia propter causa proximas, licèt scientia Dei sit necessaria.* And so he speaketh concerning Predestination; [f] *Ordo prædestinationis certus est, & tamen libertas arbitrii non tollitur, ex qua contingenter provenit prædestinationis effectus.* And concerning the decree of Reprobation; [g] *Quòd reprobatus non potest gratiam adipisci, non est intelligendum secundùm impossibilitatem absolutam, sed conditionatam.* Men are no more precisely determined *ad unum* in our doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation then in that of the Remonstrants. *In mente ac voluntate Dei* the decrees are eternall, immutable, necessary, subject to no variation or contingency, as well in the one opinion as in the other: *In temporali executione*, where men are the agents, the actions which lead to heaven or hell are subject to contingency in both.

[e] *Part. 1. qu. 14. art. 13.*

[f] *Quæst. 23. art. 6.*

[g] *Art. 3.*

To all this we may adde, That Hope or Fear cannot immediately arise from any decrees of God altogether unknown to men: But who shall be saved, or who shall be damned, as it is onely determined in the eternall decree of Predestination and Reprobation, is a thing altogether unknown.

E What this Authour meaneth, when disputing against us he saith, The eternall decrees of Divine Predestination and Reprobation

bation are *peremptorie, inevitable, irreversible, irresistible*, I cannot conjecture. It should seem, in his opinion the eternall decrees of Predestination and Reprobation are ambulatorie, avoidable, reversible, resistible by the creature.

Though the decrees considered in themselves are *peremptory*, *inevitable*, &c. yet the actions of men whereby at length they arrive at heaven or fall into the pit of hell, are free, contingent, &c. Reprobation includeth a will or absolute decree of God to permit such singular persons to fall into finall sin-guiltinesse, and to inflict eternall punishment upon them for their sinnes: doth this make their particular sinfull actions *necessary, inevitable*, &c? No: [h] *Quòd in hoc peccatum vel illud labantur, ex libero illorum arbitrio contingit, unde & meritò imputatur in culpam.*

[h] *Aquin. part. 1. qu. 23. art. 3.*

It is true, *it lieth not in the power of any creature to disannull* the eternall absolute decrees of Gods will: But yet it lieth in the power and choice of free creatures (such as are angels and men) to do or not to do those things whereby such decrees are in time accomplished. It was not in Davids or Peters power to *disannull* the eternall decree of God concerning their Predestination and Salvation: Yet the actions of Repenting, Believing, Persevering were free actions

proceeding from their free-will and upon deliberation. So it is true, it lay not in the power of Judas or Cain to disannull the eternall decree of their Reprobation & Damnation; for *Omne aternum necessarium & immutabile:* yet it lay in Cains power freely to commit or not commit a murder upon his own brother, and in Judas his free-will to betray or not betray his Master; and so in all other sinners, to choose or not to choose the doing of those things which procure their just damnation.

F That *mens actions about ends and things determined by Gods absolute* unrevealed *decrees* are *in vain and fruitlesse*, is a vain and false opinion, and exploded by the very heathen under the name of [1] ἀργὸς λόγος or *ignava ratio, cui si pareamus, nihil est omnino quod agamus in vita.* For though our endeavours do not make them otherwise *quoad eventum* then God had fore-determined, yet the thing was so determined by God as it neither could nor should have ever come into effect without such actions and endeavours of men. His instances are as frivolous and farre from the purpose, as his opinion is from all truth. For his instance in the *devils* now damned, it is not to the point. He should have instanced in the angels not-elected before their damnation, and have shewed that their obedience had been *vain and fruitlesse*; and

[1] *Cic. De fato.*

and then he might have inferred that the good actions of men *dum sunt in via* are vain and fruitlesse. Now he can inferre nothing, but that it were a vain thing for Judas damned in hell to hope by any endeavours of his to alter the decree of his damnation.

For his instance in a *decree* of the *immortalitie of mans soul* and of the *vanitie of using means for the annihilation thereof*, it is no whit better then the other. We do not denie but it is a fruitlesse and a vain thing for any man to go-about by his temporall endeavours to alter Gods eternall decrees concerning the nature or properties which he hath allotted unto his creatures, as to make an elementarie bodie eternall, or an immortall soul mortall. And as ridiculous it is (though in another kind) for any Remonstrant to suppose that the eternall decrees of Gods Predestination and Reprobation (as himself holdeth them) can be altered by any temporall actions which men shall do or not do.

And yet though it be a vain and idle endeavour to referre our temporall actions to the alteration of any of Gods eternall decrees (for [k] *de ratione æternitatis est immutabilitas*;) yet it is no vain or idle endeavour for any man elected or not-elected to aim at eternall life by doing good actions and by absteining from evil: For if a man be ele-

[k] *Vide Augustin. Conf. l.12.c.15.*

cted, there is no other way to come unto salvation: if he be not elected, some good endeavours would serve to mitigate his damnation; and every man continuing in his good endeavours may assuredly hope for salvation & shall assuredly obtein it. There is an eternall, absolute, immutable decree, revealed unto us in Gods word, That whosoever believeth in the Sonne of God, and leadeth a sober, just and godly life, shall be saved: and whosoever doth not truly believe, but leadeth a lewd, unjust and wicked life, shall be damned. It is not the alteration of Gods decrees which mens actions must aim at, but the obteining of happinesse and escaping wretchednesse according to the tenour of his decrees. And herein no mans action can be vain or fruitlesse. For God doth not by the absolute decree of Election absolutely determine to save Peter, whether he believe or not believe, repent or not repent; and therefore Peters faith and repentance are not vain and idle actions. Neither doth he by the absolute decree of Non-election or negative Reprobation absolutely determine to damne Judas, whether he believe or not believe, repent or not repent (such absolute decrees are the absolute mistakings of the Remonstrants;) and therefore such good actions had not been vain and fruitlesse. We may truly say to every man in the world,

world, elected or not-elected, as God himself spake to desperate Cain, [l] *If thou do well, shalt thou not be accepted?* Yes questionlesse: for [m] *to every man that doth good, shall be glorie*, &c. No man shall be damned *quia ab aterno non electus aut reprobatus, sed quia in tempore infidelis & impius.*

[l] Gen. 4. 7.

[m] Rom. 2.

For the *Ministers preaching*; if this man hold it *vain*, unlesse by it some souls of those whom God hath eternally reprobated be saved, will he nill he, of necessitie he must confesse, that the Predestination and Reprobation founded upon eternall Prescience by Arminius maketh all our preaching vain. For no Remonstrant can be so ignorant as to affirm, that any man eternally predestinated was ever cast away by the negligence of the Minister, or that any man eternally reprobated (as Arminius conceiveth of Reprobation) was ever saved by the pains of the Minister: And yet we say, the Minister laboureth not in vain. First, it is not in vain in regard of the elect: for it is unto them [n] *the power of God unto their salvation.* And unto them (though unknown [o] *quoad singulares personas*) do the Ministers principally referre their labour and pains. For though the decree of Predestination, which is eternall, cannot be procured by any endeavours of men, yet the effects or benefits flowing from Predestination may be pro-

G *Vide Aug. tract. 48. in Joann.*

[n] 2. Tim. 2. 10.

[o] *Aquin. part. 1. qu. 23. ar. 8.*

moted by the Ministers. Secondly, it is not in vain in regard of the Reprobate: For though it bring none of them to salvation, yet sometimes it maketh them do some good things, and abstein from some evil, which otherwise they would not have done and it is a means to convict their consciences that their damnation is just. Last of all, the Ministers painfull preaching is not in vain in regard of himself: For hereby he escapeth that *Væ mihi si non evangelizavero*: he getteth comfort of conscience here, and a crown hereafter.

If labour be to no purpose where the thing is not *atteinable* by mans labour, then to go-about by our labour to attein the decree of Election for our selves or any other man, is a vain labour: But if labour be *profitable* when a good thing may be atteined by it, and without it cannot; then to labour to bring our selves or others to the kingdome of heaven, is never a vain labour: for by this every man may, and without this no man can enter into the kingdome of heaven.

H Every man in the world by doing as S. Paul did, may be as *sure* of *atteining everlasting life* as Paul was. Neither will the eternall decree of Reprobation, be it absolute or be it conditionall, ever stand an obstacle in any mans way.

No

No man who by the preaching of the word is excited to good works hath at any time or ever ſhall find them *fruitleſſe* or *vain*. *De neceſſariis nemo deliberat*; and therefore no man deliberateth how to get himſelf predeſtinated: but to be ſaved, is a thing depending upon our free actions, which require deliberation. I

Here he diſcovereth his erroneous conceit of Predeſtination and Reprobation, namely, That Predeſtination is an abſolute appointment of men to enjoy the kingdome of heaven, whether they live well or ill; and that Reprobation is alſo an abſolute appointment of ſome men to the torments of hell, whether they live well or ill. Such an abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation we diſclaim and deteſt.

If a wiſe man were *perſwaded* (as he ought to be) that he ſhall never be one farthing richer then God hath *determined*, yet he would uſe the ordinary means, as knowing that men cannot be brought to the end determined by God but by uſing ſuch means without which God hath alſo appointed that ſuch an end ſhall not be effected. As if God had determined in heaven and revealed to man upon earth that he ſhall live fifteen years juſt, and neither more nor leſſe, he were a fool or a mad-man that ſhould conclude, *I will neither eat nor drink theſe fifteen years*;

yeares; I will runne when I liſt into the ſire &c.

K. From all the premiſſes which this Author hath hitherto inlarged, there is no colour of inferring this concluſion, *Therefore the abſolute decrees of eternall Predeſtination and Reprobation muſt be abandoned, and Arminius his conditionall Predeſtination and Reprobation be imbraced, otherwiſe all care of piety and good living muſt needs be extinguiſhed.*

Firſt, becauſe he is quite miſtaken in the ſenſe of this word *Abſolute*. Eternall Predeſtination is not termed an *abſolute* decree of ſaving David, Peter, Paul, or any man elſe, as if it abſolved perſons predeſtinate from the neceſſitie of uſing the means of ſalvation which Gods revealed word hath injoyned; (This were rather a *diſſolute* then an *abſolute* Predeſtination.) but becauſe God eternally predeſtinating David, Peter, Paul, and the reſt, hath in his ſpeciall mercy abſolutely determined to give them that ſpeciall grace which ſhall move, inable, and make them uſe all the neceſſary means unto their ſalvation. And for eternall Reprobation, it is not termed an *abſolute* decree of damning Cain, Judas, or the Devil himſelf, as if God were abſolutely reſolved to damne them though they ſhould never intangle themſelves in any guilt of damnation, and ſhould do all thoſe good acts which God himſelf hath

hath decreed ſhall be means to bring any who uſeth them unto ſalvation: but becauſe God eternally paſſing-by them and not-predeſtinating them, hath abſolutely reſolved to withhold from them that ſpeciall mercy, more abundant and moſt effectuall grace, without which he infallibly knoweth by their own voluntary rebellion they will incurre damnation, which he is abſolutely reſolved to permit and not to prevent.

Secondly, all his *premiſſes* are too weak to induce his concluſion, becauſe eternall abſolute determinations of God concerning events wch ſhall betide unto particular men, do neither encourage nor diſcourage them from uſing the ordinary means of atteining good and avoiding evil, whileſt they are onely known in the generall, and altogether unknown as they concern this and that ſingular perſon. No man doubteth but God hath eternally determined who ſhall be [p] promoted unto worldly honours and who ſhall not, who ſhall attein unto riches and who ſhall not. The very Heathen were not ignorant of this truth, who aſcribed theſe different conditions of men [q] Διὸς μεγάλοιο ἔκητι. But becauſe ſingular perſons know not whether God have determined to advance them to honour and wealth or not, they judge not all care, pains and ſtudy to attein honour or wealth

[p] *Pſal.* 75.

[q] *Heſiod.* ἔργ. καὶ ἡμ.

wealth to be vain and fruitleſſe. Yet in temporall or externall good things there were more colour a great deal to ground idleneſſe upon Gods eternall determination, becauſe let a man take never ſo good courſes and ſo true pains to attein honour or wealth, he ſhall never compaſſe it if God have otherwiſe appointed: But in ſpirituall and eternall bleſſings, let any man take the courſe and uſe the means which God hath preſcribed to attein them, and he may aſſure himſelf they are infallibly appointed for him.

3. Thirdly, becauſe experience teacheth the contrary to his ſuppoſition, though we admit the eternall abſolute determination of God concerning this ſingular perſons ſalvation were revealed unto him extraordinarily by God himſelf. For the certain knowledge of Gods abſolute determination to give eternall life, would not in a well-diſpoſed mind produce careleſſeneſſe or idleneſſe, but a religious care and fervency of ſpirit in doing all ſuch actions as further man in the way unto life, and of removall of ſuch obſtacles as would hinder them. It is commonly held by Divines, that the bleſſed Virgin, S. Paul, and ſome others had an extraordinary revelation of their abſolute election unto eternall life; and yet none of theſe concluded that all their pains and labour

bour for atteining it was fruitlesse and vain. And if God had revealed to Judas (which in his wisdome he hath judged unfit) the eternall immutable decree of his Reprobation, yet should none of his endeavours to do good & eschew evil have been unprofitable.

Fourthly, because if men should reject the absolute, irreversible, irresistible decrees of Gods eternall Predestination and Reprobation which this Authour opposeth, under pretense that thereby all actions and means are made vain and fruitlesse unto men where the ends and things are predetermined, the Predestination and Reprobation grounded upon Gods eternall prescience would lie as open to the self-same objection: Which if it be of no validitie against the Remonstrants, neither is it against us. For first of all, as for the eternall decrees of absolute Election and Reprobation; *nihil ponunt in electis aut reprobatis*, they onely suppose in God a determination of bringing the one infallibly unto eternall life, and of permitting the other as infallibly to come short of eternall life, and by their own sinfull acts to plunge themselves into the gulf of eternall death. In the Remonstrants decree of eternall Predestination and Reprobation the same determination of God concerning the same particular men with the same infallibilitie and immutability of their

their contrary ends is eſtabliſhed. If therefore the diſtinct decrees of Predeſtination and Reprobation thus irrevocably eſtabliſhed before the world was made, make all *labour in religion unprofitable*, the Remonſtrants own doctrine doth it no leſſe then ours. Again, abſolute and eternall determinations of God concealed *in mente Divina*, though never ſo infallible and immutable, cannot in ſingular perſons hinder piety or nouriſh profaneneſſe, where there are decrees as immutable, as infallibly revealed unto the ſame ſingular perſons in Gods word, promiſing life to all without exception that do well, and threatning death to all thoſe that do ill. How can it probably be ſuppoſed that thoſe unknown Divine determinations ſhould work upon mens wills, when theſe ſo well known and ſo continually publiſhed do not.

Vide Thom. à Kempis, l. 1. c. 25 [pag. 68.

If any Remonſtrant ſhall ſay, Make me ſure of mine Election, and that no immutable eternall decree of Reprobation ſhall keep me out of heaven, and then I will labour, I will toil, I will ſweat to attein eternall life; I anſwer, No other man can make thee ſure of it: but do what thou ſayeſt, and thou mayeſt make thy ſelfe ſure of it. And if thou wilt not for ſuch a price adventure thy pains unleſſe God will firſt make thee of his privy counſel, eternall damnation is

but

out a juſt reward of thine idleneſſe and profaneneſſe.

Laſt of all, the immutability of all Gods eternall decrees whatſoever is a thing out of all queſtion amongſt orthodox Divines (I need not except Vorſtius the Remonſtrant, becauſe no man reckoneth him amongſt orthodox Divines:) I wonder therefore how this Authour ſhould think he hath ſaid any thing againſt the Divine abſolute decrees of Predeſtination and Reprobation, onely becauſe they are *peremptory, inevitable, irreverſible*, &c. If God upon the eternall prefcience of Judas his finall impenitency conceived an eternall decree of his Reprobation and Damnation (as Arminius himſelf granteth) [r] *implicat contradictionem, velle non facere eandem rem, aut revocare illud decretum*, &c. [f] *Sempiterna voluntas Dei nunquam mutabilitati ſubjacet, quia initium exſiſtendi non habet.* It is a thing unbeſeeming the Divine majeſty, not to decree from all eternity whatſoever he will do or not do for men or unto men in time; or when he hath ſo decreed, to revoke or change any of his decrees. If therefore the Remonſtrants Predeſtination and Reprobation be reverſible decrees, we will none of them; for we are ſure they were never of Gods making.

[r] *Ruiz. De vol. p. 166.*
[f] *Fulg. ad Monim. l. 2 c. 12.*

Calvines ſaying is moſt true: For the decree of Reprobation is no cauſe of infidelity; though

though the decree of Predestination prepareth for men that grace which worketh faith and sanctification in their hearts.

The *Landtgraves* profane speech maketh as much against the Arminian Predestination as against that which we hold. For suppose a Remonstrant had told him, *If you be elected, it is because God hath eternally foreseen that you will die a penitent and a faithfull man: If you be reprobated, it is because God hath eternally foreseen you will die a faithlesse and a wicked man*, this in all likelyhood would have been so far from taking away his desperate profaneness, that it would have increased it: for God cannot be deceived in his foresight.

M Wee prove not the truth of our doctrine from any mans *holinesse*, but from holy Scriptures: wee therefore passe-by this discourse as wholly impertinent. All that he saith of the *Epicures* might as well be said by us against the Remonstrants opinions: but we take no pleasure in idle vagaries.

Mens practice cannot be guided by decrees of God concealed from their knowledge, though they be decrees concerning their good or evil. But if men will shew themselves reasonable men and not mad men, they must take their rules of practice from such revealed decrees as teach what actions are means to attein good, and what

are

are means to draw evil upon our selves.

He hath a crazed *brain* that will *draw practicall conclusions* or *logicall sequeles* from decrees or antecedents whereof he knoweth not the particular tenour, or how in singular they concern himself. N

For his objection against the second answer, we say, Let him understand absolute Reprobation and absolute Election as by us it hath been formerly explained, and not according to his erroneous fansie, which hath been often confuted; and it no more *begetteth sloth* or *carnall liberty* then the Remonstrants eternall Election and Reprobation springing from Gods infallible and eternall prescience, may much lesser. For according to our position no man can have so strong a perswasion that he is elected and shall be saved whilst he continueth in *sloth*, carnall *security* or sinfull actions, as he may in theirs. If it be once conceived that the eternall decrees, which distinguish men elected and reprobated, stand founded upon the foreseen finall goodnesse of men, such is the vain confidence which most men have of their own free-will and of the sovereigne dominion which their will hath over its own acts, that though they be never so wicked for the present, yet they are most ready to flatter themselves that they will turn good and holy men before their death. And thus they

ſpend their whole life in ſin and carnall ſecurity, whileſt they hope to put themſelves within the number of the Elect by their finall penitencie when they pleaſe. But he that believeth that Predeſtination is an act of Gods abſolute will and free mercy, and that faith and holineſſe are the proper effects thereof, he can have cold comfort of his Election or Salvation whileſt he continueth in his carnall and wicked converſation; nay he muſt needs be in fear of damnation: eſpecially ſince he dareth not truſt to the broken reed of his own free-will for his repentance and perſeverance, as men of a contrary opinion are eaſily induced to do. He may have ſome ſlender hope of being converted at the length, becauſe it is within the limits of Gods power and mercy to do it: yet he cannot (in all likelyhood) ſo ſecurely and carnally preſume upon his finall converſion and perſeverance as thoſe who aſcribe theſe good acts unto their own free-will, and the certainty of them to the intuitive preſcience of the Divine underſtanding, and not to an operative effectuall eternall decree of his will.

[a] *Vide Petnot. p. 234. Et Grev. de Elect. pag. 136. Et Rem. Exam. Cenſur. p. 192.*

To this may be added, that whatſoever for faſhions ſake Remonſtrants talk of eternall Predeſtination and Reprobation, yet [a] ſome hold them ſuch incomplete acts or decrees as are never eſtabliſhed *in mente ac voluntate*

voluntate Divina before mans free-will hath actually done all the good or evil which it doth in this life. So that the decree of Reprobation being conceived by them *ad modum ſententiæ pendentis, donec per liberum hominis arbitrium omnia ſint poſita in eſſe & in actu quæ per illud poni debent*, every man may gueſſe what boldneſſe this is likely to breed in moſt men of deferring their repentance, and continuing in their carnall ſecurity till they think their end is drawing near: which few think of untill it ſuddenly ſurpriſeth them.

The Remonſtrants lately in plain terms affirm, *Falſum eſt quòd electio facta ſit ab æterno*: By which it is plain what they think of the decree of Reprobation. I have ſtood the longer upon this, that every man may ſee what the Remonſtrants principally aim at, when they are ſo bitter againſt abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation, and ſo eager for their conditionate Predeſtination and Reprobation: namely theſe two things: Firſt, that reteining the bare name of eternall Election and Reprobation, they may cloſely and obliquely oppugne the eternity of thoſe diſtinct decrees. Secondly, that they may plainly reduce all the difference of thoſe diſtinct decrees, as they are terminated unto ſingular perſons, unto the different acts of mens free-will, and exclude that

difference which the Apostle testifyeth to have been in the Divine will towards the sonnes of men, and that before the foundations of the world were laid, Rom. 8. 30. & 9. 11. Eph. 1. 4. & 11. Acts 13. 48.

o The *ignorance* of Gods decree, whether this or that singular person be in the number of the Elect or no, doth much *alter the case* in the matter which is now under debate. We now inquire whether the Remonstrants doctrine or ours be more likely to nourish carnall security in a man who hath yet no knowledge of his particular Election or Reprobation, of his future Glorification or Damnation. We say, that though men of perverse minds, whilst they are occupied in wicked courses, may out of both doctrines take occasion of carnall security and of sleeping in sin, yet that doctrine which breedeth a stronger presumption of being elected and saved in the mind of a sinner continuing addicted unto his sinfull courses, is that which most nourisheth and cherisheth men in their present looseneſſe and lewdneſſe. And this is evidently the doctrine of the Remonstrants, and not ours. For any Remonstrant (though never so wicked) may thus reason with himself leaning unto their principles, *I am (for all my present wicked condition) a man elected, and a man most certainly to be saved, if out of mine own free-will excited and enabled by Divine*

vine grace, I ſhall repent and truly believe in the Sonne of God, and ſo end my life: But theſe being actions which God hath put within mine own power, I am reſolved to perform them hereafter: Therefore I ſhall be ſaved. It is the *minor* propoſition which nouriſheth a man in his preſent lewdneſſe, and yet maketh him preſume upon his future happineſſe. And the *minor* conteining nothing in it but a promiſe of doing that good for a mans own ſelf which lieth (as he thinketh) in his own power to do, no man thus affected will greatly fear to continue in ſinne, or ſtand in any great fear of eternall damnation. But according to our doctrine a man of common ſenſe will reaſon thus, *I ſtedfaſtly believe that if God have elected me he will ſanctifie me with his grace, and bring me unto glory: and if I be not ſanctified with grace whilſt I live here, I was never elected, I ſhall never be ſaved: But mine own conſcience telleth me, that as yet I am unſanctified, that I wallow in looſeneſſe and lewdneſſe of life.*

The *true and naturall genius* of theſe premiſſes truly apprehended is to rowſe a man out of *ſloth*, and to quell groundleſſe preſumption of his future ſalvation, and (in a word) to make him conclude, *Till I alter my courſe of life, I muſt not dream of any Election or Glorification.*

Now for the manner of reaſoning which

this Authour will needs teach us, it is not worth the learning. *Many*, saith he, *are ordained inevitably to destruction, and a few to salvation.*

If by an *ordination to destruction and salvation* he mean an absolute and peremptory will in God to damne some men whether they do well or ill, we hold no such absolute ordination. If he mean an eternall absolute decree of God to bring some men (fewer in number) unto grace and glory, and to permit some others (farre more in number) to abuse the means of grace, to lose the kingdome of glory, to procure their own damnation, we cannot deny it, unless we will deny our Saviours expresse words, *Multi vocati, pauci electi*: Many run in the broad way which leadeth unto death, few in the narrow way which leadeth unto life: which I think this Authour will not say happened without Gods eternall ordination. * Matth. 22.14.

For the word *inevitably*, it is thrust into this proposition very unfitly. Things are said to be evitable or inevitable unto men, when by their actions they may or may not be avoided: But as for the eternall ordinations of God acted immanently in himself, he that termeth them *evitable* or *inevitable* in regard of us, who were not then in being, speaketh he knoweth not what.

P 2 Now for his reason, *Either I am absolutely chosen*

chosen to grace and glory, or absolutely cast-off from both. If chosen, I must of necessity believe, and be saved: If cast-off, I must of necessity not believe, and be damned. If by *absolute Election* and *Abjection* he understand such an absoluteness as bringeth men to the means or end of either without their own voluntary acts, we utterly disclaim it. If he mean such an absolute Election and Preterition as prepareth effectuall grace for some, and giveth it them in due time, and prepareth not such effectuall grace for others, neither giveth it them at any time, we grant this absolute Election and Reprobation. But whereas he saith, *If chosen, I must of necessity believe, and be saved*, the contrary followeth, *If chosen, I shall with a free-will work out mine own salvation.* And whereas he saith, *If reprobated, I must necessarily not believe, and be damned*, the contrary likewise followeth, *If reprobated, I shall out of the hardnesse of mine own heart, willingly and wittingly run in the broad way which leadeth unto my damnation.* As for the *Necessity* of *believing* and *not-believing*, which he thinketh must needs follow upon absolute Election and Reprobation, in both we grant *necessitatem infallibilitatis*; in neither *coactionis*: In both we grant *necessitatem positionis* or *ordinis*; in neither *necessitatem eventûs*, or *impossibilitatem eventûs contrarii*. God is according to his own essence and

Vide Albert. part. 1. tract. 15. q. 61. p. 138. b. & q. 63. pag. 144.

nature *Causa necessaria*: yet the second and immediate causes are not necessitated unto their actions, [7] *quia prima causa non tollit modum suæ causalitatis à secundis.* There is need therefore for any man to take thought both about the means and about the end, not to get a new ordination or decree from God, but because the eternall ordination of men unto glory cannot be effected without their own serious care and endeavour, and because the eternall ordination of men unto punishment cannot be avoided but by shaking-off sloth and carnall security.

7 *Albert. part. 1. tract 16. qu. 63. pag. 144.*

Vide Aug. De bono persev. c. 16. & lib. 3. De lib. arbitr. c. 2.

Unto all this I adde, That eternall Predestination and Reprobation, as it is founded by the Remonstrants upon Gods eternall prescience, draweth the same necessity after it. For I reason thus after his pattern; *I am either upon Gods eternall prescience of my final perseverance in faith, absolutely chosen to grace and glory, or upon Gods eternall prescience of my finall impenitency absolutely cast-off from both. If upon the Divine eternall infallible prescience of my believing and persevering I was ordained unto salvation, I must of necessity believe, and be saved: If upon the same eternall and immutable prescience of my infidelity & impenitency I was ordained to damnation, I must as necessarily not believe, and be damned.* There is the same force in this manner of reasoning to induce a carnall sluggish soul unto careles-

lesnesse

lesnesse which is in the other: There is as great necessity put upon humane actions by the eternall Prescience of God as is by his eternall Predestination. And if any man have looked into School divinity, he cannot be ignorant that the same objections which are made against Predestination, as overthrowing the Liberty of mans will, and putting a *necessity* and *inevitability* upon his actions, they are likewise made against the Divine Prescience, as doing the same: and the self-same answers and distinctions which free the one from this calumny, free the other.

Molina (no enemy to the Remonstrants doctrine) plainly affirmeth, [z] *In concilianda tam libertate arbitrii nostri circa actus peccatorum quàm evitabilitate eorum cum Divina providentia, non alius labor est quàm in iisdem conciliandis cum præscientia quâ Deus prævidet eos esse futuros nisi impediat.* Malderus (no friend to the Contra-remonstrants) [a] granteth absolute Predestination both unto the actions of grace, as Believing, Persevering, and the like, and to the end thereof, which is eternall Life. And he detesteth their opinion who hold that the free acts of men cannot be predefined eternally by God; [b] *Absit ut in illam concedamus sententiam quæ docet actus nostros liberos non posse ullo modo à Deo prædefiniri.*

[z] *Conc. qu. 22. pag. 199*

[a] *Antis. p. 14, 15, 17.*

[b] *Pag. 29.*

And

2 And to shut up all in a word; As Tiberius would have been as careleſſe in religion, if he had thought that all things come to paſſe in time according to an eternall immutable preſcience of God, as he was thinking that all things come to paſſe according to an eternall immutable deſtination of God; ſo it is as much to be feared that many Remonſtrants ground their idleneſſe and profaneneſſe upon this fanſie, That what God hath eternally foreſeen will come to paſſe in time, muſt of neceſſitie ſo come to paſſe, as that any of our opinion ſhould ground it upon the like fanſie, That whatſoever God hath eternally predeſtinated to come to paſſe in time, muſt of neceſſity ſo come to paſſe. And ſince whether we found Predeſtination upon preſcience or otherwiſe, ſtill the knowledge and comfortable ſenſe thereof can no otherwiſe be had then in and by the temporall effects, no reaſon can be given why abſolute Predeſtination (as it is taught by our Church) ſhould breed more careleſneſſe or preſumption then the Remonſtrants Predeſtination.

Vide Penot. pag. 231.

Vide Anſ. de conc. lib. arbit. cum Prad. cap. 1. & 2.

Treatiſe.

V. *It is an enemy to true* Comfort.

I Come now to my laſt reaſon againſt it, drawn from the Uncomfortableneſſe of it. It is a doctrine (*A*) full of deſperation, both to them which ſtand and to thoſe that are fallen, to men out of temptation and to men in temptation.

It

It { leadeth into / leaveth in } temptation.

and therefore can be no doctrine of Gods word: For that εὐαγγέλιον, *good news*, to men, a storehouse of sweet consolations for us in our *turbidis & lucidis intervallis*, in our best and worst conditions and changes. *These things are written*, saith the Apostle, *that by patience and comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope*: implying that therefore was the word written and left to the Church, that by the comforts comprised in it those poore souls that look toward heaven might never want in any changes or chances of this mortall life a sweet gale of hope to refresh them and to carry on their shipfull merrily toward the haven. Rom. 15.4.

1. Firſt, this doctrine (*B*) leadeth men into temptations, and into such a one too as is as sharp and dangerous as any the Tempter hath. The devil can easily perswade a man that maketh absolute Reprobation a part of his creed, that he is one of those absolute reprobates: because there are farre more absolute reprobates, even a hundred for one, then absolute chosen ones; and man hath a great deal more reason to think that he is one of the most then one of the fewest, one of the huge multitude of inevitable castawayes then one of that little flock for whom God hath precisely prepared a kingdome. Such a man is not onely capable of but framed and fashioned by his opinion for this suggestion. Which is a very sore (*C*) one, if we may believe Calvine, Bucer and Zanchius. Calvine telleth us, [n] that *the devil cannot assault a believer with a temptation more dangerous.* And a little after he saith, that it is *so much the deadlier, by how much commoner it is then any other.* [o] So ordinary is this temptation, that *he which is at all times free from it, is a rare man* (we are to conceive that he speaketh of those who hold absolute Reprobation:) and so dangerous it is, that if it get strength, he which is under it is *either miserably tormented or mightily astonished.* And a little after he saith again, [p] *He that will not wrack his soul, must avoid this rock.* Bucer also hath a passage like to this; [q] *This doubt, whether we be predesti-*

n *Calv. Inſtit. l. 3. c. 24. ſect. 4.* Nulla tentatione vel graviùs vel periculoſiùs fideles percellit Satan. o Rariſſimus eſt cujus non interdum animus hâc cogitatione feriatur. Unde tibi ſalus niſi ex Dei electione? electionis porrò quæ tibi revelatio? p Quæ ſi apud quempiam ſemel invaluit, aut diris tormentis miſerum perpetuò excruciat, aut reddit penitus attonitum. p Ergò naufragium ſi timemus, ſolicitè ab hoc ſcopulo cavendum, in quem nunquam ſine exitio impingitur. q *Bucer. in 3. ad Rom. 9. de Prad.* Ut caput omnis noxiæ tentationis, repellenda eſt hæc quæſtio, Sumúſne prædeſtinati. Nam qui de hoc dubitat, nec vocatum ſe nec juſtificatum eſſe credere poterit, hoc eſt, nequit eſſe Chriſtianus.

nate

nate or no, must be repelled as the head of every temptation: For he that doubteth of this, cannot believe he is called or justified; that is, he cannot be a Christian. Every man therefore must presume upon it as a principle of faith, that he is elected. [f] This very speech of Bucers Zanchy maketh use of to the same purpose. We see then by testimonies of these worthy men, that this temptation is dangerous and ordinary too to such as think there be absolute Reprobates.

The truth of both will further appear by the example of Petrus Ilosuanus (D) a Schoolmaster in Hungary, who going to hang himself, signified in a writing which he left at his studie for the satisfaction of his friends and countreymen the true cause of that his unnaturall fact. In that writing he delivered these three things. 1. That he was of Calvines and S. Augustines opinion, That men are not dealt withall *secundum bona aut mala opera*, according to their works good or evil; but that there are *occultiores causæ*, more hidden causes, of mens eternall conditions. 2. That he was one of that woefull companie of absolute Reprobates, *vas formatum in ignominiam*, a vessel prepared to dishonour; and therefore (though his life had been none of the worst) he could not possibly be saved. 3. That being unable to bear those dreadfull apprehensions of wrath with which he was affrighted, he hanged himself. For these are some of his words there recorded, "I go to those infernall lakes, an eternall reproch to my countrey. I commend you to God, whose mercy is denied to me. Out of this example, two things we may safely collect: First, That men who think there are many whom God hath utterly rejected out of his onely will and pleasure, may be easily brought to think by Satans suggestion that they are of that company. Secondly, That this temptation is very dangerous.

I conclude therefore this first part of my last reason, which is, That absolute Reprobation leadeth men into temptation.

II. It leaveth men in temptation: And this it doth two wayes; by 1. Making (E) the tempted uncapable of true comfort; 2. Making Ministers unable to give true comfort.

1. It maketh the tempted uncapable of true comfort: Like a Gorgons head, it doth so trouble their fansies and amaze them, especially in their paroxysmes and fits, that the strongest arguments of comfort, applied with as much art and cunning

r Præsumendum igitur ut principium fidei, nos omnes esse à Deo præscitos.

f *Zanch. l. 5. De nat. Dei, q. de Prad.*

t *Georg. Major, in 2. ad Tim. 2. fol. 1109.*

u Discedo igitur ad laqueos infernales æternam damnatos patriæ meæ. Deo vos commendo, cujus misericordiam mihi negavit.

[illegible]ing as may be, will not fasten upon them. With David [illegible]y say in their fear, that *all men are liars*, namely all such [illegible] come to comfort them in their temptation. The reason is, [illegible]cause it is an opinion incompatible with any word of com[illegible]t that can be ministred to the distressed soul in this tem[illegible]tion. Gods Love to mankind, Christs Death for all men, [illegible]e Calling of poore sinners without exception to repentance [illegible]d salvation, with all other grounds of consolation, the [illegible]mpted will easily elude with the grounds of his opinion. [illegible]hich that we may the better see, let us imagine that we [illegible]are a Minister and a tempted Soul reasoning in this or the [illegible]e manner.

TEMPTED. WO *is* (F) *me; I am a cast-away: I am absolutely rejected from grace and glory.*

MINISTER. Discourage not thy self, thou poore afflicted [illegible]ul: God hath not cast thee off. For he hateth nothing that [illegible]e hath made, but beareth a love to all men, and to thee [illegible]mong the rest.

TEMPT. *God* (G) *hateth no man as he is his creature, [illegible]ut he hateth a great many as they are sinners in Adam. And God hath a twofold love, as I have learned: a generall love, which putteth forth it self in outward and temporall blessings [illegible]ely; and with this he loveth all men: and a speciall love, by which he provideth everlasting life for men; and with this he loveth onely a very few, which out of his alone will and pleasure he singled from the rest. Under this generall love am I, but not under the speciall.*

MIN. Nay, but God so loveth all men as that he desireth their eternall good: for the Apostle saith, *He would have all to be saved, and he would have no man to perish*, nor thee in particular.

TEMPT. ALL is (H) *taken two wayes: for all sorts & conditions of men, high & low, rich and poore, bound and free, &c. and for all particular men in these severall sorts & ranks. God would have all men to be saved in the first sense, that is, all sorts: but he would not have all to be saved in the second sense, that is, all particular men of those sorts; some of my countrey, my calling, my condition of life, but not all & every one, nor me in particular. Or if it be true that God would have all particular men to be saved, yet he willeth it onely with a revealed will, not with a secret: for with that he will have millions to be damned. Under this revealed will am I, not under the secret.*

MIN.

MIN. Nay, but Christ came into the world *to seek and save what was lost*, and *is a propitiation not for our sins onely*, *viz.* the sinnes of a few particular men, or the sinnes of all sorts of men, *but for the sinnes of the whole world*: Therefore he came to save thee, and to be a propitiation for thy sinnes: for thou art one of them that were lost, and thou art one of the whole world.

TEMPT. *The* WORLD, *as I have heard, is taken two wayes in Scripture; largely for all mankind, and strictly in a restrained signification, for the elect or for believers. In the latter sense Christ dyed* (I) *for the world, namely, for the world of the Elect, for the world of believers. Or if it be true that he dyed for all mankind, yet he dyed for them but after a sort: he dyed for them all* digmitate pretii, *he did enough to have redeemed all, if God would have had it so; but he did not die for all* voluntate propositi. *God never intended that he should shed his bloud for all and every man, but for a few elected ones onely, with whom it is my lot not to be numbred.*

MIN. God hath founded an universall (K) covenant of peace with men upon the Mediatours bloud: and therefore he intended it should be shed for all men universally. He hath made a promise of salvation to every one that will believe, and excludeth none that do not exclude themselves.

TEMPT. *God purposed that his Sonne should die for all men, and that in his name should be preached and offered remission of sinnes to every one; but yet upon condition they should repent, believe, and do that which he meaneth the greatest part of men shall never do, nor me among the rest.*

MIN. God hath a true meaning that all men who are called should repent and believe, that so they might be saved. As he would have *all to be saved*, so he would have them *come to the knowledge of the truth*; and as he would have *no man to perish*, so he would have *all men to repent*: and therefore he calleth them in the preaching of the word to the one as well as to the other.

TEMPT. *God hath a double* (L) *call; an outward by the preaching of the word in mens ears, an inward by the irresistible work of the Spirit in their hearts. The outward call is a part of Gods outward will: with that he calleth every man to believe: The inward and effectuall call is a part of his secret will: and with that he calleth not every man to believe, but a very few onely, whom he hath inevitably ordained to eternall life. And therefore by the outward call*

which

which I enjoy among many others, I cannot be assured of Gods will and meaning, that I should believe, repent and be saved.

By this (*M*) we may see, that no sound comfort can be fastned upon a poore soul rooted in this opinion, when he lieth under this horrible temptation.

The example (*N*) of Francis Spiera an Italian Lawyer will give some further light and proof to this. This Spiera about the yeare 1548. against his knowledge and conscience did openly abjure his religion and subscribe to Popery, that thereby he might preserve his life and goods and liberty. Not long after he fell into a deep distresse of conscience, out of which he could never wrestle, but ended his wofull dayes in despair. To comfort him came many Divines of worth and note: But against all the comforts which they applyed to him, he opposed two things especially. 1. The Greatnesse of his sinne: It was a sinne (said he) of a deep die, committed with many urging and aggravating circumstances; and therefore could not be forgiven. This argument they quickly took from him, and convinced him by the example of Peter, that there was nothing in his sinne that could make it irremissible: Peter, that committed the same sinne, and with some more odious circumstances, repented and was pardoned, and so (no doubt) might he. 2. He opposed his absolute Reprobation, and with that he put-off all their comforts. Peter (saith he) repented indeed and was pardoned, because he was elected: as for me, I was utterly rejected before I was born; and therefore I cannot possibly repent or be saved. If any man be elected, he shall be saved, though he have committed sinnes for number many and hainous in degree: but if he be *ex repudiatis*, one of the cast-awayes, *necessariò condemnabitur*, he shall be inevitably condemned, though his sinnes be small and few. [u] A Reprobate must be damned, *be his sinnes many or few, great or little, because Gods mercy and Christs merits belong not to him.*

[u] Nihil interest an multa an pauca, an magna an parva sint, quando nec Dei misericordia nec Christi sanguis quicquã ad eos pertinet.

In this story (recorded by Cœlius Secundus and Calvine, with some others who lived at that time and wrote of it to their friends) as in a glasse we may see the disconsolate condition of a poore soul that is strongly conceited that the greatest part of the world are absolute Reprobates, and that he is one of them: He sticketh so fast in the myre and clay that he can very hardly be drawn out.

2. It maketh Ministers unable to afford true comfort to the tempted: And this it doth, because it 1. Taketh from them all solid grounds of comfort; 2. Leaveth them onely weak and insufficient grounds.

1. It

1. It bereaveth them of all solid arguments of comfort which are these, the universality (Q) of Gods Love, of Christs Death, and of the new Covenant of grace. That Minister which doth explain and apply these three things soundly and wisely to him which is tempted in this kind, doth that which is abundantly enough for the relieving and releasing of him from this temptation. And he that doth not apply these, leaveth him as he found him, in the midst of the temptation still, whatsoever may be said to the contrary in the heat of disputation.

x *Though* (saith (P) Melanchthon) *there be many things disputed in this point more hardly, yet when all is done, the universall promise of grace and salvation is a Christians onely buckler in this temptation and combat.* y *Let us not therefore* (saith he) *leave Christ, and seek for an Election out of the word;* but let us judge of Gods will of saving men by the promise and commandment, which are both universall. And in another place of the same book he hath these words, z *As it is necessary so to hold that the promise of salvation is free, so it is needfull to know that it is universall, against some dangerous conceits of Predestination.*

x *Melanchth. Loc. com. p. 526. c. de Pred.* Etsi multa disputantur durius, tamen necesse est in vero agone ad hanc arcem confugere, videlicet, quòd de voluntate Dei judicandum sit ex expresso verbo, & quòd promissio sit universalis, & quòd sit mandatum Dei æternum & immutabile, Audire Filium, & assentiri promissioni.

y Obtemperemus igitur, nè vagentur animi quærentes electionē extra verbum, & relicto Christo & omisso mandato de amplectenda promissione; sed teneamus certâ & indubitatâ fide promissionem gratiæ non inanem esse fabulam, sed Deum verè patefeciisse voluntatem suam in promissione, & verè præstare quod promisit.

z *P. 230. de prom. Evang.* Sicut est necesse scire Evangelium esse promissionem gratuitam, ita necesse est scire Evangelium promissionem universalem esse. Hanc universalem tenere necesse est adversus periculosas imaginationes de prædestinatione, nè disputemus hanc promissionem ad paucos quosdam alios pertinere, non pertinere ad nos. Non enim dubium est, quin omnium animos hæc cogitatio exerceat.

By these speeches we see clearly what this learned man thought to be the true *balm of Gilead*, whereby a wounded soul should be cured; *viz.* The universality of the Promise, and of Gods Love, and of Christs Death; for they all hang together, and cannot be disjoyned.

The reason why those grounds are able to help a man in such a case, is twofold.

1. Because they are directly contradictory to the temptation. A will to save all, a giving of Christ to death for all, a serious offer of grace to all, cannot possibly stand with an absolute antecedent will and intent of casting away the greatest part of mankind, or, to say the truth, of any one man in the world. Upon this followeth the second reason.

2. Because they serve to convince the tempted, that he cannot be in that condition in which he supposeth himself to be.

For

For if two contradictories cannot be true, he that evinceth the truth of the one, convinceth the understanding of the untruth of the other: and he that maketh it appear, that this contradictory, *God would have all to be saved, redeemed and called, to repent and believe*, is true, putteth it out of all doubt to the understanding, that the other contradictory, *God will have most men to be absolutely and inevitably damned*, must needs be false, and so raiseth up that poore soul which was pressed down with an erroneous conceit and fear that it was true. In this manner did (*Q*) Junius (though not in the same temptation) relieve a woman perplexed exceedingly with a strong perswasion that she and all her children should be damned, because she was busied about her children at a certain time when she should have been at Masse. Junius maketh short work with her, telleth her that her imployment about her children was a duty pleasing to God, but the Masse was a mere will-worship; and so delivering her of her errour upon which the temptation was built giveth her present ease and comfort. In like manner tell a man who feareth himself to be an absolute Reprobate, that there are no such absolute Reprobates, and that his fear is but mere fansie and his doubt a dream, convince him once by contradictory grounds, that there is no man in the world in that state in which he thinketh himself to be, and you drive out one nail by another, and expell the temptation. These are the sword of Alexander, which will cut asunder this Gordian knot of absolute Reprobation; and these are the true Nepenthes of a sick and sorrowfull soul.

But now these true grounds of hope and comfort no Minister can make use of that holdeth absolute Reprobation; nor, if he do usurp them, can he possibly maintein them against the replyes of the tempted, unlesse he relinquish his opinion: because (as I have said) there is a plain contradiction between them, and no man is able to maintein two propositions which speak contrary things, to be both true, any more then he can make it good, that the same thing may have a being and no being at the same time. For example; A Minister cometh to comfort a man that thinketh himself to be an absolute Reprobate: and how doth he set about it? He telleth him, That *God would have all to be saved*, that *Christ died for all*, &c. But what right hath he to these grounds of comfort seeing he holdeth the contrary conclusions, viz. That God will have a great many to be damned and to

have no part in Christ? Well; he usurpeth them notwithstanding: But is he able to maintein them against the answers of the tempted? or can he make a good reply? No certainly. For thus answereth the tempted, *God (R) would have all to be saved with a revealed, but not with a secret will: and Christ died for all men sufficiently, but not intentionally; or if God did intend that he should die for all, yet he intended it upon a condition which he purposed the most should never perform.* What can the Minister reply to this? If he will make a direct reply which shall take away the answer, he must deny that God hath two wills, the one opposite to the other, a secret will that many shall unavoydably be damned, and a revealed will that all men may be possibly saved. And he must also deny that God had an intent that Christ should not die for a great many, or that he intended he should die for all upon condition they would believe and repent, and yet purposed that the most should never believe and repent. But can he deny these things? He cannot, except he deny his own conclusion, which is, That there are many thousands eternally and unavoydably rejected in God absolute purpose from grace and glory. For that conclusion is all one with the answers of the tempted, and contradictory to those arguments of comfort which he is glad to make use of. Absolute Reprobation therefore bereaveth that Minister who believeth it, of all solid grounds of consolation, and so maketh him unable to recover a poore soul wounded with this temptation.

II. Secondly, it leaveth a Minister some weak grounds onely and insufficient to quiet the tempted: and therefore it maketh him unable to comfort him. The grounds which it leaveth him are insufficient, because they cannot (S) convince, and make it evident to the understanding of the tempted that he is not that which he feareth, that is, a Reprobate. Out of temptation probabilities will uphold a mans hope (as they did Manoahs wifes, Judg. 13.22,23. *If the Lord would kill us, he would not have received a burnt-offering at our hands, nor shewed us all these things*;) because men are not so mistrustfull then: But in temptation men are usually very suspicious and incredulous, like Jacob, who would not be perswaded that Joseph was alive and a great man in Egypt, till he saw the chariots that were sent to fetch him thither, Gen. 45.27. and like Thomas, who would not believe that Christ was risen, till he saw the print of the nails

nails and spear, John 20, 25. They will not believe any thing that is spoken for their comfort, till it be made so apparent that they have nothing to say to the contrary. My self have known some, who in their temptations have often put their comforters to their proofs, to their protestations, nay to their oathes too, before they would believe their words of comfort. And in this temptation we speak of, men are so strongly possessed with the fear of eternall rejection from the face of God that they will not easily without manifest conviction believe the contrary. But grounds convincing and satisfying a Minister that mainteineth absolute Reprobation hath not in store. Nothing can he say that is able to make it appear infallibly and undeniably to the understanding of the tempted, that he is no absolute Reprobate. All that he (T) can say is, *Be of good comfort: you are a believer, a truly repenting sinner; therefore no Reprobate. For faith and repentance are infallible fruits of Election, and arguments of a state contrary to what you fear.* But this the tempted will deny: He will say, that *he is no believer*, &c. And how will the Minister convince him that he is? He must prove to him by the outward acts of faith and repentance (for they onely are apparent to him) that he doth repent and believe. But this proof is not demonstrative, nor doth convince; because *opera virtutum simulari possunt*, the externall acts of faith, repentance, or any other grace may be counterfeited. The devil may seem to be an angel of light; wolves may go in sheeps clothing; Judas may make the world believe by his preaching and following of Christ, that he is a true Apostle; and Simon Magus, though he remain in the gall of bitternesse and bond of iniquity, may be thought by his receiving of Baptisme to be a true believer: and so may any hypocrite by some exteriour acts of faith and repentance delude the best discerner of spirits among men, and gain the opinion and esteem of a true penitent and believer. Actions externally good, or good in appearance, may be evil indeed for want of a good rule, manner, end, or some other good circumstances with which an action that is good must be clothed; (For *bonum non oritur nisi ex integris*:) and so by good consequence cannot certainly prove the man who doth them to be a good man, or to have the grace of faith, repentance, or any other truly planted in his heart. Which being so, I say that a Minister cannot (V) by the outward acts and fruits of faith and repentance which he seeth come

from him, make it evident to the tempted, to the silencing of all replyes, that he is without doubt a true believer and repenting sinner, and consequently no Reprobate. For if the tempted may say, *You may be deceived in me: for you cannot see any thing more in me then hath been seen in many a Reprobate. And if this be all you can say to prove me to be none, I am not satisfied, I may be a Reprobate: nay I am a Reprobate, and you are but a miserable comforter, a Physician of no value.*

This that I say, Piscator (*X*) doth confesse ingenuously *in Disput. de Prad. contra Schasman. thes.* 85. where he saith, 1. That no comfort can be possibly instilled into the souls of Reprobates afflicted with this horrible temptation: from whence it followeth, that the farre greatest part of men, even an hundred for one, must bear their burden (if they fall into this distemper and trouble) as well as they can: the Gospel is not able to afford them any solid comfort. 2. That the Elect being in this condition may indeed be comforted, but it must be by their sense of sinne and their desire to be freed of it by Christ: which proofs are but only probable to the best, and to a man in temptation no proofs at all; and consequently either no comforts or very small ones. In the end of the same *Thesis* also, where he saith that a man should reason thus with himself, *Grace is offered to some with a mind of communicating it unto them; therefore it may be that I am one of those to whom it is so offered:* in this place (I say) he implyeth plainly, that the doctrine of absolute Reprobation, which teacheth the communication of grace to a very few onely, affordeth but a *fieri potest*, a Peradventure I am Elected, (and that a very poore one too) for a poore soul to comfort himself withall.

An Answer to his Last reason, drawn from the Uncomfortableness of this doctrine.

LEt these few undoubted truths be alwayes remembred; 1. That Predestination and Reprobation are eternall immanent acts *in mente ac voluntate Divina* before the foundations of the world were laid.

2. That

2. That as they are such immanent acts or decrees, they work nothing upon men, because the men themselves as yet had no being. 3. That when singular persons come into temporall being, the effects or consequents of those decrees are alwayes wrought according to the nature of the subjects. 4. That the decrees of Predestination and Reprobation are irreversible & immutable. 5. That there is no reasonable ground of any particular mans perswasion that he is either under the one decree or the other, but onely what is collected *à posteriori*, from the effects. These being agreed upon, it will easily be made appear that the doctrine of the Remonstrants is more *uncomfortable* to men then ours.

That Gods Predestination and Non-predestination or negative Reprobation are eternall, absolute, and irreversible decrees, and that they are founded in Gods free pleasure of shewing speciall mercy where he will and denying it where he thinks good, is a more *comfortable* doctrine then that of the Remonstrants, *scilicet*, That the forenamed eternall decrees were enacted and founded upon the intuitive prescience of mens perseverance in good or bad acts. *A*

Now whereas he supposeth it cannot be true *Evangelicall* doctrine which affords not *consolation* unto all men in their *best and worst*

conditions and changes, this proposition
his must have many limitations, or it w
prove utterly false.

1. It must be understood onely of tho
who seek consolation in the right w
wherein according to Gods will and wo
consolation is to be found: otherwise a t
doctrine may not onely be uncomfortab
but full of terrour and affright. For exam
ple; He that would be comforted with hop
of his Predestination, whilest he is resolve
to sit idle or to run on in the broad way, th
Gospel neither doth nor ought afford hi
any sweet comfort: and it is a signe that tho
doctrine is false, if to men thus affected it a
fordeth any comfortable *hope* of being *carr*
ed to heaven.

2. A doctrine which in the event is u
comfortable to millions of men, is not b
this convinced of untruth, unlesse it be so a
cording to the nature of the doctrine and a
cording to right reason and judgement. Fo
if it be a mans own blind and corrupt reaso
or his inordinate and distempered affection
which maketh it so *quoad hunc*, this is nothing
to prove the doctrine untrue. Our Saviours
doctrine Luke 18.25. was so uncomfortable
to his disciples, that it made them cry out,
Who then can be saved? yet it was not untrue.

3. Lastly, whereas we are now in a compa
rative question, Whether the Remonstrants
doctrine

doctrine or ours be more or lesse comfortable; it is not enough to shew that accidentally, through the false apprehension or disordered affections of men, disconsolation or desperation may arise from ours, unlesse he can clear the Remonstrants doctrine from the same inconveniences; which we know he cannot, and which we can and will prove to be more liable thereunto then ours.

Whereas he saith our *doctrine leadeth men into temptation*, because *the devil may easily perswade a man that believeth absolute Reprobation, that he is one of those absolute reprobates*, there being *an hundred absolute reprobates for one absolute elect, and* there being *more reason* for any man *to think that he is one of the most then of the fewest:* We answer, That *absolute Reprobation* is Gods absolute decree of not-giving unto many men that effectuall grace without which he infallibly knoweth they will never attein unto glory. And by *absolute reprobates* nothing else can truly be understood, but persons thus absolutely distinguished from the elect in the immanent act of Gods eternall and immutable will. If this Authour have any other meaning, when he so often inculcateth *absolute Reprobation* and *absolute reprobates*, we leave him to fight with his own fansies. Now the Remonstrants in this sense hold absolute Reprobation and absolute reprobates. For al- B

beit they set three eternall decrees in order of consideration before they come to Election and Reprobation, yet they bring God in the fourth upon an eternall prescience eternally decreeing to save these singular and certain persons, and to damne these singular and certain persons, and no other. If this last decree be eternall and irreversible, if it be founded upon the eternall foresight of their finall impenitency, God hath as absolutely rejected many men from speciall or effectuall grace and glory in their doctrine as in ours.

The *devil* may *suggest*, but he cannot more *easily perswade a man that maketh it his creed*, That *ex statu lapso* God hath out of his good pleasure and mere mercy elected some unto the atteinment of salvation, and out of his absolute will left others to the losing thereof, then he may perswade those who make all men eternally reprobated whom God eternally foresaw would out of their own free-will live and die impenitent. A man must be perswaded that his own free-will was a more likely means to put him within the decree of eternall Election then the free mercy of God, or else our doctrine affordeth more hope to any man of being predestinated then theirs. Now there is no well-instructed and humble Christian, who knoweth the corruption of his own free-

will

will and the inconstancy thereof, though aided with sufficient grace, but will easilier be perswaded to a comfortable apprehension of his Election or certain salvation, when he conceiveth it as depending on Gods speciall and mere mercy, then if he should conceive it as depending upon the speciall good acts of his own free-will and foreseen perseverance therein unto his lives end: For this is, as S. Augustine speaketh, *Firmiori potiùs quàm infirmiori spem suam committere.*

As for his instance in the small number of the Elect and great number of the Reprobate, though speaking of Christians, we allow not his account of *an hundred for one*, yet we acknowledge the number of the Elect (great in it self) to be smaller then the number of the Non-elect. But so it is likewise in the doctrine of the Remonstrants: & there is farre lesse *reason* for any sinfull man to hope *that he is rather one of the fewest then one of the most*, when the discrimination must arise from the goodnesse of his own free-will, then when it is supposed to arise from the mere mercy of God. If God in his eternall decree of Election say, *I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy*, as every man is under the same estate of misery, so every man hath reason to conceive himself a capable subject of this mercy, though *de facto* it should be extended to never so few. But if

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in his eternall decree of Election he saith thus, *I will shew this speciall mercy unto none but those whom I have foreseen using well the grace which I shall offer them, and continuing in the exercise of repentance, faith, and holinesse to their lives end*, few or none can with probability otherwise perswade themselves then they are reprobates; at least none of those whom he imagineth to be under the forenamed tentation. For the devil may thus suggest, *In your own opinion no man was elected out of Gods absolute free-will and mercy, but all were reprobated before the foundations of the world were laid that were not foreseen embracing Gods grace when it was offered, exercising the same in the acts of faith and sanctification, and perseverance in so doing till their lives end. You know that there is not one of an hundred that doth this, why should you think that you are rather one of the fewest then one of the most? Nay, you know that hitherto you have resisted the motions of Gods Spirit, and obeyed your own sinfull lusts; that if at any time your will hath had an inclination to do good, it presently started aside like a broken bow: how can you think that you are one of those in whom God eternally foresaw repentance, faith and perseverance, and so put you in the number of his Elect? Surely you are in the roll of Reprobates.* The Remonstrants doctrine doth so fashion men to receive this suggestion, that unlesse

he

he will forsake his opinion of Predestination and Reprobation upon the foreseen good or bad acts of men, he hath nothing to keep him from despair, or to perswade him that he is not in the number of those who were eternally reprobated. But in our opinion, though a man for the present stick fast in the filthy mire of sin, and so cannot fetch any true comfort from the assurance of his Election, yet he is better armed against the devil suggesting the certainty of his Reprobation: For he may answer, *I confesse, I find my self tied as yet and bound in the chains of my sinnes, I acknowledge, I deserve nothing but eternall damnation. And if my Election or salvation had depended upon Gods foresight what good courses out of mine own free-will excited by grace I should take and continue in, I could not otherwise think of my self then of a man reprobated and appointed unto damnation. But I know that Gods eternall Election is a decree of pure mercy and not of retributive justice; that the bending of mens hearts to believe, repent and persevere are the supernaturall fruits of that eternall mercy, and not the naturall fruits of any mans free-will. Albeit therefore I do not as yet find any signes or effects which can put me in comfort of my Election, yet so long as I am a capable subject of Gods saving mercy, all the devils in hell cannot prove my Reprobation. Nay, this very diabolical suggestion*

which

which by Gods providence hath affrighted my soul with fear of Reprobation upon the view of my sinnes, I take as a token of Gods eternall mercy, beginning to rouze me out of the bed of security, and intending to do me good. So that whatsoever *Calvine, Bucer, Zanchius*, or any man else hath said concerning the danger of this temptation, doth as nearly concern the Remonstrants as it doth us. For though this Authour think to help himself by putting-in the term ABSOLUTE, when he speaketh of Reprobation as we defend it, & by leaving it out alwaies when he speaketh of Reprobation as he holdeth it, this helpeth not his cause at all. For we are now disputing about the eternall decrees and immanent acts which Divines call Predestination and Reprobation, & not about the temporall effects and externall accomplishment thereof, unto which some times the name of Predestination and Reprobation is also given. The Divine immanent act of reprobating Cain, Judas, or any other, is as absolute a Reprobation, as irreversible and immutable, being conceived after the Remonstrants doctrine as after ours. For albeit they place an act of absolute prescience before Reprobation, which we place after, yet both they and we acknowledge it such an absolute decree as never was nor ever will be altered. If the temporall accomplishment, which is the actuall Damnation of the reprobate

Reprobate, be termed their Reprobation, we say as well as they. That this dependeth upon temporall conditions. For that one temporal effect should depend by way of condition upon another, is agreeable to truth and right reason: but that an immanent eternall act of Gods will should depend by way of condition upon a temporall act of mans will, is contrary to true Divinity. Reprobation therefore as it is eternally an act or decree immanent *in voluntate ac mente Divina*, must of necessity be absolute.

His example of the *Hungarian Schoolmaster* is a poore proof against absolute Reprobation. For first Saint Augustine and Calvine and all orthodox Divines are of opinion, that though men be not predestinated or passed-by *secundum prævisianem operum bonorum aut malorum*, (for all men are foreseen alike plunged in sin and misery as they are objects of Election and Non-election or Preterition) yet for salvation and damnation at the day of judgement, all men shall be dealt withall *secundum bona aut mala opera*. Secondly, if this man perswaded himself *that he was one of the wofull company of absolute Reprobates, and that therefore he could not be saved* I would know if he would have been otherwise perswaded had a Remonstrant told him, *There is indeed an eternall and immutable decree of Reprobation, but it made no absolute Reprobates* D

probates but such whom God eternally and absolutely foresaw would die impenitent; God foresaw that you would by the help of his mercy and grace die a faithfull and penitent man. This cold comfort which the Remonstrants doctrine giveth against absolute Reprobation could never have kept this wretch from hanging himself. For he would have choked his comforter with the same answer which made him choke himself, *I commend you to God, but I find this mercy is denied to me, for I know I have an impenitent heart.* Reprobation therefore which is Gods eternall decree, being as absolute in their opinion as in ours, it affordeth the devil the same matter of suggestion.

E Now to his second argument, That absolute Reprobation *maketh a tempted man uncapable of comfort, and a Minister unable to give true comfort*, we answer, That the eternall Reprobation of Cain or Judas upon an eternall prescience is more liable to this objection then that which we defend, for the reasons above mentioned. No man ought to seek for comfort of his Election but in the fruits thereof, nor to be utterly discomforted with apprehending his Reprobation untill he be uncapable of the fruits of Election. If any be so distempered in his reason or affection that upon the devils suggestion he will like a wizard guesse at his own Reprobation,

ation, and foretell his own Damnation, it will be as hard for a Remonſtrant to remove his uncertain and ungrounded fanſie as for us. The reaſon is, Becauſe whatſoever he telleth him of Gods love, Chriſts death, generall vocation, &c. the tempted will ſtill glade with ſaying, *Theſe concern ſuch whom God hath not upon his eternall and abſolute preſcience abſolutely reſolved to condemne: But I know that I am one of thoſe in whom God hath foreſeen finall impenitency*, &c. *and thereupon from everlaſting hath decreed me to damnation.*

To his imaginary Conference.

IT is no hard matter to make any opinion ſeem abſurd, where an Adverſary frameth both objections and anſwers. If we ſhall take the ſame courſe, we can burden his opinion of Predeſtination and Reprobation upon preſcience of the different acts of mens free-will with more and greater inconveniences. In generall we ſay,

Firſt, that whereas he is onely carefull to prevent the devils ſuggeſtions whereby he goeth-about to drive men into deſpair, there is farre more need to prevent thoſe whereby he holdeth men in ſecuritie. If one man have been perplexed or driven into deſpair by the doctrine of abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation, hundreds are emboldened unto careleſneſſe and preſumption upon the doctrine 1.

doctrine of conditionate Predestination and Reprobation, For this maketh every man believe that he may be a predestinated man when he listeth. No man maketh any great haste to do that which he conceiveth he may do well enough at any time.

Secondly, in this imaginary conference he supposeth alwayes that a man must be rid out of dread and perplexitie by the Minister assuring him that he is no Reprobate; wherein he himself is quite deceived. For no Minister hath any such commission, nor any such revelation. He must go another way to work; wherein our doctrine will further him better then that of the Remonstrants.

Lastly, there is no man so fooliſh as to think that a Minister can shew him whether he be in the number of the Elect or of the Reprobate; or that a wicked man perplexed with this doubtfull cogitation, can be so freed from it as to encline to the more comfortable part, whilest he continueth impenitent. All that can be done for his good, whilest he continueth faithlesse and impenitent, is to perswade him to suspend the opinion of his Reprobation; whereof his own reason recollected is able to tell him he hath no certain knowledge. And it is a rule, *De quolibet præsumendum bonum donec constet contrarium*. That doctrine therefore must

must needs be more powerfull to make a man suspend the opinion of his being a Reprobate, which is more likely to bring him into some probable hope of his future repentance. Now unto a man feeling the corruption of his own nature, and perplexed with the conscience of his continuall voluntary rebellion, and thereupon conceiving himself a Reprobate, what hope of his future conversion can the Remonstrants doctrine afford him? He must tell him, *Thou art one of those whom God eternally foresaw repenting, believing, persevering, and who hast all these acts in the power of thine own will: and therefore there is great probabilitie of thy future repentance.* This poor tempted wretch finding in himself for the present all things seeming quite contrary to what the Remonstrant Minister telleth him, will rejoyn, *Thou liest unto me; God never saw any such goodnesse in me: he foresaw that in me which I now see in my self, a wicked will and a perverse heart, which will hold me fettered in sinne unto my lives end. I am therefore one of those whom according to thine own doctrine God eternally reprobated.* As for our doctrine, it cannot give such a tempted person a certainty of his future repentance, but it may give him a more probable and comfortable hope; because it will referre his hope to that unspeakable mercie of God which this

Authour hath so highly extolled) and to that omnipotent power whereby God is able to work for us beyond our hope, and to produce in us both the will and the deed of repenting when he pleaseth. There is somewhat more likelyhood of future repentance, when a sinner is thus referred to Gods absolute will for it, then when he is referred to his own absolute free-will: and therefore the fear of his Reprobation may in all probability be easiiyer diminished by our doctrine then by theirs.

But I come to his Conference betwixt the Tempted person and the Minister. Where I will take leave to make our own answers: for I like not his.

F TEMPT. *Wo is me; I am a cast-away: I am absolutely rejected from grace and glory.*

MINIST. If thou speakest of Gods eternall secret decree of Election and Reprobation, why dost thou affirm that of thy self which thine own reason must needs tell thee is not known unto thy self? If thou speakest of an absolute rejection from grace and the kingdome of heaven which hath already seised upon thee in this life, why dost thou affirm that which thou knowest and seest to be false? God hath and doth continually afford thee gratious illuminations and excitations: and he will not leave thee destitute of them, if thou do not voluntarily harden thine

thine heart against them. God hath promised forgivenesse unto any sinner at what time soever he shall repent; nay, he hath promised eternall life unto any sinner who shall believe in his Sonne. Thou art not rejected from this covenant of grace nor excluded from the kingdome of glory untill by voluntary finall impenitencie and infidelitie thou excludest thy self.

TEMPT. *God hateth no man as he is his creature, but he hateth a great many as they are sinners in Adam. He loveth all men with a generall love, but he loveth onely a very few with his speciall love, by which he provideth everlasting life for them. I am onely under his generall love: I am excluded from his speciall love; and therefore I am a reprobate, and must of necessity be damned.* G

MINIST. It is true, that God hateth nothing which himself created, and yet it is most true, that he hateth sinne in any creature of his, and hateth the creature infected with sinne, in such manner as Hatred may be attributed unto God. But for all this he so generally loved mankind fallen in Adam that he hath given his onely-begotten Son, that what sinner soever believeth in him, should not perish but have everlasting life. And this everlasting life or heavenly kingdome is so provided for men by God, that no decrees of his can bring any man thither

without faith and repentance, nor no decrees of his can keep any man out who repenteth and believeth. As for the measure of Gods love exhibited in the externall effects unto men, it must not be denied that God poureth out his graces more abundantly upon some men then upon others, and worketh more powerfully and effectually in the hearts of some men then of others; and that out of his alone will and pleasure: But yet where this more *speciall* love is not extended, his lesse speciall love is not restrained to outward and temporall blessings onely, (as you falsely imagine) but it reacheth to internall and spirituall blessings, even such as will bring men to an eternall blessednesse if their voluntary wickednesse hinder not. As for your curious and impossible desire, to be now ascertained that you are under Gods more especiall grace, you ought not to desire the knowledge of it, neither have I any means or power to breed such an apprehension in your understanding, untill the experimentall sense of your repentance, faith, and resolution to cleave fast unto God, preach unto your own soul and conscience this speciall love of God towards you. In the mean time do not voluntarily harden your own heart, do not say unto your self, *I know I am a Reprobate, I know I am none of those unto whom God intendeth*

Vide Thom. de Kempis, l.1.c.25. n.3.

eth to shew his speciall love, since you know well enough that you neither know it, nor can know it in the state you are.

TEMPT. *God would have some out of all sorts of men to be saved, but he loveth not every man, neither would he have every particular in these several all sorts to be saved: at least not with his secret will; for with that he will have millions to be damned. And therefore though in his revealed will he would have me saved, yet I am one of those whom in his secret will he hath reprobated and appointed to be damned.* H

MINIST. You misconceive the difference betwixt Gods secret will and his revealed will, and ignorantly feigne a contrariety and contradiction where there is none. You must therefore know, that Gods revealed will teacheth men upon what terms or conditions he is willing to bestow eternall life upon them, namely upon the condition of their repenting, believing and persevering. And under these conditions God doth not onely desire the salvation of some men out of every sort, but of every particular man in every sort of men. And he hath no secret will contrary to this revealed will, wherein he should purpose to damne any one man repenting, believing and persevering. But you must further know, that God hath an eternall secret will wherein he hath resolved within himself to have that speciall mercy

upon some which shall bring them to repentance, to faith, to perseverance and eternall happinesse. This will conteineth not a contradiction of the former, but an accomplishment in such persons as God vouchsafeth this speciall favour. God hath not made his Ministers privy to this secret will of his: and therefore it is a vain desire in you to be assured of this from the Minister. By labouring to perform Gods revealed will you may attein a comfortable perswasion that you are under that his secret will. But whilest you neglect to do that, it is unpossible that you should be freed from your fear of Reprobation and Damnation, and unprofitable for you to be possessed with a groundlesse comfort of your Election and certain Salvation.

I TEMPT. *Christ died onely for the world of the elect. Or if he died for all mankind, he died for them all* dignitate pretii; *he did not die for all* voluntate propositi. *God never intended that he should shed his bloud for all and every man, but for a few selected ones onely: of whose number I am not, for I am a reprobate.*

MINIST. Christ died for all and every singular person, who by repentance and faith in his bloud may, according to the tenour of the Gospel, have eternall life given him through Jesus Christ our Lord. And Christ died thus for all, not onely because his death was in regard of the worth a suffi-

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cient ransome for all and more then all, but because it is Gods settled purpose, by Christs bloudshed to save any man that shall believe truly in him, and to save no man that continueth an unbeliever. Christ died not to save any few selected ones without their repentance and faith: and Christ died not with an exception or exclusion of any one man in the world from the benefit of salvation, performing the condition of faith and repentance. When any man hath finished his course in faith and godlinesse, and is arrived in heaven, the event undeniably proveth that God had an eternall absolute purpose of giving the grace of repentance and perseverance unto such a man, and saving him by the bloud of Christ. And when any other man hath finished his course in impenitency and infidelity, and is plunged into hell, the event also undeniably proveth that God had no eternall absolute purpose to convert, sanctifie, or glorify such a man. If this be that *voluntas propositi* which you must be acquainted withall before you will seek after salvation by repenting and believing in Christ Jesus, God never made me of his counsel that I should be able to reveal such a secret unto you. But without the revealing of this, I assure you there lieth no such particular exception against you, that can hinder you from the benefit of Christs

bloudshed whensoever you shall repent and believe in him. Desire to do this, endeavour to do this, and then Gods Spirit will in due time bear witnesse unto your spirit that you are the child of God, and no reprobate. Other course to free you from this horrible tentation I know none.

K TEMPT. *Notwithstanding the universall covenant of peace with men upon the Mediatours bloud yet this taketh no effect, but upon condition that men repent and believe. God never meant that the greatest part of men should do this: And I by name am one of those whom God never meant should do it: for I am a reprobate.*

MINIST. It is most true, that Christs bloud is effectuall to save no man, but upon condition of his repenting and believing. And as you have well apprehended this truth, so learn by it to apprehend another, namely, that Christs bloud is effectuall to save any man who repenteth and believeth in him. And let not the devils suggestions make you so profane, as to say that God meaneth you should never do that which he commandeth you to do, and for doing whereof he affordeth you such means as cannot be frustrated but by your own voluntary default and wilfull wickednesse. God willeth that you should neither receive his word nor his grace in vain: say not therefore when he calleth upon you to repent, and

nd inciteth you thereunto, that his meaning is you ſhould not repent. But I am afraid you deceive your ſelf with a falſe conſtruction of theſe words *Gods meaning*. You muſt know it is one thing to ſay, God truly *meaneth* that men ſhould do what he commandeth, another thing to ſay that God certainly *purpoſeth* to make men do what he commandeth. The goodneſſe of the action which God commandeth, the word commanding, and the Spirit exciting thereunto, are good proofs unto you that God meaneth (that is, liketh, deſireth, willeth) that you ſhould do thoſe good things which he requireth: but they are not certain proofs that God intendeth or meaneth to remove all thoſe wilfull obſtacles which your ſelf may put, or to make you do that which your ſelf careth not to do, nay ſtriveth not to do. If you will not buckle your ſelf to do any of thoſe good actions which God commandeth, untill ſome Miniſter can aſſure you that you are one of thoſe whom God abſolutely meaneth or intendeth *ex nolente facere volentem*, your deſire is a diſorderly deſire, and of a thing impoſſible to be known by man untill it be wrought by God.

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MINIST. *God hath a double calling of men: an outward calling, by preaching the word in mens ears; an inward, by the irreſiſtible work of the Spirit in their hearts. The outward calling*

ling is a part of Gods outward will: the inward and effectuall calling is a part of his secret will. He calleth me onely with the outward call: and therefore I cannot be assured of Gods good will and meaning that I should believe, repent, and be saved.

MINIST. You misconceive Gods calling. His *outward calling by preaching the word in mens ears* is a means to convey the sense of the word preached inwardly to their understandings, and *mediante intellectu* inwardly to stirre-up their wills to the doing of such things as they now see would make for their eternall good. And I appeal unto your own knowledge and experience, Did the word preached never pierce further then your ears? hath it not inlightned your understanding with the wholesome doctrine of the Gospel? Hath not Gods Spirit at some time or other by the word inwardly moved you to break off your sinfull and lustfull courses, and to lead a sober, just and religious life? Why do you contrary to your own conscience falsely accuse God of affording you a bare outward calling, but no inward? Why do you traduce him as not willing that you should believe, repent, and so be saved? Take it for a certain rule; God alwayes willeth men should do those things which by his word written he enjoyneth them to do, and by his Spirit inlightning

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and inciting he so helpeth them to do, that is onely the voluntary perverseneſſe and ſtubbornneſſe of their own wills reſiſting the word and the Spirit which hindreth them from doing thoſe things which they ſhould. It is true, that God can make any hard and reſiſting heart a ſoft and obedient heart; and he doth it where he hath an eternall purpoſe out of ſpeciall mercy ſo to do: And it is as true, that God may juſtly leave a ſtubborn heart to his own reſiſtency and perverſeneſſe, and this he doth where he hath purpoſed in juſtice ſo to do. *Deus miſeretur cujus vult, & quem vult indurat.* If you long to be aſſured of this ſecret meaning or purpoſe of God towards you in particular before you reſolve upon your repentance, I can aſſure you that it is the devil who hath ſtirred up in you a longing after a thing impoſſible, that ſo he may procure your deſtruction. Strive therefore to bring this fooliſh and wicked fanſie out of your mind, and to judge of the meaning of God, which belongeth unto you, according to his word revealed unto you, leaving his ſecret and unſearchable will unto himſelf.

By this which hath been ſhewed, we may ſee that it is impoſſible to comfort a deſperate wretch, who will not be comforted unleſſe he may firſt be aſſured of that whereof no mortall man can poſſibly aſſure him. M

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For he that will go about to assure an in faithfull man, that he is not in the numb of men eternally reprobated, must be ab to assure him that he is in the number men eternally elected. For the Remo strants themselves, who acknowledge ete nall Election and Reprobation as well a we, confesse there is no middle sort of m which are neither eternally elected nor ete nally reprobated; and therefore if they ca assure a man he is not reprobated, they ca assure him he is elected.

N For the example of *Francis Spiera*, it ma keth no more against us then against an who hold distinct opposite decrees of El ction and Reprobation established *in men ac voluntate Divina* before the foundation of the world were laid. When the Dev suggesteth unto a man, that by Gods decre he is in the number of persons reprobated he troubleth him not with Jesuiticall or Ar minian disputations, whether a conditiona prescience or an absolute prescience mu *secundùm nostrum modum intelligendi* be pre supposed in the same eternitie unto the ete nall decrees of Election and Reprobation but he taketh advantage upon that wherei we all agree, that God is not now to mak his decrees who shall be elected and who not, but that this was a thing immutably ordered from all eternitie. Upon this tru

ground

ground he troubleth the fanſie of a man with ſtrong conceit that he is one of thoſe ſingular perſons not-elected. That this is a raſh groundleſſe conceit, both we and the Remonſtrants may convince the partie tempted: but to aſſure him that he is within the number of the Elect, it is more then we are able to do.

I wiſh this Authour had quoted the place in *Calius* or *Calvine*, that ſo we might have judged how truly he reporteth them. Sleidan reporteth the ſame ſtory, and telleth us, *De miſericordia Dei cœpit deſperare*; That when his comforters urged ſuch teſtimonies as expreſſe Gods great mercy, he denied not the truth of them, but ſaid they belonged not unto him; *Et quòd agnitam veritatem abjuraſſet, deſtinatum ſe cruciatibus æternis, illóſque jam animo ſeſe perſentiſcere atque videre: neque Deum amare poſſe, verùm horribiliter odiſſe dicebat.* As for the phraſe or opinion of *abſolute Reprobation*, which this Authour here ſo often harpeth upon, it is not once mentioned by Sleidan. And it is more probable, that Spiera had his conceit of the doctrine of Predeſtination and Reprobation from the * Romane church wherein he was bred, or from the Lutheranes by whom he had been converted, then from the Calviniſts, with whom it appeareth not (in my Authour) that he had any acquaintance.

Vide Comment. lib. 21. fol. 255.

* *Scotus and his followers.*

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If therefore Spiera would admit of no comfort, untill he were by the Minister assured that he was under the eternall decree of Election and not of Reprobation, all the Remonstrants in the world with all their new opinions could have done him no good, for he would still have opposed, *I am sure Gods absolute and eternall foresight of my finall impenitency was ranked amongst the reprobate, as you your selves teach me all were whom God eternally foresaw should die impenitent: I am one of those; and therefore I shall never repent, I shall never be saved, I shall certainly be damned.* Let any Remonstrant shew me a way how to perswade a desperate impenitent faithlesse man, being in extreme fear that he is a Reprobate according to Gods eternall decree made upon an eternall provision of his finall impenitency, and I will easily shew him how to do the same, admitting that decree of absolute Predestination and Reprobation which we defend. Tell a man who is perswaded that he is a Reprobate according to the Remonstrants decree of eternall Reprobation, that the thief upon the crosse, that Mary Magdalene, that S. Paul repented, were pardoned, and saved, he will answer, *These indeed did so, because God had eternally elected them, foreseeing this their repentance: as for me, God eternally foresaw my finall impenitency, and there-*

thereupon passed in eternitie a decree of Reprobation upon me: and therefore that cannot be reversed, neither can I repent and be saved. And if the *greatnesse of the number* of Reprobates make any thing for strengthening the tentation, in all likelyhood the number of Reprobates must needs be greater, if Election and Reprobation be conceived after the Arminian doctrine. For if Election and Rejection be made *ex massa corrupta & damnabili*, more are like to be elected and fewer rejected when absolute and mere mercy maketh the discrimination then when the absolute prevision of mans good using the Divine grace offered unto him and constancy to the end of a mans life in this good usage make the distinction.

The *universalitie of Gods love, of Christs death, and of the covenant of grace* are *solid arguments of comfort* to a man repenting, believing and persevering in the way of true godlinesse; and they bring with them a comfortable perswasion that such a man is an elect child of God: But unto a man into whose head, upon occasion of his lewd life and impenitent heart, the devil hath put this strong fansie, *I am one of those whom God upon his eternall prevision of my finall impenitency eternally reprobated*, those arguments can do little good. For put them into form thus, *Gods love is universall; Christs death an universall*

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verſall ranſome for the ſinnes of all men; T
covenant, SI CREDIDERIS, SALVUS ERI
univerſall: *Therefore God did not fore*
thy finall impenitency, and thereupon decreed
exclude thee from eternall life. No man c
be ſo perplexed by the devil ſuggeſting un
him his eternall Reprobation, but he wi
eaſily ſee that ſuch arguments can give hi
no aſſurance of his eternall Election: Nay,
they will rather increaſe his fear of Repro
bation: becauſe at the very preſent he find
eth in himſelf an hard and impenitent hear
and deſpaireth of the mollification thereof
which will induce him to imagine that Go
eternally foreſaw him a finall impenitent
man, and upon that eternally reprobated
him according to the Remonſtrants do
ctrine.

P *Melanchthon* ſpake wiſely and truly, tha
the promiſe of grace, pardon, *and ſalvation*
(upon repentance and faith) *is our ſureſt re*
fuge in tentation. For as for eternall Electi
on and Salvation, God hath not abſolutely
promiſed them unto any ſingular perſon:
and therefore no man can comfort himſelf
from a decree altogether unknown unto
himſelf; but his comfort in tentation muſt
be drawn from the embracing of the condi
tions of life made known unto him in the
Goſpel. But whileſt a man ſtandeth poſſeſ
ſed with a fanſie of his own Reprobation

and

and with a knowledge of his impenitency and fear of finall obduration, the universall conditionall promises cannot perswade him that he is one of the Elect, or disswade him from thinking he is one of the Reprobate. Melanchthon therefore thought the Universalitie of the promise a good motive to incourage any man unto repentance: but he thought it not a good argument to prove that any man is a person elected, and shall most certainly repent, though he now think the contrary. This is the scruple, this is the deviliſh suggestion, which the conditionall promises, though never so generall, cannot remove out of the fansie of an impenitent & desperate sinner, such an one as Spiera was.

These universall promises are not *directly contradictory to the tentation.* The tentation is, *I Spiera am a Reprobate, and shall die in my finall impenitencie:* The universall promise is, *Whosoever believeth and repenteth, shall be saved.* Let this Authour shew the contradiction.

His often inculcated propositions, *God will have all men to be saved, to repent, God will have none to be absolutely damned*, &c. have so often been explained & proved impertinent to the purpose wherunto he applyeth them, that they need no further answer.

The storie of *Junius his relieving a perplexed woman* is farre fetched: the applica- 2

tion further off from the present point. The tentation supposed is not about the word *Absolute*, but about the very decree of eternall Reprobation. This Authour should shew that there is no irreversible or immutable decree, distinguishing men *ab aterno in electos & reprobatos:* for this breedeth the scruple. To talk to a soul perplexed with fear of Reprobation, *that there are no absolute reprobates*, and then to expound absolute Reprobates to be men absolutely damned whether they repent or no, will afford him little comfort who hath a preconceit that God foresaw him finally impenitent, and upon this prescience decreed him a Reprobate. He that shall go about to *cut the Gordian knot* with telling a perplexed soul there are no men absolutely elected or absolutely rejected, can do him little good; unlesse he prove also there were no men eternally elected and eternally rejected upon the prescience of their finall perseverance or finall impenitencie. For this man supposeth himself to be one of those whom God before the foundations of the world were laid foresaw finally impenitent, and thereupon he concludeth that he is one of those who must of necessitie be eternally damned. For in all Divines opinions these propositions are true; *Deus nihil potest velle ex tempore; Deus non potest non habere volitionem quam habet;*

Ruiz. De volunt. Dei, disp. 12. art. 7. p. 175.

habet; non potest habere voluntatem quam non habet. Unlesse therefore it be demonstrated, that God neither out of his absolute will nor out of his eternall will guided by his absolute and eternall prescience hath distinguished men *in electos & reprobatos*, the perplexed soul cannot be rid from the forenamed tentation. And a Remonstrant must *relinquish his opinion* of the eternall Election and Reprobation of singular persons upon the Divine prescience, or he can never be able to satisfie a tempted person who acknowledgeth himself to be faithlesse and impenitent, and supposeth that God, eternally foreseeing he would so remain unto his lives end, hath eternally rejected or reprobated him. For example, a Remonstrant cometh to comfort a man who thinketh himself to be one of those whose Reprobation God hath decreed from everlasting upon the everlasting foresight of his finall impenitencie: He telleth him, *God would have all to be saved, Christ died for all*, &c. What can the Remonstrant Minister conclude hereupon? *Therefore no man was reprobated from everlasting upon the foresight of his impenitencie: Therefore not you.* This were to crosse his own principles. As for an orthodox Minister, he will never go about to prove unto the tempted person that there is no such thing in the world as

some men absolutely elected and others absolutely not-elected: but he will shew unto him, First, That absolute Election and absolute Non-election or negative Reprobation are not (as he fearfully and fondly imagineth) decrees of absolutely saving any man whether he repent or no, or of absolutely damning any man whether he repent or no. Secondly, That it is a fooliſh and deviliſh kind of divination for any man to put and place himſelf in the number of the Elect or Non-elect upon the mere uncertain fanſie of his own mind, or upon the malitious ſuggeſtion of the Tempter. And therefore if he would be out of perplexitie, he muſt no longer conceive himſelf certain of that whereof his own reaſon awakened will ſhew him he cannot poſſibly be certain. His tongue muſt not ſay that wherein his own knowledge giveth him the lie. Laſtly, when he is brought to confeſſe, that he neither is nor can be certain what God in his eternall counſel decreed of him before the world was made, he is to be inſtructed to drive away the fear of his Non-election, and to gain ſome comfortable aſſurance of his Election, by labouring to do thoſe things which become the Elect children of God, and to avoid thoſe things which are proper to the children of the devil. This was the old and onely way which the Apoſtles knew

to

to gain a comfortable perſwaſion of a mans Election, and conſequently to drive away the fear or ſuſpition of being a Reprobate. If the Remonſtrants have a new way of doing this, I dare confidently affirm it cannot be a good way.

For his objections againſt us, of Gods *two oppoſite wills*, the one *ſecret*, the other *revealed*; of ſome mens *impoſſible ſalvation* and *inevitable damnation:* they are his own erroneous collections. We have already ſhewed that there are no ſuch oppoſite wills in God: and that for poſſibilitie of atteining ſalvation and avoiding damnation, every man hath as much according to our doctrine as theirs. But becauſe this Authour never leaveth inculcating abſolute Reprobation to be a doctrine that taketh away all grounds of comfort, I muſt tell him again and again, that if he admit eternall decrees in God, of giving repentance and perſeverance unto Peter, and of not-giving it unto Judas, of giving eternall life unto Peter, and of not-giving it unto Judas, let him ſuppoſe or imagine what act of Divine prefcience he pleaſeth to be precedent unto the forenamed decrees, Judas was as abſolutely under the decree of Reprobation, and ſo as abſolute a Reprobate, in his doctrine as ours. For the eternall will of God is altogether abſolute, which decreeth a future event, *R*

consideratis conditionibus adjungendis ut de facto adjunctis: But thus did God (by the confession of the Remonstrants) decree the Reprobation and Damnation of Judas from all eternitie: The decree therefore of his Reprobation was absolute.

S Whereas therefore this Authour presumeth that he is able to *convince the understanding of a tempted man that he is no Reprobate*; if he mean he can convince him that he shall not be damned if he repent and believe, we can do the same: But if he mean (as he must do, if he will free the tempted person from his perplexitie after his way) that he is able to convince him that he is none of those in whom God eternally foresaw finall impenitencie, that he is none of those whom God upon this foresight eternally reprobated; I dare say, he is able to do that which neither S. Paul nor S. Peter were able to do: And therefore we are not ashamed to professe, that we cannot attein to this skill. And I think that if any tempted man should put a Remonstrant to his *oath* or *protestation* whether he indeed can assure him that he is no Reprobate, according to his own doctrine of eternall Reprobation, he would not dare to take such an oath. He might safely swear unto him, that he neither is nor shall be thrown from the face of God into hell, if he repent: but he

he cannot safely swear unto him, that he shall repent, or that God upon the foresight of his stubbornnesse did not from all eternity absolutely appoint him unto damnation.

And were it possible for a Remonstrant Minister to perswade such a desperate wretch of his future repentanc and faith, yet this is not *demonstrative to convince* him that he is no Reprobate. For he might reply, *You have taught me that a man may totally and finally fall away from faith, that he may lose regeneration, sanctification, adoption: I am one of those in whom God hath eternally foreseen this my finall falling away*: And therefore though I now felt repentance and faith stirring in my heart (which I do not) yet I know in the end I should relapse; and therefore you neither do nor can assure me that I am no Reprobate. T

We willingly grant, that we cannot, *to the silencing of all replies*, from the *outward seeming acts of faith and repentance* prove a man to be a *true believer*, to be a person elected, to be *no Reprobate*: But we can do as much upon the grounds of our doctrine as any Remonstrant can upon his, and somewhat more: because in his doctrine men justified, sanctified, adopted may become Reprobates, and so be damned in the end. V

What *Piscator* saith is thus farre forth true, That *no comfort* from assurance of E- X

lection, or from assurance of not-being under the decree of Reprobation, can *possibly be instilled into the soul* of any man elected or not-elected, so long as he continueth faithlesse and impenitent.

And for this Authour, if he can perswade but *one* of his *hundred* reprobates, whilest he lieth in impenitencie, that he is no reprobate, he hath but brought him into a fools paradise, and comforted him with a lie, or at least with that whereof the truth is to him who avoucheth it altogether unknown and uncertain: Which boldnesse becometh not the true Ministers of the Gospel of Christ.

To shut up all; It is a grosse errour in this Authour, to suppose that the Gospel teacheth a Minister how to comfort a desperate impenitent sinner, by assuring him that he is of the number of the Elect, or that he is not within the number of the Reprobate, or that Gods eternall decrees of Election and Reprobation are yet unmade or unsettled. And it is a strange fansie which this Authour hath conceived, that the Remonstrants doctrine can give such a distempered and impenitent sinner proofs more then probable that he is no reprobate. Nay he further implieth, that his doctrine can give such a person more comfort then this FERRI POTEST *Peradventure I am elected.* Belike it can assure him, *Without all Peradventure, thou art an elected person.*

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those who can do this, are able to set up a ladder, climb into heaven, pry into the book of life, and bring men news that they are certainly appointed to be made partakers both of grace and glory. A religious Christian will never be thus comforted by such bold and blind assurers. If at any time he happen to be perplexed, he will wait for comfort from the Spirit of comfort, and he will not seek it in uncertain conjectures or divinations of his own or other mens, but in the reall effects of the same Spirit experimentally found and felt in his own soul. Whilest we walk in the Spirit, we are sure to find comfort from the Spirit: Whilest we walk in the flesh, it is not an earthly Minister that can comfort us. Labour to eschew evil and do good, the fear of Reprobation will vanish, and the sweet comfort of Election will replenish thine heart.

READER,

READER.

The authour thought good to close up these his Animadversions with a Conclusion touching the manifold abuse and use of the doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation.

IT now remaineth that for a close of all we speak something concerning the abuse of the doctrine of Election and Reprobation, and of the right use of the same. Let us begin with the preachers ~~and~~ themselves, then proceed unto the hearers.

1. First, those Ministers do very ill and indiscreetly who deliver this most true doctrine preposterously and not in its due place. Thus we conceive them to do who at the first step do bring carnall men to the contemplation of this great depth of Election and Reprobation, who ought in the first place to be called to faith in Christ and to serious repentance: which is all one as if a man should purposely give to a sick and weak person strong and solid meat which his stomach is not able to bear, contrary to that of the Apostle, *Strong meat belongeth* Heb. 5. 14. *to them that are of full age, even those who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil.* We ought therefore to imitate the practice of Christ and of the Apostles,

Apostles, and to preach the Gospel in the same order which our Master and those most skilfull builders did follow. But in what manner did our Saviour Christ instruct men to life eternall? We have a notable example John 3. 16. where in the first place he teacheth, That God so loved the world that he gave his Sonne for the redemption of mankind. Then he addeth, That every one who believeth in this Redeemer shall obtein life everlasting; but those that believe not shall therefore perish because they believed not in the Sonne of God. Hitherto we have not one word concerning the mysterie of Election and Reprobation. But afterwards, when Christ saw some by the preaching of the Gospel brought to repentance, faith and holinesse of life, lest they should attribute unto themselves these effects of speciall grace and mercie, he openeth unto them the deep mysterie of Election, and telleth them how all those graces flowed from the decree of Predestination. This is the scope of these places, [a] *It is given to you to know the mysteries of the kingdome of heaven, but to them it is not given.* [b] *All that the Father giveth me shall come to me.* S. Paul treadeth in his Masters steps, and observeth the same method of teaching. For being about to preach unto the Jews the Gospel of Christ, he beginneth not at the point

[a] *Matth.* 13.11.

[b] *John* 6. 37.

point of Election and Reprobation, but pre-
[c] Acts 13. 38. miseth in generall [c] *forgivenesse of sinnes* to all believers, and teacheth that all unbeli-
[d] ver. 46. vers do by their own default [d] *put from them everlasting life* offered unto them. But after that divers of them had embraced Christ by a true faith, then at length the Evangelist thought fit to lay down the cause thereof in
[e] ver. 48. these words, [e] *As many as were ordained to eternall life believed.* If therefore we would not go to work preposterously, whensoever we have to do with such who for the greatest part it is likely are ignorant and carnall men and not yet endued with true faith and holinesse, we are to move them to faith in Christ and newnesse of life, and not to step into the doctrine of Election and Reprobation untill we deal with those in whom we manifestly perceive the effects of Election, that is faith and the fruits thereof. S. Augustine to this purpose saith very wisely, [f] *It is good that some truth be concealed, for their sakes who are uncapable thereof.* Whence that of the Apostle, [g] *I could not speak unto you as unto spirituall, but as unto carnall.*

[f] De Persev. lib. 2. c. 16. *Utile est ut taceatur aliquod verum propter incapaces.*
[g] 1. Cor. 3. 1.

2. Secondly, those do abuse this most true doctrine, who when they explain it unto the people do wander into such questions as through their too much subtiltie do exceed the vulgar capacitie, and are more fit for the Schools

schools then the pulpit; yea indeed unfit even in the Schools to be meddled withall, if the importunity of our adversaries and the neffity of mainteining our own cause did not sometimes drive us even against our wills to these nice speculations. Such are the discussions which are made by Divines about the signes of Priority & Posteriority in the eternall decrees of God, with great labour and little profit. Some affirm that the first decree in the Divine understanding and will was of sending the Redeemer; & then another, of saving the Elect by this Redeemer. Others hold the contrary way. Yea, so boldly curious have some mortall men been, that when they have laid down the order of the Divine decrees as a thing whereof they had certain knowledge, affirming this to have been the first decree of the Divine will, that the second, another the third, and so on, at length they stick not to avouch, that if God had not observed this very order which they approve of, he should have done either unwisely or unjustly. A wise Minister should wholly abstein from handling these thorny questions: however the businesse never ought to come to that point, that if we fail in these our speculations, any reproch should be fastened upon God himself. The Ministers of the word therefore, as oft as occasion is offered of treating of Predestination

before

before the people, must be content to contein themselves within those bounds which the holy Scripture hath clearly chalked out unto us. Let them teach, how God elected his own unto life eternall before the foundations of the world were laid. Let them teach, how this Election flowed not from the foresight of mans merits, but from the free will and gracious pleasure of God electing. Let them teach, that whatsoever saving good is found in us, is the effect of this free and gracious mercy. Let them teach, that the assurance of our Election is not to be sought in Gods secret decrees or our own idle imaginations, but in the effects and operations of the faithfull and sanctified soul. These and other such doctrines which are clear, sound and profitable, may and ought be preached unto Christians. But those which are either too knotty or else altogether fruitlesse (especially when they are not clearly grounded and revealed in the word of God) ought quite to be excluded out of vulgar congregations. And here I cannot but tax the folly and rashnesse of some (especially young) Preachers, who assoon as they heare any new controversie concerning Predestination started amongst Divines, be it never so intricate, never so unfruitfull, yet presently they acquaint the people with it: This they presse, this they

daily

daily ſtand upon, and think it an argument of great learning to diſcuſſe thoſe points amongſt the unlearned, which their auditours do not at all underſtand. Againſt theſe may we take up that of the ſonne of Sirach, [h] *A fool travelleth with a word as a woman in labour of a child: as an arrow that ſticketh in a mans thigh, ſo is a word in a fools belly.* This abuſe therefore is chiefly to be avoided by the Miniſters of the word; who as they may deliver the ſimple, clear and fundamentall doctrine of Predeſtination with profit and edification to the people of God rightly trained up, ſo can they not run out into intricate queſtions, and curiouſly diſcuſſe both ſides of the controverſie after the manner of the Schools, but by this their ſuperfluous diligence they muſt needs train up their people rather unto curioſity and itch of contention, then unto faith and zeal of a godly life. Yea, what Prudentius ſaid of wrangling ſophiſters may well be applyed unto theſe men;

Fidem minutis diſſecant ambagibus,

They mince the faith into petty circumſtances: Or rather that of the Apoſtle, [i] *They dote* (or, *are ſick*) *about queſtions or ſtrifes of words, whereof cometh envy, ſtrife,* &c.

[h] *Eccles* 19.12.

[i] 1.Tim.6.4

Thirdly, as we do worthily blame thoſe who offend by doing too much, ſtretching this doctrine of Predeſtination to intricate & ſuperfluous queſtions; ſo alſo are they no leſſe 3.

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to be taxed who seem to offend by do
too little, while they propound Predestin
on & Reprobation to the people in the eff
onely or the event, that is, the infallible sa
vation of the Elect, and the infallible d
mnation of the Reprobate; in the mean tim
little regarding, or at least not with the sam
diligence acquainting the people with th
means whereby the Elect are brought unt
salvation, and the means whereby the Re
probates do rush headlong into destruction
whereas indeed it is a dangerous matter t
lay open before the eyes of the vulgar th
naked and bare doctrines of Predestination
and Reprobation. A wise Minister there
fore will never teach the people that some
particular persons are absolutely predestina
ted unto life, but withall he will let them
know that these persons are none other bu
such as by faith and holinesse do walk in the
way to eternall life. He will never teach that
some particular persons were passed-by in
this infallible ordination unto life everlast
ing, but withall he will also shew that these
are none other but they who by their own
voluntary impenitency, infidelity and impie
ty did most deservedly pull upon themselves
eternall destruction. So Paul delivereth this
doctrine of Predestination, Rom. 8. where
having made mention of Predestination, he
presently annexeth thereunto Vocation, Ju
stifi-

fication, Sanctification, without which we ought not so much as to dream of our Predestination, at least we cannot come to any certain evidence thereof. So likewise Ephes. 1. unto the doctrine of Predestination he joyneth Sanctification and other spirituall gifts, which are σημεῖα, manifest tokens, of the predestinate. In like manner the point of Reprobation is so to be unfolded, that all may understand, that although by his speciall mercy God do not free the Reprobates from death, yet he forceth not any unto sin, but they are carried headlong unto their destruction, and that by their own voluntary motion. So Paul in his epistle to the Philippians, when he speaketh of the Reprobate, [k] *whose end is destruction*, he addeth, *whose God is their belly, whose glory is in their shame, who mind earthly things.* So Jude in his epistle speaking of some [l] *who were ordained to condemnation*, he straight addeth, that they were *wicked men who turn the grace of God into lasciviousnesse, and deny the onely Lord God and our Lord Jesus Christ.* It is not therefore the duty of a Minister, so to urge absolute Predestination as in the mean time to forget the means: Because although Gods decree concerning the salvation of this man, suppose Peter or Paul, be absolute, yet the salvation of Peter and of Paul in regard of the event and fulfilling of the decree doth depend upon

[k] Phil. 3. 19

[l] Jude v. 4

on the conditionate use of the means. Neither on the other side is the Reprobation of any particular persons so to be pressed, as though they were infallibly to be damned whatsoever they do: Because the decree of Reprobating some doth not infringe the truth and stedfastnesse of the Evangelicall promises made unto all and every one. For they hold true when they are in generall divulged in this form, *Whosoever believeth shall be saved*: And they hold true also when they are applyed in speciall to any particular person, *If thou believest and leadest an holy life, thou shalt be saved.* To be short, the saying of that most wise and learned Father is very necessary to be observed by all Ministers of the word, who sheweth, [m] That we may speak that which is true concerning the absolute decree of the Divine will to save and reprobate men, and yet not in that due manner in which we ought to speak. For example; If a man should speak to his auditours to this purpose, *Whether ye run or sleep, whether ye receive the word into your hearts or reject it, yet in the conclusion ye shall all be such as God who is invincible decreed ye should be, as God who is infallible foresaw ye would be*, this is indeed a most true doctrine; But because in the manner of propounding it seemeth to separate the end from the means, and to invite

[m] *August. De bono Persev. lib. 2. c. 21.*

vite men to slothfulnesse, in the judgement of S. Augustine [n] *it is so most true that withall it is most wicked, unfoasonable, inconvenient; not that the saying is false, but because it is not wholesomely applied to humane infirmity.* [o] *Now it is the part of a deceitfull or unskilfull physitian so to applie a good plaister that either it shall do no good or do hurt.* And hitherto we have touched upon those abuses whereinto Ministers do sometimes run when they go about to preach unto the people the doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation. We comprised them all (as ye might observe) under three heads: For either they are preposterous, and deliver it to such as are yet uncapable thereof; or else they stretch their discourse beyond that fundamentall and simple doctrine delivered by the Apostle, and run out into intricate and curious speculations farre unfit for the peoples understanding; or lastly they deliver it defectively, barely and abruptly mentioning the infallible end and absolute event predetermined by God on either side, but speaking not a word of the severall means, conditions or wayes whereby those severall ends are attained. But the decree of the divers ends is secret, and concerneth God more properly then men; but the precept about the means is revealed, and belongeth to men rather then to God: This therefore

[n] Ibid. cap. 22. *Nempe hoc verissimum est: id a sane, sed improbissimum, importunissimum, incongruentissimum, non falso eloquio sed non salubriter valetudini humanæ infirmitatis appositio.*

[o] *Dolosi vel imperiti medici est etiam utile medicamentum sic alligare ut aut non prosit aut obsit,* cap. 21.

ought chiefly to be presſed and inculcated by the Miniſters of the word. But from the Preachers let us proceed unto the people.

Now men are wont to abuſe this doctrine of Predeſtination two manner of wayes, either unto preſumption, or unto deſpair. The preſumptuous, when they heare Predeſtination mentioned, as though they could gheſſe what God before the creation of the world determined concerning them, ſtraight without any premiſſes at all they conclude themſelves to be of the number of the predeſtinate. And to this raſh concluſion they annex this profane inference, *Live as I will, ſince I am predeſtinate I ſhall be ſaved.* Thus from raſhly preſuming what they pleaſe they proceed to live licentiouſly as they pleaſe. On the contrary, the deſperate, aſſoon as they underſtand how ſome were elected ſome paſſed by by God before the foundations of the world were laid, preſently conceiting ill of their own caſe they reckon themſelves among the reprobate. And to this blind conjecture they adde this wicked concluſion, *Since I am not of the Elect, wherefore ſhould I trouble my ſelf by hearing Gods word, receiving the Sacraments, mortifying my fleſh, and bringing forth the fruits of new life? for do I what I can I ſhall at length be damned.* Thus theſe by deſpair do fall into the ſame ſlothfulneſſe and neglect

glect of their salvation whereinto the others fell by presumption. Both these abuses ought most sharply to be reproved, and withall the remedies are to be shewn whereby they may be avoided. For the former, those rash presumers are to be admonished, that although *in thesi*, in the generall, it be most certain that God from all eternitie elected some rejected others, yet if we come down to particular persons, it is a secret kept close in Gods own breast, which be those persons that were destinated unto life, which be those who are not comprehended in his gratious decree. It is therefore a very diabolicall temptation which moveth men to dive into the depth of Gods eternall decrees, and from thence to take up a rash perswasion of their Predestination. For the decree of Predestination as it concerneth others is altogether by us unsearchable. Whence that of Prosper, [p] *Let it not much trouble us that we are ignorant who are vessels of Election.* As it concerneth our selves, it is unsearchable also *à priori*, in its causes, and is to be perceived onely by its effects after our conversion and sanctification. Luther most excellently saith, [q] *Of God so farre as*

[p] De lib. arb. *Nè impatienter feramus quòd electionis vasa non novimus.*

[q] In Gen. 26. *De Deo quatenus non est revelatus, nulla est fides, nulla scientia, nulla cognitio. Omitte speculationem de Deo abscondito, si vis effugere blasphemiam Dei. Si credis in Deum revelatum, & recipis verbum ejus, paulatim etiam absconditum Deum tibi revelabit. Altiora te nè quæsieris, & fortiora te nè scrutatus fueris: Audi Filium incarnatum, & sponte se offeret tibi prædestinatio tua.*

he is not revealed there is no faith, no stirring, no knowledge. Leave off to muse of God where he concealeth himself, if thou wouldest avoid being guilty of blasphemy. If thou believest in God revealed and receivest his word, he will also by little and little reveal unto thee God concealed. Seek not after things above thy reach, and search not for what is above thy capacity: Hearken to the Sonne incarnate, and thy Predestination will quickly manifest it self unto thee. Thus Luther. They flatly dote therefore who, as if they were of Gods privie counsel, presume that they can be assured of their Predestination before they have any knowledge of their conversion and justification. The onely remedie for this madnesse is, that as they have been taught out of the word of God that some were elected, some passed by, from all eternity, so they should learn out of the same word, that no man either can or ought absolutely conclude himself to be in the number of the elect before he find himself to be in the number of those who are converted and do truly believe. Thus S. Paul, [1] *The Lord knoweth them that are his. And, Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquitie.* As if he had said, God himself knoweth who are elected by looking into the secret decree of his own will: but thou, O man, whosoever thou art, dost not know that thou art elected but by departing

[1] 2. Tim. 2. 19.

departing from thy course of iniquitie. So saith Peter, [f] *Give diligence to make your calling and election sure.* For though it be most sure and firm in the purpose of God electing, yet there can be no certaintie of the Election of any particular man, but onely of him that doth well. Lastly, Ephes. 1. (where the doctrine of Predestination is professedly handled) the Apostle teacheth both these points, *viz.* That God [g] *chose* his *before the foundation of the world*; and, That we have not the assurance of this Election *sealed* in our hearts till after that we have received the *Gospel* into our hearts and *believed in Christ.* If thou obeyest Gods call, thou mayest rightly conclude that thou wast from all eternitie predestinated: If thou persevere in thy unbelief and impietie, dream thou mayest or surmise that thou art predestinated, know or believe thou canst not. Away therefore with all rash presumption of Predestination, which is never begotten by the right unfolding of this doctrine, but by the foolish imagination of carnall men or the pernitious suggestions of the devil.

[f] 2. Pet. 1. 10.

[g] Ephes. 1. 4.

v. 13.

Now let us weigh the inference which such presumptuous men do use to make: *Live as I will*, say they, *since I am predestinated I shall be saved.* I will not further stand to examine the rashnesse of this presumpti-

on, having spoken sufficiently thereof already. Let it be granted that such an one is indeed predestinated, yet nothing can be more wicked, nothing more foolish, nothing more false then this conclusion.

1. First, it is a certain token of a wicked wretch, not of an elected person, to take occasion of sinning from that which should have encouraged him to holinesse of life. He who saith in his heart, *I am predestinated*, what saith he else but this, *God out of his meer good pleasure hath ordained me to eternall life* but he who hence doth gather, *Therefore I may live as I list*, what saith he but this, *Therefore I may of set purpose run headlong towards hell?* But how can he who is not more wicked then Wickednesse it self reason thus, *Because I believe that God was thus specially gratious towards me, therefore I will shew my self exceedingly unthankfull towards him: Because God hath decreed to bring me to the kingdome of heaven, therefore I will trie if I can maugre his decree cast my self into the pit of hell.?* Profane and godlesse men, who turn the grace of God into wantonnesse, may sometimes perhaps out of a conceited opinion of their Predestination fall into this desperate madnesse: But for a truly regenerate and faithfull man, whose heart is assured by the holy Ghost that he is the sonne of God and ordained from all eternitie to

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the participation of the kingdome of heaven, it is as impossible that he from the sense and perswasion of his Predestination should draw this wicked conclusion, as for wood to be cold in the middle of the fire, or the aire to be dark when the sun-beams are diffused through it. u *Every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself*, saith the Apostle. Therefore they that defile themselves with all manner of lusts, come farre short of a true perswasion of their being elected. u 1. John 3. 3.

2. Secondly, nothing is more foolish then the foresaid inference. For as it is an argument of wisdome to choose and use fit and proper means for the obteining of the appointed end; so it is the height of folly, from the appointment of the end to inferre a refusing or neglect of the means. We will explain this by some speciall examples. God had decreed from eternitie, and moreover revealed unto Abraham, that in his seed all nations should be blessed. Now suppose that Abraham presuming upon this decree had resolved wholly to abstein from the company of Sarai his wife, and had thus reasoned with himself, *Whatsoever I do or not do, God will take care for the accomplishment of his own decree*; it would be hard to say whether such reasoning were more guiltie of folly or of wickednesse. In like manner, if Ezekiah, after notice of Gods decree

decree to prolong his life fifteen years should thereupon have determined with himself from thence forward neither to eat nor drink nor do any thing else that is ordained for the preservation of mans life, who could excuse him from extreme madnesse? Accordingly, should we grant that such a particular man were elected by God unto life eternall; should we further grant the same man to have certain knowledge of his Election, not by faith onely and the secret testimonie of the Spirit, but by the voice of God himself clearly sounding from heaven; yet after such an extraordinary revelation of his Election to neglect the means leading to salvation, and supinely to expect by power of the Divine decree to be drawn to the use of them whether he will or no, would be a manifest argument not of an elected but of a brainlesse person.

3. Thirdly, nothing is more false then this manner of reasoning, *I am predestinated, Therefore whether I believe or not believe, whether I live well or ill, I shall be saved.* For although the Predestination of a man being granted, his salvation must necessarily follow, yet it followeth not upon every condition. For example; That Paul was elected to salvation from all eternity, is most true: yet if any should argue thus, *Therefore whether he had been converted unto Christ or had per-*

persevered in his blasphemy against him, he had been saved, he would inferre a most false conclusion. For if these reasonings were true, the preaching of the Gospel would be in vain, the administration of the Sacraments superfluous, our conversion, justification, sanctification idle and frivolous: for Predestination alone would carry a man to heaven whether he would or no. But such dreams as these are to be avoided: For the decree of Predestination about the end to be obteined doth not exclude but include the means and ordinary way whereby men tend to that end. This conditionall proposition therefore, *Although Paul continue in unbelief, he shall be saved*, is so farre from following upon the doctrine of Predestination, that the contradictory thereof may thence be deduced, namely, *If Paul believe not, it is impossible he should be saved.* The reason is manifest: Because the same God who decreed to save Paul, decreed to save him by faith, not by impenitence and unbelief. This may very well be illustrated by that purpose of God to save all those from shipwrack who sailed together with S. Paul towards Rome: For though God had infallibly decreed to deliver all these men, and by an [a] angel had revealed this his decree unto Paul, yet the Apostle cryeth out, [b] *Except the mariners abide in the ship, they cannot be saved.* The same say we con-

[a] Acts 27. 24.
[b] v. 31.

concerning the Predeſtination of any par-
cular perſons unto life eternall: Altho
it be infallibly decreed by God, although
beclearly evidenced to the perſons them-
ſelves, yet can they not bee ſaved excep
they abide in faith and godlineſſe. The do-
ctrine of Predeſtination therefore permit-
teth not any man to perſwade himſelf tha
his ſalvation is certain before he find tha
he is truly converted, truly faithfull, truly
ſanctified. Much leſſe doth it permit men
to preſume, that following their luſts and
living wickedly, they may nevertheleſſe at-
tein the kingdome of heaven. And thus
much concerning the former abuſe.

Now let us come to them who from the
doctrine of Predeſtination take occaſion to
deſpair, and conclude from thence, that al-
though they believe in Chriſt, and lead
their lives never ſo holily, notwithſtanding
by reaſon of the infallibility of the Divine
decree they ſhall at length be damned. Firſt
let us conſider how ill theſe mens perſwaſi-
on of their Reprobation is grounded: Se-
condly, what an ill conſequence this is, That
though they believe and follow good works
yet their damnation is certain. For the firſt,
I would fain know what argument of de-
ſpair any Chriſtian can draw from this do-
ctrine, That God before the foundations of
the world were laid did paſſe thoſe decrees

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of Predestination and Reprobation in the secret counsel of his own will. For first even reason it self forbiddeth us in matters whereof we are altogether ignorant to determine any thing on either side: Now what God did before the creation of the world is a point so deep and unsearchable, that to go about by conjecture to dive into it is even as if man a poore earthworm should attempt to scale heaven with a ladder. Here we may well take up that Exod. 19. 12. *Take heed to your selves that ye go not up into the mount or touch the border of it: whosoever toucheth the mount, shall be surely put to death.* Hilary saith very well, 2. *We are to pry no further into the Divine reason then it hath pleased to reveal it self to our understanding.* Now this it giveth us to understand, that some were elected, some reprobated: but who are elected who reprobated, it suffereth us not to know. But further, though any man were so rash and heady as that he could not moderate himself, but must needs peep beyond the written word into these eternall and hidden actions of God, yet from these his most uncertain conjectures to prescribe himself a rule what to do or not do, were madnesse void of all reason. For let us put case, that a battel were to be waged between two armies, and God by some Prophet had revealed that the farre greater part of the souldiers should perish in the fight, and

2 De Trin. lib. 10. *Ratio calestis in tantum intelligenda est in quantum se permittit intelligi.*

and the lesser part should escape, without mentioning what particular persons he will by his speciall favour preserve from death or suffer to be slain, I demand now, whether any man by occasion of the Divine will thus farre revealed would needs before the combat reckon himself in particular to be one of the number of those who must certainly perish, and hereupon out of a desperate humour throw down his weapons, run upon the enemies swords, and voluntarily offer himself to be slain; I demand, I say, whether this wretch should rather be thought to be driven into this despair by the Divine revelation or by his own madnesse. Without doubt he may blame himself for taking occasion (where no just one was given) from the foresaid revelation. The very same we may think of those who from the doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation set forth in generall do take occasion to thrust themselves into the number of those that are reprobated and shall certainly perish, and thereupon to neglect their spirituall armour, to offer their throat to the devil, and wilfully to plunge themselves into the pit of hell. [a] *A man ought not to despair*, saith S. Augustine in a certain place, *of the salvation of any one whom the patience of God doth suffer to live, least of all of his own. This deadly conclusion there-*

[a] *De nullius hominis salute desperandum quem Dei patientia sinit vivere; de suipsius minimè omnium. Tanquam caput igitur omnis noxiæ tentationis repellatur ab animo Christiani hæc mortifera conclusio, Sum ex reprobatis.*

fore

fore, I AM ONE OF THE REPROBATES, *ought to be repelled by every Christian as the most dangerous temptation of all other.* Lastly, although (as we touched formerly) before true conversion and sanctification no man can obtein either any certaintie of his Election or any true feeling and lively comfort, yet the doctrine of eternall Election doth not afford to a Christian any probable conjecture whence he may gather that himself in particular is one of the non-elect: yea rather any one that liveth within the pale of the Church, although yet unconverted, may learn so much from thence as may and ought move him rather to conceive himself to be one of those whom God from all eternitie elected to everlasting life. It is a commonly received rule amongst Divines, *De quolibet homine præsumendum est bonum donec constet contrarium*, We ought to hope well of every one untill we know the contrary. If we ought not out of conjecture to conclude any thing amisse of others, then ought we not of our selves. But let us see now how many reasons there be which may keep a Christian from thus despairing. If thou art a Christian, thou hast God by the Gospel calling thee; thou hast the Sonne of God in the Gospel offered unto thee, and together with him remission of sinnes and life eternall; thou hast the Spirit of

of God ſtanding and knocking at the doore of thy heart; thou haſt many other things, which though they be not ſufficient to demonſtrate infallibly to a man that he is elected while yet he believeth not and remaineth unſanctified, yet they ought abundantly to demonſtrate thus much to any man, that he neither can nor ought have any preconceit that he is reprobated. But they obiect, *God indeed doth offer the outward means unto me, but ſince I am none of his elect, he will never impart unto me the pretious gift of faith.* How knoweſt thou that? Ask thou faith of God, and uſe diligently the means ordained for the begetting of faith, and thou maiſt be confident that thou art neither ſhut out of Gods Predeſtination nor ſhalt finally be kept deſtitute of the gift of faith. But if any do ſo ſtiffly perſwade himſelf that he is a reprobate as withall to caſt off all care of his ſalvation, he hath enterteined this perſwaſion into his breaſt without all reaſon, and he neglecteth the means againſt all religion. But this doctrine of Predeſtination and Reprobation is no more to be concealed or relinquiſhed becauſe ſuch as theſe do thus waiwardly abuſe it, then the doctrine of the Trinitie is becauſe the Jews and Mahometanes deride and reject it.

Having therefore confuted this raſh and impious perſwaſion, let us examine a little the

the conclusion which they infer from it, viz. That although they do believe the Gospel, and live never so holily, yet for all that they shall be damned, by reason of the infallible decree of the Divine will. I answer, There was never in the Divine will any such decree as these men imagine, of damning any man though he should believe and live righteously. Yea, God hath established and published unto all men a quite contrary decree, That[b] *whosoever believeth in his Sonne shall not perish but have everlasting life.* And, That [c] *there is no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit.* The doctrine therefore of Gods secret decree of Predestination and Reprobation can afford no comfort to any man before he knoweth that he is in Christ and is become a new creature: neither can it drive any man to despair who believeth the Gospel and is carefull to lead a godly life; because such a care is a consequent fruit of Election. Whence S. Augustine,[d] *From your godly and upright course of life ye may conclude that ye do belong to Gods gratious Election.* The summe of what we have said is this; That the doctrine of eternall Predestination and Reprobation is true, and *quoad thesin*, in the generall, clearly delivered in the Scriptures: yet as it hath respect unto particular persons elected or reprobated, it is a most

[b] *John* 3. 16.

[c] *Rom.* 8. 1.

[d] De bono persever. c. 23 *De ipso cursu vestro bono rectóq; condiscite vos ad prædestinationem Divinæ gratiæ pertinere.*

unsearchable mystery; which to go about by curious search or mere conjectures to pry into, is both extremely fooliſh and wicked. We muſt alwayes therefore have recourſe to the word revealed, the which when we believe and obey, we do ſafely draw out from thence this comfortable concluſion *à poſteriori*, from the effects, That we are Gods choſen children: But as long as we abide in infidelity and unconverted, it is folly to preſume we are elected, madneſſe to conclude we are reprobated, whereas the will of God hath as yet by no externall effect evidently manifeſted it ſelf unto us on either ſide. Hitherto of the abuſes of this doctrine: Now let us proceed to ſhew the uſes thereof.

Here in the firſt place I premiſe this, That they are in no wiſe to be hearkned unto who conceive that this doctrine of Election and Reprobation ought therefore to be quite buried in ſilence, becauſe profane and wayward men do abuſe it either to preſumption and licentiouſneſſe or to deſpair and rechleſneſſe. If the former cautions be obſerved, That we neither deliver it unſeaſonably to thoſe that are uncapable, nor immoderately ſtretch it to curious ſpeculations, nor propound it to the people by halves and defectively, then it is clear and evident that this doctrine ought to be preached. Firſt, becauſe

becauſe Chriſt and his Apoſtles taught it publickly, notwithſtanding the wickedneſſe of carnall men: And it is farre ſafer from their example to learn what is profitable to be taught and what not, then from humane reaſonings. Secondly, becauſe Election is a ſingular benefit of God, and the foundation of all other gifts which tend to ſalvation: And it is the part of unthankfull men to deſire to conceal ſuch an eſpeciall favour becauſe wicked and ungodly men are troubled to heare of it. Laſtly, becauſe this very doctrine doth exceedingly encourage the faithfull and godly to proceed in their courſe of faith and godlineſſe, of whom more regard ought to be had then of profane wretches who are wont to pervert all things to their own deſtruction. For we ought not ſo much to fear leſt thoſe who have no mind to embrace the truth ſhould be offended at our doctrine, as leſt while we conceal the truth of this myſtery ſuch as both are able and willing profitably to lay hold on it, ſhould in the mean time be ſurprized with errour. But now let us addreſſe our ſelves to unfold the uſes of this doctrine.

In the firſt place it ſerveth to illuſtrate many of Gods Attributes, and exceedingly manifeſteth thoſe Divine properties which every Chriſtian ought rightly to know and 1.

acknowledge, and which they who impugne this doctrine can never acknowledge as is meet. I will briefly run over some of the chief of them. First, Gods infallible and eternall Prescience of contingent events and of all the actions of free agents, is such a property as by granting or denying whereof we grant or deny a Deity. Wherefore Isai. 44. 7. God doth challenge the foreknowledge of future events to himself alone, and denieth it to all the gods of the heathen. Now this Prescience is so linked together with the doctrine of Predestination, that he who granteth or denieth either must needs by consequence grant or deny both. Further, an absolute Dominion and Sovereignty over all the creatures and their actions, especially over the wills and actions of men, is so proper unto God, that he is not to be held for a God who cannot bend and incline the wills of men which way he please, and that without any violence offered to their naturall freedome. But if we reject the doctrine of absolute Predestination, we must withall of necessity abbridge God of his absolute power over the wills of men. It is therefore no small use that we make of this doctrine, when we learn from thence that God hath an omnipotent power of turning the hearts of men which way he please. Moreover, the Immutability of the Divine

Divine will is held to be another of Gods principall attributes. *The Lord of hosts hath purposed, and who shall disannull it?* Isai. 14. 27. *I am the Lord, I change not*, Mal. 3. 6. Now what is Predestination but the eternall decree of this unchangeable will of God? For τὸ ἀμετάθετον τῆς βουλῆς αὐτοῦ, *the immutability of his counsel*, is seen in nothing so clearly as in it. Lastly, we ought to acknowledge and admire in God a free and gracious Mercy altogether undeserved on the creatures part: and this attribute also doth shine so clear in the doctrine of Predestination, that those who go about to deny or obscure it must withall be guilty of denying or obscuring this mere and free mercy of God shewed in the salvation of man. If therefore we mean not to coyn a new God, we must not introduce a new Predestination, but retein that which the holy Scripture hath delivered unto us. Let us look a little on Arminius and his followers. These men reteining the bare name of Predestinatiõ, have indeed brought in a Postdestination; yea under the empty title of Predestination they understand nothing else but such a purpose in God to bring the faithfull unto the kingdome of heaven and to shut out the unbelievers, as was then onely conceived by him, as it hath reference to particular persons, when he foresaw that they would persevere unto the end either in

faith or in unbelief. Now it is worth our pains to consider how these men handle the foresaid Divine attributes. Vorstius being [c] loth to admit of such a Predestination as agreeth with Gods nature, hath shaped out a nature for God sutable to that Predestination which he dreamed of. Hereupon he questioneth all those forementioned Divine attributes. The universall Prescience he hotly opposeth under the person of others, not answering any thing to the objections alledged; but for the arguments of the orthodox side, these he confuteth with might and main, or at least endeavoureth to confute them. We will give you a taste of the man.

[c] Not. ad Disp. de Deo, pag. 328. &c.

[f] Pag. 329. *Infallibilis & prorsus universalis omnium futurorum præscientia nulli usui est in Deo.*

[f] *An infallible and universall foreknowledge*, saith he, *of all future events is of no use at all in God.*

[g] Pag. 330. *Admissâ hâc præscientiâ universali & prorsus infallibili, necesse est multa Scripturæ loca mirabilibus glossis torquere.*

[g] *This universall and absolute prescience being admitted, many places of Scripture must needs be wrested by strange glosses.* And again,

[h] Pag. 331. *Absit ut Deo vel hypocrisin, vel temeritatem atque imprudentiam ejusmodi attribuamus cujusmodi per infallibilem illam omnium futurorum prænotionem induci omnino videtur.*

[h] *God forbid that we should attribute unto God any such either hypocrisie, or rashnesse, or folly, as by this infallible foreknowledge of all future things seemeth necessarily to be fastened upon him.* Now let us heare whether he conceive any better of Gods Sovereignty over the wills of men.

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[i] *God would have virtuous habits to be in us, and good actions to be done by us freely and contingently: Therefore this will of God can import no more power or efficacy then agreeth with the nature of a bare wish or desire.* And else-where he affirmeth that [k] God *doth procure our conversion, holinesse, and perseverance, yet so as that he is rather to be conceived to wish and desire it, then to necessitate or absolutely & irresistibly to effect it.* Hence floweth that common doctrine of the Arminians, * *When the Divine grace hath done all that it useth to do for the conversion of a man, yet still his conversion is so farre in his own power, that he may choose whether he will be converted or no.* Yea further, since they are of opinion that the will of God cannot bear such sway over mans as to incline it which way it please without prejudice to the libertie thereof, therefore they avouch [l] that *God did never absolutely will or peremptorily intend the conversion of any man.* Neither can the Immutabilitie of the Divine will escape being violated by these impugners of absolute Predestination. For hereupon doth Vorstius take upon him thus to censure our Divines,

[i] Amica Duplic. ad Jo. Pisc. pag. 55. *Virtutes & bona opera liberè prorsus & contingenter in nobis esse aut à nobis fieri vult: eóque potentiùs aut efficaciùs ea ipsa quàm per modum voti aut desiderii velle non potest.*

[k] Vor. ad disp. de Deo pag. 355.

* *Positis omnibus gratiæ Divinæ operationibus quibus Deus utitur ad conversionem humanam, manet tamen ipsa conversio ità in hominis potestate, ut converti possit vel non possit.*

[l] Corvin. ad Bogerman. pag. 203.

[m] Nor. pag. 195. *Non satis circumspectè loquuntur qui Deum ut essentiâ sic etiam voluntate prorsus immutabilem esse affirmant. Voluntas Dei ad extra non minùs in Deo quàm in Angelis & hominibus ad opposita vertibilis.*

[n] Pag. 371. *Nihil absurdi ex eo sequitur quòd Deus in tempore quædam præcisè velle vel nolle dicitur quæ fortassis antea non ità præcisè voluit vel noluit.*

[o] Pag. 486. *Pœnitentia rectè Deo convenit, quatenus ipsa ei era sua propter supervenientem aliquam causam insperatam verè improbat, deserit, aut mutat.*

[m] *They speak but unadvisedly who affirm that God is absolutely immutable as well in his will as in his essence. The will of God* ad extra, *as it respecteth the creatures, is no lesse alterable then the will of angels and men.* [n] *It is no absurd assertion to say that God did in time precisely and determinately will or not will some things which perhaps before he did not so precisely will or not will.* But in another place he hath a speach that savoureth of most rank blasphemy; [o] *God may properly be said to repent, in as much as by reason of something intervening contrary to his expectation he doth truly find fault with, give over, or alter his own actions.* Moreover, those men do flatly overturn Gods free Mercy who disallow absolute Predestination, and will have it to depend upon the foreseen actions of men. For it is not an act of mere mercy to ordain any man to salvation onely upon foresight that he who is thus ordained will rightly use the freedome of his will. Hence S. Augustine saith, That Predestination is to be preached to the end [p] *that Gods true grace may have an invincible bulwork to defend it.* It is manifest therefore that this

[p] De bono persever. c. 21. *ut possit vera Dei gratia insuperabili munitione defendi.*

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is one speciall use of the doctrine of Predestination, To learn from thence to conceive aright of the Divine attributes, which they who reject it cannot possibly do. Wherefore it is much to be feared, lest those who disallowing S. Pauls Predestination embrace that of Arminius, will at length also like well of Vorstius his God, hewed out and squared for the most part by the rule of Arminius his Predestination. Thus much of the first use of this doctrine.

Secondly, the doctrine of Predestination doth serve to kindle in the hearts of the faithfull a most ardent love towards God. For what more effectuall motive can there be to move a man unto love then to be prevented by the love and bounty of another. Now onely the orthodox doctrine of Predestination doth stirre-up this love in the hearts of the elect, because it alone doth teach that God did freely love them from all eternity, and of his speciall favour loaded them with his gratious benefits. On the contrary, the doctrine of Arminius sheweth us how by believing and persevering in obedience men did first choose God before they were chosen by him, and did first ingage God by their singular obedience before they were by him endowed with any speciall favours. That this fruit doth spring from the sense of our Election, Bernard hath observed; 2.

ved; ¶ *Who is righteous, but he who requiteth the love of God with love again? Which is never done except the holy Ghost reveal unto a man by faith Gods eternall purpose concerning his future salvation.*

¶ *Justus quis est nisi qui amanti se Deo vicem rependit amorem? quod non fit nisi revelante Spiritu per fidem homini aeternum Dei propositum super sua salute futura*, Epist. 107.

3. Thirdly, this doctrine is a great spurre and encouragement to the study of true godlinesse unto all those who are affected with a lively sense of their Election. For as soon as the heart of a man beginneth to glow with the love of God, presently he hath an ardent desire of glorifying God by his good works and of testifying his thankfulnesse. Howsoever therefore sometimes those that prattle much of their Predestination are negligent & sluggish, yet such as have obteined a true and lively sense thereof are fervent and zealous of good works. Neither indeed can it be otherwise: For no man can by the evidence of faith and testimony of the Spirit apprehend that he is elected, but withall he must apprehend thus much, that he is elected to the end he may be holy and unblameable before God through love; that he is created anew unto good works, which God hath prepared for him that he should walk in them; in a word, that he is ordained as well unto the works of grace as to the reward of glory. But he abhorreth and repelleth farre from him that profane cogitation, *I am predestinated; therefore I may live as I list.*

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The fourth use of this doctrine is this, 4.
That it is a speciall means to beat down the pride of man, and to beget in him true humility. For whereas it is the nature of man to desire ever to have something in himself, though never so small, whereby he may seem to have deserved Gods favour before others, or at least by merit of congruity to have obteined it; this doctrine telleth us roundly, that whatsoever good any of us either hath or can, it all proceedeth from the speciall and free bounty of God. What man therefore can boast of his own strength who is forced to acknowledge that all the good that is in him hath God for its authour, conserver and finisher, and that out of his speciall good purpose and love? What man can choose but think meanly of himself, and humble himself before God, who is perswaded that no man, though indued with angelicall perfection, can ever attein life everlasting but by virtue of Gods Predestination? Whence S. Augustine upon that of the Psalmist, [r] *Shew us thy mercy, O Lord*, saith thus, *Happy is the man to whom God sheweth his mercy: He can in no wise be lifted up with pride to whom God sheweth his mercy. For by shewing his mercy unto him, he perswadeth him that whatsoever good he hath, he hath it from none but him who is our universall good. And when he considereth that he hath all that he enjoyeth*

[r] *Psalm.* 85. 7.

joyeth not from himself but from his God, considering hereof he waxeth not proud, not waxing proud he is not lifted up, not being lifted up he falleth not, not falling he standeth, standing he adhereth unto, adhering unto he abideth in, abiding in he enjoyeth and rejoyceth in the Lord his God. Thus Saint Augustine. And more briefly in another place, [f] *This decree of God of bestowing his benefits ought to be declared, that he that hath ears to heare may not glory in himself but in the Lord.* This use of Predestination the Apostle himself intimateth in those words, Ephes. 1. 6. *He hath predestinated us to the praise of the glory of his grace.*

[f] De bono persev. lib. 2. c. 20. *Prædicanda est prædestinatio ista beneficiorum Dei, ut qui habet aures audiendi, non in seipso sed in Domino gloretur.*

5. Fifthly, this orthodox doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation doth arm the faithfull against diffidence, and against all the temptations and assaults of Satan whereby he laboureth to throw them into despair. This use of this doctrine our Saviour himself and his Apostles have in divers places commended unto us. Luke 12.32. *Fear not, little flock: for it is your Fathers good pleasure to give you the kingdome.* The same scope had the Apostle Rom. 8. where having laid down the doctrine of Predestination, he straight endeavoureth from thence to encourage the godly and faithfull against whatsoever any wayes may molest and trouble them, and draw them into distrust or any danger. For what else do those comfortable

ble speaches breath out, *If God be for us, who can be against us?* vers. 31. *Who shall lay any thing to the charge of Gods elect?* vers. 33. *Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?* vers. 35. *In all these things we are more then conquerers through him that loved us. For I am perswaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels,— nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord,* vers. 37. &c.? This therefore is the most true and wholesome use of our Predestination, not to feed our minds with the idle speculation thereof, but to sustein, refresh and strengthen them with firm hope and faith, when they labour and grone and are discouraged under the pressures of the world, the infirmities of the flesh, and the assaults of the devil. I am not ignorant that the ancient Pelagians and some late adversaries of absolute Predestination do reason farre otherwise with themselves; namely on this manner, If Predestination and Reprobation depend upon the acts of our free-will; if grace be tendred promiscuously unto all men, and it be left to our choice whether we will believe or not believe, persevere or not persevere, then let us take good courage: for since our will is mistresse of her own actions, no man can fall short of salvation unlesse he will. But then we must needs despair, when our salvation

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is wholly grounded upon the secret pleasure of God, not upon our own free-will. Here we may well cry out with the Psalmist, [t] *Surely men of low degree are vanity, and men of high degree are a lie; to be laid in the balance they are altogether lighter then vanity.* If thy salvation depended upon thine own will, then thou supposest thou shouldest rightly use the grace offered unto thee, and at length attein unto the kingdome of heaven. What Adam in his integrity did not, what the Angels placed in heaven and endued with heavenly perfections did not, when they were left unto their own liberty, that thou frail man, though overwhelmed with sinne and battered continually with temptations, presumest thou shouldest be able to do if the Divine Predestination were quite removed, and the businesse wholly left in thy power. On the other side thou complainest that by this doctrine thou art driven to despair, because it placeth the whole œconomie of mans salvation in Gods free pleasure: As though then there were no remedy but men must despair when they are commanded to put all their confidence in God alone. But whatsoever hope the proud Pelagian can build upon the power of his own free-will, which is none at all, that and more can the righteous build upon the alone mercy of God, which is infinite. I demand

[t] Psalm. 62. 9.

mand of them therefore with S. Augustine, *Whether there is any fear that a man should then despair of himself when he is told that he must place his hope in God, and not rather that he should despair when out of a wretched pride he placeth it in himself.* What difference therefore there is in respect of true and solid confidence, betwixt those who will needs rely upon their own will excited by Gods grace and then left to its liberty, and those who depend wholly on the grace of Predestination unavoidably and invincibly working upon and ruling the wills of the Elect, we may learn of the same Father in his book *De corrept. & grat.* chap. 11, 12, 13. Notwithstanding therefore all the calumnies of the Pelagians we avouch, that this is one speciall use of the orthodox doctrine of our Churches concerning Predestination, that by the shield of faith relying upon Gods eternall and unchangeable good will towards us we arm and protect our selves against despair and the fiery darts of the devil.

[u] *De bono persev. lib. 2. cap. 22. An timendum est nè tunc de se homo desperet quando spes ejus ponenda demonstratur in Deo, non autem desperaret si eam in seipso superbissimus & infelicissimus poneret.*

Sixthly, the consideration of Election doth stirre up the faithfull to constancie in prayer. For having learned that all good tending to salvation is prepared for them out of Gods good pleasure, they are hereby encouraged to call for and as it were to draw down from heaven by their prayers those good things which from eternitie were

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were ordained for the elect. For they know well, that prayer is the key of heaven, and that God doth not use to bestow his saving graces upon lazie sluggards, but upon such as duly seek after them. Moreover, the same Spirit of Adoption which beareth witnesse to our spirit that we are Gods chosen children, is also the Spirit of Prayer and Supplication, and enflameth our hearts to call daily upon our heavenly Father. Those therefore who from the certaintie of their Predestination do pretend that the duty of prayer is superfluous, do plainly shew that they are so farre from having any certaintie of their Predestination that they have not the least sense thereof. Aquinas speaketh very learnedly and soundly, [x] *The Elect ought to labour in good works and in prayer: for hereby their Election is ascertained and accomplished.* [y] *For as naturall effects, though foreseen by God, yet are brought into act by naturall causes, without which they cannot come to passe; so the salvation of the Elect being decreed by God, whatsoever furthereth the same falleth under the same decree, as prayer, care to live godlily, and the like, without which the salvation of the Elect will never be accomplished.* By how much therefore the firmlier any man is perswaded in his heart of his Predestination, so much the greater ought his care to be of praying frequently unto God. For example;

[x] Part. 1. qu. 23. art. 8. *Prædestinatis conandum est ad bene operandum & orandum, quia per hujusmodi prædestinationis effectus certitudinaliter impletur.*

[y] Idem, ibid.

example; There was never any who more strongly urged the doctrine of absolute Predestination, never any who had more clear apprehension of his own Election, then the Apostle S. Paul, and yet this doctrine and apprehension did not (as the Pelagians falsely affirm) withhold him from prayer, but made him more vehement and frequent in that duty. The same may we say of James, who is styled the brother of the Lord. Without doubt he (if ever any other) had a most firm perswasion of the love of God and of his own Election, yet (as [z] Eusebius recordeth) so did he wont himself to daily prayers, that his knees became hard and brawnie like the feet of a camel. To be slack and sluggish therefore in prayer is not the propertie of those who by the testimony of Gods Spirit have got assurance of their Election, but rather of such as have either none or very small apprehension thereof. For assoon as any one by believing doth conceive himself to be one of Gods elect children, he earnestly desireth to procure unto himself by prayer those good things which he believeth that God prepared for his children before the foundation of the world.

[z] Hist. Eccles. lib. 2. c. 23.

7. Lastly, it is manifest that when the doctrine of Predestination is rooted in our hearts, it doth exceedingly enable us pati-

ently and meekly to sustein all adversitie. Neither is this use lightly to be esteemed, seeing that Patience, as Tertullian [a] saith, is *a grace so necessary in all religious duties, that he that wanteth it can neither keep any commandment, nor perform any work acceptable to the Lord.* Now the consideration of Predestination doth work patience in the Elect three manner of wayes. First, because from thence they conceive certain hope that their momentanie afflictions being ended they shall infallibly attein life everlasting. Now what man into whose breast this perswasion is entred, that he was elected to life eternall before the creation of the world, can be of so low and cowardly a spirit as to be moved to impatience by the crosses & troubles of this temporall life? The Apostle encouraged herewith crieth out thus in the midst of his adversitie, [b] That *the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us.* Holy Prosper, a disciple of S. Paul, susteineth himself with the same prop; [c] *I weigh*, saith he, *what I suffer with what I hope for, and my hopes do incomparably exceed all my sufferings.* Again, the Apostle Heb. 10. 34. alledgeth the knowledge that the saints had of being elected to eternall life as a speciall cause of their patience in enduring afflictions: *Ye had compassion of me in my bonds, and took joyfully the*

[a] De patient.

[b] Rom. 8. 18

[c] In Sent. *Appendo quod patior contra id quod spero, & incomparabiliter majus est quod speratur quàm quod infertur.*

the spoiling of your goods, knowing your selves that ye have in heaven a better and enduring substance. As though he had said, Those onely do patiently endure the losse of these earthly goods who know that there be heavenly goods appointed and prepared for them. Secondly, the consideration of Predestination doth wonderfully conduce to the begetting of patience in the minds of the faithfull, because whosoever understandeth this doctrine aright, understandeth withall that he was elected not straight to be carried into heaven on a bed of down, but to become conformable unto the Head of the Elect Christ Jesus as well in the crosse as in the crown, and first in the crosse, after in the crown. For so saith the Apostle, [d] *If so be that we suffer with him, we shall be also glorified together.* And S. Peter, [e] *Rejoyce in as much as ye are partakers of Christs sufferings, that when his glory shall be revealed ye may be glad also with exceeding joy.* Afflictions therefore do not onely not tire the patience of the Elect, but they beget within them a secret and spirituall joy. For being afflicted they rejoyce, and *embrace their sufferings like reliques consecrated by the touch of Christ.* And from this their conformitie with Christ here in suffering the miseries of this life they do assuredly gather their conformitie with him hereafter in the fruition

[d] *Rom.* 8. 17

[e] 1. *Pet.* 4. 13.

Luther.

tion of everlasting joyes; according to that of Gregorie, [f] *The more grievous and heavie my pressures are for the present, the greater is my certaintie of future joyes.* Hence not patience alone but joy also in afflictions doth spring up unto the predestinate. Thirdly, by the doctrine of Predestination the faithfull are trained up unto patience, because from thence they learn that all crosses and troubles fall out unto them not by chance but by Gods determinate appointment, not according to the fury of the wicked but according to the will of their Father, lastly, not for their hurt but for their advantage. No man hath throughly learned the doctrine of Predestination but he also acknowledgeth all this: and no man is firmly perswaded of this, but he patiently endureth whatsoever misfortunes can befall him. But if at any time any impatience be found in the breast of the faithfull, it is because they either not sufficiently believe or not attentively consider this most comfortable doctrine of Predestination. For if this perswasion be rooted in our hearts, That no man can do any thing against us but what the *counsel of God determined before to be done*, we shall never impatiently grumble because God doth not alter his eternall decrees that so we might escape our momentany evils. Further, if this also be added, That the wicked

[f] Moral. 1. 4. *Quò malùm præsentibus durius deprimor, eò de futuris gaudia certiùs præsume.*

Acts 4. 28.

ked are onely as rods in the hand of God, and cannot scourge us as much and as long as they please, but as much and as long as seemeth good unto God our heavenly Father, who will not meekly suffer himself to be chastised by the powerfull hand of so gratious a Father? Lastly, if we take-in this also, That those very things which seem hard and sharp to be suffered do undoubtedly work together for our good, who would take I will not say impatiently but unwillingly a potion which, though bitter, yet is tempered and prepared for him by so wise, so loving a Physician?

And thus you see how many excellent uses do flow from the orthodox doctrine of Predestination. What remaineth shall be dispatched in a word or two. If we will shew that we have not a fleeting or uncertain conjecture onely, but a true and solid knowledge of our Election, we must have recourse to the forenamed uses, and by them make triall whether our conceit of our Election be a deceitfull illusion or a true perswasion springing from faith. We are to account it false and deceitfull if it prove idle and unprofitable, much more if we find it to be the pernicious mother of presumption: But if it hath taught us to conceive worthily of God, if it hath enflamed our hearts with the love of him, if it hath kindled in us a zeal of

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FINIS.